Agency costs,institutions, learning,and taxation in venture capital contracting

This paper introduces a data set on forms of finance used in 12,363 Canadian and US venture capital (VC) and private equity financings of Canadian entrepreneurial firms from 1991 to 2003. The data comprise different types of venture capital institutions, including corporate, limited partnership, government, and labour-sponsored funds as well as US funds that invest in Canadian entrepreneurial firms. Unlike prior work with US venture capitalists financing US entrepreneurial firms, the data herein indicate that convertible preferred equity has never been the most frequently used form of finance for either US or Canadian venture capitalists financing Canadian entrepreneurial firms, regardless of the definition of the term ‘venture capital’. A syndication example and a simple theoretical framework are provided to show the nonrobustness of prior theoretical work on optimal financial contracts in venture capital finance. Multivariate empirical analyses herein indicate that (1) security design is a response to expected agency problems, (2) capital gains taxation affects contracts, (3) there are trends in the use of different contracts which can be interpreted as learning, and (4) market conditions affect contracts.     

How to Design Public Venture Capital Funds: Empirical Evidence from South Korea

This study examines the effects of several features of government‐managed, sponsored venture capital (VC), and private VC funds on overall VC investments in new technology‐based firms (NTBFs) during two developmental stages (i.e., growth and restructuring) in South Korean VC market and suggests hints for designing effective government VC programs. Our results from data on 463 funds in the period 1995–2005 indicate the factors bearing a positive effect on VC investments targeted to NTBFs. Such factors are the fund specialization focusing on certain industrial sectors, performance‐sensitive compensation for venture capitalists in private and government VC funds.     

Government policy towards entrepreneurial finance: Innovation investment funds

This paper analyses 280 Australian venture capital and private equity funds and their investments in 845 entrepreneurial firms over the period 1982–2005. I focus the analysis on the Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) governmental program, first introduced in 1997. In order to highlight the unique aspects of the IIF, I compare the properties of the Australian IIF program with government venture capital programs in Canada, the UK and the US. The IIF program is unique with a focus on partnering between government–private sector partnerships, as described herein. I analyse the performance of the IIF funds along several dimensions: the propensity to take on risk by investing in early stage and high-tech investments; the propensity to monitor and add value to investees through staging, syndication, and portfolio size per fund manager; and the exit success. For each of these evaluation criteria, I assess the performance of the IIF funds relative to other types of private equity and venture capital funds in Australia. The data analysed show – in both a statistically and economically significant way – that the IIF program has facilitated investment in start-up, early stage and high tech firms as well as the provision of monitoring and value-added advice to investees. Overall, therefore, the data are strongly consistent with the view that the IIF program is fostering the development of the Australian venture capital industry. However, the vast majority of investments have not yet been exited, and the exit performance of IIFs to date has not been statistically different than that of other private funds. Further evaluation of IIF performance and outcomes is warranted when subsequent years of data become available.     

Limited attention and the role of the venture capitalist

This research analyzes the venture capitalist's incentives to maximize the profits of the entrepreneurs of ventures and the limited partners of a venture fund. Venture capital is a professionally managed pool of capital invested in equity-linked private ventures. Entrepreneurs turn to venture capitalists for financing because high-technology startup firms have low or negative cash flows, which prevent them from borrowing or issuing equity. In addition, venture capitalists are actively involved in management of the venture to assure its success. This solves the problem of startup firms that do not have the cash flows to hire management consultants.Venture capital contracts have three main characteristics: (1) staging the commitment of capital and preserving the option to abandon, (2) using compensation systems directly linked to value creation, and (3) preserving ways to force management to distribute investment proceeds. These characteristics address three fundamental problems: (1) sorting the venture capital among the entrepreneurial ventures, (2) providing incentives to motivate venture capitalists to maximize the value of the funded ventures, and (3) providing incentives to motivate entrepreneurs to maximize the value of the ventures. Venture capitalists fund only about a dozen projects a year out of a thousand evaluated. Each project may receive several rounds of financing. Payoffs to VCs can be very high or be a complete loss.The typical venture capital (VC) firm is organized as a limited partnership, with the venture capitalists serving as general partners and the investors as limited partners. General partner VCs act as agents for the limited partners in investing their funds. VCs invest their human capital by placing their reputation on the line. The goal is to begin to convert the investment into cash or marketable securities, which are distributed to the partners. VC management companies receive a management fee equal to a percentage (usually 2.5%) of the capital of each fund. They also receive a percentage (15–30%) of the profits of each fund, called carried interest. Periodic reports are made by the VC firm to the limited partners. Usually these are only costs of managing the fund, and so revenues are negative. Most contracts specify the percentage of time that the VC will devote to managing the fund.The analysis of this research deals with the incentives of the VC who has limited attention to be allocated between improving current ventures and evaluating new ventures for possible funding. The analysis shows that the VC, as agent for both the entrepreneur and the general partners, does not have the incentives required to maximize their profits. The VC allocates attention among ventures and venture funds less frequently than required to maximize the entrepreneurs' and limited partners' profits. However, the VC does maximize the total profits of all ventures. Because the VC considers the opportunity cost of attention, the VC's allocation of attention is efficient. The implication of this result is that, although the entrepreneurs and limited partners could be made better off with a different allocation of the VC's time, this would be an inefficient use of the VC's time.     

Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: A networking perspective

The networking of 464 venture capital firms is analyzed by examining their joint investments in a sample of 1501 portfolio companies for the period 1966–1982. Some of the factors that influence the amount of networking are the innovativeness, technology, stage, and industry of the portfolio company. Using the resource exchange model, we reason that the relative amount of networking is explained primarily by the degree of uncertainty associated with an investment rather than by the sum of money invested.Among the findings of our study about venture capitalists are the following:The top 61 venture capital firms that managed 57% of the pool of venture capital in 1982 had an extensive network. Three out of four portfolio companies had at least one of the top 61 venture capital firms as an investor. Those top 61 firms network among themselves and with other venture capital firms. Hence they have considerable influence.Sharing of information seems to be more important than spreading of financial risk as a reason for networking. There is no difference in the degree of co-investing of large venture capital firms—those with the deep pockets—and small firms. Furthermore, where there is more uncertainty, there is more co-investing, even though the average amount invested per portfolio company is less. That, we argue, is evidence that the primary reason for co-investing is sharing of knowledge rather than spreading of financial risk. Venture capital firms gain access to the network by having knowledge that other firms need.It is likely that there will be increasing specialization by venture capital firms. Knowledge is an important distinctive competence of venture capital firms. That knowledge includes information such as innovations, technology, and people in specific industry segments. Among the portfolios of the top 61 venture capital firms are ones with a concentration of low innovative companies, others with a concentration of high innovative technology companies, and others with a no particular concentration. As technology changes rapidly and grows more and more complex, we expect that venture capitalists will increasingly specialize according to type of companies in which they invest. Only the largest firms with many venture capitalists will be like “department stores,” which invest in all types of companies. The smaller firms with only a few venture capitalists will tend to be more like “boutiques” which invest in specific types of companies, or in specific geographical regions around the world.We think that the networking of venture capital firms has the following implications for entrepreneurs:Entrepreneurs should seek funds from venture firms that are known to invest in their type of product. It speeds the screening process. If the venture capital firm decides to invest, it can syndicate the investment through its network of similar firms. And after the investment has been made, the venture capital firms can bring substantial expertise to the entrepreneur's company.Entrepreneurs should not hawk their business plans indiscriminately. Through their networks, venture firms become aware of plans that have been rejected by other firms. A plan that gets turned down several times is unlikely to be funded. Thus it is better to approach venture capital firms selectively.The extensive network of the leading venture capital firms probably facilitates the setting of a “market rate” for the funds they invest. The going rate for venture capital is not posted daily. Nevertheless, details of the most recent deals are rapidly disseminated through venture capitalists' networks. Hence, that helps to set an industry-wide rate for the funds being sought by entrepreneurs.Lastly, we give the following advice to strategic planners:Venture capital firms share strategic information that is valuable to others outside their network. Since they often invest in companies with emerging products and services, venture capitalists gather valuable strategic information about future innovations and technological trends. Thus, strategic planners should tap into venture capitalists' networks, and thereby gain access to that information. It is sometimes information of the sort that can revolutionize an industry.     

Financing High Technology Startups in Belgium: An Explorative Study

The results of an explorative study on the financing of 18 high technology Belgian startups are reported. On a counts basis, the most important sources of financing at the startup are the entrepreneurs and the banks, but the sources that provide the largest amounts of funds are the venture capital companies and private investors. Private investors and venture capitalists have a complementary role, with the former investing mostly at the startup and the latter financing the early growth. The role of the government, universities and other companies is limited.     

