Chief financial officer overconfidence and stock price crash risk

Numerous studies have shown the prevalence of overconfidence among Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). Surprisingly, the real effect of CFO overconfidence is under-researched. Using data from a large sample of US-listed firms over the period 1993–2019 and adopting an eclectic theoretical approach, we find that overconfident CFOs are more likely to increase stock price crash risk than non-overconfident CFOs through risk-taking and bad news hoarding. These findings pass a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, departing from most overconfident studies that merely examine one type of top managers (i.e., Chief Executive Officer (CEO)), we consider the influence of CEO and CFO overconfidence jointly. Interestingly, we find that CFO overconfidence outweighs CEO overconfidence in influencing stock price crash risk. Moreover, the overconfidence effect is intensified when overconfident CFOs collaborate with overconfident CEOs, thus raising stock price crash risk. However, stronger governance and a transparent information environment constrain overconfident CFOs' effect on stock price crash risk. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of CFO overconfidence in determining stock return tail risks.     

The executive compensation implications of the tax component of earnings

We extend prior research by examining the weight applied to earnings generated by changes in ETRs (i.e., the tax component of earnings) in determining CEO and CFO compensation. We examine both bonus and total compensation and find that the predicted relationships between compensation and the tax component of earnings are largely limited to bonus compensation. This is not surprising since bonus compensation represents an unambiguous link between contemporaneous performance and compensation, while equity compensation is in part determined by agency considerations. Our evidence suggests that both CEOs and CFOs are compensated for the tax component of earnings. We find that CEOs are rewarded equally for the tax component of earnings relative to other components of earnings, while CFOs are rewarded more for the tax component of earnings relative to other components of earnings. Additionally, the weight applied to the tax component of earnings when determining CFO bonus compensation is greater when; (1) the tax component of earnings does not appear to be related to earnings management; (2) ETRs decrease rather than increase, (3) the firm pays bonus based on after-tax earnings rather than pre-tax earnings, and (4) the firm is tax aggressive rather than non-tax aggressive. The variations in the weighting of the tax component of earnings for CFO bonus compensation noted above in combination with evidence that CEO bonus compensation is indifferent to ETR-related earnings versus other components of earnings, suggests that the tax component of earnings is a contractual component of CFO bonus compensation.     

CFO role and CFO compensation: An empirical analysis of their implications

Given concerns over CFO pay, especially incentives, and considering the tension between a CFO’s fiduciary responsibility and being a key member of the firm’s executive team, we examine the determinants and effects of CFO compensation amount, incentive intensity, and proximity to CEO compensation in a sample of European companies (FTE 500, 2005–2009). First, we focus on the CFO role as a determinant of CFO compensation. Like prior work, we proxy for CFO roles by using hand-collected public data on education and past professional experience, but we supplement these proxies with proprietary data to more directly capture the firm-specific nature of the CFO job in term of its similarity with that of the CEO. We thus argue how CFOs can have varied roles characterized by different levels of financial expertise and CEO-likeness, and document that it is this latter aspect that is associated with CFO compensation. Second, we study the effects of CFO compensation design on outcomes in the CFO’s realm related to financial reporting. We find that CFO financial expertise is positively associated with financial reporting quality, while a CFO’s pay long-term incentive intensity and a CFO’s incentive compensation proximity with the CEO are negatively associated with financial reporting quality. Overall, then, our results suggest that CFOs get rewarded for their CEO-likeness, and particularly for their being similar to the CEO in terms of tasks and decision making authority. But it is their financial expertise that is positively related to financial reporting quality. At the same time, using compensation that is more incentive intensive and more similar to that of the CEO appears to be potentially detrimental to the quality of financial reporting. These results are relevant for boards involved in selecting highly expert CFOs, and their compensation committees charged with defining subsequently effective incentive compensation plans for those CFOs.     

