Harmonization of carbon taxes in international climate agreements

The use of some kind of carbon tax is often proposed as part of an international climate policy. One possibility could be an international climate agreement requiring a harmonization of domestic carbon taxes. It is shown that there are several practical difficulties with such an agreement, and that it therefore is unlikely that CO₂ emissions will be allocated efficiently between countries with this type of agreement. Alternative types of agreements include an international carbon tax, in which the governments of the participating countries pay a tax, in proportion to their CO₂ emissions, to an international agency. A very similar arrangement would be to introduce a system of emission permits which are internationally tradeable between governments. Under quite general conditions, agreements of these two types can be designed so that they are both efficient and satisfy whatever distributional objectives one might have. Under both of these systems, the choice of domestic policies could be left to the individual countries. A domestic carbon tax is an obvious policy response from a country participating in an agreement of this type.Significant parts of the paper are based on research at CICERO (Center for International Climate and Energy Research, Oslo) and the Centre for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF), Oslo. The paper draws heavily on a related paper (Hoel, 1992a) which was prepared for Workshop on Fee and Charge Systems for Reducing Greenhouse Gases, OECD, Paris, November 5–6, 1991. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for useful comments on an earlier version of the paper.     

On the efficiency of environmental instruments in a spatial economy

This paper develops an efficiency criterion to evaluate environmental policy instruments in a spatial economy. We call an environmental policy regime at the regional level efficient if it guarantees not only an efficient distribution of emission permits within a region, but also an efficient locational pattern of mobile firms across the regions of a federation. Using marketable pollution rights or emission taxes, efficiency in this broad sense can only be achieved if revenues of regional environmental agencies are not transferred to regional firms. Direct controls neither support an efficient allocation of emission rights within a region nor locational efficiency of firms.     

Foreign direct investment in a world of multiple taxes

Governments impose multiple taxes on foreign investors, though studies of the effect of tax policy on the location of foreign direct investment (FDI) focus almost exclusively on corporate income taxes. This paper examines the impact of indirect (non-income) taxes on FDI by American multinational firms, using affiliate-level data that permit the introduction of controls for parent companies and affiliate industries. Indirect tax burdens significantly exceed the foreign income tax obligations of foreign affiliates of American companies. Estimates imply that 10% higher local indirect tax rates are associated with 7.1% lower affiliate assets, which is similar to the effect of 10% higher income tax rates. Affiliate output falls by 2.9% as indirect taxes rise by 10%, while higher income taxes have more modest output effects. High corporate income tax rates depress capital/labor ratios and profit rates of foreign affiliates, whereas high indirect tax rates do not. These patterns reveal the impact of indirect taxes and suggest the mechanisms by which direct and indirect taxes affect FDI.     

两税合并对引进外资的影响及对策分析

"两税"并存,让外资企业享受"超国民待遇",吸引外商投资,作为特定历史条件下的权宜之计,无可厚非。但随着经济的发展、时代的变迁,更需要有一个公平、公正的市场竞争与投资环境。基于自身的利益,围绕新税制的设计,各方曾有过激烈的博弈。本文就博弈的解数之一,即统一税制后是否会对引进外资产生严重的影响及如何应对问题,发表个人的浅见。     

Choosing the right instrument

This paper analyses the optimal choice of second-best optimal environmental policies. Using a partial equilibrium model, the paper first reconfirms the well-known result that the existence of a double dividend (in its weak definition) favours environmental policy instruments which maximise tax revenues for a given improvement in environmental quality. Additional revenues can be used to reduce the distortion of existing taxes such as taxes on labour and capital income. Without uncertainty, environmental taxes and auctioned permits are equally appropriate. In the presence of uncertainty, however, the optimal choice of taxes or tradable permits depends on the relative magnitudes of the marginal environmental damage and the marginal benefit from consuming a polluting good. In the second part, the paper, therefore, analyses how the revenue capacity affects the optimal choice of environmental policy instruments in the presence of uncertainty. The paper shows that the first-best choice rule between price and quantity regulation (Weitzman, 1974) remains valid in a second-best world with distortionary taxation.     