Venture capital's role in financing innovation for economic growth

Previously, there has been little empirical evidence about the role of venture capital in fostering technological innovation. Recent research, sponsored by the National Science Foundation and Babson College and completed with our colleagues Stanley E. Pratt and Norman Fast (Venture Economics and Venture Capital Journal) shed some new light on the flow of venture capital to highly innovative technological ventures from 1967–1982. The evidence suggests that venture capital not only plays a significant role, but that it is a unique kind of investing in terms of when, where, and how it is done. Ironically, this research indicates that the “capital” in venture capital is the least important ingredient in fostering technological innovation. Rather, it is management intensive, requiring very early involvement by venture capitalists in nurturing budding innovators and technology, and thereby bird-dogging and accelerating the emergence of highly innovative technologies. Further, the post-1979 reduction of the capital-gains tax has led to unprecedented growth and development in the venture-capital industry. One result has been that a new industry structure is emerging, and along with it some new danger signals for the future flow and commercialization of technological innovation. Several lessons emerge from our findings that hold implications for venture capital investors and entrepreneurs alike.Successful venture-capital investing in technologically innovative firms requires more than just risk money. Savvy entrepreneurs seek out venture capitalists with noteworthy reputations for their nonmonetary, high value-added contributions to fledgling firms. Venture capitalists who can play a highly constructive role in emerging firms can attract higher-quality ventures. Qualities commonly cited by entrepreneurs are: helping to find the select key management-team members: providing credibility with suppliers and customers; and helping to shape strategy when the daily pressures postpone this vital task. As one put it, “It is far more important whom you obtain funding from than how much and at what price.”Investing in technologically innovative ventures is a more specialized business than suggested by the common stereotype of homogeneity among venture capitalists. Fewer than 5% of the 464 venture-capital firms in our study accounted for nearly 25% of all the investments in highly innovative technological ventures. Investors posses sepcialized know-how, including a web of contacts and networks, a great degree of syndication of deals, and a great intensity of involvement. The message for technology entrepreneurs is clear: focus on venture-capital firms with reputations for proven performance in your technology and market, especially with your targeted customers.Contrary to the notion that venture-capital investors sit and wait for business plans and innovative ideas to come to them and then simply write checks, many of the most active firms do just the opposite: they engage in active “bird-dogging” efforts to identify exceptional innovators with the relevant technical expertise and commitment to bring about the commercialization of promising technologies. They also team with innovators and entrepreneurs to create an “acceleration effect” by actually compressing the time span and increasing the velocity at which new technologies are brought to commercial maturity and societal utility. Founders and investors alike have related numerous examples of highly innovative technological ventures that became realities in what they believed to be one-fourth to one-half the time that would have been required within a large, established firm.Looking ahead, the new venture-capital climate of the mid-1980s offers both bane and blessing.As the pool of capital has exploded, the industry has become more diverse and specialized than even before. Sharp differences are visible in terms of investing objectives, criteria, and strategy, focusing on particular stages, size, and a technology-market niche. Megafunds of $100 + million have been raised, and as funds get larger the minimum investment escalates, typically $1 million or more now. Entrepreneurs in search of venture capital need to be more knowledgeable and focused than ever before.Significant portfolio problems continue to surface as the would-be “pearls” of 1982–1984 become “lemons” in 1985–1986. One results of this is the drying up of funds for seed and strat-up investments. Many venture capitalists are simply overburdened by cleaning up problems in their own portfolios and in replacing management. Fortunately, some innovative venture capitalists have seen opportunity in this adversity, and a handful of specialized seed and first-stage funds have been launched.Ironically, many of the trends and pressures in the venture-capital industry in the mid-1980s may inadvertently shift investing attention away from more innovative technological ventures. The implications of these changes are painful for entrepreneurs, investors, and the nations. How can technological innovation and international competitiveness be achieved of the venture-capital community is unable-or unwilling-to contribute as greatly to the funding of new innovations as it has in the past? Where will technology entrepreneurs find the risk capital and “value-added involvement” so vital to commercial success? And how can venture-capital pools provide the handsome yields on invested capital of the past if they shift investing to later-stage ventures?On the brighter side, we are still in an era of unprecedented opportunity for entrepreneurs and investors alike. Even with the sharp drop in new funds available in venture-capital pools to an estimated $2.5 billion in 1985, this is still 25 to 50 times greater than the annual flow of new venture capital during the dismal 1970s. The recent industry shake-up, coupled with a continuance of the favorable capital-gains tax, should foster a healthier, if not wiser and more disciplined, venture-capital industry during the remainder of the decade.     

