FLATTENING OF BOND YIELD CURVES

Putting no restrictions on forward interest rates, earlier research has shown that yield curves for coupon-bearing bonds will become flat for long maturities. This paper shows that weak restrictions on forward rates imply flattening of bond yield curves for maturities of 10 to 15 years.     

THE DYNAMICS OF BOND YIELD SPREADS AROUND RATING REVISION DATES

We examine the effect of rating revisions on sterling Eurobond yields using a panel model with conditional heteroskedasticity that controls for event‐induced changes in the variance of spreads. Positive rating revisions are fully anticipated by the time the upgrade occurs. Negative revisions are only partially anticipated, and spreads on downgraded bonds rise for some time after the downgrade has been announced. This asymmetry is not apparent in a conventional event study model. All ratings announcements are accompanied by a temporary fall in yield volatility. We attribute this to the resolution of uncertainty about the true rating of the bond.     

THE REGULATION EFFECT OF CREDIT RATINGS ON BOND INTEREST YIELD: THE CASE OF JUNK BONDS

This paper examines the 'regulation effect' of bond ratings of yield. It is shown that the high yield premia on 'speculative bonds' not only reflect the high probability of default, but also contain an effect of regulation. A multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) technique is used to separate the default component of yield premium from the regulation effect. The results in the study suggest that non-regulated investors, by taking advantage of the regulation effect, may earn an extra premium on a diversified portfolio of 'speculative bonds', at least for the period under this study (from January 1982-June 1987).     

THE DEBT MATURITY CHOICE: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

In this paper I develop and test three nonmutually exclusive hypotheses about the determinants of corporations' debt maturity choices using a sample of corporate bonds issued between 1982 and 1986. The empirical evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that firms use bond maturity to facilitate monitoring by outsiders (the monitoring hypothesis) and weakly supports the hypothesis that firms with high-quality projects use bond maturity to signal project quality (the signaling hypothesis). The evidence does not support the hypothesis that firms use bond maturity to achieve an optimal trade-off between interest tax shields and bankruptcy costs (the tax/bankruptcy cost hypothesis).     

REVISITING THE HIGH YIELD BOND MARKET: MATURE BUT NEVER DULL

Ten years ago the author of this article wrote a piece for this journal reviewing the history of the "junk" bond market from its start in the mid-1970s through the collapse of the leveraged restructuring movement at the end of the 1980s. In the summer of 1990, the high yield market was at a critical point in its development. With defaults high and still rising, the yield spreads over Treasuries of junk bonds had jumped to over 700 basis points and the new issue market had all but dried up. Drexel Burnham Lambert had recently filed for Chapter 11, and Michael Milken had been indicted. At that time, when many market observers were pronouncing the junk bond market "finished," the author of this article said that the market performed a valuable economic function and, despite investor losses, would weather the crisis.
In describing the remarkable recovery of the high yield market in 1990s, this article notes some important changes in the market. And, although there are now troubling similarities (including rising default rates and spreads) to conditions in the early '90, there are also important differences that are likely to make the start of this decade a better one for investors.