Do asymmetries matter for European monetary policy?

In this paper we analyze the impact of economic and institutional (ECB decision rules) asymmetries on the effectiveness of monetary policy in Euroland. We consider a model where asymmetric shocks and divergent propagation of shocks in output and inflation are potential causes of tensions within the ECB concerning the conduct of common monetary (interest rate) policy. Welfare implications of the alternative decision procedures are discussed.     

National information and euro area monetary policy: a generalized ordered choice approach

We empirically analyze the influence of inflationary pressure originating from persistent national misalignments on the ECB’s interest rate decisions between 2000 and mid-2010. To do so, we introduce an indicator that summarizes the threat to euro area price stability originating from self-reinforcing expected inflation differentials. The indicator is computed based on persistent deviations of national expected inflation and GDP growth rates from the corresponding euro area aggregate. It thereby captures area-wide excess demand pressure on the euro area inflation rate. In order to determine the information content of this indicator, we add it to an empirical monetary policy reaction function. We then analyze this reaction function in the framework of a generalized ordered choice model that fits the data a lot better than its commonly used, more restricted counterpart. Within this empirical framework, we find that after controlling for several area-wide aggregates, national information does not provide additional information that is indicative of the ECB’s policy rate decision.     

The effect of ECB monetary policies on interest rates and volumes

This article assesses the transmission of ECB monetary policies, conventional and unconventional, to both interest rates and lending volumes or bond issuance for three types of different economic agents through five different markets: sovereign bonds at 6-month, 5-year and 10-year horizons, loans to nonfinancial corporations and housing loans to households, during the financial crisis, and for the four largest economies of the euro area. We look at three different unconventional tools: excess liquidity, longer-term refinancing operations and securities held for monetary policy purposes following the decomposition of the ECB’s Weekly Financial Statements. We first identify series of ECB policy shocks at the euro area aggregate level by removing the systematic component of each series and controlling for announcement effects. We second include these exogenous shocks in country-specific structural VAR, in which we control for credit demand. The main result is that only the pass-through from the ECB rate to interest rates has been effective. Unconventional policies have had uneven effects and primarily on interest rates.     

What is on the ECB’s mind? Monetary policy before and after the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) both before and after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. In the literature, researchers typically select one Taylor rule-based model to analyze monetary policy of central banks and to derive determinants for the interest rate setting. However, uncertainty about the choice of this respective model is typically neglected. In contrast, we apply a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) approach to extend the Taylor rule to account for model uncertainty driven by heterogeneity in the ECB’s decision-making body, the Governing Council. Our results suggest the following: First, the ECB focuses on the inflation rate when setting interest rates. Second, economic activity indicators were in the focus of the ECB before the financial crisis. Third, over the last decade, the role of economic activity decreased, indicating that inflation is the main driver of monetary policy decisions in the post-crisis period. Fourth, when setting interest rates, central bankers appear to consider more than one model.     

External monetary shocks and monetary integration: Evidence from the Bulgarian currency board

Starting July the 1st 1997, Bulgaria adopted a Currency Board (CB) monetary system. This paper aims at investigating if the adoption of the CB monetary system, which involves the cost of losing monetary autonomy, has provided a relatively better (with respect to other CEEC) monetary integration of Bulgaria with the European Monetary Union (EMU). Since Bulgarian monetary variables are endogenous under a CB, we focus on the ECB and FED interest rates as the main sources on monetary volatility. First, we find that ECB shocks are more rapidly absorbed and have less significant impact of domestic variables, with respect to other external monetary shocks (FED rate changes). Second, the responses of Bulgarian variables following changes in the ECB interest rate present lower persistence and significance, with respect to what the previous literature emphasized for other CEEC with monetary autonomy. This latter result still holds when accounting for different sources of cross-country heterogeneity outlined in the literature, thus supporting that the adoption of the CB may have worked as a rather good device in terms of integration of Bulgaria into the EMU.     

