A reply to Randall E. LaSalle: “The civil justice system and going-concern audit reports: Comments on ‘Auditors’ decision-making under going-concern uncertainties in low litigation-risk environments: Evidence from Hong Kong’ ”

In a dissent from the conclusion reached in Lam and Mensah [Lam, K, Mensah, Y.M., 2006. Auditors’ decision-making under going-concern uncertainties in low Litigation-risk environments: Evidence from Hong Kong. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 25 (6), 706–739], Lasalle has proposed a number of alternative plausible explanations for our findings that Hong Kong auditors issued disclaimer of opinions in a manner associated with the eventual outcome to the clients. We examine these explanations and attempt to relate them to relevant empirical evidence in the literature. We find that none of his plausible explanations is consistent with the limited empirical evidence available. Thus, we continue to believe that a high litigation-risk environment is not a necessary pre-requisite for high quality audits.     

Auditors’ decision-making under going-concern uncertainties in low litigation-risk environments: Evidence from Hong Kong

This study examines the audit opinions issued by auditors in a low litigation-risk environment at a time of high economic uncertainty – that of Hong Kong in the period immediately after the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Empirical research using United States data has shown that, contrary to professional guidance which restricts the issue of “disclaimer of opinion” only to situations where existing uncertainties prevent the auditor from forming an opinion, auditors tend to use the “disclaimer” report (in the going concern context) to signal more extreme client firm’s distress. In the high litigation-risk environment of the US, researchers have attributed this tendency to the idea that “disclaimer of opinion” reports are used by auditors to provide some protection against potential legal liability. The results of this study provide evidence that, even in the low litigation-risk environment of Hong Kong, auditors still use “disclaimer” reports to signal more extreme client firm financial distress. Thus, the maintenance of a high litigation-risk environment does not appear to be a necessary pre-requisite for high quality audits.     

Determinants of going concern opinions and audit fees for development stage enterprises

Startup entities have been the focus of much political and academic interest recently. Development stage enterprises (DSEs), as defined by SFAS 7, are startup entities for which some publicly available information exists. New accounting standards have removed the DSE designation and related extra reporting requirements, and placed more responsibility on owners and managers to assess the ability of entities to continue as a going concern. We examined information from financial statements and audit reports of companies previously reporting as DSEs to investigate what increases the likelihood of receiving a going concern modification in auditors' opinions (GCO) and what affects audit fees. Our overall analyses indicate that the asset size of DSEs, negative working capital, and prior-year going concern modifications consistently influence going concern modifications to auditors' opinions. Managers should clearly consider these conditions when making their assessment of their companies' future going concern status. Our results indicate that the size of the audit firm did not influence the going concern modification decision, but Big4 auditors charge significantly higher fees than other auditors. Thus, managers/owners of DSEs should weigh the benefits of having a Big4 firm audit on their financial statements against the higher fees charged by those firms.     

The changing relationship between audit firm size and going concern reporting

As a result of gradual shifts in the market for audit services, we expect financially stressed public companies to be increasingly audited by regional firms, who, in turn, will be increasingly likely to issue going concern reports to their financially stressed public companies. Our expectations challenge the view that larger audit firms, in order to avoid exposure to litigation, report more conservatively. To address these issues, we examine the 22 years between 1989 and 2010, which we classify into four ERAs (e.g., 1989–1994, 1995–2001, 2002–2005, and 2006–2010). We initially document that over time, financially stressed public companies are shifting to regional audit firms, partly due to the actions of larger audit firms shedding these clients, which represent ex-ante conservatism. In contrast, audit firm reporting represents ex-post conservatism. We next show that over time, for their financially stressed public clients, regional audit firms are increasingly more likely to issue going concern reports, and BigN audit firms are increasingly less likely to issue going concern reports. We also show that in more recent ERAs, regional audit firms have been more likely than BigN and national audit firms to issue a going concern report to their financially stressed pubic clients. Overall, our evidence suggests that more recently, larger audit firms, relative to regional audit firms, acted more proactively to lessen their litigation risks through increasing centralization of client selection and acceptance processes. However, our evidence suggests that more recently, to lessen their litigation risks, regional audit firms, relative to BigN and national audit firms, acted more conservatively by issuing more going concern reports to their financially stressed public clients.     

