Reactive or proactive? Investor sentiment as a driver of corporate social responsibility

Investors and financial markets have been a neglected stakeholder group in studies on a firm’s motivations to be socially and environmentally responsible. Despite being a strong driving force behind firm value, no study has investigated the influence of market and investor sentiments on CSR behaviour. Using a global sample, we investigate the effects of market and investor sentiments on firm CSR performance. We find negative market and investor sentiments in the prior year motivate firms to improve their CSR performance in the next year. We also find the magnitude of improvement in CSR performance differs not only by country, but by CSR sub-category as well. These findings imply that a firm’s motivation to improve its CSR performance is reactionary, rather than being driven by altruism. Regulators and proponents of CSR should thus seek to persuade investors and financial markets to put pressure on firms to further advance the CSR agenda.     

Does the market value greenhouse gas emissions? Evidence from multi-country firm data

Despite increasing global attention on corporate carbon emissions, few studies have examined the value relevance of carbon emission information in the international context. This paper examines whether carbon emission information voluntarily disclosed by a firm affects its market value. After controlling for a firm's likelihood to provide voluntary carbon disclosures, we find that the level of carbon emissions is negatively related to firm value. This negative impact is more prominent for firms in countries that have a national carbon emission trading scheme and stringent environmental regulations. Furthermore, corporate governance is found to reduce the negative value effect of carbon emissions, indicating that shareholders have favorable perceptions regarding the carbon management ability of firms with good corporate governance. Cultural contexts such as uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation also affect the value effect of risks and future liabilities associated with carbon emissions. We find that the value-decreasing effect of carbon emissions is weaker in countries characterized by high uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientations.     

Strange bedfellows? Voluntary corporate social responsibility disclosure and politics

We show a reliable association between voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure and company political interests, which we proxy by company employees’ contributions to political action committees and statewide voting in presidential elections. This relation is most pronounced for the contributions of Democratic employees at companies in states that vote for the Democratic presidential candidate. We also show a positive association between corporate political contributions and excess stock returns. A portfolio strategy of investing based on company size, CSR disclosure intensity and corporate political contributions produces a significant positive mean excess stock return of 4.5 per cent over 3 months following CSR disclosure.     

Does corporate social responsibility affect the cost of capital?

We examine the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on the cost of equity capital for a large sample of US firms. Using several approaches to estimate firms’ ex ante cost of equity, we find that firms with better CSR scores exhibit cheaper equity financing. In particular, our findings suggest that investment in improving responsible employee relations, environmental policies, and product strategies contributes substantially to reducing firms’ cost of equity. Our results also show that participation in two “sin” industries, namely, tobacco and nuclear power, increases firms’ cost of equity. These findings support arguments in the literature that firms with socially responsible practices have higher valuation and lower risk.     

Does corporate social responsibility help the survivorship of SMEs and large firms?

Using a sample of 2480 firms from 51 countries covering the period 2010–2015, we find that firms with more effective corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to be more engaged in CSR. Consistent with the stakeholder theory and the conflict resolution model, this result suggests that managers adopt effective governance mechanisms together with CSR engagement in an attempt to mitigate conflicts among stakeholders. Moreover, after controlling for endogeneity and simultaneity issues, we find that both CSR engagement and corporate governance mechanisms have a significantly negative influence on the firms' risk of financial distress measured by the Altman et al. model (1995). Our results also show that the favorable influence of CSR on the firms' capability of survivorship is more pronounced in SMEs than in large firms.     

Does corporate social responsibility affect mutual fund performance and flows?

We use an asset-weighted composite corporate social responsibility (CSR) fund score to study the effects of CSR on fund performance and flows. Compared to low-CSR funds, high-CSR funds display poorer performance, stronger performance persistence, a weaker performance-flow relationship, and comparable persistence in flows. These findings are consistent with investors in high-CSR funds deriving utility from non-performance attributes.     

