Applying ethical theory to public relations

There seems to be a prevailing belief among public relations professionals that ethical problems can easily be solved by either reference to a simplified code or citation of a few well-worn platitudes. However, the route to a more complete understanding of questions of ethics is circuitous and often painstaking. By applying a number of ethical theories to a public relations problem, both the skilled public relations technician and the public relations professional may arrive at similar conclusions concerning moral obligations; however, the professional is in the most favorable position to effect change.Thomas H. Bivins is Assistant Professor at the University of Oregon, School of Journalism. He is also Head of Public Relations Sequence and has been awarded Public Relations Student Society of America: Faculty Advisor of the Year, 1984, 1986.     

Applying neutralization theory to fair trade buying behaviour

More and more consumers are willing to pay a premium for fair trade products. However, great potential remains as the market shares of these products are still low. In the present study, neutralization theory was applied to investigate the reasons for consumers hesitating to buy more fair trade products. A postal paper‐and‐pencil survey was sent out using random addresses from the telephone book in the German‐speaking part of Switzerland, resulting in a final sample size of n = 620. The results show that the techniques of neutralization are used to various degrees. A principal component analysis resulted in two strategies of neutralization: an internal strategy (focusing on the consumers themselves) and an external strategy (focusing on the farmers in developing countries). A regression analysis proved that the internal neutralization strategy was an important predictor for fair trade buying behaviour, even when controlling for attitudes towards fair trade.     

Applying the principles of Gestalt theory to teaching ethics

Teaching ethics poses a dilemma for professors of business. First, they have little or no formal training in ethics. Second, they have established ethical values that they may not want to impose upon their students. What is needed is a well-recognized, yet non-sectarian model to facilitate the clarification of ethical questions. Gestalt theory offers such a framework. Four Gestalt principles facilitate ethical clarification and another four Gestalt principles anesthetize ethical clarification. This article examines each principle, illustrates that principle through current business examples, and offers exercises for developing each principle. Eugene H. Hunt is professor of management in the School of Business at Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond. He has done advanced studies in organization development at the National Training Laboratories (NTL) and has studied Gestalt theory at the Gestalt Institute in Cleveland. He currently teaches a course in the history of management thought for doctoral students, in principles of management for masters students, and in organizational behavior for undergraduate students. For a number of years he wrote a column in Management World titled, Expanding Your Repertoire of Managerial Behavior.Ronald K. Bullis is Acting Head of Staff at a Presbyterian Church in Richmond, Virginia. He has done advanced graduate work in clinical social work at Virginia Commonwealth University and is an adjunct faculty teaching law and religion at Virginia Union University, Richmond. He also teaches law and religion at the Institute of Theology at Princeton Theological Seminary. He conducts individual, group and family counseling and is a certified sex educator.     

基于博弈的战略联盟分析

随着世界经济一体化的发展,追求个体利益的形式面临着极大的挑战,而互利共赢战略以经济全球化时代为实施背景,以深化国内经济体制改革为实现基础,以开展与世界各国的经济合作为实践途径正在逐渐成为经济发展的主流。而企业战略联盟的出现正是时代发展的产物,它是互惠共赢的最典型的体现方式。本文通过博弈的方法,对战略联盟进行分析,并通过Cournot模型,分析战略联盟能给企业带来的利益,从而说明战略联盟实现互惠的机制。     

Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 1: Dramatic resolution vs. Rational solution

Drama theory differs from game theory in that it does not regard actors' preferences and perceived opportunities as fixed, but as capable of being changed by the actors themselves under the pressure of pre-play negotiations. Thus characters in a drama undergo change and development. A manyperson, multiphase theory of dramatic transformation is presented, showing how thecore of a drama (in the sense of game theory) is transformed by the interaction between the characters into a strict, strong equilibrium to which they all aspire. The process of dramatic transformation is shown to be driven by actors' reactions to various paradoxes of rationality; it is proved that when all these paradoxes have been overcome, a full dramatic resolution has been reached, satisfying actors' emotional and moral demands, as well as the demands of rationality.     

Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 2: Formal model of the resolution process

In a drama, characters' preferences and options change under the pressure of pre-play negotiations. Thus they undergo change and development. A formal model of dramatic transformation is presented that shows how the core of a drama is transformed by the interaction among the characters into a strict, strong equilibrium to which they all aspire. The process is seen to be driven by actors' reactions to various paradoxes of rationality.     

基于博弈论的多基站协作波束成形

为抑制小区间干扰,提出了一种基于博弈论的多基站协作波束成形算法,并将该算法应用于多基站协作通信系统模型。该算法是在已知其他小区策略选择的情况下,最大化自身利益的迭代算法。在此基础上研究了将最大化用户速率问题转化为效用函数优化问题进行求解,然后证明其纳什均衡的存在性和唯一性,最后给出求解纳什均衡的步骤。仿真结果表明,相对于非协作算法,所提算法在期望用户方向上保持较高的增益,同时有效地零陷干扰用户,达到抑制小区间干扰的目的,并且具有很好的收敛性。     

A game theory modeling approach for 3G operators

This paper presents the technoeconomic evaluation of a third generation rollout scenario followed by the identification of the market conditions for two operators in a simple game theory model. The considered scenarios reflect the point of view of both dominant operators and new entrants. Technoeconomic results are presented in terms of net present value (NPV), acting like the pay-off function in the proposed theoretical Game Theory model. The business case presented here was studied by using a tool, developed by European Projects IST-25172 TONIC/ECOSYS, a model developed by the EURESCOM P901 project and the Game Theory Tool named Gambit.     

Explaining supplier-buyer partnerships: a dynamic game theory approach

Car manufacturers are introducing new purchasing policies in the European automotive industry. Aggregation of parts to form complete prefabricated systems is becoming the prominent way for suppliers to increase their competitiveness. This change implies new organizational arrangements between car manufacturers and suppliers to reflect a new relationship between traditionally adversarial firms. Using a game-theoretic approach, we emphasize, in this paper, that a partnership can only be accomplished, when the present uncertainty between the car manufacturer and the supplier can be drastically reduced. We show through a dynamic game construct and a case study how trust between suppliers and assemblers can be forged.     

博弈论在战略管理会计中的应用途径

战略管理会计是企业战略管理系统的一个子系统,行使着对企业战略管理的决策支持功能。目前由于战略竞争的分析方法欠缺,无法使其胜任战略管理的任务。应将博弈论引入战略管理会计中,以其对抗性的原理和对弈性的技术,在人力资源管理、竞争对手分析、投资战略制定等方面开拓其在战略管理会计中的应用途径。     

Applying the theory of reasoned action to examine consumers' attitude and willingness to purchase organic foods

The organic food market has emerged as a growing trend among consumers. The present study examines the relationship between Health Consciousness (HC), Organic Food Knowledge (OFK), Subjective Norms (SN), Price Perception (PP), Environmental Concern (EC), Attitude (ATT), Willingness to Purchase (WP), and Actual Buying Behaviour (ABB) towards organic food. Furthermore, the study explores the mediating effects of ATT and WP in the relationship between the aforesaid variables and ABB. The data was collected from 240 respondents using convenience sampling approach. The Structure Equation Modelling (SEM) using ADANCO 2.2 is used to test the hypotheses of the conceptual model proposed in the present study. The study found that the variables HC, OFK, SN, EC, ATT, WP significantly affect the ABB. Also, it is observed that EC is the strongest predictor of ATT, WP, and ABB in organic food purchase, whereas PP is the least influencing factor. Further, HC positively influences ATT and WP but shows a negative association with ABB. The antecedents HC, OFK, SN, PP, EC has shown a significant indirect effect on ABB among respondents through ATT and WP. Finally, the theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

