上市公司股票期权激励制度研究

股票期权激励制度从本质上说是以产权制度为基础,旨在解决公司所有权与控制权分离情况下委托代理问题的激励机制.只有在公司内部构建起有效的约束公司相关利益主体间相互关系的机制,并结合相应的制度环境和市场条件,股票期权激励制度才可能充分发挥其积极作用.由于我国并不具备推行股票期权激励制度的前提条件,我们必须对上市公司实施股票期权激励制度进行引导与规范,控制股票期权激励机制的滥用.本文认为,要有效实施股票期权激励,除修改法律法规、科学设计业绩评价体系与股票期权激励制度方案外,更重要的是完善公司治理机制,加强证券监管,培育资本市场与职业经理人市场,提高中介机构的独立性.     

股票期权实施范围研究(上)

作为２０世纪８０年代以来最富成效的激励制度之一，股票期权已成为市场经济国家和地区的企业对高级管理人员（以下简称高管人员）进行长期激励的非常普遍的方式。调查数据显示，截止１９９７年底，美国４５％的上市公司实施了股票期权计划，１９９６年《财富》杂志评出的全球５００家大工业企业中有８９％的企业实行了股票期权制度，美国硅谷的公司更是普遍采用了股票期权制。由于股票期权在长期激励、降低委托代理成本、提升公司业绩、提高投资者信心，特别是海外投资者信心等方面具有我国传统薪酬制度难以替代的作用，近两年来，股票期权…     

股票期权激励制度关键要素的优化设计

股票期权制度的内在缺陷影响了其激励的有效性，其制度设计的不合理之处在于以单一的股票价格作为衡量业绩和确定价格的指标。本文重新设计了业绩评价模型和行权价格定价模型。以期能够发挥股票期权制度的应有效果，为企业制定股票期权计划提供有益的参考。     

我国现阶段推行股票期权的局限性分析

通过对我国实行股票期权对经理人员起不到激励作用的原因以及在技术上存在的难题的分析，得出了现阶段我国股票期权制度应该缓行的结论。     

实行经理股票期权的问题及其对策

经理股票期权制度是被市场证明有效的，能积极促进企业中长期稳定并持续发展的激励制度。我国在理论上、政策上都积极鼓励、支持这一制度的实施。但在实践中，实施这一制度有很多的现实问题，必须有效地加以解决，以促进经理股票期权制度的积极实施。 一、股票来源的问题与对策 １．中国目前的新股发行政策尚没有关于准许从上市公司的首次公开发行中预留股份以实施公司的股票期权激励计划的先例，同时增发新股的政策也没有相应的条款。另一方面，中国的上市公司通过股份回购的方式取得实施股票期权激励计划所需股份的途径被相应的政策规定所…     

我国股票期权设计相关问题初探析

股票期权作为一种协调经营者与股东利益关系的长期激励制度,在我国受到了越来越多的关注。据统计,我国1000多家上市公司中,正在实施或已经实施了不同类型股票期权的公司已有近100家,近150家化工企业上市公司中,也有21家在进行尝试。所谓股票期权是指企业给予经营者(即被激励者)     

实行股票期权制度的积极作用、面临的主要问题及对策建议

近年来,对上市公司经营者实行股票期权激励方式在我国受到人们越来越多的关注。我国一些省市首先在国有企业特别是上市公司开始尝试股票期权制度。实行股票期权制度对深化国有企业改革和推动国有企业发展产生了积极作用,同时也面临着一些深层次的问题,需要我们在实践中不断探索并予以解决。     

