JAPANESE ANTITRUST: RECONCILING THEORY AND EVIDENCE

Japanese antitrust law exempts a variety of vertical and horizontal restraints that remain closely regulated in the United States. Despite these dissimilar antitrust environments, however, market concentration, firms' exercise of market power, and deadweight loss from monopoly are highly similar in the two countries. The hypothesis that antitrust alters the relative mix of price to non-price competition rather than the absolute level that competition assumes might explain this empirical puzzle. Thus, this paper studies Japanese antitrust exemptions for resale price maintenance and export cartel associations to illustrate how adopting vertical and horizontal restraints has allowed Japanese firms to substitute towards forms of non-price competition better tailored to industry characteristics.     

COLLUSION AND ANTITRUST DETECTION*

This paper investigates the impact of antitrust policy on the strategic choice of product specification when firms can collude with respect to prices, cannot collude with respect to location and may have their collusion ended if it is detected by the antitrust authority. Depending on the aggressiveness of the antitrust authority, different location configurations may emerge in equilibrium. Extremely aggressive and extremely lax policies lead to the least efficient outcomes while the configuration maximizing social welfare is obtained by an intermediate policy.     

RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND ANTITRUST POLICY

Some scholars would legalize all purely vertical resale price maintenance (RPM). They acknowledge that RPM can harm consumers when it facilitates horizontal collusion among manufacturers or dealers. But when RPM is purely vertical (i.e., when it is imposed by a manufacturer acting independently), they argue that it must be procompetitive. Recent theoretical research has shown, however, that purely vertical RPM can reduce economic efficiency. This result occurs when the higher prices and dealer services induced by RPM benefit marginal consumers but substantially reduce the welfare of intramarginal consumers, who would have preferred the product without the services at a lower price. Since these circumstances are empirically plausible, a rule of per se legality may not be appropriate. At the same time, evaluating RPM under the rule of reason might not be workable. Anticompetitive instances of the type described could be difficult to prove. These research findings, therefore, are most consistent with a rule of per se illegality for RPM, with exceptions for situations in which RPM is most likely to be pro-competitive (e.g., new entry).     

BORK'S PARADOX: STATIC VS. DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY IN ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

Judge Robert Bork holds two opposing attitudes towards perfect competition. It is a highly useful economic model for illustrating allocative efficiency, but it is a defective policy model because it deliberately omits productive efficiency. He reconciles these attitudes by combining perfectly competitive allocative efficiency with dynamically competitive productive efficiency in his analysis.
However, these two kinds of competition do not readily mix. One is a static equilibrium concept, the other a dynamic disequilibrium concept. One assumes perfect knowledge and the absence of change; the other assumes imperfect knowledge, learning, and continual flux. Each kind of competition is built on assumptions which, if true, would preclude the existence of the other.
Bork's policy conclusions require the simultaneous existence of both kinds of competition. If he drops dynamic competition from the analysis, a much more stringent antitrust policy is called for. If he drops static competition, economic theory does not justify even his strictures against mergers and cartels.     

TYING, BANKING, AND ANTITRUST: IT'S TIME FOR A CHANGE

The anti-tying section (Sec. 106) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1970 severely limits U.S. banks' or bank holding companies' ability to link one product or service to another. Though the provisions of Sec. 106 resemble the anti-tying provisions of the U.S. antitrust laws, the latter are considerably less restrictive and more flexible. Sec. 106 represents a misguided legislative effort to deal with a perceived problem of banks' market power. Though tying can be a manifestation of market power, it is more likely—especially for banking—to represent efficient combinations of complementary components. Regulatory and judicial enforcement of Sec. 106 surely has seriously inhibited the flexibility and efficiency of bank pricing and product offerings. A simple solution to this legislative over-regulation is to repeal Sec. 106 and instead extend the reach of the antitrust laws to cover abusive tying by banks.     

THE ROLE OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS IN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

Recently enacted sentencing guidelines were designed to reduce disparity and to increase the average sanction for white-collar offenders. Whether these outcomes will be achieved, however, depends on how closely judges adhere to the new guidelines. We cannot yet determine how the guidelines will be implemented but can learn much about judicial behavior by studying past sentencing practice.
This paper examines sentences imposed on criminal antitrust offenders from 1955 to 1980. Judges are appointed for life and ostensibly are "independent" of the political process. The data suggest, however, that judges do not operate in apolitical vacuum. When Congress increased the status of antitrust violations from misdemeanor to felony in 1974, judges responded by doling out higher penalties–even for offenders not subject to new higher statutory maximums. In addition, the paper shows that Republican judges tend to impose harsher antitrust penalties than do Democratic judges, and that sentencing behavior apparently is influenced by a judge's prospect of promotion to a higher court position. These findings have important policy implications both for the judicial selection process and for ensuring that the judicial branch follows congressional wishes.     