Does corporate social responsibility protect shareholder value from the shock of COVID-19? Evidence from China

Our study examines whether and how increased engagement in social responsibility activities by a firm affects movements in its stock prices during the COVID-19 public health crisis, which is regarded as an exogenous shock to economic ties between focal firms and their customers, employees, and suppliers. We find that corporate social responsibility has an inverted U-shaped relationship with shareholder value. The nonlinear relationship is more dominant at firms with higher cash-flow constraints and weaker cost-adjustment capabilities. Our research also generates meaningful implications for business practices.     

Are red or blue companies more likely to go green? Politics and corporate social responsibility

Using the firm-level corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings of Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini, we find that firms score higher on CSR when they have Democratic rather than Republican founders, CEOs, and directors, and when they are headquartered in Democratic rather than Republican-leaning states. Democratic-leaning firms spend $20 million more on CSR than Republican-leaning firms ($80 million more within the sample of S&P 500 firms), or roughly 10% of net income. We find no evidence that firms recover these expenditures through increased sales. Indeed, increases in firm CSR ratings are associated with negative future stock returns and declines in firm ROA, suggesting that any benefits to stakeholders from social responsibility come at the direct expense of firm value.     

A research note on standalone corporate social responsibility reports: Signaling or greenwashing?

Over the past two decades, more and more U.S. firms are voluntarily issuing costly standalone Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reports. Nevertheless, firms’ motivations for issuing standalone CSR Reports are not clear. In this paper, we consider two different explanations: signaling and greenwashing. The first explanation, signaling, proposes that firms use standalone CSR Reports as a signal of their superior commitment to CSR, which suggests firms with stronger social and environmental records will be more likely to issue standalone CSR Reports as compared to those without. The second explanation, greenwashing, proposes that firms use standalone CSR Reports to pose as “good” corporate citizens even when they do not have stronger social and environmental records. To provide insight into these explanations we compare the CSR performance scores of firms that issue CSR reports to those firms that do not. We control for firm size, leverage, profitability and industry. We find that firms that voluntarily issue standalone CSR Reports generally have higher CSR performance scores, which suggests that firms are using voluntary CSR Reports to publicize stronger social and environmental records to stakeholders.     

Good for managers,bad for society? Causal evidence on the association between risk-taking incentives and corporate social responsibility

Using FAS 123R as an exogenous shock to stock options, I provide evidence that equity-based risk-taking incentives discourage corporate social responsibility (CSR). This finding suggests that compensation incentives can motivate managers not to pursue CSR strategies because CSR reduces firms’ risk and provides insurance-like benefits. Firms with a greater demand for CSR's risk reduction are more sensitive to changes in risk-taking incentives. I triangulate my results by confirming that CSR weaknesses are positively related to subsequent stock return volatility. Overall, using a robust empirical design, I find that risk-taking incentives are a determinant of firms’ CSR.     

Does social responsibility begin at home? The relation between firms’ pension policies and corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities

Review of Accounting Studies - Pension freezes are highly visible corporate actions with the potential to hurt the firms’ reputation as “responsible” employers. We document that...     

Does corporate social responsibility affect auditor-client contracting? Evidence from auditor selection and audit fees

We find that firms with higher CSR performance are more likely to choose Big N auditors and less likely to switch to non-Big N auditors, consistent with socially responsible firms demanding higher audit quality. Furthermore, we provide robust evidence that firms with higher CSR performance pay lower audit fees using both levels and changes models, suggesting that higher CSR performance reduces auditor engagement risk. Our analysis based on the difference-in-differences approach indicates that it is higher CSR performance that leads to lower audit fees, not vice versa. Overall, the results highlight the important role of CSR performance in auditor-client contracting.     

Do corporate governance mechanisms matter for cash holdings and firm value?

This paper examines the relationships between firm-level corporate governance mechanisms and cash holdings; along with their combined effects on firm value for a sample of firms listed in Singapore and Malaysia. Firms with less effective governance attributes are found to be more inclined to accumulate cash than those with more effective governance. The results support the flexibility hypothesis in that an increase in agency conflicts between managers and minority shareholders leads to entrenched managers having more discretion to hoard cash reserves. In addition, the incremental value of holding excess cash is shown to be negative for firms with a single leadership structure, firms with a pyramidal ownership structure, as well as family-controlled firms. The discounts associated with these firms may reflect investors’ recognition of the possibility of managerial entrenchment.     