Non-audit Service Fees and Audit Quality: The Impact of Auditor Specialization

We posit that the effect of non‐audit fees on audit quality is conditional on auditor industry specialization. Industry specialist auditors are more likely than nonspecialists to be concerned about reputation losses and litigation exposure, and to benefit from knowledge spillovers from the provision of non‐audit services. We find evidence that audit quality measured by increased propensity to issue going‐concern opinion, increased propensity to miss analysts' forecasts, as well as higher earnings‐response coefficients increases with the level of non‐audit services acquired from industry specialist auditors compared to nonspecialist auditors.     

Auditors’ going‐concern‐modified opinions after 2001: measuring reporting accuracy

An important change in auditors’ reporting behaviour in the period after the high‐profile corporate collapses in 2001 is that auditors were more likely to issue going‐concern (GC)‐modified audit opinions. Comparing company failure rates subsequent to receiving a first‐time going‐concern (FTGC)‐modified audit opinion in the pre‐ and post‐2001 periods, we find a consistent type 1 error (misclassification) rate (the rate of survival among companies issued an FTGC opinion). Results are indicative of auditors maintaining GC reporting accuracy when comparing the 1995–1996 and 2004–2005 periods. This conclusion is supported after considering the impact of mitigating circumstances surrounding companies that received an FTGC‐modified audit report and survived.     

Client influence and auditor independence revisited: Evidence from auditor resignations

Financial scandals such as the Enron-Andersen debacle provoke concerns that auditors lack independence when faced with influential clients. Unlike previous studies that examine whether client influence affects audit quality on ongoing engagements (providing mixed results), we investigate whether client influence (which engenders “independence risk”) at the audit-office level affects auditor resignations from high engagement-risk clients. We construct summary measures of engagement risk, using client disclosures on Form 8-K filings, potential risk factors (e.g., litigation risk), and auditor action (e.g., issuance of a going concern opinion) on the previous year’s financial statements. Focusing on risky clients, we find that auditors are more likely on average to resign from influential clients, and this positive association holds for auditors that are less likely to have mechanisms in place to mitigate independence risk. Also, importantly, influential clients are prevalent across the spectrum of client size, and the positive association between client influence and auditor resignations holds for both large and small clients.     

Effect of audit report disclosure on auditor litigation risk

Internationally, the escalating number of cases levelled against auditors and the costs of defending such actions has led to the auditing profession calling for measures to reduce their liability burden. Relatively few measures have been taken by the auditing profession by way of adapting the disclosure contained in the audit report to mitigate their litigation risk. This study examines whether the issuance of an audit opinion with a going concern related ‘emphasis of matter’ paragraph or work practices disclosure has any effect on potential litigants' likelihood of pursuing litigation against the auditor. An analysis of 69 responses from advanced law students and 18 practitioners working in corporate liquidation demonstrate that a modified (but not qualified) audit report effectively acts as a ‘red flag’ and reduces potential litigants' propensity to initiate litigation. However, work practices disclosure did not significantly alter potential litigants' inclination to recommend litigation. Despite this finding, respondents (particularly liquidators) indicated that work practices disclosure was an important factor in their litigation decision. These results suggest that further investigation into how to effectively disclose the work done on audit and assurance engagements is needed. This has implications for standard setters and the auditing profession, especially considering recent changes in the disclosure contained in audit and assurance reports.     

The effect of SOX on small auditor exits and audit quality

We find that over six hundred auditors with fewer than 100 SEC clients exit the market following SOX. Compared to the non-exiting auditors, the exiting auditors are lower quality, where quality is gauged by: (1) avoidance of AICPA peer reviews and failure to comply with PCAOB rules, and (2) severity of the peer review and inspection reports. In addition, clients of exiting auditors receive higher quality auditing from successor auditors, as captured by a greater likelihood of receiving going concern opinions. Our results suggest that the PCAOB inspections improve audit quality by incentivizing low quality auditors to exit the market.     