The impact of institutional sources of capital upon the minority-oriented venture capital industry

Venture capital (VC) funds specializing in investing equity capital in minority-owned businesses have grown rapidly over the past decade, fueled by the willingness of major institutional investors to support this traditionally neglected niche. We investigate impacts of public pension funds upon the minority VC sector. These funds, providing over half of all capital invested in minority VCs, selectively invest, seeking to fund only those VCs likely to generate high returns. Although they attempt to pick the winners, our findings indicate that they have failed to do so. The influence of public pension funds upon the minority VCs is nonetheless real, skewing investing away from traditional practices and toward those of the venture capital mainstream. In the process, minority VCs funded by pension fund money invest in high-tech fields more than other minority-oriented VC funds do. Further, they are less likely to fund minority-owned small firms, focusing increasingly upon firms owned by nonminority Whites. Neither of these trends has resulted in increased returns. Rather, diverting minority-oriented VCs away from their traditional mission of investing in minority firms operating in a broad range of industries has resulted in lower returns over the years studied.     

Does Venture Capital Syndication Spur Employment Growth and Shareholder Value? Evidence from German IPO Data

This study empirically examines the syndication of equity by multiple venture capitalists in Germany. Following the literature, there are mainly two competing views as to why venture capitalists syndicate investments. First, syndication can be viewed as a means of risk-sharing. Second, venture capitalists may provide important productive resources to firms: capital and information. I test hypotheses based on these two aspects. The results show that the syndication of equity and the number of venture capitalists involved cannot be fully explained by firm characteristics like size, age, or industry affiliation. Although syndicated investments do not differ significantly in stock-market performance, they do show significantly higher growth rates.     

Venture capital secondary funds—the third exit option

This article highlights some of the challenges associated with investing in private equity and, specifically, venture capital, as well as the opportunities presented by the availability of secondary market solutions. Today, the secondary market allows venture capital investors to align liquidity solutions with investment objectives similar to those used in other established markets like real estate and lending. Over the last ten years, it has become clear that exit opportunities for venture‐backed portfolio companies correlate strongly with the state of the economy and its ability to support merger‐and‐acquisition (M&A) and initial public offering (IPO) market activity. Due to their experience and specialization, secondary funds know how to assess quickly potential investments and offer tailored investment solutions. Moreover, these funds offer an attractive exit option that is compelling not only in down economic cycles but also during periods of economic expansion. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The informal venture capital market: Aspects of scale and market efficiency

Risk capital is a resource essential to the formation and growth of entrepreneurial ventures. In a society that is increasingly dependent upon innovation and entrepreneurship for its economic vitality, the performance of the venture capital markets is a matter of fundamental concern to entrepreneurs, venture investors and to public officials. This article deals with the informal venture capital market, the market in which entrepreneurs raise equity-type financing from private investors, (business angels). The informal venture capital market is virtually invisible and often misunderstood. It is composed of a diverse and diffuse population of individuals of means; many of whom have created their own successful ventures. There are no directories of individual venture investors and no public records of their investment transactions. Consequently, the informal venture capital market poses many unanswered questions.The author discusses two aspects of the informal venture capital market: questions of scale and market efficiency. The discussion draws upon existing research to extract and synthesize data that provide a reasonable basis for inferences about scale and efficiency.Private venture investors tend to be self-made individuals with substantial business and financial experience and with a net worth of $1 million or more. The author estimates that the number of private venture investors in the United States is at least 250,000, of whom about 100,000 are active in any given year. By providing seed capital for ventures that subsequently raise funds from professional venture investors or in the public equity markets and equity financing for privately-held firms that are growing faster than internal cash flow can support, private investors fill gaps in the institutional equity markets.The author estimates that private investors manage a portfolio of venture investments aggregating in the neighborhood of $50 billion, about twice the capital managed by professional venture investors. By participating in smaller transactions, private investors finance over five times as many entrepreneurs as professional venture investors; 20,000 or more firms per year compared to two or three thousand. The typical angel-backed venture raises about $250,000 from three or more private investors.Despite the apparent scale of the informal venture capital market, the author cites evidence that the market is relatively inefficient. It is a market characterized by limited information about investors and investment opportunities. Furthermore, many entrepreneurs and private investors are unfamiliar with the techniques of successful venture financing. The author's scale and efficiency inferences, coupled with evidence documenting gaps between private and social returns from innovation, prompt questions about public as well as private initiatives to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market.The article concludes with a discussion of Venture Capital Network, Inc. (VCN), an experimental effort to enhance the efficiency of the informal venture capital market. VCN's procedures and performance are described, followed by a discussion of the lessons learned during the first two years of the experiment.     

