ISSUES IN MEDIUM-TERM MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT

Four years after the onset of the world debt crisis, the issueis how to restore growth. The answer is structural adjustment,both macro and micro. At the macro level, adjustments have tobe made to the structure of aggregate demand and supply to restoregrowth while generating the needed trade surpluses. This meansprimarily real exchange rates that are maintained at appropriatelevels and an emphasis on investment. At the micro level, itis argued that most developing countries need to liberalizetrade, allow the price system to operate, develop financialsystems, reform taxes, and improve the efficiency of publicenterprises, perhaps by selling them. The article discussesthe nature of these two types of reforms and the policy andresearch issues relevant to World Bank analysis of growth programs.      

新理财

2005第1期 为配合“2004中国CFO年度人物”评选。本期我们刊发了一组有关中国CFO角色转换及职能定位的章。中国的CFO正处于转型的关键时期。适应现代公司需要的CFO应该具备哪些素质？这些素质又从哪里获得？我们的评选不企图，也不可能解决所有这些问题，但我们力图从远远落后于国际的中国CFO群体中挖掘出具有国际水准的中国CFO，使全国的会计界能够分享我国优秀CFO的成功方略，为大家展示更具参考价值的管理范例。     

CORPORATE CASH HOLDINGS

There have been several cases in recent years—most notably, Chrysler—in which shareholders have objected to the level of companies' holdings of cash and other liquid assets. This paper describes the authors' study of the determinants of liquid asset holdings by publicly traded U.S. firms and how these holdings change over time. For those companies that appear to hold excess cash, the study also attempts to investigate whether such companies have a tendency to reduce value by "overinvesting"—a tendency described in the academic finance literature as the "free cash flow problem."
According to the study, the most important determinants of corporate cash holdings are size, risk, and the extent of the firm's investment opportunities, with smaller, riskier, and high-growth firms holding larger amounts of cash as a percentage of total (noncash) assets. These results are consistent with corporate decisions to hold liquid assets in order to preserve the firm's ability to make strategic investments when operating cash flow turns down and outside funds are expensive.
The authors also report that most companies with large amounts of excess cash tend to acquire it mainly by accumulating internally generated cash flows, and not by issuing securities. Perhaps surprising, the study also finds that spending on new projects and acquisitions is only slightly higher for firms with excess cash—and that such firms also tend to have higher payouts to shareholders in the form of dividends or stock repurchases. Thus, there is little evidence in this study of a free cash flow problem, as well as some indication that managers are aware of and attempt to address the problem.     

VALUE-AT-RISK AND CORPORATE VALUATION

Although first used mainly by financial institutions to evaluate their trading risks, Value-at-Risk (VAR) can also be used to enhance an industrial corporation's understanding and management of its market risks. To illustrate this broader application of VAR analysis, the authors present a simple example focusing on the valuation of a closely held company. In this case, VAR is used to analyze the sensitivity of the firm's value to movements in uncertain exchange rates, commodity prices, and interest rates.     

CORPORATE CONTROL IN COMMERCIAL BANKS

Unique factors in commercial banks' legal and regulatory environment may influence their mechanisms of corporate control. I investigate this issue in a sample of U.S. bank holding companies (BHCs) by analyzing how many underwent a change in corporate control by hostile takeover, friendly merger, management turnover by the board, or intervention by regulators. I compare the relative importance of these methods with those in nonfinancial firms. 1 relate the use of these methods to BHC board and ownership structure and performance. I find that the most important corporate control mechanism in banks is regulatory intervention, and that the primary market-based corporate control mechanism is action by the board of directors. Overall, however, BHC boards are much less assertive than their counterparts at nonfinancial firms. I examine reasons for this.     

LABOR LAWS AND CORPORATE INVESTMENT

In the United States, the costs of unionized labor are higher in states without right‐to‐work (RTW) laws. I show that unionized firms located in these states invest less. These firms have about 4 percentage point lower capital expenditures (normalized by net property, plant, and equipment) than other firms. I confirm these findings by examining a natural experiment created by the adoption of RTW laws in Oklahoma and examining union certification elections using regression discontinuity design.     

ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND CORPORATE FINANCE

This article is based on remarks I gave at the 2000 meeting of the Southern Finance Association (SFA). I was extraordinarily flattered to be named Distinguished Scholar for 2000 by the SFA; I would like to thank the members and officers of the association for this award. As an SFA board member, I participated in establishing the Distinguished Scholar program. The original idea was to broaden participation in SFA by more of the profession's senior researchers. Last year I believe we chose the ideal person for the inaugural award, Professor Richard Roll of UCLA. But I must admit that I felt somewhat awkward in accepting the award this year. Although I certainly appreciate having my work recognized, I have attended SFA meetings regularly over the last quarter century. They afford a wonderful opportunity to renew valued friendships (some going back to graduate school) and revisit my southern roots. So this award is quite special for me, even if I do not consider myself its ideal recipient.     

ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM

This paper develops three basic economic principles for effective corporate governance: (1) information accuracy and timeliness, (2) management accountability, and (3) auditor independence. Accuracy and timeliness of information is critical to providing market participants with the data necessary to monitor and evaluate managers. Management accountability focuses on strengthening the incentives of managers to act in shareholders' interests and on increasing the likelihood and magnitude of punishment for wrongdoing. Auditor independence reduces the incentives and likelihood that auditors would give managers more leeway to undertake fraudulent or questionable acts.
The author provides a preliminary assessment of how well legislative reforms, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, regulatory changes at the SEC, and private sector responses such as those from self-regulatory organizations like the NYSE and NASDAQ, conform to these economic principles. The paper concludes by commenting on current proposals from the SEC on "shareholder democracy" and emphasizing the importance of balancing private and public regulatory responses.