税收竞争与协调：综述与启示

税收协调的动力并非来自竞争本身，或许更多的是对竞争的恐惧以及模仿效应。税收协调具有潜在收益。在人头税筹集财政收入有限的前提下，税收协调会提高效率。也就是说，如果所有辖区同时提高资本税，那么所有辖区都将增加税收收入，进而改善公共服务水平。同时，由于国家资本总量固定且辖区是同质的，资本税的增加并不影响资本的分配结构。     

税收竞争理论综述

税收竞争是各个国家或地区,为吸引流动生产要素,促进经济增长,进而提高国民福利,在税率设定和税制安排上相互博弈和竞争的行为。本文以经济效率为线索,系统地从Tiebout假说、基本税收竞争理论和各种假设扩展下的研究来综述税收竞争理论,内容包括税收竞争导致经济无效率的原因及其减弱和消除办法,税收竞争的经济效应和税收协调等。     

对于国际税收竞争的初探

20世纪80年代以来,随着经济全球化的深入发展,资本、劳动力、技术等的跨国流动日趋频繁及容易,国与国在税收制度、政策上的相互联系、相互依赖、相互制约日益加强。因为包括资本、技术、劳动力在内的生产要素是一国重要的课税基础,其收益往往对应着某些税种的课征对象,而其拥有者则对应着相应的税种纳税人。因而这些要素的流动性必然会对一国税收收入、税制结构、税负结构、税收征管及其税收主权产生深刻的影响。同时也可能主动运用降税、税收优惠等税收手段吸引流动性要素的流入或防止其外流。如果它国对此的反应是此采取同样或更甚的措施,则国际税收竞争就不可避免了。     

税收竞争、寻租与财政分权

无论是在工业化国家还是发展中国家中，都存在着一个共同的现象，即在一国内部实行财政分权制度。财政分权是伴随着经济一体化的不断推进而同时产生的。关于财政分权这一问题，一直都引起了经济学家对政府政策有效性问题的关心和兴趣。财政支出责任划分会提高地     

税收竞争、分成激励与政府偏好——兼论均等化转移支付的作用

财政分权为地方政府大力发展经济提供激励的同时,也引发了地区之间的税收竞争。分成激励将如何影响地区间的税收竞争强度?在不同政府偏好下税收竞争将怎样影响地区投资、产出差距和居民福利?均等化转移支付在税收竞争中扮演着什么样的角色?为了解答上述问题,本文构建一个税收竞争模型并进行多个维度的拓展,结合数值模拟分析表明：(1)地方政府税收分成比例增加会提高税收竞争强度;(2)地区之间的税收竞争、投资和税收政策显著受到地方政府偏好的影响;(3)随着分成激励的加强,税收竞争将导致地区之间的产出差距和居民福利差距逐渐增加;(4)均等化转移支付制度能够缓解地区间税收竞争。因此,上级政府在制定对地方主政官员考核方式时应该考虑地方政府偏好对地区税收政策和财政支出政策的影响,同时要做好地区统筹,为欠发达地区提供相应政策支持并合理利用均等化转移支付政策工具。     

完善税收激励政策 推动中国新能源产业发展

新能源产业是中国战略性新兴产业之一,发展新能源产业是转变经济发展方式,优化产业结构的必然选择。然而目前中国新能源产业的发展面临诸多难题,需要国家税收优惠政策的激励和扶持。针对目前税收优惠政策存在的诸多缺陷和不足之处,有必要对其加以完善。     

资本集聚、税收互动与纵向税收竞争

依据2003—2007年中国26个省区269个城市的面板数据,通过构造3维误差成分结构的空间计量模型,以及工具变量两步sys-GMM估计、双重固定效应法和多重空间权重矩阵设置,本文发现政府层级之间存在显著的纵向税收外部性。这种互补性质的策略互动影响不同于西方理论考虑的具有充分和稳定税收管辖权的各级政府会由于共享税基产生交互影响,而是上级政府基于政治和行政权威,面向辖内下级政府实施的具有利维坦特征的税收驱赶和"挤压"影响,是一种纵向政府层级间的"税收竞争"。     

税收竞争、经济集聚与地区投资行为

中国财政分权体制下的地区间招商引资竞争广泛存在。本文通过一个纳入经济集聚因素的新古典投资决策计量模型,考察了税收激励对投资地域选择的影响。研究发现目前在中东部地区经济集聚可为地方财政带来一定的集聚租金,这使地区间税收激励政策呈现为差异化竞争策略;投资的流动性、地区经济基础、投资的产权性质等均对地区的税收激励政策选择有重要影响。本文的研究意味着,实现区域均衡发展需要构建稳定的地区间财力分享制度、改善欠发达地区的产业发展基础。     

国家规模与FDI的税收竞争

一、引言当厂商选择成为跨国公司和建立国外生产企业时,厂商很少会建立工厂而只供应它所投资的国内市场。相反,厂商会建立一个供应周边国家消费者的基地。这种FDI行为可能是由为了努力提高在某个地区的国家之间的一体化水平而引起的,比如说现在的一体化组织:欧盟(EU),北美自由贸易区(NAFTA)和东盟国家(ASEAN)等。     

Tax competition in federations revisited

We extend Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2004) by considering all-purpose public goods that are beneficial to both producers and consumers. Horizontal externality (resp. vertical externality) exerted by tax competition will not necessarily lead to inefficient outcomes.     

