Synergistic valuations and efficiency in spectrum auctions

In spectrum auctions, bidders typically have synergistic values for combinations of licenses. This has been the key argument for the use of combinatorial auctions in the recent years. Considering synergistic valuations turns the allocation problem into a computationally hard optimization problem that generally cannot be approximated to a constant factor in polynomial time. Ascending auction designs such as the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction (SMRA) and the single-stage or two-stage Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) can be seen as simple heuristic algorithms to solve this problem. Such heuristics do not necessarily compute the optimal solution, even if bidders are truthful. We study the average efficiency loss that can be attributed to the simplicity of the auction algorithm with different levels of synergies. Our simulations are based on realistic instances of bidder valuations we inferred from bid data from the 2014 Canadian 700 MHz auction. The goal of the paper is not to reproduce the results of the Canadian auction but rather to perform “out-of-sample” counterfactuals comparing SMRA and CCA under different synergy conditions when bidders maximize payoff in each round. With “linear” synergies, a bidder's marginal value for a license grows linearly with the total number of licenses won, while with the “extreme national” synergies, this marginal value is independent of the number of licenses won unless the bidder wins all licenses in a national package. We find that with the extreme national synergy model, the CCA is indeed more efficient than SMRA. However, for the more realistic case of linear synergies, SMRA outperforms various versions of CCA that have been implemented in the field including the one used in the Canadian 700 MHz auction. Overall, the efficiency loss of all ascending auction algorithms is small even with high synergies, which is remarkable given the simplicity of the algorithms.     

Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany

The second–generation (GSM) spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid multi-unit auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a game theoretic explanation of low price equilibrium in simultaneous, ascending-bid multi-unit auctions. In particular, it is shown that in the unique equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies, the efficient allocation is reached at minimum bids.     

The 5G spectrum auction in Chile

In 2021, the Chilean government implemented a first-price package auction to allocate electromagnetic spectrum for 5G mobile services. The auction was run sequentially for different spectrum bands, allowing firms to exploit band complementarities. It was a combinatorial auction, so firms could bid for any combination of blocks within a band. It contemplated spectrum caps – upper limits on the spectrum for each firm – to ensure competitiveness. The beauty contests used in previous processes became obsolete, as there was a need to promote competitiveness and transparency in the telecommunication sector. Four incumbents and one potential entrant participated in the auction. The auction raised more than USD $450 million, which was six times more than the sum of the revenues of all previous contests in the country. We discuss this experience and show how different aspects of the context justified our design choices.     

Economics at the Federal Communications Commission

This article reviews several issues confronted by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) over the past year and discusses some of the economic analysis employed by the FCC in examining these issues. The article also identifies areas in which future academic research would be valuable to the agency.Thanks are due to Heather Dixon, David Fiske, Evan Kwerel, Jonathan Levy, and Larry White (the editor) for useful comments. The opinions expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the FCC, its staff, or commissioners.     

Regulating B2B online reverse auctions through voluntary codes of conduct

In response to real and perceived abuse by market makers, buyers, and sellers, some industry trade groups representing suppliers have developed voluntary codes of conduct, white papers, and other forms of guidance for online reverse auction participants. The intent of these guidelines is to improve both the reverse auction process and relationships between buyers and sellers. This paper examines the rationale for creating guidelines and codes of conduct, and examines their efficacy in regulating reverse auctions to achieve improved outcomes for market makers, buyers, and sellers. Data from primary and related secondary sources indicate that industry-specific codes of conduct and guidelines have not had a favorable impact.     

Sorry Winners

Bidders who receive both “common-value” and “private-value” signals about the value of an auction prize cannot fully infer their opponents’ information from the bidding. So bidders may overestimate the value of the prize and, subsequently, regret winning. When multiple objects are on sale, bidding in an auction provides information relevant to the other auctions, and sequential auctions are more vulnerable to overpayment and winners’ regret than are simultaneous auctions. With information inequality among bidders, the seller’s revenue is influenced by two contrasting effects. On the one hand, simultaneous auctions reduce the winner’s curse of less informed bidders and allow them to bid more aggressively. On the other hand, sequential auctions induce less informed bidders to bid more aggressively in early auctions to acquire information.      

Reverse auctions for relationship marketers

Reverse auctions in logistics and procurement have grown dramatically since the advent of widespread Internet usage in the late 1990s. A literature review indicates that scholars and practitioners are reaching a consensus around a trade-off between the value and benefits of gaining lower prices versus losing long-term relationships with suppliers. Yet at the same time, a quiet evolution has come about in the economics and management literature, opening the way for new, more relationship-friendly auction designs. Based on this new work, a series of guidelines and principles are developed which describe how managers may collect the economic pricing advantage of reverse auctions—yet retain the long-term benefits of relationship marketing.     

