Potential Beneficiaries from Reverse Mortgage Products for Elderly Homeowners: An Analysis of American Housing Survey Data

A variety of reverse mortgage loan programs have been available to elderly households for over a decade. The number of unrestricted reverse mortgage loans issued by the private sector has been quite small. About 12,000 loans have been issued through mid-1992. Some researchers take this to mean that the size of the potential market for reverse mortgages is also quite small. Other researchers claim that current low levels of activity reflect supply and demand problems, but that the potential market is in fact quite large. This paper uses American Housing Survey (AHS) data to estimate the potential size of the market for unrestricted reverse mortgages. The 1989 national AHS shows that there are over twelve million elderly homeowners (age 62 and over) who own their homes free and clear. Depending on their income, age and the level of home equity, the group of households most likely to benefit from reverse annuity mortgages is considerably smaller. As one approach to defining a lower bound of the estimate of potential beneficiaries from reverse mortgages, we count the number of homeowners in a prime group consisting of the older elderly, aged 70 or above, with an annual income of $30,000 or less, with home equity between $100,000 and $200,000, who have lived in their homes for over ten years. We estimate that there are about 800,000 elderly households in this prime group. For such households, reverse mortgage payments could represent a substantial percentage increase in income; other definitions of target groups can also be explored using the tables provided. The paper uses the 1985 through 1988 AHS Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) surveys to identify areas that have a large number of elderly homeowners in the prime target group, and in which these homeowners represent a large fraction of the elderly homeowner population. These locations are likely targets for introduction of reverse mortgage products because any campaign can be targeted towards a high concentration of likely eligible beneficiaries.     

Immigrants and Mortgage Delinquency

This article studies the effect of immigrant status on mortgage delinquency. Due to their different social and economic background, immigrant households may not integrate well into the host society, and therefore are more likely to be delinquent on mortgages than otherwise identical native‐born households. We test this hypothesis by comparing the mortgage delinquency rate between immigrant and native‐born households in the 2009 PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) data, in which all the immigrant households have been in the United States for more than 10 years. We find that, after controlling for observables, those relatively recent immigrants who have been in the United States for 10 to 20 years have a higher mortgage delinquency rate than native‐born, while immigrants who have resided in the United States for more than 20 years are no different from native‐borns. In addition, there is no evidence that the second generation of immigrants is more likely to be delinquent than the third‐or‐higher generations. Our results are robust to potential sample‐selection bias and functional misspecifications.     

Reverse Mortgages and the Liquidity of Housing Wealth

Housing wealth constitutes most of the non-pension wealth of the elderly population. This study analyzes the potential of reverse mortgages to increase the income and liquid wealth of the elderly by identifying households with relatively high levels of housing equity. Because this article looks at the whole distribution of elderly households and considers debt as well as income, it finds a larger potential market for reverse mortgages than previous studies.
Calculations from the 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation and Census population estimates show that over six million homeowners in the United States could increase their effective monthly income by at least 20% by using a reverse mortgage. Of these, more than 1.3 million have no children. Furthermore, a reverse mortgage would allow over 1.4 million poor elderly persons to raise their incomes above the poverty line.     

How Does Mortgage Debt Affect Household Consumption? Micro Evidence from China

The high growth rate of mortgage debt in various emerging and developed economies has captured headlines following the financial crisis. In this article, we investigate how mortgage debt impacts household consumption behavior and various components of household consumption. Utilizing comprehensive household survey data from China, we show that households with a mortgage consume a higher portion of income than households without a mortgage. This is in line with the argument that having a mortgage reduces the uncertainty that the household faces regarding how much to save each month in order to be able to own a house, and this reduced uncertainty leads to lower monthly savings for the purpose of buying a house. We also find that among households with a mortgage, those who spend a larger share of their income on mortgage payments spend less on consumption, reflecting the crowding out effect of mortgage payments on household consumption. Furthermore, we show that a government policy of decreasing the maximum loan‐to‐value ratio has a significant impact on households’ consumption. The article offers the first evidence of the impact of growing mortgage debt on the consumption behavior of households, and will have implications for government policies that encourage mortgage borrowing.     