美国对华贸易政策的决策和形成因素-以PNTR议案投票结果为例的政治经济分析

本文运用贸易政治经济学的分析框架,对2000年美国国会投票表决是否给予中国永久性正常贸易关系(PNTR)地位这一事件进行经验检验,以此来分析国会议员的投票行为(直接决定了对华贸易政策的形成)受哪些因素影响,并指出这些影响因素的重要程度。通过分析,我们得出如下结论:美国对华贸易政策是政府和利益集团共同作用的均衡结果,议员的个人因素在政策的决策过程中几乎不能发生任何作用,经典贸易模型所预测的不同群体对贸易自由化的态度不能完全被议案的投票结果所证实。     

On the size of the public sector

The main goal of this paper is to detect the mechanisms that should rationally stimulate the decision making-policies of the European Central Bank (ECB). This is carried out under the framework of theoretical principles of interest rate rules. Firstly, we deduce a set of logically advisable guidelines for the strategy actually developed by this central bank. Then we contrast a wide set of hypotheses with reference to those variables the ECB takes into account on deciding its monetary policy, with a flexible treatment regarding the number of months of advance or delay in the explanatory variables. The results lead us to the conclusion that the ECB, besides adopting a smooth strategy, especially bears in mind the expected core inflation rate, with a reaction coefficient adjusted to that initially proposed by Taylor. The economic growth rate, though it has a significant positive coefficient, matters relatively little and is backward looking. Finally, we evaluate up to what point the behaviour of the ECB is assimilative to an inflation targeting framework, solving this question affirmatively.     

TALKING LESS AND MOVING THE MARKET MORE: EVIDENCE FROM THE ECB AND THE FED

This paper examines and compares the communication strategies of the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, and their effectiveness. First, we find that the surprise components of both monetary policy actions and statements have important but differing effects on asset prices, with unexpected communication having a much greater impact on longer‐term interest rates. Second, both the ECB and the Fed have proven to be equally successful in moving their domestic asset prices using either monetary policy or news shocks. However, the response of the American yield curve to the surprise component of Fed's statements is larger than the reaction of the European term structure to ECB's announcements. This result is intimately related to the amplitude of the policy rate cycle that is much larger in the US than in the euro area combined with the bounded support of the news shock. Third, we analyze the cross‐effects and show that the Fed has been more able to move the European interest rates of all maturities than the ECB to move American rates. This finding is tied to the predominance of dollar fixed income assets rather than to an attempt of the ECB to mimic the Fed.     

Overbidding in fixed rate tenders—an empirical assessment of alternative explanations

This paper investigates various theories explaining banks’ overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the proposed new rules by the ECB, aimed at neutralizing interest rate expectations, would not eliminate overbidding if the rationing rule in the fixed rate tenders remains unchanged.     

Comparing monetary policy reaction functions: ECB versus Bundesbank

This paper compares the European Central Bank’s (ECB) conduct of monetary policy with that of the Bundesbank. Estimated monetary policy reaction functions show that the ECB reacts similarly to expected inflation but significantly stronger to the output gap than the Bundesbank did. Theoretical considerations suggest that this stronger response to the output gap may rather be due to a higher interest rate sensitivity of the German output gap than to a higher weight given to output stabilisation in the objective function of the ECB. Counterfactual simulations based on the estimated interest rate reaction functions reveal that German interest rates would not have been lower under a hypothetical Bundesbank regime after 1999. However, this conclusion crucially depends on the assumption of an unchanged long-run real interest rate for the EMU period and is reversed when the Bundesbank reaction function is adjusted for the lower long-run real interest rate estimated for the ECB regime.

Judgment aggregation in search for the truth

We analyze the problem of aggregating judgments over multiple issues from the perspective of whether aggregate judgments manage to efficiently use all voters' private information. While new in judgment aggregation theory, this perspective is familiar in a different body of literature about voting between two alternatives where voters' disagreements stem from conflicts of information rather than of interest. Combining the two bodies of literature, we consider a simple judgment aggregation problem and model the private information underlying voters' judgments. Assuming that voters share a preference for true collective judgments, we analyze the resulting strategic incentives and determine which voting rules efficiently use all private information. We find that in certain, but not all cases a quota rule should be used, which decides on each issue according to whether the proportion of ‘yes’ votes exceeds a particular quota.     

MONETARY POLICY COMMITTEES: MEETINGS AND OUTCOMES

Monetary Policy Committees (MPCs) differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper, we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behavior of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on preprepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) under Chairman Bernanke. (JEL E58, D71, D78)     

Bashing and supporting central banks: the Bundesbank and the European Central Bank

In this paper, we analyse the influences leading to external pressure on or public support for German and European monetary policy. Based upon the findings for the Deutsche Bundesbank, lessons are drawn for the European Central Bank (ECB). We show that external pressure on the ECB stems mainly from politicians or from international organisations (such as the IMF). In contrast with evidence for the Bundesbank, interest groups (such as commercial banks) hardly attempt to influence European monetary policy. German data show that factors leading to external pressure on the central bank are rising unemployment and the threat that governments will lose their majority in the next election. Evidence for the latter is, however, weak, and we show that in any case this source of pressure is likely to be of minor importance for the ECB.     