克服股票期权缺陷,建立有中国特色的激励制度

本文通过分析西方股票期权的缺陷，提出国内企业必须建立员工持股，多种激励，虚拟股票计划等有中国特色的激励制度，才能在今后的发展中立于不败之地。     

经理人股票期权价值的理论及应用

股票期权激励的研究和实践中广泛应用布莱克——斯科尔斯模型进行股票期权的公允价值计价,然而对经理人而言的股票期权价值还要考虑经理人的风险偏好、财富的多元化程度等因素的影响。经理人期权价值不等于公司期权成本的基本理论可以解决及解释在股票期权实践中的一些关键性问题,如期权激励有效性的衡量、激励期权的风险溢价、最优行权价的确定、行权时间的确定。该理论的应用对我国上市公司股权激励的实施也有重要启示。     

Black-Scholes模型与经理股票期权的实证研究

经理股票期权(Exexutive Stock Options,ESOs)做为企业高管人员的一种激励方式,是从金融衍生工具股票期权发展而来,其理论起点为传统委托--代理框架下的最优契约理论.本文以经理股票期权作为研究对象,结合Black-Scholes期权定价模型,对中国2006～2008年88家实施股票期权激励的上市公司进行实证研究,得出中国上市公司样本企业股票期权价格与股票期权行权价、授予时股票价格、股票价格波动丰、无风险利率、股票期权有效期的相关变化关系,为经理股票期权契约设计提供参考.     

A model of person‐pay interaction: how executives vary in their responses to compensation arrangements

A wealth of research indicates that both executive characteristics and incentive compensation affect organizational outcomes, but the literatures within these two domains have followed distinct, separate paths. Our paper provides a framework for integrating these two perspectives. We introduce a new model that specifies how executive characteristics and incentives operate in tandem to influence strategic decisions and firm performance. We then illustrate our model by portraying how executive characteristics interact with a specific type of pay instrument—stock options—to affect executive behaviors and organizational outcomes. Focusing on three individual‐level attributes (executive motives and drives, cognitive frame, and self‐confidence), we develop propositions detailing how executives will vary in their risk‐taking behaviors in response to stock options. We further argue that stock options will amplify the implications of executive ability, such that option‐heavy incentive schemes will increase the performance of talented executives but worsen the performance of low‐ability executives. Our framework and propositions are meant to provide a starting point for future theorizing and empirical testing of the interactive effects of executive characteristics and incentive compensation on strategic decisions and organizational performance. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do Broad‐based Employee Ownership,Profit Sharing and Stock Options Help the Best Firms Do Even Better?

This article analyses the linkages among group incentive methods of compensation (broad‐based employee ownership, profit sharing and stock options), labour practices, worker assessments of workplace culture, turnover and firm performance in firms that applied to the ‘100 Best Companies to Work For in America’ competition from 2005 to 2007. Although employers with good labour practices self‐select into the 100 Best Companies firms sample, which should bias the analysis against finding strong associations among modes of compensation, labour policies and outcomes, we find that employees in the firms that use group incentive pay more extensively participate more in decisions, have greater information sharing, trust supervisors more and report a more positive workplace culture than in other companies. The combination of group incentive pay with policies that empower employees and create a positive workplace culture reduces voluntary turnover and increases employee intent to stay and raises return on equity.     

权变视角下现代企业激励机制研究

传统激励理论以人的共性为出发点,忽视了不同个体间的差异性及情境因素的影响,激励效果较差。权变激励针对个体特殊性、情境多样性和社会复杂性,通过情感激励、按需激励、培训激励、股票期权激励等几种运行方式,以动态、多维的新视角寻找激励结构中各种关系的最佳匹配。从而优化激励过程,提高激励的有效性。     

公司融资结构与委托代理机制设计研究

以现代财经理论为出发点,建立了非对称信息条件下基于融资结构的委托代理模型,并将财务风险和经理持股两个因素纳入模型中,对模型进行了求解,研究了在此背景下的激励机制的设计,并通过对模型的分析,阐述了经理在股权激励和债务约束两种背景下的行为特征。     

A dual agency view of board compensation: the joint effects of outside director and CEO stock options on firm risk