NEW INSIGHTS INTO THE DECLINE OF ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT

The total number of cases that the Antitrust Division has filed during the past decade has increased, but the number of significant criminal price-fixing cases has declined. Policy changes have had significant effects on other areas of enforcement. This paper argues, however, that the decline in this dimension of antitrust enforcement can be explained by a 1974 act of Congress that increased criminal penalties for price-fixing violations from the misdemeanor level to the felony level. According to this argument, the stiffer penalties' deterrent impact has reduced the supply of antitrust violations. In this respect, the analysis highlights the flaws in measuring the strength of enforcement from the frequency of cases filed. In addition, the paper reports empirical evidence from a multinomial logit model of defendant plea choice indicating that the felony penalties encourage defendants to plead not guilty more frequently. Furthermore, data on the outcomes of criminal antitrust cases reveal that the government has greater difficulty in obtaining convictions when felony penalties apply. From the viewpoint of enforcers, these findings imply that detecting and prosecuting significant price-fixing violations is more difficult. This, in turn, helps explain the reduction in related private enforcement.     

GENERAL AND PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM THEORY IN BORK'S ANTITRUST ANALYSIS

In applying economic theory to evaluate antitrust laws, Judge Robert Bork explicitly favors a partial equilibrium over a general equilibrium approach. He believes the general model assumes away too many real-world aspects to be usefully employed as a criterion by which to judge real-world laws.
However, Bork's partial equilibrium replacement, the Oliver Williamson trade-off model, implicitly contains many of the same assumptions as general equilibrium theory. Equilibrium prices in all industries, an absence of external effects, and well-defined demand curves are assumptions of both general equilibrium theory and the Williamson trade-off model. If one theory is judged inadequate because of these assumptions, so should the other.
Bork's analysis is more consistent with market process theory than with his own partial equilibrium approach. Market process theory assumes neither the absence of externalities, nor the presence of well-defined demand and equilibrium prices in all industries.     

COMPARABLE WORTH: SOME ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION

The comparable worth approach is a radical departure from market determination of wages. This paper considers some economic issues pertinent to the comparable worth dialogue and focuses on implications of comparable worth legislation at the state and local levels. We show that current sex differentials in wages could reflect voluntary labor supply choices and/or discrimination. We also discuss the reverberations of comparable worth and note that some women in an occupation targeted with a wage increase could be made worse off as a result of employer cutbacks. We discuss why state or local officials may be hesitant to adopt comparable worth and also offer possible explanations for their being receptive to it. The intent throughout is to provide a balanced discussion that will aid individuals in taking an educated stand on the issue.     

THE CAPITAL INFLOWS PROBLEM: CONCEPTS AND ISSUES

Since 1990, capital has flowed from industrial countries to developing regions like Latin America and parts of Asia. Most countries welcome reentry into international capital markets. However, capital inflows often are associated with inflationary pressures, a real exchange rate appreciation, a deterioration in the current account, and a boom in bank lending. This paper briefly examines how these inflows have altered the macroeconomic environment in a number of Asian and Latin American countries, and discusses the pros and cons of the policy options .     

WESTERN FARM LABOR ISSUES

This paper examines three farm labor issues: (1) how mechanization affects the demand for farm labor; (2) how immigration reform affects the supply of farm workers; and (3) how 10 years of collective bargaining affect the farm labor market. The evidence suggests that mechanization, immigration reform, and collective bargaining have had or will have fewer effects on the farm labor market than is often assumed. However, the farm labor market is vulnerable to future shocks if it remains isolated from nonfarm labor markets.     

DETERMINANTS OF BANK ACQUISITION PREMIUMS: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE

The recent interstate bank merger phenomenon has received little attention in the literature. Specifically, existing studies fail to explain sufficiently the variation of premiums paid and fail to investigate adequately the bank merger wave in terms of its interstate banking context.
This study employs models with substantial overall explanatory levels. The interstate banking context proves to be very significant. First, the study considers and finds significant the effective date of a state's interstate statute in relation to a deal's announcement date. This contrasts sharply with other studies. Second, the study uses and also finds significant a binary variable distinguishing intrastate deals from interstate deals. The premiums paid for interstate market entry, on average, exceeded those paid for intrastate transactions. Third, including regional binary variables reveals a pattern of variation in pricing throughout the country. The Southeast, the study's base of comparison, exhibited the highest premium level.
Other significant determinants of premiums paid include profitability as measured by returns on equity, growth proxied by state deposit growth and future expected population growth, and charge-offs to total loans as an indicator of loan quality.