The determinants of board composition: An agency theory perspective

This study examines the interrelation between board composition and variables that capture various agency and financial dimensions of the firm. The agency literature suggests that outside directors on the board provide important monitoring functions in an attempt to resolve, or at least mitigate, agency conflicts between management and shareholders. The agency literature indicates that other mechanisms such as managerial equity ownership, dividend payments, and debt leverage also serve as important devices in reducing agency conflicts in firms. This study argues and documents that an inverse relationship exists between the proportion of external members on the board and managerial stock ownership, dividend payout, and debt leverage. This is consistent with the hypothesis that individual firms choose an optimal board composition depending upon alternative mechanisms employed by the firm to control agency conflicts. Board composition is also found to be systematically related to a number of other variables including institutional holdings, growth, volatility, and CEO tenure.     

Corporate tax,financial leverage,and portfolio risk

We examine the theoretical implications of corporate income tax for a risky portfolio in a aggregate-endowment economy. In this model, corporate income tax affects the portfolio risk associated with the rebalancing motive during market clearance. An asset is defined as a portfolio of stocks and bonds whose portfolio weights are similar to financial leverage. Corporate tax can decrease after-tax consumption from dividends (increase leverage) and increase the tax shield that increases dividends (decrease leverage). Changes in dividends are responsible for the correlation between expected dividend growth and consumption growth and, thus, affect stock pricing and returns. Overall, the model is characterized by tax-induced portfolio risk associated with financial leverage.     

Lateral hiring and the performance of professional service firms: the moderating effects of leverage ratio

We theorized and tested the performance implications of the lateral hiring by professional service firms (i.e. law firms). Using a longitudinal dataset of lateral partner hires in 148 US law firms between the years of 2004 and 2008, the results indicated that the size of lateral hiring had a reversed U-shape relationship with the financial performance of a firm. In addition, the leverage ratio (i.e. the ratio between associate lawyers and partners) significantly moderated the reversed U-shape relationship between lateral hiring and firm performance, such that the placement of the bend in the curvilinear relationship, that is, the threshold, occurred more quickly at a low than at a high leverage ratio. This study contributes to the literature on strategic human resource management in professional service firms by providing empirical evidence on the effect of lateral hires and by emphasizing that lateral partner hiring should be considered with other important HR issues to fully capitalize lateral partners.     

Firm leverage and investment decisions in an emerging market

In this study, the effect of leverage on investment is analyzed by employing panel data methods for the Turkish non-financial firms that are quoted on İstanbul Stock Exchange. For one-way error component models, it is shown that there is a negative impact of leverage on investment for only firms with low Tobin’s Q. These results are in conformity with the previous literature and agency theories of corporate finance stating that leverage has a disciplining role for firms with low growth opportunities. However, when the model is extended to include the time effects in a two-way error component model, the relation between leverage and investment disappears.     

财务杠杆对企业资本结构的影响

企业价值最大化或股东财富最大化作为企业管理的一种理念越来越受到学术界和股东们追捧。不同筹资方式对企业价值最大化产生的影响引起大家广泛的关注,财务杠杆效应倍受青睐。本文通过分析企业财务杠杆效应进而分析不同资本结构情况下企业财务风险的大小,从而得到企业最佳资本结构,达到企业价值最大化的目标。     

Initial Financial Conditions,Unobserved Heterogeneity and the Survival of Nascent Canadian Manufacturing Firms

The firm dynamics literature has stressed productivity, size, and age effects in firm duration. Understanding the implications of financial state has largely been unexplored because of the lack of quality data on private entrant firms. This paper investigates the role of start‐up financial conditions (debt‐to‐asset ratio) on the duration of entrant manufacturing firms using a unique administrative firm‐level database called T2LEAP. The debt‐to‐asset ratio has an economically and statistically significant effect on firm hazard after controlling for usual covariates and unobserved heterogeneity. Further, a non‐monotonic relationship between firm hazard and leverage appears. Firm hazard varies positively with leverage for firms in the top two leverage quintiles, whereas hazard rates fall with leverage in the lower quintiles. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The dynamics of the leverage cycle