Venture capital investing for corporate development objectives

There is a significant new player emerging in the venture capital world whose participation is changing the way that the venture business is done. Domestic and foreign corporations have discovered that investing in venture capital adds a new dimension to their corporate development strategies and can also make an outstanding return on investment.Armed with serious amounts of cash, aware of the value of an association with their name and frequently possessing marketing power that a small company covets, corporations are competing with venture capitalists for the best deals. Obtaining a “corporate partner” is now an accepted part of a small company's financing strategy.For the corporate development executive, this activity provides a useful tool to widen the spectrum of participation in new technologies while retaining the entrepreneurial drive and reducing the cost and exposure of new ventures. However, it is not a panacea for growth and caution should be exercised to avoid creating unrealistic expectations.Both entrepreneurs and venture capitalists welcome this source of later-stage capital, providing it minimizes equity dilution and assists in product development, marketing and liquidity for their investment. However, it is a competitor for the venture capitalists in sourcing deals and a potential adversary for the entrepreneur when objectives clash. Additionally, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists often are suspicious of the corporation in the small company's boardroom.The objective of most corporations is the strategic benefits that can result from venture capital investing, such as acquisitions, technology licenses, product marketing rights, international opportunities and a window on technology. However, this objective is frequently mixed with a financial return objective and can lead to a confused strategy.Participation by corporations can take many different forms but usually begins with investments in several venture capital funds as a limited partner and evolves into direct investments in venture companies. Formation of a venture development subsidiary by the corporation is a demonstrated way to maximize the strategic rewards. If financial return is the only objective, then a stand-alone venture fund is the best vehicle.The most important factors for the strategic success of a corporate program are the creation of a high-quality deal stream and the use of outstanding people to interface between the corporation and the venture capital world. In addition, there has to be a long-term commitment, active involvement and a carefully devised internal communications strategy to promote and protect the program.Creation of a formal venture development subsidiary is probably the best way to maximize the strategic objectives. Lubrizol Enterprises operates as such a subsidiary of The Lubrizol Corporation and utilizes venture capital investing, acquisitions, partnerships, and contract research to develop strategic business units based on leading-edge technologies.     

Venture capital in Western Europe

Western Europe is in the process of an entrepreneurial renaissance. An integral part of this renaissance is the emergence of a venture capital industry in Europe. Although the venture capital institution in Europe is very much modeled along the lines of its American counterpart, it is significantly smaller in size both in absolute terms as well as in relation to the size of the economy. Substantial differences in venture capital activity are also found to exist within Europe,it is most prevaient in the United Kingdom, France, and Netherlands. Surprisingly, it is less developed in West Germany, particularly given the size of this country's economy.Venture capital in Western Europe shares some characteristics with that in the United States. Its investment focus is in high technology, and syndication between funds is common. Unlike the United States, however, banks are a major source of venture capital funds. Surprisingly, in spite of the economic integration to which the European Community aspires, the mobility of venture capital across national boundaries is low.The authors try to explain differences in venture capital activity in several countries of the European Community by examining four aspects of each country's environment. In particular, the size of the technology sector, the cultural influence on entrepreneurial risk-taking, the government's policy to stimulate risk capital and entrepreneurship. and finally, the ability of venture-backed firms to turn to publicly traded markets as a source of future financing. One common factor shared by the three countries with the highest level of venture capital activity is the presence of a secondary stock market geared to the needs of a small, relatively new venture contemplating an initial public offering. The Unlisted Securities Market in the United Kingdom, the Seconde Marché in France, and the Parallel Market in the Netherlands serve these needs and provide the mechanism by which venture capitalists can liquidate their equity position after the venture is quoted on these financial markets. To the venture it provides access to public financing for funding continued growth.In the United Kingdom and Netherlands, the business enterprise has historically been regarded as a tradeable entity and hence the concept of ownership by passive investors is well accepted. In France, where this is a relatively recent phenomenon, the government has played a strong role in stimulating an interest in stock market investing in general. It has also created some extremely attractive fiscal incentives for investors in venture capital funds.     