多用户MIMO系统中基于博弈论的鲁棒性功率分配

针对多用户多输入多输出（MU-MIMO）天线系统,提出了一种基于非合作博弈论的功率分配方案。此博弈模型中,以用户在系统中的信号泄漏噪声比值（SLNR）作为用户功率分配和公平性参数设置的依据,保证用户所期望的服务质量和公平性,并证明了纳什均衡的存在性。其次,考虑信道估计误差的影响,提出了一种基于滑动模型的迭代功率分配控制算法满足所有用户的最小通信质量要求。仿真结果显示此方案在信道误差的情况下,相比现有方案可提高系统吞吐量。     

Honesty in negotiation

It is often suggested that deceptive behaviour in negotiation is ethical. A number of academic writers have put that view, and several have even suggested that a contrary approach is naÝve. Writers argue either that deceptive behaviour is generally expected or else that such behaviour is necessary to enable us to guard ourselves against exploitation. But in fact participants in the negotiating process differ in what they expect, and we can be careful without being deceptive. That is how we ought to proceed, if we want to treat others as responsible decision-makers. Our obligations in business negotiation are the same as elsewhere. Business is not a distinct game with defined rules, like poker. Neither 'business' nor 'negotiation' are by their nature set apart from other situations. The behaviour which is appropriate in negotiation depends on the circumstances. As in other situations, we have an obligation to pay attention to others to ascertain their actual expectations and intentions, and then act accordingly.     

农业谈判:难啃的骨头

新一轮的 WTO 农业谈判已进入第三阶段,情况到底如何?世界贸易组织多哈第四届部长级会议不仅以通过中国加入WTO而举世瞩目,而且以发动新一轮多边贸易谈判"多哈发展议程"而载入     

Culture and negotiation

Negotiation has three elements: predisposing factors, process, and outcomes. Process is the art and outcomes is the science of negotiation. Culture adds a new consideration that affects each element. Culture's effects on negotiation are studied using Geert Hofstede's dimensional model of culture. The negotiation process and Hofstede's culture model are combined in four settings. The settings are defined by two factors, if the negotiation is within or between cultures and the role of the participant as a negotiator or intervener. The predicted effects of culture on the process and outcome are detailed for each setting. Then the outcomes of the negotiation decision are discussed in terms of Hofstede's model, especially “Uncertainty Avoidance” and “Masculinity-Femininity” dimensions. Culture clearly influences each aspect of negotiation. Understanding culture can make the participants more effective negotiators and interveners.     

Emotions in negotiation

In this article, we discuss the ways in which emotions influence the course of negotiation. Emotions play a role in the development of relationships among negotiators; they also facilitate or hinder coordination of strategic exchanges. These functions highlight an interplay between information-processing and emotional expressions: intentions are inferred from statements made and nonverbal gestures sent. They are understood as part of an expression game that emphasizes interaction dynamics. They are also understood in terms of the organizational contexts surrounding negotiation. These are some of the themes that surface in the articles contributed to this special issue. An overview of the articles calls attention to key points but also expands on the themes suggested by the authors. The work reported in this issue provides a basis for a continuing research agenda on emotions in negotiation.     

供应商如何做好洽谈做准备

过去的一年里．我们接手了大大小小数十个sourcing项目．有近千供应商被推荐绘了世界各地的买家。然而．获得推荐只能算作获得了参赛资格．买家会依据推荐名单继续层层筛选．最终仅数十个供应商能获得订单。推荐名单中很大一部分供应商在和买家初次洽谈之后就没有了下文。这时．人们往往会把失败的原因归结为价格因素．质量体系不合要求．物流方案不完整等等。诚然,     

土地征用中溢价分割问题的博弈分析

本文的研究目的在于运用博弈论分析土地征用中的溢价分割问题.本研究采取规范分析法和博弈分析法,认为对土地溢价的分割,应该区分土地用途的性质,实行差别对待,对纯公益性和准公益性用地,应按照一定比例对土地溢价进行分割;对非公益用地,土地的溢价应归农民所有.