We present a simple agent-based model of a financial system composed of leveraged investors such as banks that invest in stocks and manage their risk using a Value-at-Risk constraint, based on historical observations of asset prices. The Value-at-Risk constraint implies that when perceived risk is low, leverage is high and vice versa; a phenomenon that has been dubbed pro-cyclical leverage. We show that this leads to endogenous irregular oscillations, in which gradual increases in stock prices and leverage are followed by drastic market collapses, i.e. a leverage cycle. This phenomenon is studied using simplified models that give a deeper understanding of the dynamics and the nature of the feedback loops and instabilities underlying the leverage cycle. We introduce a flexible leverage regulation policy in which it is possible to continuously tune from pro-cyclical to countercyclical leverage. When the policy is sufficiently countercyclical and bank risk is sufficiently low the endogenous oscillation disappears and prices go to a fixed point. While there is always a leverage ceiling above which the dynamics are unstable, countercyclical leverage policies can be used to raise the ceiling. We also study the impact on leverage cycles of direct, temporal control of the bank׳s riskiness via the bank׳s required Value-at-Risk quantile. Under such a rule the regulator relaxes the Value-at-Risk quantile following a negative stock price shock and tightens it following a positive shock. While such a policy rule can reduce the amplitude of leverage cycles, its effectiveness is highly dependent on the choice of parameters. Finally, we investigate fixed limits on leverage and show how they can control the leverage cycle.     

利益相关者视角下的财务困境成本与收益

本文认为,传统的财务理论仅从企业的角度考虑负债所导致的财务困境成本与收益,忽视了负债经营对债权人、客户、供应商、雇员及竞争对手等利益相关者交易行为的影响。企业财务杠杆过高会给潜在的债权人、客户、供应商和雇员带来了隐性成本,而理性的利益相关者通常可以事先预见到这些成本,最终将由负债企业承担。企业财务杠杆过高还会导致竞争对手趁机掠夺其市场份额,从而使企业未来利润大幅度下降。尽管有企业可以利用财务困境获得一些收益,但是相对于其财务困境成本,这些收益通常是微不足道的。     

Dividends and leverage: How to optimally exploit a non-renewable investment

In this paper we model the situation where a non-renewable investment is given, for instance a resource reservoir, and show how to optimally trade-off between dividends and leverage, in order to maximize a performance indicator for shareholders, up to the bankruptcy time. We then study the way market risk (the volatility of the market price of the resource) impacts the optimal policies and the default risk of the company. The moments when the policies are rebalanced are analyzed and we give a measure of the agency costs which appear between the shareholders and the debt-holders.     

Agency costs in the banking industry: An examination of ownership behavior,leverage and dividend policies

This paper examines agency theory arguments in the banking industry by analyzing the effect of four variables that proxy for agency costs—earnings volatility, managers' portfolio diversification losses, bank size, and standard deviation of bank equity returns—on the three financial policy variables of managerial stock ownership, leverage, and dividend yield. It is one of the first studies that examines the determination of financial policy variables, in light of agency concerns, in the banking industry. The study examines the largest 104 U.S. banks during the period 1985–1989. Evidence suggests that bank size and a measure of the managers' portfolio diversification opportunity set affect the bank's level of managerial stock ownership, leverage and dividends.     

杠杆演进以及初始杠杆对资本结构的影响分析

本文对公司财务杠杆的演进趋势以及初始杠杆对资本结构的影响进行了实证检验。结果表明,在初始时较高(或较低)杠杆公司在10年后仍维持较高(或较低)杠杆,并保持明显的差异性。随着时间的推移,较高(或较低)杠杆公司呈现出显著的杠杆收敛性。初始杠杆对10年以后公司当前杠杆的决定存在着显著且稳定的影响,即初始杠杆不随时间而改变且反映公司初始企业特征的因素是当前杠杆的重要决定因素。     

公司治理结构对财务报告品质可靠性的影响*——从盈余门坎的角度分析

研究重点在于探讨台湾上市公司治理结构是否会影响公司财务报告品质可靠性.由于台湾上市公司的核心代理问题主要来自控制股东与小股东之间的利益冲突.本文预期,控制股东会通过盈余管理达到门坎.实证结果发现,代理问题较严重的公司,裁决性应计项目较大,并会通过盈余管理跨越前期盈余门坎,造成财务报告信息可靠性降低.相较于其他类型的控制股东,具有家族色彩的控制股东较会通过盈余管理达到门坎,并降低财务信息品质可靠性.     