What do we learn from ratings about corporate social responsibility? New evidence of uninformative ratings

The rise of investments professionally managed with a socially responsible mandate has generated growing interest in environmental and social ratings. However, it is not clear how informative these ratings are or whether they are distorted by greenwashing. Based on the ratings of the leading provider, I offer the first evidence linking greenwashing to ratings inflation. Better ratings do not predict less future corporate bad behavior. This is of concern because it undermines the signaling value of these ratings. To understand these results, I develop a model where the rating agency may underinvest in greenwashing detection while firms have incentives to window dress and engage in greenwashing. Finally, controlling for greenwashing improves ratings predictive quality.     

Corporate social responsibility: An umbrella or a puddle on a rainy day? Evidence surrounding corporate financial misconduct

We examine the way a fraudulent firm's pre‐ and post‐misconduct corporate social responsibility engagement is associated with its stock performance to investigate the reputational role of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In the short term, firms with good CSR performance suffer smaller market penalties upon the revelation of financial wrongdoing, supporting the buffer effect, as opposed to the backfire effect, of a good social image. We also find that the misbehaving firms’ post‐misconduct CSR efforts are negatively associated with delisting probabilities, and positively with stock returns. These findings support the argument that increasing post‐crisis CSR engagement can be an effective remedy for a damaged reputation.     

Blessing or curse? Government funding of deposit insurance and corporate lending

A key policy to limit the possibility of bank runs is an explicit deposit insurance scheme, which can be either privately or government funded. Using syndicated loans from 63 countries during the period 1985–2016, we study the effect of government involvement in deposit insurance funding on price and non-price characteristics of loans. We show that changes from purely private-funded to either government-funded or jointly funded deposit insurance increase all-in-spread-drawn by approximately 4.6 %, further increase loan fees, decrease loan maturity, and increase the use of performance pricing provisions. Our findings are consistent with the moral hazard problem behind government-funded deposit insurance schemes.     

The US financial crisis and corporate dividend reactions: for better or for worse?

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - We examine how changes in dividend policy in 2008 as the financial crisis was unfolding influenced firm risk-adjusted returns in the following years....     

New development: A game of responsibility? The regulation of health and social care professionals

The UK's law commissions in a recent joint report have recommended that individual regulatory bodies for medical and other healthcare professions receive more decision-making power and that procedural regulation (for example fitness to practice proceedings) be standardized. Patient wellbeing and professional standing of practitioners are likely to be deeply affected. The legislative process needs to be scrutinized closely to ascertain that government and regulatory bodies do not use the reform to shirk accountability and engage in a blame game.     

Liquid asset sheltering,or cost of capital? The effect of political corruption on corporate cash holdings

I posit that political corruption affects firms through an entrenchment between entrepreneurs and politicians instead of coercive extortion. Based on this postulate, I refute the claim that firms in a more corrupt environment hold less cash due to liquid assets sheltering from political extraction. Instead, I propose that firms in a more corrupt environment hold less cash because of the high cost of capital. In fact, I find that firms in more corrupt countries hold cash beyond their optimum for the given cost of carry due to severe financial constraints. This excess cash results in value destruction. I call this phenomenon the financial effect of corruption. Thus, I challenge the conventional wisdom and argue that the effects of political corruption on corporate cash holdings are primarily indirect through financial mechanisms.     

Does Brazilian allowance for corporate equity reduce the debt bias? Evidences of rebound effect and ownership-induced ACE clientele

We analyse if the Brazilian Allowance for Corporate Equity (ACE-type system) reduces the debt tax bias. Specifically, we study if the continuous treatment effect of interest on equity negatively affects the level of financial leverage. We find that the tax policy implemented is similar to the deductible cash dividends and not to an ACE. The empirical implication is that the interest on equity treatment increases the debt tax bias, producing a rebound effect to what is expected for this policy on the risk-taking behaviour and corporate capital structure. This rebound effect is homogeneous in firms with different financial constraints status. There are evidences that shareholders influence the cash distribution policy, adjusting the later to their own tax preferences. Therefore, there may be an “ACE clientele effect” induced by heterogeneity in tax preferences among shareholders.