ENDOGENOUS TRADE POLICY: A TIME-SERIES APPROACH*

This paper provides a time-series analysis on the relationship between the extent of endogenous trade policy and both political and economic variables. The chosen trade policy indicator is the number of foreign-trade regulations passed each year for the benefit of a single firm or industry. The data are from Uruguay, 1925–1983. This country, which experienced an impressive economic decline, is an outstanding example of the rent-seeking society. The paper shows that endogenous regulations increased with discretionary policies, with adverse macroeconomic shocks and under dictatorship. It also shows that these regulations had a negative long-run effect on the growth rates of output and exports. The short-run effect was positive however.     

ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY*

I characterize the optimal export promoting policy for international markets whose structure is endogenous. Contrary to the ambiguous results of strategic trade policy for duopolies, it is always optimal to subsidize exports when entry is endogenous, under both quantity and price competition. With homogenous goods the optimal export subsidy is a fraction 1/ε of the price, where ε is the elasticity of demand (the exact opposite of the optimal export tax in the neoclassical trade theory). Analogously, I show the general optimality of R&D subsidies and of competitive devaluations to promote exports in foreign markets where entry is endogenous.     

LAND USE REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTRY: EVIDENCE FROM THE TEXAS LODGING INDUSTRY*

This article examines the anticompetitive effects of land use regulation using microdata on midscale chain hotels in Texas. I construct a dynamic entry–exit model that endogenizes hotel chains’ reactions to land use regulation. My estimates indicate that imposing stringent regulation increases costs considerably. Hotel chains nonetheless enter highly regulated markets even if entry probabilities are lower, anticipating fewer rivals and hence greater market power. Consumers incur the costs of regulation indirectly in the form of higher prices.     

COUNTERTRADE AS TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DIVERSION

This paper analyzes countertrade as a special case of a customs union in which the countertrade agreement gives rise (as in customs union theory) to both trade-creating and trade-diverting effects. The net effects on welfare are ambiguous. A detailed case study from Egypt and brief examples from other countries illustrate the relevance of this interpretation .     

#br# 异质性消费者、异质性厂商与异质性匹配内生贸易——一个贸易理论的新范式*

异质性消费者与异质性厂商的异质性匹配从需求与供给两方面诱致贸易活动产生,基于消费者异质性假定与厂商异质性假定所构建的异质性匹配内生贸易模型,是在新贸易理论与新新贸易理论基础上的综合性拓展和研究新范式引入的逻辑起点。本文的主要贡献在于,在消费者异质性与厂商异质性假定条件下构建国内国际均衡模型,从异质性消费者与异质性厂商的异质性匹配角度对贸易活动进行内生性解释,把产业内贸易与跨国公司内贸易纳入到统一的贸易理论分析框架之中,基于贸易理论新范式对跨国公司产生、产业内贸易与跨国公司内部贸易、企业跨国投资、企业跨国并购与合并、跨国企业贸易联盟的形成进行内生解释,把一个异质性匹配新范式引入贸易理论研究并对当代主流贸易理论进行新拓展。     

DESIGNING POLICY TO OPEN TRADE*

In this paper we consider recent proposals to auction U.S. import quotas, using the funds so obtained to encourage relocation out of the protected industries. We first discuss the design of quota auctions so as to maximize revenue for the government. We then consider why quota auctions should be used at all, rather than simply using tariffs, or immediately opening trade and compensating people with income transfers. We argue that the information available to the government, or lack thereof, is a critical factor in understanding these policies.     

A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS PAYOFF MOTIVES AND ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY*

A model of endogenous payoff motives and endogenous order of moves is analysed in a mixed duopoly. We find that, when a non‐negative price constraint is imposed on public and private firms' quantity choice, both firms always choose to be relative‐payoff‐maximisers, and both simultaneous move and sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium. In contrast, when non‐negative absolute profit constraint is imposed, public and private firms always choose to be absolute‐payoff‐maximisers, and only sequential move can be sustained in equilibrium.     

BILATERALISM AND FREE TRADE*

We study a setting with many countries; in each country there are firms that can sell in the domestic as well as foreign markets. Countries can sign bilateral free‐trade agreements that lower import tariffs and thereby facilitate trade. We allow a country to sign any number of bilateral free‐trade agreements. A profile of free‐trade agreements defines the trading regime. Our principal finding is that, in symmetric settings, bilateralism is consistent with global free trade. We also explore the effects of asymmetries across countries and political economy considerations on the incentives to form trade agreements.     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND COMPENSATION*

Liberalization harms some groups while generating aggregate benefits. We consider various labor market policies that might be used to compensate those who lose from freer trade. Our goal is to find the policy that compensates each group of losers at the lowest cost to the economy. We argue that wage subsidies should be used to compensate those who bear the adjustment costs triggered by liberalization whereas employment subsidies should be used to compensate those who remain trapped in the previously protected sector. Our analysis indicates that the cost of compensation is low, provided that the right policy is used.     