Top executive gender diversity and financial reporting quality

We examine whether gender diversity of chief executive and chief financial officers (CEOs and CFOs) is associated with financial reporting quality. The CEOs and CFOs of publicly traded companies are both required to certify the appropriateness of their financial statements and annual disclosures. We argue that gender diverse dyads (groups) of executives can bring different perspectives and professional skepticism to financial reporting. Using a sample of different CEO/CFO gender dyads during 2006–2019, we postulate and find evidence of higher accruals quality among firms led by gender-diverse dyads compared to accruals quality reported by firms led by all-male CEO/CFO pairs. Additional analyses reveal that the auditors of firms with gender-diverse executive dyads issue audit reports later, charge higher audit fees, and are more likely to be one of the Big 4 firms. These findings support the view that top executive gender diversity enhances financial reporting quality, which has important implications for corporate governance mechanisms.     

Can CFOs resist undue pressure from CEOs to manage earnings?

Building upon the premise that, under certain conditions, the ability of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to pressure the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) is limited, we develop a measure of CFO resistance that captures the ability of the CFO to resist undue pressure from the CEO to manage earnings. In doing so, we consider various sources of power for both the CEO and CFO, and a market setting where CFO resistance is perceived to be high. We find that firms with resistant CFOs are less likely to engage in earnings management than firms with non-resistant CFOs, ceteris paribus. Additionally, while confirming prior evidence that CEOs with strong incentives are more likely to manage earnings, we show that this effect is significantly less pronounced in the presence of resistant CFOs. Overall, our findings suggest that firms can improve the quality of financial reporting by creating conditions that enable CFO resistance.     

The influence of CEO and CFO power on accruals and real earnings management

In this study, we examine the effect of CEO and CFO power on both accruals and real earnings management (AEM and REM, respectively), and the extent to which CEO and CFO power mitigate the effect of one another on AEM and REM. We further examine whether the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) altered these effects. In the pre-SOX period, we find that AEM (REM) is greater when the CEO (CFO) is powerful relative to the CFO (CEO). In the post-SOX period, however, we find that the effect of relative CEO power on AEM subsides, whereas the effect of relative CFO power on REM persists. Additionally, we find evidence to suggest that powerful CFOs inhibit the AEM preferences of powerful CEOs in both the pre- and post-SOX periods. Finally, we find evidence to suggest that powerful CEOs inhibit the REM preferences of powerful CEOs in the pre-SOX period, but not in the post-SOX period. Collectively, our results suggest that the power of the CEO relative to the CFO is an important factor in the both the type and magnitude of earnings management.

     

Chief financial officer co-option and tax avoidance in European listed firms

This paper investigates the impact of chief financial officer (CFO) co-option on corporate tax avoidance. Using hand-collected data from a sample of nonfinancial listed firms included in the S&P350-Europe from 2013 to 2019, we find that firms with co-opted CFOs exhibit higher levels of tax avoidance. We also find that the board membership of co-opted CFOs moderates their propensity to engage in tax avoidance. These results introduce novel evidence about the role of CFOs in influencing firms’ levels of tax avoidance. They also shed light on the monitoring activity of the board of directors in the presence of board members who are also key decision-makers in tax strategies.     

CEO Overconfidence and Earnings Management During Shifting Regulatory Regimes

This study examines the relationship of CEO overconfidence with accrual‐based earnings management, real activities‐based earnings management, and targeting to meet or just beat analyst forecasts. Following, we measure “overconfidence” based on the CEO's tendency to hold in‐the‐money stock options, as rational expected utility maximizers should exercise early to avoid overexposure to company idiosyncratic risks. The results show that before the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), companies of overconfident CEOs were more likely than other CEOs to engage in managing earnings through accelerating the timing of cash flow from operations and achieving analyst forecast benchmarks. After SOX, we find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to have income‐increasing discretionary accruals. They remain more likely to engage in real activities management through abnormally high cash flows, and also have abnormally low discretionary expenses. These results are consistent with overconfident CEOs feeling less constrained by SOX, and suggest that this individual characteristic works against regulators’ attempts to constrain earnings management by corporate executives. In contrast, we find that the tendency of overconfident CEOs to manage to targets decreases after SOX, perhaps due to changes in investor behavior in the new regulatory environment.     