Effects of managerial overconfidence and ability on going-concern decisions and auditor turnover

I examine how the appearance of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect 1) auditors' decisions to issue a going concern opinion and 2) auditor dismissal rates after issuing a going concern opinion. Managerial attributes are likely to have an influence on auditors' decisions because auditors obtain and evaluate information about client management's remedy plans when there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. While prior literature on managerial overconfidence classifies all managers who demonstrate overconfident behaviors in one group, I argue that the literature needs to take managerial ability into consideration when measuring overconfidence. I find that auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion to clients with seemingly overconfident managers only when the management who appears overconfident is also incompetent. I also find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after issuance of a going concern opinion when the client company has seemingly overconfident management. Finally, I find that the association between managerial overconfidence and auditor dismissal subsequent to issuance of a going concern opinion is stronger when management is relatively more powerful than the company's audit committee.     

Discussion of “economic analysis of accountants’ ethical standards: the case of audit opinion shopping”

In his paper, Cushing (Cushing, B.E., (1999). Economics analysis of accountants’ ethical standards: The case of audit opinion shopping. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 18 (4/5)) argues for an increasing role of “laissez-faire” approaches to professional accounting ethics. To formally present his argument, Cushing (1999) employs a classic auditor–client dispute over a financial reporting issue; the dispute’s resolution is framed within a prisoner’s dilemma game. Three increasingly sophisticated models are used to examine both strict (explicit rules and monitoring) and laissez-faire (moral training and leadership) approaches to induce ethical auditor play within the prisoner’s dilemma game.My comments are an effort to consider if Cushing's (1999) arguments for a laissez-faire approach are practicable. To do this I first relate Cushing's (1999) arguments to the theoretical attributes of a profession. Second, I extend his arguments to include ethical disposition. Two bases of ethical disposition are discussed, moral reasoning theory and the persona of individuals. I conclude that a movement toward a laissez-faire approach to ethics is a strategy the profession should not ignore.     

An investigation of recent changes in going concern reporting decisions among Big N and non-Big N auditors

Corporate accounting failures and regulatory proceedings that led to the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 increased the scrutiny of auditors. We investigate whether these events resulted in a change in auditor behavior with respect to going concern reporting. Generally speaking, we find that non-Big N auditors became more conservative while Big N auditors became more accurate. Specifically, non-Big N auditors issued more going concern opinions to both failing and non-failing clients post-2001, reducing their Type II misclassifications at the expense of increased Type I misclassifications. However, Big N auditors decreased their Type I misclassifications with no corresponding increase in Type II misclassifications. Thus, our findings suggest that increased auditor scrutiny resulted in performance improvements in the area of going concern reporting primarily for larger auditors. For smaller auditors, improved going concern accuracy for subsequently bankrupt clients came at the cost of more going concern opinions being issued to subsequently non-failing clients.     

Auditor litigation: Evidence that revenue restatements are determinative

This study extends the Palmrose and Scholz (2004) general litigation and general restatements study by focusing on auditor litigation and revenue restatements. We investigate all potential accounting issues, individually, instead of by their group method, with regard to auditor litigation. The impact of the individual accounting issues implicated in restatements is of concern to auditors and audit standard setters in gauging auditor litigation risk and audit risk. It also is important for financial analysis and securities valuation because investors' losses are greater, and recovery of losses on a percentage basis is lower, when the auditor is a defendant, and especially when the auditor has a more severe, negative litigation experience (Commolli et al., 2012). We examine financial reporting lawsuits filed from 2001 to 2008 and find that revenue restatements—far more than any other kind of restatements—are associated with auditors being named defendants and also auditors experiencing a more severe, negative outcome in the litigation.     

The horse has bolted: revisiting the market reaction to going concern modifications of audit reports

This paper examines what value is added by an audit report through an investigation of the information content for first‐time going concern modifications (GCMs). Consistent with prior research, we find no evidence of a short‐term market reaction to the public announcement of a first‐time GCM. We document a significant adverse medium‐term market reaction in the 12 months prior to a first‐time GCM announcement, but find no evidence of a persistent market underreaction in the 12 months following the announcement. These results are consistent with an audit opinion fulfilling an attestation function and confirming the deteriorating financial condition of a firm.     

A neural network approach to the prediction of going concern status

The assessment of a firm's going concern status is not an easy task. To assist auditors, going concern prediction models based on statistical methods such as multiple discriminant analysis and logit/probit analysis have been explored with some success. This study attempts to look at a different and more recent approach—neural networks. In particular, a neural network model of the feedforward, backpropagation type was constructed to predict a firm's going concern status from six financial ratios, using a data set containing 165 non-going concerns and 165 matched going concerns. On an evenly distributed hold-out sample, the trained network model correctly predicted all 30 test cases. The results suggest that neural networks can be a promising avenue of research and application in the going concern area.     