Spectrum auction design: Simple auctions for complex sales

Following the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum. Spectrum auctions have raised hundreds of billion dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The PCS spectrum was sold via a simultaneous multi-round auction, which forces bidders to compete for licenses individually even though they typically value certain combinations. This exposes bidders to risk when they bid aggressively for a desired combination but end up winning an inferior subset. Foreseeing this possibility, bidders may act cautiously with adverse effects for revenue and efficiency. Combinatorial auctions allow for bids on combinations of licenses and thus hold the promise of improved performance. Recently, a number of countries worldwide have switched to the combinatorial clock auction to sell spectrum. This two-stage auction uses a core-selecting payment rule. The number of possible packages a bidder can submit grows exponentially with the number of licenses, which adds complexity to the auction. For larger auctions with dozens of licenses bidders cannot be expected to reveal all their valuations during such an auction. We analyze the impact of two main design choices on efficiency and revenue: simple “compact” bid languages versus complex “fully expressive” bid languages and simple “pay-as-bid” payment rules versus complex “core-selecting” payment rules. We consider these design choices both for ascending and sealed-bid formats. We find that simplicity of the bid language has a substantial positive impact on the auction?s efficiency and simplicity of the payment rule has as a substantial positive impact on the auction?s revenue. The currently popular combinatorial clock auction, which uses a complex bid language and payment rule, achieves the lowest efficiency and revenue among all treatment combinations.     

A Law of Large Numbers: Bidding and Compulsory Competitive Tendering for Refuse Collection Contracts

In this paper we investigate the relationship betweencosts and number of bidders for U.K. local authorities'refuse collection contracts. We find that a highernumber of bids is associated with a lower cost ofservice. This finding, as well as being an importantempirical verification of standard proposition inauction theory, has important policy implications. TheU.K. Labour government elected in 1997 has abolishedCompulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT). Our findingsindicate that this would increase local authorities'expenditure in refuse collection.     

Reverse auctions and buyer-seller relationships: A rejoinder to Emiliani and Stec's commentary

In response to Emiliani and Stec's commentary, we present rebuttal to their specific points and further assessment of auctions' role in relationships. We fear the commentators represent a segment of procurement managers closed to using auctions. To help overcome their apprehension, we reemphasize statements in the original article and amplify the role of auctions by referring to the wider relationship marketing literature. The bottom line is that we still believe relational auction is not an oxymoron and our proposed design amendments can create an environment of transparency, fairness, and bilateral communication which leads to further relational strengthening.     

Resale and bundling in auctions

The possibility of resale increases bidders' incentives to jointly reduce demand in multi-object auctions, because resale increases low-value bidders' willingness to pay and reduces high-value bidders' willingness to pay. Therefore, resale may reduce the seller's revenue. In a simple model with complete information, however, allowing resale and bundling the objects on sale are “complement strategies” for the seller (under reasonable conditions)—by bundling and allowing resale the seller earns a higher revenue than by selling the objects separately and/or forbidding resale. We also show why allowing resale may reduce efficiency.     

Lead-farmer extension and smallholder valuation of new agricultural technologies in Tanzania

Encouraging the widespread adoption and use of new on-farm technologies is an important part of productivity-led strategies to promote agricultural transformation. While many interventions have been designed to promote adoption through extension and education, little is known about how these efforts influence farmer willingness-to-pay (WTP) for new technologies. We use a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit farmer WTP for two improved seed varieties and a new seed treatment product, Apron Star, under two different lead-farmer extension treatments in Tanzania: (i) a demonstration plot showcasing the technologies within a village; and (ii) a demonstration plot coupled with distribution of trial packs enabling some farmers to test the technologies on their own land. In the BDM, farmers were presented with six products – the two bean varieties: without Apron Star, with Apron Star already applied, and with a sachet of Apron Star for the farmer to treat the seed him/herself. Our results suggest that neither extension treatment significantly affects WTP for these technologies. However, we find that farmers are willing to pay more for seed that is pre-treated with Apron Star than for seed bundled with a sachet of Apron Star for self-treatment.     

Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance

Auctions, which are applicable to aid-related procurement systems, have been recently recognized as an important tool for improving economic efficiency. Using data on procurement auctions for Japanese official development assistance projects, the equilibrium bid function is estimated. The data reveals that a 1% increase in the number of bidders decreases the equilibrium bid by about 0.2%. This implies that strengthening competition at procurement auctions lowers contract prices and mitigates the heavy indebtedness of developing countries. Auctions are also instrumental in fostering local business environment and governance. For intensifying bidding competition, it is useful to introduce an electronic bidding system, encourage local firms to jointly bid, and relax excessive qualification requirements.     

Great School Milk Conspiracies Revisited

This paper revisits a particular case involvingtwo dairy processing companies accused ofrigging bids in northern Kentucky schooldistricts during the 1980s. Evidence andarguments presented to support a conclusion ofovert collusion are reassessed. Analyses ofincumbency rates, market shares, bid levels, biddispersions, bid distance relationships, exactbidding differentials, and bids from hellindicate that the two dairies may have beenengaged in tacit collusion instead of overt collusion.     