Platform competition and seller investment incentives

Many products and services are not sold on open platforms but on competing for-profit platforms, which charge buyers and sellers for access. What is the effect of for-profit intermediation on seller investment incentives? Since for-profit intermediaries reduce the available rents in the market, one might naively suspect that sellers have weaker investment incentives with competing for-profit platforms. However, we show that for-profit intermediation may lead to overinvestment when free access would lead to underinvestment because investment decisions affect the strength of indirect network effects and, thus, access prices. We characterize the effect of for-profit intermediation on investment incentives depending on the nature of the investment and on which side of the market singlehomes.     

Bargaining and competition revisited

We show the robustness of the Walrasian result obtained in models of bargaining in pairwise meetings. Restricting trade to take place only in pairs, most of the assumptions made in the literature are dispensed with. These include assumptions on preferences (differentiability, monotonicity, strict concavity, bounded curvature), on the set of agents (dispersed characteristics) or on the consumption set (allowing only divisible goods).     

Tax evasion and competition

Using a Cournot oligopoly model with an endogenous number of firms and evasion of indirect taxes, we show that more intense competition may have the negative side effect of increasing tax evasion, thereby, lowering public revenues and welfare. This will be the case if market entry costs decrease. A similar result will hold if marginal production costs fall and demand is either weakly concave, or convex and inelastic. The result of more competition, less evasion and higher public revenues will be obtained if (a) marginal production costs fall and demand is convex and elastic or (b) the demand elasticity increases. As a policy implication, we prove that tax enforcement should be intensified if there is a negative trade‐off between competition and evasion.     

Tax incentives in fiscal federalism: an integrated perspective

Abstract Models of fiscal federalism rarely account for the efficiency implications of intergovernmental fiscal ties for federal tax policy. This paper shows that fiscal institutions such that federal tax deductibility, vertical revenue‐sharing, and fiscal equalization (being common features of existing federations) encourage local taxation, but may discourage federal taxation. Furthermore, the structure of public spending is skewed towards local spending. We also show that, when considering Leviathan governments, fiscal institutions reduce confiscatory taxation by the federal government. The result is contrary to the Cartelization Hypothesis ( Brennan and Buchanan 1980 ). Finally, we characterize the efficient design of intergovernmental fiscal ties.     

Product market competition,incentives and fraudulent behavior

The present paper studies incentive provision in a model where a manager can affect the firm's stock price by exerting unobservable effort and through costly, deceptive signalling and investigates the role product market competition plays in shaping shareholders' trade-off between inducing effort and fraud.     

Tax incentives and foreign direct investment in China

The preferential tax policies for foreign direct investment (FDI) in China were terminated by a tax reform in 2008. This article uses the provincial-level panel data for 1998?2008 before the reform in order to study whether the tax incentive had been a significant determinant of foreign investment decisions. We find that market size and geographic location had significant impacts on the FDI inflow into China but the tax incentive policies were not a sufficient determinant of FDI inflow into China over the periods studied, which provides a rationale for the termination of the tax incentives in FDI at 2008 reform in China.     

Tax incentives and fertility in Canada: quantum vs tempo effects

Abstract.  Using inter-jurisdictional differences in the implementation of the Family Allowance Program in Canada in the mid-1970s, this paper first shows that Quebec families with two or more children prior to being exposed to the program responded quite strongly to the added incentives in the short run relative to women in other Canadian provinces. Tracking down the cohorts across Censuses, we find that the same group of Quebec families subsequently showed a decrease in fertility relative to the rest of Canada, leaving ultimate family size unaffected. These results are consistent with the program having generated only a timing effect.     

Tax incentives for investment: A dynamic general equilibrium perspective

Zusammenfassung In einem einfachen dynamischen Gleichgewichtsmodell mit überlappenden Generationen werden die Wachstumswirkungen von Investitionsförderungsmaßnahmen simuliert. Dabei stellt sich heraus, daß die Wirkung des Steuersatzes von den anderen Bestimmungen der Unternehmenssteuer abhängt. Wenn die Steuer bereits in der Ausgangslage durch großzügige steuerliche Absetzbarkeit der Investitionsausgaben investitionsfördernd ist, dann kann nur eine Erhöhung des Steuersatzes zusätzliche Investitionen induzieren. Der höhere Steuersatz steigert den Wert der Absetzbarkeit von Investitionsausgaben und schafft damit den Investitionsanreiz.Außerdem erweist sich die Erhöhung des Absetzbetrages als eine Investitionsförderungsmaßnahme, die sich selbst finanziert. Dennoch ist die Erhöhung des Absetzbetrages kein free lunch, weil die Reduktion der Anschaffungskosten für neues Kapital aufgrund einer einfachen Arbitrage-Bedingung auch das alte Kapital entwertet. Dieser Kapitalisierungseffekt von Investitionsförderungsmaßnahmen belastet die Kapitaleigner und wirkt daher wie eine versteckte Vermögenssteuer.

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An earlier version of the paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Austrian Economic Association 1988. I am indebted to J. R. Chen and the referees for valuable comments.