Reverse Mortgages and Prepayment Risk

This paper presents a detailed assessment of the Connecticut Housing Finance Authority (CHFA) reverse annuity mortgage (RAM) program. Because of the size and payment history of the program, the analysis provides an empirical framework on which to develop and assess other home equity conversion (HEC) programs. The program offers insights into the economic impact of these programs and the factors affecting prepayment. The program issued 765 annuities over five years, and 240 of these loans have terminated payments. The annuity payments had a demonstrable financial impact on the elderly participants, with an 88% average annual income increase. Prepayment rates varied across borrower and loan characteristics. The rates were most sensitive to marital status and were heavily affected by the age of the borrower and the term of the loan. Although default risk exists, the evidence indicates a low probability of the loan value exceeding the house value.     

Mortgage Default and Prepayment Risks among Moderate‐ and Low‐Income Households

Using a unique sample of community reinvestment loans, we study the propensity of very low‐income households to terminate a mortgage and compare it to the outcomes for low‐income and moderate‐income households. The results indicate that, even within moderate‐ and low‐income segments, lower or very low income is associated with higher default and lower prepayment probabilities. In addition, depending on how low the borrower's income is, classic determinants of loan termination such as credit scores, the amount of equity in the home and local labor market conditions can have different impacts on default and prepayment probabilities.     

Explaining Refinancing Decisions Using Microdata

This paper develops a model which explains how mortgage-rate movements, transactions costs, changes in borrower income and house value, personal financial opportunities and the prepayment option embedded in fixed-rate mortgages affect a financially flexible borrower's decision to refinance an existing loan while retaining the underlying home. Broadening the focus of previous analytical work, the model explains why households with similar mortgage loans may react differently as financial market conditions change. It contains definitive empirical predictions that are supported by an analysis of a choice-based sample of individual loan transactions. Results suggest that refinancings are motivated both by movements in the level of interest rates and by borrowers' desires to alter their capital structures in the face of changing income and housing wealth.     

Housing Price Dynamics,Mortgage Credit and Reverse Mortgage Demand: Theory and Empirical Evidence

This article presents some theoretical and empirical approaches for identifying interactions among fundamental economic variables that determine housing prices. Using home equity conversion mortgage (HECM) loan‐level data, this study quantifies the major risks of reverse mortgages and shows that higher housing prices induce higher demand for reverse mortgages among elderly homeowners. Senior citizens rationally hold pessimistic expectations about future housing price appreciation and lock in their home‐equity gains by obtaining reverse mortgages, which in turn led to the substantial HECM growth prior to the financial crisis of 2008. A novel simulation also forecasts HECM loans under various economic scenarios. From a mortgage credit perspective, these findings generate several policy implications for the implementation of “HECM 3.0.”     

Pay Me Now or Pay Me Later: Alternative Mortgage Products and the Mortgage Crisis

Mortgage contract design has been identified as a contributory factor in the recent market crisis. Here we examine alternative mortgage products (including interest‐only and other deferred amortization structures) and develop a game theoretic model of contract choice given uncertain future income and house prices across different types of borrowers. Results imply that deferred amortization contracts are more likely to be selected in housing markets with greater expected price appreciation and by households with greater risk tolerance; moreover, such products necessarily entail greater default risk, especially among lower‐income households who are aggressive in housing consumption levels. Empirical tests of model predictions generally provide support for the theory.     

Is Selection Bias Inherent in Housing Transactions? An Equilibrium Approach

We develop an equilibrium model for residential housing transactions in an economy with houses that differ in their quality and households that differ in their planned holding horizon. We show that, in equilibrium, a clientele effect persists, with long‐horizon buyers overwhelmingly choosing higher quality properties and short‐horizon buyers settling for lower quality properties. This clientele effect creates a sample selection bias: the properties that are on the market are predominantly of lower quality. Since these are the preferred choice of short‐horizon buyers, they demonstrate a faster turnover. Both the clientele effect and the selection bias are more pronounced with an increase in the variance of house quality and in the variance of the planned holding horizon. Our theoretical model supports empirical evidence on the existence of such bias in home price indices and explains it by the differences in ex ante holding horizons.     

