Reconciling the Wage Curve and the Phillips Curve

Abstract.  The wage curve is the negative relationship that links wage levels to the unemployment rate. It fits accurately with modern non-competitive labour-market models, but goes against a Phillips-curve modelling, because the latter ties wage growth to the unemployment rate. In this article, we present a comprehensive review of these non-competitive models, highlighting recent contributions that try to eliminate the possible 'gap' that exists between the concepts of the wage curve, on the one hand, and the Phillips curve, on the other.     

Europeanization or globalization? Transnational wage bargaining and the distribution of activity in European labor markets

This paper investigates the impact of globalization on labor markets, in terms of wage inflation and the distribution of activity across regions. Specifically, we study the effects of aggregation in the labor markets on the distribution of employment and inflation pressures, where there are differences in market structures and transmission mechanisms underpinned by relatively immobile labor. To demonstrate these ideas, we take the European experience as a “laboratory” to show what can be expected from globalization in the labor markets in practice. Using models of wage leadership vs. locational competition, we examine the extent and strength of aggregation effects on labor market costs using a sample of data from 1983 to 2007 which covers the period of the creation of the Euro. We find that the aggregation effect has decreased significantly since the start of EMU, improving the trade-off between inflation and unemployment. At the same time, while Germany played an important role in the run-up to EMU in terms of wage leader, its role has now decreased and been replaced by globalization forces. This implies increased locational competition in terms of wage formation. We demonstrate this with the emerging role of the US as the benchmark for wage setting in Europe.     

Academic scholarship,organization prestige,and the earnings of U.S. business school deans

This study models the market for business school deans as an outcome of a differential game between a university's central administration and the job candidates in the market for business school deans. In our model, the ability of a business school dean to advance the organization is enhanced by his or her own scholarly reputation, such that a job candidate chooses an optimal level of scholarship that relates to his or her marketability. In this way, the supply of scholarship (by job candidates) can be seen as the supply of job candidates in the market for business school deans, whereas the demand for scholarship can be seen as the demand for business school deans. The main features of our game‐theoretic model are tested using data from both national and regional business schools and colleges in the U.S. Econometric results indicate that each additional scholarly contribution by a business school dean generates a wage premium ranging from $1,000 to $1,200, whereas in the case of national institutions, each additional student enrolled at the doctoral (master's) level raises the wage by $671 ($56). Lastly, the production of between nine and 10 scholarly contributions is found to be necessary in order to face a 50% probability of holding a business school deanship at a national institution, whereas production of about 37 scholarly contributions leads to a 50% probability of holding a deanship with a named business school at a national institution.     

NOMINAL AND REAL WAGE RIGIDITIES IN NEW KEYNESIAN MODELS: A CRITICAL SURVEY

Abstract The labour market is receiving increasing attention in the New Keynesian literature. In this paper, I critically survey this literature in order to highlight the role played by wage rigidities in the explanation of fluctuations caused by technology shocks. To this aim, I present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices, nominal wage rigidities and hiring costs. The comparison between this model and that of Blanchard and Gali highlights the non‐trivial differences which exist in the way nominal wage and real wage rigidities drive the economy's dynamics. My conclusion is that models incorporating nominal wage rigidities and some degree of price stickiness provide a better account of macroeconomic dynamics than models with real wage rigidities.     

Price/Wage Staggering and Persistence: A Unifying Framework

Abstract.  In this paper, we provide a general unified framework to clarify the issue of persistence of real effects of money shocks in staggered wage/price models. We mainly aim to: (i) highlight which features of the underlying economy, and particularly of the labour market, are crucial for generating output persistence; (ii) analyse the differences between price and wage staggering.     

Optimum organization of the labor market in a small open economy

In Denmark labor has been organized in independent but cooperating craft unions for more than a century. Within an extremely simple model of a small open economy facing imperfect competition, we analyze four different ways of organizing the labor market and show that the Danish model (partial centralization of the wage setting process) may be accounted for as the outcome of a two-stage Nash bargaining game, being robust in relation to changes in market conditions, and likely close to optimum from the point of view of society as a whole.     

Real options signaling game models for dynamic acquisition under information asymmetry

We construct a real options signaling game model to analyze the impact of asymmetric information on the dynamic acquisition decision made by the aggressive acquirer firm and passive target firm in the takeover terms and timing. The target firm is assumed to have partial information on the synergy factor of the acquirer firm in generating the surplus value. Our dynamic acquisition game models are based on the market valuation of the surplus value of the acquirer and target firms, where the restructuring opportunities are modeled as exchange options. We analyze the various forms of equilibrium strategies on the deal and timing of takeover in the acquisition game and provide the mathematical characterization of the pooling and separating strategies adopted by the acquirer firm. We also determine the terms of takeover in the signaling game under varying levels of information asymmetry and synergy.     