经济政策不确定性、金融摩擦与宏观经济

基于Baker的经济政策不确定性指数和平滑转移向量自回归模型,分析了经济政策不确定性对宏观经济的影响及其传导机制。研究表明:经济政策不确定性的冲击通过实物期权机制对投资和产出造成短期的负面影响,加大了宏观经济的波动性;金融摩擦使经济政策不确定性冲击对宏观经济的影响具有非对称性;金融摩擦的程度以外部融资溢价水平来衡量,在外部融资溢价水平"高"的情况下,经济政策不确定性的冲击对宏观经济的不良影响更大。     

Efficient introduction of Pigovian taxes

This paper considers the dynamics of introducing pollution taxes when firms have to invest into abatement facilities. This accumulation of abatement capital, however, proceeds sluggishly. Therefore, actual policy proposals of pollution taxes consider a phased introduction. This paper considers the normative aspects of such a policy. More precisely, it proves that pollution taxes should be introduced radically rather than gradually.     

Distorting taxes and interest on reserves

Few governments in developed economies currently pay interest on reserves. However, Goodfriend (2001) [Goodfriend, M., 2001. Interest on reserves and monetary policy, mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond] concludes that it is a useful tool to implement monetary policy. In a monetary growth model with a financial intermediary and a firm who needs to borrow to pay wages, it is shown that paying interest on reserves financed by a labor tax reduces welfare.     

经济政策不确定性与企业多元化程度选择

多元化是现代企业发展战略中的一个重要问题。近年来多元化程度下降成为我国上市公司发展中一个主要特征。以2003-2017年沪深两市上市公司为研究对象,考察经济政策不确定性对上市公司多元化的影响。结果显示:经济政策不确定性与上市公司多元化程度显著负相关;对内生性问题进行处理后,这种负相关性在民营企业、高成长企业、非受保护行业的企业以及在金融危机爆发后更为明显。进一步研究还表明:上市公司经营实力、治理环境和股东监督力度的提高,会使经济政策不确定性对降低公司多元化程度的影响有所减弱。政府减少政策变动,保持政策的长期性和稳定性,并在制定经济政策时充分考虑企业的异质性特征,有利于企业多元化程度选择;另一方面,公司也需不断提高自身的学习能力,优化治理体系,增强抗风险能力。     

税收竞争对中国环境污染的影响的实证检验

以中国30个省、自治区和直辖市的工业污染数据为样本建立三维时序立体数据表,运用极值熵值法测度中国环境污染排放强度,从税收总量和税收结构双重视角建立动态面板回归模型,利用差分广义矩估计方法对税收竞争对环境污染的影响进行实证检验,得出以下结论:①2000—2016年,中国环境污染呈现上升趋势。2003年以前,东部地区污染排放强度高于中西部地区,此后,东部地区环境污染改善明显;2005年以后,中部地区环境污染压力上升;2012年以前,西部地区污染排放强度呈现交替升降的演变趋势,而近年来西部地区环境污染压力超越东部和中部地区。②从税收总量来看,政府间税收竞争显著抑制污染排放,是一种“趋优竞争”。③从税收结构来看,增值税竞争加剧污染恶化,企业所得税竞争有效抑制污染排放。④分地区看,东部地区税收竞争程度低,对污染排放影响不显著,而中西部地区税收竞争对污染排放的影响较为显著。⑤从政府环境管制来看,政府间税收竞争与政府环保政策相互影响,显著抑制环境污染。改革官员晋升考核体系、完善税收分权体制和实行差异化税收政策是当务之急。     

Excise taxes,over-shifting,cross-elasticity,and tax revenue

This article examines cross-elasticity effects in excise taxation for markets characterized by monopolistic competition and over-shifting. Extending the constant elasticity demand model to consider cross-elasticity leads to notably different results regarding tax revenue maximization. With nonzero but weak cross-elasticity effects relative to the price elasticity, we derive a higher optimal tax-price ratio compared to prior research. With strong cross-elasticity, revenue can continually be increased by raising the excise tax. Overall, the study offers government greater incentive to use excise taxes to obtain revenue.     