Chinese venture investments in the United States, 2010–2017

This article contributes to the understanding of Chinese venture investors in the United States by comprehensively measuring the amount and type of venture investments coming to the United States from China. Venture activity is examined by focusing on the number of investments made by venture capital funds, both U.S.‐ and China‐based that include Chinese corporations undertaking corporate venture capital (CVC). Chinese participation in venture funding of United States emerging companies increased from 21 investments in 2010 to 407 in 2016 and 2017. Venture capital funds account for 78% of the investment activity, with Chinese CVC undertaking 22% of the investments. We contribute to the literature of CVC by providing definitions of three specific types of investing firms: corporate funds, strategic investors, and strategic partnerships. In addition, we provide data and examine the motivations of Chinese firms forming strategic partnerships with United States startups.     

Assessing mission drift at venture capital impact investors

In this article, we consider a recent trend whereby private equity available from venture capital (VC) firms is being deployed toward mission‐driven initiatives in the form of impact investing. Acting as hybrid organizations, these impact investors aim to achieve financial results while also targeting companies and funds to achieve social impact. However, potential mission drift in these VCs, which we define as a decoupling between the investments made (means) and intended aims (ends), might become detrimental to the simultaneous financial and social goals of such firms. Based on a content analysis of mission statements, we assess mission drift and the hybridization level of VC impact investors by examining their missions (ends/goals) and their investment practices (means) through the criteria of social and financial logic. After examining eight impact‐oriented VC investors and their investments in 164 companies, we find mission drift manifest as a disparity between the means and ends in half of the VC impact investors in our sample. We discuss these findings and make suggestions for further studies.     

The role of top management team human capital in venture capital markets: Evidence from first-time funds

This paper examines whether the human capital of first-time venture capital fund management teams can predict fund performance and finds that it can. I find that fund management teams with more task-specific human capital, as measured by more managers having past experience as venture capitalists and by more managers having past experience as executives at start-up companies, manage funds with greater fractions of portfolio company exits. I also find that fund management teams with more industry-specific human capital in strategy and management consulting and, to a lesser extent, engineering and non-venture finance manage funds with greater fractions of portfolio company exits. Perhaps counter-intuitively, I find that fund management teams that have more general human capital in business administration, as measured by more managers having MBAs, manage funds with lower fractions of portfolio company exits. Overall, measures of task- and industry-specific human capital are stronger predictors of fund performance than are measures of general human capital.     

Publicly traded venture capital funds: implications for institutional “fund of funds” investors