Information,branding, certification,and consumer willingness to pay for high-iron pearl millet: Evidence from experimental auctions in Maharashtra,India

In this paper we use hedonic testing methods adopted from food science literature and the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism adopted from economic valuation literature to estimate consumer demand for biofortified high-iron pearl millet (HIPM) in Maharashtra, India. Unlike biofortification with provitamin A, biofortification with minerals, such as iron and zinc, does not change the color or the appearance of the biofortified crop. Therefore, we test the impact of both nutrition information, and branding and certification, as well as the nature of the brand and of the certifying authority (state level versus international), on consumer demand for HIPM. We find that even in the absence of nutrition information, consumers assign a small but significant premium to the HIPM variety relative to the local variety. This is consistent with consumers’ more favorable rating of the sensory characteristics of the high-iron variety. Nutrition information on the health benefits of HIPM increases this premium substantially, and regression analysis reveals that consumers prefer international branding and international certification authority to their state-level counterparts.     

Estimating demand from eBay prices

This paper presents results for identification and estimation of the value distribution from eBay auction prices. The paper presents results for eBay type auctions with independent private values and unobserved participation. It is first shown that the distribution of values is identified from observing the distribution of prices and knowing the distribution of potential bidders. The main identification result presents conditions for which the distribution of values and the distribution of potential bidders are simultaneously identified. Not surprisingly, the intuition is similar to the standard results for identifying demand from observed equilibrium prices. The estimation method suggested by the identification results is used to estimate the value distribution for the “C5” Chevrolet Corvette sold on eBay. The results suggest that a simple OLS model on prices will over estimate the mean value of the item. The estimation results are then used to calculate the optimal reserve price for these cars. The estimated optimal reserves are compared to the actual reserves. Actual hidden reserves are set much higher than actual non-hidden reserves. The evidence suggests sellers set Buy-It-Nows and hidden reserves optimally to account for re-listing opportunities.     

Economic Analysis at the Federal Communications Commission

This article reviews a number of the major economic issues confronting the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) over the past year and discusses new analytic techniques that FCC economists applied to some of those issues. The article also identifies several areas in which further academic research would be valuable to this agency.Martin Perry is serving as FCC Chief Economist on leave from Rutgers University, New Brunswick NJ. Jonathan Levy is the FCC Deputy Chief Economist and, like Evan Kwerel and Chuck Needy, works in the FCCs Office of Strategic Planning and Policy Analysis. Mark Uretsky works in the FCCs International Bureau and Tracy Waldon in the FCCs Media Bureau. All authors are economists except for John Williams, an engineer consultant who advises the FCC on spectrum issues.     

Sourcing in the global aerospace supply chain using online reverse auctions

This article discusses the use of online reverse auctions to source engineered components in global aerospace supply chains using online reverse auctions and examines the specific case where a long-established U.S. economic cluster supporting large tier-one aerospace companies must compete against globally distributed sources of supply favored by their customers due to unit price savings, principally the result of lower wages. The article also examines if global sourcing practices based on power-based bargaining is an intelligent or effective solution to market pressure demanding lower prices, or whether collaborative problem solving and the creation of knowledge-sharing networks offers greater potential for cost savings and improved long-term supply chain competitiveness. Key factors that contributed to the recent failure of global sourcing initiatives using online reverse auctions are presented. Findings can be generalized to other industries that use online reverse auctions for globally sourcing engineered components that rely on networks of supporting service suppliers to create finished goods.     

Combining participatory crop trials and experimental auctions to estimate farmer preferences for improved common bean in Rwanda

Participatory crop improvement raises the prospects for developing seed varieties that meet the needs of subsistence farmers but may face challenges regarding preference elicitation, particularly in complicated policy environments. We integrate binding experimental auctions with participatory variety selection to elicit farmers’ preferences for improved common bean varieties in Rwanda. We find that auctions reveal farmer preferences more accurately than stated nonbinding rankings in this context and that participatory on-farm crop research is essential to understanding how farmers evaluate tradeoffs between multiple crop attributes. We also find that farmers highly value intercrop yield despite government policy that encourages farmers to monocrop.     

Consumer valuation of information about food safety achieved using biotechnology: Evidence from new potato products

This study focuses on the role of food labels and information for affecting consumers’ valuation of food safety achieved through application of biotechnological (biotech) methods. In 2002, potato products cooked to a high temperature were first reported to contain the human carcinogen acrylamide. Research discoveries using genetic engineering can substantially reduce carcinogenic-forming potential, and thereby increase food safety of potato products. Adult consumers from three distant regions of the U.S. were the subjects in lab auctions of potato products. They engaged in distinct rounds of bidding, first without packaged information and again after receiving information about the food safety risks and benefits of new biotech potato products. The study finds that willingness-to-pay (WTP) for these new potato products are not significantly different from conventional potato products under no information. However, exposure to a scientific perspective and scientific plus industry perspectives increases participants’ willingness-to-pay for the new potato products and reduces willingness-to-pay for conventional products. Exposure to the negative perspective on the new technology significantly reduces willingness-to-pay. Consumer valuation of the new potato products is affected by food labels, information, and consumer attributes. A consumer information program could be needed to gain consumer acceptance of these potato products or other foods that have been genetically modified to increase certain food safety dimensions.