税收优惠与FDI的时空分析——基于税收优惠信号理论的实证研究

文章从税收优惠信号理论的视角出发,研究我国税收优惠政策对外国直接投资(FDI)的影响。文章认为在我国市场化改革的不同阶段,以及在市场化进程的不同的地区,税收优惠政策对FDI的影响力大小是不同的。进而利用1986~2004年我国28个省市的面板数据进行了实证检验;扩展了Sylvie Demurger等(2002)所建立的地区优惠政策指数,以度量我国各省市的相对税收优惠程度;同时还利用樊纲和王小鲁(2001、2003、2004)编制的中国各地区市场化进程数据,将各省市分为市场化程度高的地区和市场化程度低的地区两组样本,分别进行了实证分析。结果表明,从整个样本区间(1986~2004年)来看,我国税收优惠政策是影响FDI的重要因素,但在1992年之后其影响力明显减弱,而且从横向来看,市场化程度越高的地区,税收优惠对FDI的影响力越弱。     

基于CGE模型的环境税优惠政策的环保效应分析

通过建立一个CGE模型,并对该模型在存在和不存在环境税优惠政策两种场景下的社会产出、产品供应和社会福利状况进行模拟分析,考察环境税优惠政策的环保效应。结果表明,环境税的税收减免在长期内对社会福利的影响不大,但是,它却会对环境税的环境保护效果产生较大的负面影响。在使用税收减免工具时,政府要从社会福利和环境保护、能源使用等方面加以考虑,避免社会总福利的净损失。     

全面质量管理战略、环境不确定性与企业绩效

随着市场经济体制的建立和对外开放程度的提高,尤其是在中国加入WTO以后.中国企业面临的国际国内竞争形势空前严峻,如何通过改善质量管理水平来持续快速地提升企业绩效成为研究者和执业者亟待解决的一个重大问题.TQM竞争优势的维系依赖战略过程,而竞争优势的创造则来源于其战略内容.在两种战略导向(顾客导向和经营导向)下收益的增长或成本的降低都可以改进企业的绩效.企业应在不同外部环境条件下,根据自身的战略导向选择最合适的TQM内容以最大限度地提升企业绩效.     

Living to save taxes

Does taxation affect the timing of death? This is an interesting example of how behavior might be affected by economic incentives. We study how two changes in Swedish inheritance taxation 2004–2005 have affected daily all-cause mortality. Our main result is that mortality decreased by 17% the day before the expected tax repeals began.     

Piercing the Veil of Uncertainty in Transboundary Pollution Agreements

This paper addresses the question of how uncertainty in costs and benefits affects the difficulty of reaching a voluntary agreement among sovereign states. A measure of difficulty is constructed related to side-payments necessary to make an agreement a Pareto-improving move. Using a simple model, it is shown that uncertainty actually makes agreement easier.JEL classifications: Q5, H4, D7, D8An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Conference on Risk and Uncertainty in Environmental and Resource Economics, Wageningen, The Netherlands, June 2002.     

On the efficiency of indirect taxes in differentiated oligopolies with asymmetric costs

This paper shows that unit taxation can be welfare superior to ad valorem taxation in asymmetric and differentiated oligopolies if the goods are sufficiently differentiated, the cost variance is sufficiently large and the ad valorem tax rate is sufficiently high. Moreover, this result holds under either Cournot competition or Bertrand competition.      

税收优惠政策调整对FDI流入的影响分析

随着新的企业所得税法的实施,税收优惠政策也发生了巨大调整。通过对新税收优惠政策的分析及最新数据的比较得出：企业所得税法税收优惠政策的调整不会阻碍FDI的流入,相反,新政策在目前甚至将来还有助于FDI的质量的提高和数量的增加。     

策略性环境政策:环境税和减排补贴的比较分析

文章把战略性贸易政策模型扩展到环境领域,策略性环境政策认为政府有动机通过降低环境标准补贴出口企业,以达到利润转移的目的.文章分析了策略性环境政策中比较受忽视的一部分--环境技术补贴,本国政府结合使用环境税和减排补贴,我们验证了政府使用策略性环境政策的动机,得到了最优的污染排放税率,认为虽然环境政策仍旧不能消除生产带来的环境损害,但是环境技术补贴提高了本国的环境标准,企业会更少地遇到绿色壁垒报复.