Institutional investors supply the bulk of the funds which are used by venture capital investment firms in financing emerging growth companies. These investors typically place their funds in a number of venture capital firms, thus achieving diversification across a range of investment philosophy, geography, management, industry, investment life cycle stage and type of security. Essentially, each institutional investor manages a “fund of funds,” attempting through the principles of portfolio theory to reduce the risk of participating in the venture capital business while retaining the up-side potential which was the original source of attraction to the business. Because most venture capital investment firms are privately held limited partnerships, it is very difficult to measure risk adjusted rates of return on these funds on a continuous basis.In this paper, we use the set of twelve publicly traded venture capital firms as a proxy to develop insight regarding the risk reduction effect of investment in a portfolio of venture capital funds, i.e., a fund of funds. Measurements of weekly total returns for the shares of these funds are compared with similar returns on a set of comparably sized “maximum capital gain” mutual funds and the daily return of the S&P 500 Index. A comparison of returns on an individual fund basis, as well as a correlation of daily returns of these individual funds, were made. In order to adjust for any systematic bias resulting from the “thin market” characteristic of the securities of the firms being observed, the Scholes-Williams beta estimation technique was used to reduce the effects of nonsynchronous trading.The results indicate that superior returns are realized on such portfolios when compared with portfolios of growth-oriented mutual funds and with the S&P 500 Index. This is the case whether the portfolios are equally weighted (i.e., “naive”) or constructed to be mean-variant efficient, ex ante, according to the capital asset pricing model. When compared individually, more of the venture funds dominated the S&P Market Index than did the mutual funds and by much larger margins. When combined in portfolios, the venture capital funds demonstrated very low beta coefficients and very low covariance of returns among portfolio components when compared with portfolios of mutual funds. To aid in interpreting these results, we analyzed the discounts and premia from net asset value on the funds involved and compared them to Thompson's findings regarding the contribution of such differences to abnormal returns. We found that observed excess returns greatly exceed the level which would be explained by these differences.The implications of these results for the practitioner are significant. They essentially tell us that, while investment in individual venture capital deals is considered to have high risk relative to potential return, combinations of deals (i.e., venture capital portfolios) were shown to produce superior risk adjusted returns in the market place. Further, these results show that further combining these portfolios into larger portfolios (i.e., “funds of funds”) provides even greater excess returns over the market index, thus plausibly explaining the “fund of funds” approach to venture capital investment taken by many institutional investors.While the funds studied are relatively small and are either small business investment companies or business development companies, they serve as a useful proxy for the organized venture capital industry, despite the fact that the bulk of the funds in the industry are institutionally funded, private, closely held limited partnerships which do not trade continuously in an open market. These results demonstrate to investors the magnitude of the differences in risk adjusted total return between publicly traded venture capital funds and growth oriented mutual funds on an individual fund basis. They also demonstrate to investors the power of the “fund of funds” approach to institutional involvement in the venture capital business. Because such an approach produces better risk adjusted investment results for the institutional investor, it seems to justify a greater flow of capital into the business from more risk averse institutional investment sources. This may mean greater access to institutional funds for those seeking to form new venture capital funds. For entrepreneurs seeking venture capital funds for their young companies, it may also mean a lower potential cost of capital for the financing of business venturing. From the viewpoint of public policy makers interested in facilitating the funding of business venturing, it may provide insight regarding regulatory issues surrounding taxation and the barriers and incentives which affect venture capital investment.     

An institutional view of China's venture capital industry: Explaining the differences between China and the West

Institutional theory argues that institutions in general, and culture in particular, shape the actions of firms and individuals in a number of subtle but substantive ways. The theory has been used to explain a number of significant and substantive managerial differences found in different parts of the world. To date, the examination of venture capital outside the US and Europe, however, has been rather limited. Institutional theory also suggests that there would be differences in how venture capital may operate in other parts of the world, such as Asia where the culture is substantially different from the West. Based on interviews with 36 venture capitalists in 24 venture capital firms investing in China, this exploratory research finds that China's institutional environment creates a number of significant differences from the West. The article discusses the impact of these findings on future research on Asian venture capital, theory development, and the activities of venture capital professionals in that region.     

Venture Capitalists, Syndication and Governance in Initial Public Offerings

This paper examines the development of effective boards in venture capital (VC)-backed initial public offerings. It argues that VC-backed IPOs suffer from two sets of agency costs which are related to principal–agent and principal–principal relationships between the founders and members of the VC syndicate. Using a unique sample of 293 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK it shows that VC syndicates invest in relatively more risky firms. VC-backed IPOs have more independent boards than IPOs with no VC involvement, with board independence being higher in syndicated VC-backed firms. These results are consistent with assumption that these governance factors are used to mitigate agency costs associated with VC involvement in IPO firms. We also find that in syndicated IPOs there is a higher equity presence of passive private equity firms investing alongside VC firms.     

Deal Structuring in Philanthropic Venture Capital Investments: Financing Instrument,Valuation and Covenants

Philanthropic venture capital (PhVC) is a financing option available for social enterprises that, like traditional venture capital, provides capital and value-added services to portfolio organizations. Differently from venture capital, PhVC has an ethical dimension as it aims at maximizing the social return on the investment. This article examines the deal structuring phase of PhVC investments in terms of instrument used (from equity to grant), valuation, and covenants included in the contractual agreement. By content analyzing a set of semi-structured interviews and thereafter surveying the entire population of PhVC funds that are active in Europe and in the United States, findings indicate that the non-distribution constraint holding for non-profit social enterprises is an effective tool to align the interests of both investor and investee. This makes the investor behaving as a steward rather than as a principal. Conversely, while backing non-profit social ventures, philanthropic venture capitalists structure their deal similarly as traditional venture capital, as the absence of the non-distribution constraint makes such investments subject to moral hazard risk both in terms of perks and stealing and social impact focus.