β系数与微观经济杠杆之关系研究

本文对我国钢铁类、能源类和化纤类上市公司2002年和2001年的β系数和微观经济杠杆度(经营杠杆度DOL和财务杠杆度DFL)的关系进行实证研究,得到两个主要结论:(1)回归分析得到我国2002年钢铁类上市公司以及2001年化纤类上市公司的β系数和微观经济杠杆度的参数估计方程;(2)实证结果显示我国钢铁类、能源类和化纤类上市公司的经营杠杆度DOL和财务杠杆度DFL在一定程度上有相互抵销的均衡趋势,验证了微观经济杠杆理论中经营杠杆度DOL和财务杠杆度DFL的均衡假设。     

公司发行可转换债券融资的动机分析

公司使用可转换债券筹集外部资金既是作为普通债券的替代,增加转换特性来降低利息率从而保持现金流量,也是转换条款建立“延迟股权”,通过转换,以高于现行股票的价格出售。本文研究发现,公司发行可转换债券是为了减少由于股东和管理者以及股东和债权人之间冲突所引起的代理成本;为了降低由发行普通债券带来的高额预期财务危机成本和普通股发行中经常出现的严重负面公告效应;以及在投资者和管理者对公司面临的风险认识不同时,使其价值不易受公司风险变化的影响。     

Influential ownership and capital structure

This paper explores the relation between ownership structures and capital structures in Russia—an economy with a state‐run banking sector, weak corporate governance, and highly concentrated ownership. We find that firms with the state as controlling shareholder have significantly higher leverage than firms controlled by domestic private controlling shareholders other than oligarchs. Both firms controlled by the state or oligarchs finance their growth with more debt than other firms. Profitability is negatively related to leverage across all types of controlling owners, indicating a preference for internal funding over debt. The results indicate that firms with owners that have political influence or ties to large financial groups enjoy better access to debt. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

融资结构与资本预算方法选择

传统的资本预算方法因没有考虑负债对企业的影响,权衡理论认为负债会给企业带来节税收益,降低股东与经理之间的代理成本,同时也会给企业带来财务困境成本和股东与债权人之间的代理成本。修正现值法、权益现金流量法和加权平均资本成本法,是西方主流反映负债融资对投资项目价值正负效应杠杆企业的资本预算方法。本文对此进行了探讨。     

Managerial compensation and the agency costs of debt finance

This paper presents a model of the agency costs of debt finance, based on the conflict of interest between shareholders and bondholders. We show how the terms of the compensation contract offered to management by shareholders can reduce these agency costs. We derive a managerial compensation contract that restores the first-best outcome and leads to a local irrelevance result for financial structure. More generally, the model points out that the nature of managerial compensation contracts will affect the firm's optimal financial structure, and offers a reason why managerial compensation is typically not closely correlated with shareholder returns.     

Firms,shareholders, and financial markets

We study the influence of the financial market on the decisions of firms in the real market. To that end, we present a model in which the shareholders’ portfolio selection of assets and the decisions of the publicly traded firms are integrated through the market process. Financial access alters the objective function of the firms, and the market interaction of shareholders substantially influences firms’ behavior in the real sector. After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we show that the financial sector integrates the preferences of all shareholders into the decisions for production and ownership structure. The participation from investors in the financial market also limits the firms’ ability to manipulate real prices, i.e., there is a loss of market power in the real sector. Note that, while the loss of market power changes expected profits, it is not detrimental to shareholders since the expected return of equity share depends on the variance (and not the mean) of profits. Indeed, any change in expected profits is absorbed by the financial price. We also show that financial access increases production, thereby altering the distribution of profits. In particular, financial access induces firms to take on more risk. Finally, financial access makes the relationship between risk-aversion and risk-taking ambiguous. For example, it is possible that an increase in risk-aversion leads to more risk-taking, i.e., the variance of real profits increases.     

Firm leverage decisions: Does industry matter?

We use a standard capital structure mode l to investigate the firm leverage decisions of 1620 companies listed in the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) across a span of 13 years (2000–2012), dividing the sample into mining and other industries (non-mining). We also test for significant differences in leverage decisions between these two groups by applying a dummy variable approach. Our findings show that fundamental differences exist between mining and non-mining companies when making leverage decisions. We find evidence that mining firms are more sensitive to profitability and asset tangibility where neither profitability nor asset tangibility has significant association for non-mining firms. Overall results suggest that industry-type does matter for firms making leverage decisions.     

经营杠杆与经营杠杆度的论述

本文运用杠杆原理,研究分析了经营中存在的经营杠杆及其杠杆度,推导出经营杠杆度的计算公式,阐明了经营杠杆在P-S图中的位置及其确定方法。得出以下几个结论:①经营杠杆是实际经营中客观存在的;②经营杠杆度DOL与安全边际系数MRS互为倒数关系,两者都对企业的经营状况起警示作用;③经营杠杆度DOL对销售收入S的函数为单调减函数;④企业应力求通过减小DOL来增加息税前利润EBIT。