IS THE VIEW FROM THE EUROTOWER PURELY EUROPEAN? – NATIONAL DIVERGENCE AND ECB INTEREST RATE POLICY

The official view on ECB monetary policy claims that decisions are based on euro zone data and that diverging regional developments are disregarded. To test empirically whether regional developments have an impact on ECB decisions we develop a generalised monetary policy reaction function which allows for an influence of regional divergence. Reaction function estimations and a probit model of interest rate decisions for the first years of the euro area offer some first support for an impact of regional divergence. The results clarify that ignoring a potential national perspective may lead to biased estimates for the ECB reaction function.     

An Analysis of EU Voting Procedures in the Enlargement Context

The problem of a fair and effective voting system in the EU deserves particular emphasis, due to the fact that several issues to be agreed upon concern matters of crucial national interest. The aim of this paper is to assess, in the enlargement context, the advantages and disadvantages of different voting systems within the EU, studying the statistical distributions of the rate of winning and blocking coalitions on the basis of a simulation model. The different scenarios of the voting procedures’ results confirm the positive effects of the Penrose square root rule, which remains the only valid voting system to be adopted in the future for the main EU decision-making bodies.     

Interest linkages between the US,UK and German interest rates: should the UK join the European Monetary Union?

In light of continuing mixed results in the literature, this paper re‐examines the German Dominance Hypothesis (GDH) and considers whether the UK should join the Eurozone. For this purpose, short‐term interest rate relationships between the UK, Germany, the Eurozone and the USA, for the period January 1982 to June 2007, are studied. The policy implication of a loss of monetary autonomy for the UK in favour of Germany or the European Central Bank (ECB) would give support to the UK joining the EMU as an economic response. From the early 1980s the Bundesbank’s responsibility was to use money growth targets to keep average inflation rate down in the long run. This long run objective suggests that an appropriate methodology for testing the GDH is to test whether the German stochastic trend is a driving stochastic trend. In other words we determine whether a permanent shock to the German interest rate has a permanent effect on the UK interest rate. To this end the structural shocks in a VECM are identified by imposing long‐run restrictions of the type developed in King et al. (1991). We apply the same techniques to testing whether the UK has suffered a loss of monetary autonomy in favour of the ECB.     

Forecasting the Direction of Policy Rate Changes: The Importance of ECB Words

This paper evaluates the predictive power of different information sets for the European Central Bank (ECB) interest-rate-setting behaviour. We employ an ordered probit model, i.e. a limited dependent variable framework, to take into account the discreteness displayed by policy rate changes. The results show that the forecasting ability of standard Taylor-type variables, such as inflation and output gap, is fairly low both in-sample and out-of-sample, and is comparable to the performance of the random walk model. Instead by using broader information sets that include measures of core inflation, exchange rates, monetary aggregates and financial conditions, the accuracy of the forecasts about ECB future actions substantially improves. Moreover, ECB rhetoric considerably contributes to a better understanding of its policy reaction function. Finally, we find that that the ECB has been fairly successful in educating the public to anticipate the overall future direction of its monetary policy, but has been less successful in signalling the exact timing of rate changes.     

Macroeconomic and financial effects of oil price shocks: Evidence for the euro area

The paper investigates the macroeconomic and financial effects of oil price shocks for the euro area, with a special focus on post-2009 oil price dynamics and the recent slump. The analysis is carried out episode by episode, by means of a large-scale time-varying parameter model. We find that recessionary effects are triggered by oil price hikes and, in some cases, also by oil price slumps. In this respect, the post-2009 run-up likely contributed to sluggish growth, while uncertainty and real interest rate effects are the potential channels through which the 2014 slump has depressed aggregate demand and worsened financial conditions. Also in light of the zero interest rate policy carried out by the ECB, in so far as the Quantitative Easing policy failed to generate inflationary expectations, a more expansionary fiscal policy might be required to counteract the deflationary and recessionary threat within the expected environment of soft oil prices.     

International spillovers of ECB’s unconventional monetary policy: the effect on Central Europe

We examine how unconventional monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) influences macroeconomic stability in three Central European economies. We estimate various panel vector autoregressions (PVARs) using monthly data from 2008 to 2014. Using the shadow policy rate and central bank assets as measures of unconventional policies, we find that output growth and inflation in Central Europe temporarily increase following an expansionary unconventional monetary policy shock by the ECB. Using both impulse responses and variance decompositions, we find that the effect of unconventional policies on output growth is much stronger than the effect on inflation.