Managerial conservatism and corporate policies

This paper investigates how conservative managers make corporate decisions. Motivated by psychology research, we use handwritten signatures (i.e., emotionally restraint disclosure styles) as a proxy for CEO conservatism. We find that firms with conservative CEOs engage more with safer investments (capital expenditures), engage less with risky policies (Research & Development expenses and debt financing), hold more cash, are less likely to pay cash dividends, and more likely to use stock repurchase schemes. We use the same proxy for CFO conservatism. We find that CFO conservatism is a better determinant than CEO conservatism for cash holding and financing policies, but the reverse is true for investment policies. Conservative CFOs prefer long-term debt to short-term debt.     

Overconfidence and Corporate Tax Policy

Review of Accounting Studies - Using a sample of firms experiencing exogenous CEO departures, we investigate whether firms with overconfident CEOs avoid more tax. We find robust evidence of a...     

The Effect of Overconfidence on the Sensitivity of CEO Wealth to Equity Risk

Recent theory predicts that shareholders provide overconfident managers with weaker risk-taking incentives. We test this prediction using a sample of bank CEOs over the period 1993–2002. We classify a CEO as overconfident if he is more often characterized as confident than as cautious in press. Consistent with theory, we find that the sensitivity of CEO wealth to equity risk is lower for overconfident CEOs. Our finding suggests that shareholders know whether a CEO is overconfident, and take that into account when designing the compensation contract for the CEO.     

Differences in the sophistication of Value-based Management – The role of top executives

This paper responds to recent calls for studying the diffusion of management practices beyond classifying companies as adopters and non-adopters (Ansari et al., 2010, Lounsbury, 2008). In particular, we examine how characteristics of CEOs and CFOs as well as perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) of the top management team (TMT) affect the sophistication of Value-based Management (VBM) for which we develop a multi-dimensional construct.We base our analyses on a unique dataset that comprises archival data, interviews and survey data from top executives of German HDAX companies (58% response rate). The results of our Partial Least Squares (PLS) model (R² = 55%) support most of our hypotheses and provide interesting findings.We find that the CFOs in our sample have substantially more influence on VBM-sophistication than CEOs. In particular, we document that cognitive styles (educational background in business) of CFOs have a substantial impact on VBM-sophistication. Moreover, short-tenured CFOs are associated with high VBM-sophistication. As expected, the related negative effect of long tenure on VBM sophistication is practically offset if the CFO has an educational background in business.Another relevant finding is that high perceived environmental uncertainty of the top management team is significantly associated with lower VBM-sophistication. The results of our control variables moreover reveal that systematic risk (‘beta’) leads to higher VBM sophistication.     

The mediating effect of REM on the relationship between CEO overconfidence and subsequent firm performance moderated by IFRS adoption: A moderated-mediation analysis

The present paper is pursuing a new direction in the analysis of behavioral finance based on examining whether future performance of the firm is related to overconfidence displayed by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). We suggest two channels for this relationship, real earnings management (REM) and the mandatory IFRS adoption. First, examining the impact of IFRS adoption on firms’ future performance, we find that overconfident CEOs who do not adopt IFRS exhibit poorer future performance. Other interactions related to overconfidence and IFRS are not significant. Second, examining the relationship between overconfidence and IFRS adoption on REM, we find that overconfident CEOs indulge in higher REM than non-overconfident CEOs. Further, overconfident CEOs who adopt IFRS display greater REM than do those who not adopt IFRS. Therefore, we prove that the indirect effect of CEO overconfidence on the subsequent firm performance through REM is contingent on the mandatory IFRS adoption.     

Powerful CEOs and stock price crash risk

We find that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) are associated with higher crash risk. The positive association between CEO power and crash risk holds when controlling for earnings management, tax avoidance, chief executive officer's option incentives, and CEO overconfidence. Firms with powerful CEOs have higher probability of financial restatements, lower proportion of negative to positive earnings guidance, and lower ratio of negative to positive words in their financial statements. The association between powerful CEOs and higher crash risk is mostly evident among firms with higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock prices and when CEOs have lower general skills. External monitoring mechanisms weaken but do not eliminate the association between powerful founder CEOs and higher crash risk.     