RETURNS TO SCALE IN RETAIL TRADE*

This paper attempts to estimate genuine scale effects in retail trade from a cross section of retail stores in Israel. This is done by estimating a simple production function for several retail branches and employing the faithful old direct Cobb-Douglas structure with value added as output and labor and capital inputs. And indeed despite the well-known peculiarities of the retail industry, a cross section estimation produces “normal” production-function estimates with reasonable input elasticities. The estimates also identify marked increasing returns-to-scale parameters, higher in food and lower in branches less affected by consumer participation and geographical dispersion. These increasing returns may explain a good part of the increase in sales per unit of inputs observed in time series.     

新贸易理论及内生与外生比较利益理论的新发展:回应

我们在"新贸易理论、比较利益理论及其经验研究的新成果:文献综述"(见《经济学季刊》第1期)中,评述了否定赫克歇尔-俄林禀赋比较利益说(简称 H-O 定理)的文献,并用3个反例证明流行的比较利益说并不具有一般性。梁琦和张二震两位教授在"比较利益再探讨"(以下简称"比文")一文中对我们的文章提出批评。我们感谢他们认真地读我们的文章,并检验我们文中的计算。但是,对于他们提出的批评,我们却不能同意。第一,关于能否事先假定要素密集度逆转不出现的问题。对于一个代表     

ENDOGENOUS FERTILITY AND THE CONSUMPTION TAX*

The differential incidence between the consumption tax and the labour income tax is examined in a model where altruistic parents decide the number of children endogenously. In contrast with past results, the consumption tax is not neutral and exerts distortional effects. As a result, welfare gets worse off through the tax reform of switching from a labour income tax to a consumption tax. This provides the argument about the treatment of bequests under a consumption tax.     

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL DYNAMICS*

In this article, industrial evolution is driven by endogenous technology choices of firms, generating a rich environment that includes the possibility of a dramatic shakeout. The likelihood, magnitude, and timing of this shakeout are characterized and depend not only on the size of an innovation but also on cost structure. In this setting, trade liberalization reduces the likelihood of a shakeout, resulting in more stable industrial structures. However, when shakeouts arise in global markets, the distribution of exits can vary widely across countries. Furthermore, conditions exist where a shakeout occurs in a closed economy but not in an open economy.     

ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN A MIXED DUOPOLY: WEIGHTED WELFARE AND PRICE COMPETITION*

In this paper we analyse the endogenous order of moves in a mixed duopoly for differentiated goods. Firms choose whether to set prices sequentially or simultaneously. The private firm maximises profits while the public firm maximises the weighted sum of the consumer and producer surpluses (weighted welfare). It is shown that the result obtained in equilibrium depends crucially on the weight given to the consumer surplus in weighted welfare and on the degree to which goods are substitutes or complements. We also analyse whether the equilibria obtained maximise the sum of the consumer and producer surpluses or not. Finally we study whether the nationality of the private firm influences the results.     

INTERNATIONAL AND INTRA‐NATIONAL TRADE: A CONTINUUM APPROACH*

We build up a Ricardian trade model with multiple regions within a nation and examine how international trade determines interregional patterns of production and specialization. We show that the degree of interregional concentration of economic activities moves in different directions in two trading nations. The role of “absolute advantage” becomes crucial in dictating the course of income disparity across regions. We discuss cases with varying degrees of labour mobility and reconfirm the result on post‐trade interregional concentration and dispersion. Later we explore the impact of “scale factor” in this model and show how principle of comparative advantage and economies of scale interact to determine the pattern of specialization and volume of trade.     

ENDOGENOUS CONSUMER PARTICIPATION AND THE RECYCLING PROBLEM*

We endogenise the extent of consumer participation in the recycling process, and analyse its effect on the ‘recycling problem’. When recycling requires consumers to undertake costly sorting activities to separate scrap from household waste, they will participate only if the net reward from sorting is positive. Consumers' sorting cost is subject to a network effect arising due to social norms. With heterogeneous consumers differing in terms of their sorting cost, the entire output of the recyclable product may not be subsequently available as scrap to the recycling firms. This increases the virgin producer's monopoly power, and may also lead to multiple equilibria if the network effect of sorting is sufficiently large. The latter result suggests a role for the government in influencing equilibrium selection to improve social welfare. Depending on the fraction of consumers that participate in recycling, increased societal pressure on consumers to recycle may decrease consumer participation and increase the virgin producer's market power.