Valuing the Mortgage Borrower's Prepayment Option

This paper investigates the value of the prepayment option that normally accompanies a fixed-rate mortgage. Using the two-state option-pricing model developed by Bartter and Rendleman, the paper presents simulations of prepayment option values using several sets of interest rate parameters. The sensitivity of the value of the option to changes in various aspects of the mortgage contract is assessed. Prepayments are not priced separately in the market from the underlying mortgage, so the paper investigates how the inclusion of a prepayment option affects the contract interest rate. Finally, there is reason to believe that any option-pricing model will overestimate the value of a mortgage prepayment option. The size of this bias is assessed indirectly and is found to be rather small.     

Borrower Attitudes Toward Alternative Mortgage Instruments*

Much of the existing literature on homeownership assumes that financial markets work well enough to allow households to translate permanent income into effective demand. However, transaction costs, imperfections, and uncertainties all constrain the markets' operation so that people are often forced to choose a quantity of housing stock that diverges from their desired consumption level. Instead of being able to borrow against future income for the down payment or to make monthly payments in a pattern that matches future income, young families in their early years may be constrained from purchasing the size house they desire, and older households may remain in homes larger than they need. In light of these market imperfections, housing and tenure decisions depend not only on permanent income and the relative price of housing services, but also on such mortgage parameters as monthly payment patterns, down payment, and rate of equity accumulation. Models of the demand for housing and homeownership described in the existing literature do not include these parameters of mortgage finance. Mortgage terms are important factors in housing consumption and investment decisions. Because the standard mortgage no longer seems appropriate for all households under all economic conditions, the extent to which alternative mortgage instruments meet the requirements and preferences of different segments of the market becomes an important issue.     

Regressive Interest Rate Expectations and Mortgage Instrument Choice in the United Kingdom Housing Market

The paper considers the choice of mortgage instrument when the rate of interest is fixed for a short duration, with reversion to a variable (bullet) rate mortgage contract. The research is the first direct test for regressive interest rate expectations using United Kingdom data while testing for wealth and portfolio effects. The econometric modeling uses a variety of nonparametric and parametric techniques to control for classification error in the dependent variable. There is evidence that households adopt regressive interest rate expectations. The lack of statistical significance of wealth and portfolio effects confirms the short run cash flow perspective of United Kingdom mortgage choices.     

Self‐Reported vs. Market Estimated House Values: Are Homeowners Misinformed or Are They Purposely Misreporting?

Extant research finds significant gaps between a homeowner's self‐reported house value and market estimates, and that the gap is largest for underwater homeowners. Prior studies, however, have largely overlooked the possibility that homeowners’ self‐reported house value may be more accurate due to private information. Previous research has also neglected the possibility that there could be discordance between what homeowners know and what they report as their house value. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, this study examines how the choices of households reveal their knowledge of the true home value. In so doing, we find that that post move housing choices reveal that market estimates are accurate assessments of the housing value. Further, we find evidence that these underwater homeowners are aware of the actual house value, but are reporting them incorrectly. The results show that misreporting underwater homeowners are as likely to be late on their mortgage payments as homeowners that are reporting negative equity. Underwater homeowners’ reluctance to admit their losses accords with the theory of loss aversion.     