This paper contributes to multiple agency theory by examining how the compensation schemes awarded to outside directors and the CEO jointly affect firm‐level risk taking. Using data of the S&P 1500 firms from 1997 to 2006, we find support for earlier arguments that providing the CEO, the outside directors, or both with stock options increases risk taking. More importantly, we find that compensating outside directors with stock options has significantly stronger effects than CEO stock options. Finally, contrary to what one would expect, we find that these effects are mutually substituting; that is, if both the outside directors and the CEO are provided with stock option compensation, outside directors' incentives weaken the effect of the CEO's incentives on firms' risk taking. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managerial compensation and corporate spinoffs

Research summary : This article investigates how corporate spinoffs affect managerial compensation. These deals are found to improve the alignment of spinoff firm managers' incentive compensation with stock market performance, especially among spinoff firm managers that used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary, and particularly when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to its parent firm's remaining businesses. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for the parent firm managers running the divesting companies. This finding appears to be driven by a significant post‐spinoff increase in these managers' incentive compensation, the magnitude of which is inversely related to governance quality in their firms. Together, these results elucidate how spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and the companies they divest. Managerial summary : This article explores how spinoffs affect incentive alignment: the correlation between incentive compensation and stock market performance. The incentive alignment of spinoff firm managers improves following these deals. These gains are the largest when spinoff firm managers used to be divisional managers of the spun‐off subsidiary and when the spun‐off subsidiary performs better than or is unrelated to the other businesses in the parent firm. By contrast, incentive alignment does not improve for parent firm managers. Instead, the level of these managers' incentive compensation rises significantly post‐spinoff, and the magnitude of this increase is inversely related to governance quality in these firms. Together, these results shed light on the ways in which spinoffs influence managerial compensation in diversified firms and in the companies they divest. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

股票期权激励契约合理性及其约束性因素——基于中国上市公司的实证分析

股权激励是完善上市公司治理的重要环节。设计适合中国上市公司特征的股权激励方案并规避其所带来的风险是使其发挥作用的关键。本文以2006—2008年公布与实施股票期权激励方式的中国上市公司为样本,对股票期权激励契约的合理性特征及其内生约束性因素进行了理论探讨与实证检验,研究表明,激励期限与绩效条件是体现股票期权契约合理性的关键要素,除外部法律与监管约束之外,大股东、债务融资与独立董事等内生性因素对两者具有显著的约束作用,进一步证实了公司内部治理机制的互补效应假说,为上市公司股票期权契约的设计与实施提供有益参考。     

Myopic Corporate Behaviour with Optimal Management Incentives

Existing models in which stock markets lead to corporate 'short-termism' rely on an exogenously imposed objective for top managers. This paper endogenizes both managers' concern for short-term stock prices and the resulting distortions. We show that when the manager can trade on her own account on the stock market in a way that is observable to market participants but which is not verifiable in court, shareholders will choose an incentive contract which induces a bias towards short-term returns. Consistent with recent evidence, the short-term bias is greater when the optimal contract provides low-powered management incentives.     

管理者薪酬、在职消费与公司绩效——基于合作博弈的分析视角

在我国公司管理者的薪酬激励体系中,年薪、股权激励和在职消费是三个重要组成部分,系统地研究这三个组成部分之间的关系及其对公司绩效影响,对于建立有效的管理者薪酬激励制度和完善公司治理具有重要意义。本文从合作博弈的角度出发,在非对称Nash讨价还价模型的基础上,通过引入内生化的讨价还价力,构建了一个内生化的Nash讨价还价模型,并应用此模型系统地分析了管理者年薪、股权激励与在职消费之间的关系。本文理论模型分析表明:在给定年薪的情况下,管理者持股比例与在职消费之间存在替代关系。本文运用2005—2010年沪深两市A股上市公司面板数据对上述分析结果以及管理者年薪、股权激励、在职消费与公司绩效之间关系进行了实证分析,结果发现:管理者持股比例和在职消费之间存在替代关系,管理者持股比例的增加能够抑制在职消费,从而提高公司绩效。