The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and staggered price and wage determination in a model with firm-specific labor

We develop a DSGE model with firm-specific labor where wage and price setting are subject to Calvo-type staggering. This is in general an intractable problem due to complicated intertemporal dependencies between price and wage decisions. However, the problem is significantly simplified if we, in line with empirical evidence, assume that prices can be changed whenever wages are. We show that the price- and wage-setting relationships are substantially altered by the introduction of firm-specific labor. Specifically, the inflation response is substantially dampened, whereas the wage inflation response is increased as compared to models with freely mobile labor. These distinctive features of the model with firm-specific labor are supported by empirical evidence from a structural VAR.     

Monopsonistic discrimination, worker turnover, and the gender wage gap

Motivated by models of worker flows, we argue in this paper that monopsonistic discrimination may be a substantial factor behind the overall gender wage gap. Using matched employer–employee data from Norway, we estimate establishment-specific wage premiums separately for men and women, conditioning on fixed individual effects. Regressions of worker turnover on the wage premium identify less wage elastic labour supply facing each establishment of women than that of men. Workforce gender composition is strongly related to employers' wage policies. The results suggest that 70–90% of the gender wage gap for low-educated workers may be attributed to differences in labour market frictions between men and women, while the similar figures for high-educated workers ranges from 20 to 70%.     

Testing Part of a DSGE Model by Indirect Inference

We propose a way of testing a subset of equations of a DSGE model. The test draws on statistical inference for limited information models and the use of indirect inference to test DSGE models. Using the numerical small sample distribution of our test for two subsets of equations of the Smets–Wouters model we show that the test has accurate size and good power in small samples, and better power than using asymptotic distribution theory. In a test of the Smets–Wouters model on US Great Moderation data, we reject the specification of the wage‐price but not the expenditure sector. This points to the wage‐price sector as the source of overall model rejection.     

A SURVEY OF TRADE AND WAGE INEQUALITY: ANOMALIES,RESOLUTIONS AND NEW TRENDS

This paper surveys recent studies on trade and wage inequality. We first introduce some trade‐based explanations for increased wage inequality. There are, however, a number of criticisms of this line of thought based on the ‘trade‐wage inequality anomaly’, the ‘price‐wage anomaly’, and the small volume of trade. Mainly due to these criticisms, trade‐based explanations for rising wage inequality have been limited in the economic literature. Rather, the primary explanations for wage inequality have been based on skill‐biased technological change. Some trade models, however, have weakened the above criticisms, and more economists now argue that the effect of trade, though relatively small compared to that of technological change, is more significant than generally believed. Finally, we attempt to link new trends in inequality, such as job polarization and within‐group inequality, to the trade and wage inequality literature.     

Public infrastructure provision and skilled–unskilled wage inequality in developing countries

In this paper, we develop several static three-sector general equilibrium models with diverse labor market structures to investigate the effects of government provision of public infrastructure on the skilled–unskilled wage inequality in developing countries. The basic full employment model shows that the production sectors' relative dependence on the public infrastructure provision plays a crucial role in determining the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. Different relative dependences on public infrastructure may even result in opposite changes in the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. The above results are robust even when we extend the basic full employment model to three fundamentally different cases.     

Strategic militancy and the probability of strikes in union-firm bargaining

The paper provides a model that explains the probability of strikes by the union's use of militancy as a strategic tool in bargaining. Militants are useful because they provide a credible threat, hence enhancing the union's bargaining position. Using a multi-stage bargaining game, we show that, in general, militants will be used by the union as a strategic tool. The strategic benefit of militancy is reflected by the fact that the wage and employment level will be higher in a union that uses militants, compared to a union that does not. We use the model to show that the level of militancy and the probability of a strike decrease with the union's power. This suggests that policies that increase the strength of the union will have, at least, a partial positive effect on social welfare. We also show that the model can be viewed as providing an equilibrium of a repeated game, an interpretation that can explain the probability of strikes even in the absence of militants.     

Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly with Upstream Suppliers

This paper analyzes the noncooperative game on the choice of strategic variable to set in duopoly in the presence of an upstream market for the input. For the case of labor input, the analysis shows that if the wage is the result of decentralized firm-union bargain, a duopoly producing substitutes may choose to compete either in the quantity space or in the price space, depending upon the distribution of bargaining power in the wage negotiation and the union's relative preference over the wage. For the case of input suppliers as profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that a vertically differentiated duopoly may prefer to compete either in the quantity space or in a mixed strategy setting where the high-quality firm plays price and the low-quality firm plays quantity, depending upon the extent of substitutability, the degree of vertical product differentiation and the distribution of bargaining power in the input price negotiation.     

Wage mobility in Europe. A comparative analysis using restricted multinomial logit regression

The paper investigates cross-country differences in wage mobility in Europe using the European Community Household Panel. We examine the impact of specific wage-setting institutions, such as the collective bargaining and the trade union density, the employment protection regulation and the welfare state regime on wage mobility. We apply a log-linear approach that is very much similar to a restricted multinomial logit model and much more flexible than the standard probit approach that is typically applied in the research on wage mobility. It is shown that the macro-economic context and the aforementioned specific institutions explain a substantial part of the cross-country variation that is larger than the part that regime type explains. The findings also confirm the existence of an inverse U-shape pattern of wage mobility, showing a great deal of low-wage and high-wage persistence in all countries.     

A small linear model of wage- and price-inflation in the Norwegian economy

This paper presents a model of inflation in a small open economy which features both wage-wage linkages and a wage-price spiral. Hence we have a simultaneous structure which contains the conventional Scandinavian model of inflation as a special case. Full system estimation results are reported. Great emphasis is placed on data coherency and on parameter stability. One interesting finding is that both wage growth and the wage level in the exposed (E)-sector are strongly influenced by the outside wage. This contradicts the predictions of the Scandinavian model, which defines the wage-leading role of the E-sector by the absence of outside wage effects in E-sector wage formation. Another result is that the speed of adjustment to exogenous shocks is greater for prices than for wages. This finding may be important in explaining real wage flexibility, which is often seen as the hallmark of low unemployment economies such as the Norwegian.     

Should managerial delegation contracts be made before or after union wage setting? A game‐theoretic analysis

This paper analyzes a multiple‐stage game in which, at the final stage, two (managerial) firms compete over quantities in the product market. Prior to this stage, firm‐specific unions set the workers' wages, while the owners of both firms hire managers and provide them with incentive contracts. Owners can freely decide to arrange the managerial contract before or after the (non‐managerial) wage determination stage. Hence, the endogenous choice of the incentive contract stage is derived. The possibility of multiple equilibria arises, where both owners choose managerial contracts before or after unions' wage setting, crucially depending on unions' preferences. Such results also prove to be true for a remarkable degree of asymmetry in preferences over wages vis‐à‐vis employment across unions.     

Verifiable wage offers and recontracting: effect on wage and consumption profiles

This paper analyzes the effect of recontracting and matching verifiable wage offers on the intertemporal structure of contract wage and consumption profile for a two-period economy. A contract firm provides specific training for a worker during the first period, which increases his productivity if he stays in the second period, but the worker may quit to accept an alternative wage offer after a successful search. Wage offers are private to the worker but can be presented to the contract firm for matching. This paper shows that when capital markets are imperfect and wage offers are verifiable, the contract firm recontracts and matches any wage offers the worker receives up to the second-period productivity. The ex ante contract wage profile will be flat. Inefficient quits will be eliminated and there will be complete ex ante consumption smoothing. It is significant to note that the result of rising wage profile derived in numerous contract models is fragile with respect to assumptions on mechanism of interfirm labor mobility.     

Assessing DSGE model nonlinearities

We develop a new class of time series models to identify nonlinearities in the data and to evaluate DSGE models. U.S. output growth and the federal funds rate display nonlinear conditional mean dynamics, while inflation and nominal wage growth feature conditional heteroskedasticity. We estimate a DSGE model with asymmetric wage and price adjustment costs and use predictive checks to assess its ability to account for these nonlinearities. While it is able to match the nonlinear inflation and wage dynamics, thanks to the estimated downward wage and price rigidities, these do not spill over to output growth or the interest rate.     

Wage and price adjustment in a multimarket disequilibrium model

The estimation of wage and price adjustment equations rests heavily on the use of tension variables that aim at capturing the disequilibria in the labour and goods markets. Disequilibrium models therefore provide a natural way of endogenizing these tension variables. This paper estimates jointly a two-market disequilibrium model and a wage and price adjustment block where price and wage growth react to excess effective demands. The estimation is carried out using the simulated pseudo-maximum-likelihood methods developed by Laroque and Salaniè (1989); the results look promising as regards the estimation of even more sophisticated models.