Reversing the Trend: The Recent Expansion of the Reverse Mortgage Market

Reverse mortgages allow elderly homeowners to tap into their housing wealth without having to sell or move out of their homes. However, very few eligible homeowners used reverse mortgages to achieve consumption smoothing until recently, when the reverse mortgage market in the United States witnessed substantial growth. In this article, I examine 1989–2007 loan‐level reverse mortgage data and conduct three sets of analyses to better understand the demand for reverse mortgages among elderly homeowners. First, I study the ZIP code characteristics correlated with reverse mortgage originations. Second, I show that recent reverse mortgage borrowers are significantly different from earlier borrowers in many respects. Third, I investigate the reasons why the reverse mortgage market experienced substantial growth in the mid‐2000s. Combining the reverse mortgage data with county‐level house price data, I find that higher house prices lead to more reverse mortgage originations. Specifically, the increases in house prices account for about one‐third of the overall growth in the reverse mortgage market from 2003 to 2007.     

Reverse Mortgages and Interest Rate Risk

We develop and apply a valuation model that quantifies the interest rate risk inherent in fixed-rate reverse mortgages. Consistent with intuition, our results show that the interest rate risk of a reverse mortgage is greater than that of either a typical coupon bond or a regular mortgage. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that this difference in interest rate risk is extremely large. In fact, the interest rate risk of a reverse mortgage often is several orders of magnitude greater than the interest rate risk of other fixed-income securities.     

Down Payment Saving in the United States: Evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics

We present a model of household saving toward a mortgage loan under an exogenous down payment requirement and preference for owning over renting. Our model explains a set of empirical observations such as the dual effect in the form of some households, in response to higher down payments, becoming discouraged savers while those who do not abandon purchasing plans save more. We also employ instrumental variable‐based methods to investigate the down payment saving behavior of first‐time home buyers in the United States. The empirical results based on Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data support the inelastic down payment elasticity of saving implied by our model.     

Are Adjustable‐Rate Mortgage Borrowers Borrowing Constrained?

Past research argues that changes in adjustable‐rate mortgage (ARM) payments may lead households to cut back on consumption. These outcomes are more likely if ARM borrowers are borrowing constrained, and we show in this article that ARM borrowers exhibit attitudes toward borrowing and behavior that are consistent with being borrowing constrained. Although the demographic and financial characteristics of ARM and fixed‐rate mortgage (FRM) borrowers are somewhat similar, ARM borrowers differ from FRM borrowers in their uses of credit and attitudes toward it. In addition, we find the consumption growth of households with an ARM is more sensitive to past income than the consumption growth of other households, suggesting the ARM borrowers may be subject to borrowing constraints that hinder their ability to smooth consumption.     

Home Ownership,Household Leverage and Hyperbolic Discounting

I examine tenure and mortgage choice in an equilibrium model in which households make decisions as if they discount hyperbolically rather than exponentially. Overall, hyperbolic discounting does not seem to explain the high rates of home ownership or portfolio concentration in housing in the data. I then study the choice between mortgages that require a substantial down payment and mortgages that require no down payment. Allowing households access to no‐down‐payment mortgages exacerbates rather than mitigates the undersaving of hyperbolic discounters. However, even when households discount hyperbolically, welfare is higher when households have access to no‐down‐payment mortgages.     

Distributional Consequences of Alternative Mortgage Instruments

One of the major factors hindering the introduction of alternative mortgage instruments is the possibility of adverse consequences to certain groups of households seeking to obtain credit for homeownership. This study examines this issue through an analysis of cross-sectional household data obtained from the 1970 Survey of Consumer Finances. Using multiple regression analysis, a series of structural demand models are derived and estimated. These models relate the probability of homeownership, levels of housing consumption, mortgage credit usage, and downpayment to income, assets, and other socioeconomic variables, to variables representing the relative price of housing and homeownership, and to certain variables representing the present value and cash flow costs of mortgage credit. Several mortgage-related variables are found to be influential in housing demand decisions. These models are then used to simulate alternative instrument introduction. The graduated-payment and price-level adjusted mortgages are predicted to be superior to the current instrument of mortgage finance in encouraging homeownership, housing consumption, and the use of mortgage credit among all household classes. The standard variable-rate mortgage, especially one tied to a short-term interest rate, is predicted to be inferior to the standard instrument, with the most adverse impacts upon lower-income, young, elderly, and black households.