CEO overconfidence and IRS attention

We examine the likelihood that the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS), in its enforcement role, will accord particular attention to firms that are managed by CEOs who exhibit over-confidence, given that such CEOs may be more aggressive in their tax policies and strategies. Using data from 7757 firms, we find that this is indeed the case. Such attention is even more pronounced in the instance of overconfident CEOs whose firms are financially constrained and/or financially distressed. We also find that the IRS has augmented its audit processes to give more attention to overconfident CEOs during and post financial crisis. This may be due to the increased vulnerability of their firms to external shocks, which consequently increases the incentives to embark on tax avoidance strategies, value-destroying investments, and/or highly biased financial reporting (and forecasting responses) to tax authorities. Our results are robust after accounting for the possibility of endogeneity and using a wide range of specifications, measures, and econometric models.     

CFO gender and financial reporting transparency in banks

We investigate the effect of CFO gender on the timeliness of loan loss provision (LLP) reporting using a large sample of US banks from 2007 to 2016. Our findings show that women CFOs are associated with timelier forward-looking provisioning than men counterparts, suggesting that they follow a more transparent approach to financial reporting policies. Our results hold under different model specifications, including the use of bank and CEO fixed effects. We further address endogeneity concerns by showing that the timeliness of LLP reporting improves significantly for banks experiencing a man-followed-by-woman CFO transition. Overall, our study supports the notion that women CFOs are associated with higher financial reporting transparency and provides further insights into how CFO gender affects risk-aversion and ethics in banks, with wider implications about the importance of women’s representation in the finance-based industry.     

Manager‐Specific Effects on Earnings Guidance: An Analysis of Top Executive Turnovers

We investigate how managers contribute to the provision of earnings guidance by examining the association between top executive turnovers and guidance. Although firm and industry characteristics are important determinants of guidance, we conclude that CEOs participate in firm‐level policy decisions, whereas CFOs are involved in the formation or discussion of guidance. Among firms that historically issued frequent guidance, breaks in guidance following CEO turnovers are relatively permanent and are potentially attributable to firm‐initiated changes in guidance policy. Breaks following CFO turnovers, however, likely reflect uncertainty on the part of the newly appointed executive—they are concentrated in the two quarters following the turnover, are associated with the background of the newly appointed CFO, and extend to the relative precision of the guidance. Among firms that did not issue guidance historically, we find some evidence that newly appointed externally hired CEOs increase the likelihood of providing guidance.     

Director overconfidence

We examine overconfident chief executive officer (CEO) directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more likely to serve on the nominating or the compensation committee, have more independent directorships, and foster higher attendance rates on boards. Boards with overconfident directors are more likely to appoint a better prepared and more reputable CEO following a turnover. These newly appointed CEOs are also more likely to be overconfident. This evidence indicates overconfident CEO directors exhibit significant influence on the board and over the firm's CEO selection.     

CEO overconfidence and dividend policy

We develop a model of the dynamic interaction between CEO overconfidence and dividend policy. The model shows that an overconfident CEO views external financing as costly and hence builds financial slack for future investment needs by lowering the current dividend payout. Consistent with the main prediction, we find that the level of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms managed by CEOs who are more likely to be overconfident. We document that this reduction in dividends associated with CEO overconfidence is greater in firms with lower growth opportunities and lower cash flow. We also show that the magnitude of the positive market reaction to a dividend-increase announcement is higher for firms with greater uncertainty about CEO overconfidence.     

Financial Expert CEOs and Earnings Management Around Initial Public Offerings

This study examines the association between financial expert CEOs and earnings management (EM) around initial public offerings. We identify financial expert CEOs as those having past experience in either banking or investment firms, large auditing firms, or finance-related roles. We find strong evidence that newly listed firms with financial expert CEOs are less likely to engage in either accrual-based or real EM in the offering year than those with non-financial expert CEOs. In particular, our results are robust after controlling for the potential selection issue that occurs due to non-random matching of CEOs to firms. In addition, we employ alternative measures of financial expertise, including past experience in a CFO position, financial experience variety, and professional qualifications. We document that CEOs who used to work as CFOs and those who gained varied financial experience are less likely to manage earnings through both accruals and real activities. Moreover, CEOs who have a professional qualification in finance and/or accounting are also associated with lower accrual-based EM.