An investigation of independent audit opinions and subsequent independent auditor litigation of publicly-traded failed savings and loans

Failures of savings and loans (S & Ls) have resulted in substantial independent auditor litigation; however, there is limited empirical evidence concerning audit opinions of failed S & Ls. Our study investigates the audit opinions of publicly-traded S & Ls that subsequently failed. We found that the independent auditors of failed S & Ls issued qualified (or modified) going-concern opinions or going-concern disclaimers of opinion on the last audited financial statement prior to failure in 19 of 24 cases. Results of univariate and multivariate analyses are consistent with several predictions concerning economic factors expected to influence the type of audit opinion, and our evidence suggests that auditors rendered going-concern reports to those S & Ls that were most likely to fail ex ante. Analysis of independent auditor litigation data reveals that auditor lawsuits related to these failed S & Ls were filed in seven cases. Five of these seven lawsuits implicated auditors who rendered going-concern reports. This suggests that going-concern reports in the year prior to the failure of an S & L do not prevent auditor litigation. Because it is possible that independent auditors will face situations comparable to the S & L crisis in the future, government regulators and the public accounting profession should be interested in research that enhances the understanding of the audit opinion formulation process in such settings.     

PCAOB inspection reports and audit quality

With the creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), audit firm oversight shifted away from self-regulation to independent regulation. The inspections program is the central feature of the PCAOB. We examine whether PCAOB inspections are able to distinguish actual audit quality (as opposed to perceived) during the period inspected to better understand this important regulatory tool. We use three measures that proxy for actual audit quality: abnormal accruals, restatements, and the propensity to issue a going concern opinion. For triennially inspected auditors, we find that PCAOB inspections are associated with lower audit quality when the reports are seriously deficient (weaker results for deficient reports). More specifically, we find clients of triennially inspected auditors that receive a deficient or seriously deficient report are associated with significantly higher abnormal current accruals and clients of auditors that receive a seriously deficient report are associated with a greater propensity to restate. Our evidence is subject to the caveat that PCAOB reports for triennially inspected auditors do not capture the going concern aspect of audit quality. For annually inspected auditors, the results are conflicting and suggest PCAOB inspection reports do not distinguish audit quality during the period inspected for annually inspected auditors.     

Audit Effort and Market‐perceived Risk: Evidence from South Korea

Auditors incur a loss of credibility and/or status or litigation costs only when investors recognise audit failures. In this respect, auditors may be concerned about an increase in market‐perceived risk even though the total amount of audit risk is constant. Consistent with this reasoning, I find that auditors increase audit effort in response to increases in market‐perceived information risk. This suggests that the expected costs of audit failures are a function of investors’ recognition, and thus increased market‐perceived risk causes auditors to become more concerned about their audit failures and to increase audit effort. Further, this study shows that audit effort is effective in reducing market‐perceived information risk, suggesting that auditors contribute to the information environment.     

The impact of prior working papers on auditor evidential planning judgments

There has been significant concern in auditing about the effects of relying on prior working papers in planning audit procedures (“anchoring”). This study employed an experiment with varying information sets: prior working papers, current year information and “scenario” (summarized prior year information). Practicing auditors were asked to design a substantive audit program for a case where changes in the client's environment dictated additional procedures. A consensus program from three partners was used as a bench-mark. Experimental groups were about equally adaptive to the changing environment. However, auditors provided with prior working papers demonstrated lower efficiency. The scenario group exhibited both high relative effectiveness and efficiency, while current information subjects displayed the lowest overall level of performance.     

Explaining auditors’ propensity to issue going‐concern opinions in Australia after the global financial crisis

We document an increase in auditors issuing going‐concern opinions in Australia over a prolonged period since the Global Financial Crisis that is not fully explained by changes in client risk. Overall, our evidence is consistent with auditors reporting more conservatively with the increased level of scrutiny from Australian Securities and Investments Commission inspections and other increased regulation, and in particular, the negative attention following the 2011–2012 inspections. As a result, auditor reports with reference to going‐concern issues have become less informative regarding future corporate failure.