Bertrand Price Undercutting: A Brief Classroom Demonstration

The author presents a brief classroom demonstration illustrating Bertrand price undercutting. The demonstration is appropriate for micro principles and intermediate- and upper-level undergraduate classes, as well as graduate classes in micro, industrial organization, and game theory.     

Price and quantity competition under free entry

This paper complements that of Cellini et al. (Cellini, R., Lambertini, L., Ottaviano, G. I. P., 2004. Welfare in a differentiated oligopoly with free entry: A cautionary note. Research in Economics, 58:125–33.), which shows that Cournot competition may generate higher welfare compared to Bertrand competition in an economy with free entry. Unlike them, we provide a more general proof for this result and show that Cournot competition generates higher welfare compared to Bertrand competition when the products are sufficiently differentiated. If the products are close substitutes, welfare is higher under Bertrand competition. We show that these qualitative results hold whether or not number of varieties increases market size. We also show when the active firms earn higher profits under Bertrand competition compared to Cournot competition.     

Price floors and competition

A potential source of instability of many economic models is that agents have little incentive to stick with the equilibrium. We show experimentally that this can matter with price competition. The control variable is a price floor, which increases the cost of deviating from equilibrium. According to traditional theory, a higher floor allows competitors to obtain higher profits. Behaviorally, the opposite result obtains with two (but not with four) competitors. An error model, which builds on Luce (Individual Choice Behavior, 1959), can adequately describe supra-Nash pricing with a low-floor, but then fails to capture the overall pro-competitive effect of a high-floor seen for duopolies.     

Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition

We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition, higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition. Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee.     

How to eliminate the uncovered market: A duopoly model with government intervention

To eliminate poverty, government intervention is critical for addressing uncovered markets. To assess how this can be done effectively, this study constructs a two-firm model with government intervention. The study focuses on the preconditions, methods, and effects of different government intervention strategies. There are three main findings. (1) When consumer income levels fall below a certain threshold, an uncovered market segment is created, and government intervention should be introduced. (2) Government intervention strategies can be divided into subsidy-type, production-type and mixed-type, and each type achieves a different level of consumer surplus. Given a level of consumer surplus, the optimal strategy is affected by production costs. (3) For production-type and mixed-type intervention strategies, when the market is covered, lower intervention costs can achieve higher consumer surplus if government production costs are low. Furthermore, the optimal subsidy-type intervention strategy varies with the changes in product quality if relaxing the precondition of market coverage.     

Price competition between big and small supermarkets: evidence from Seoul

This article empirically investigates the level of competition between superstores and smaller retailers in the Korean retail industry where market entry and operational hours of the former are restricted in order to protect the latter. Applying spatial econometric methods to store-level price data from Seoul, we find that while spatial price correlations among same-size stores exist, product prices across different-size stores are spatially uncorrelated. This result implies that consumers may not view superstores’ and smaller retailers’ products as close substitutes, and thus their markets are likely to be segmented from each other.     

Market concentration and competition in OECD mobile telecommunications markets

This study analyses the progress of market concentration in OECD member states’ mobile telecommunications markets and evaluates the relationship between market concentration and performance. Using annual panel data from 24 OECD member states for the 1998–2011 period, the study estimates regression equations for market concentration, mobile prices and profits. The empirical results indicate that the more concentrated the mobile market, the higher the prices and profits, providing support for the market power hypothesis. If this hypothesis holds, then market concentration can be a useful indicator of market performance. On the other hand, the applicability of the hypothesis is unclear for the second half of the sample period. The results provide evidence that regulatory policies influence the structure and performance of mobile markets.     

排污权价格形成机制及其优化分析

构建有效的排污权价格形成与运行机制是排污权交易制度建设的关键环节。本文分析了排污权的初始分配机制以及不同市场条件下排污权交易的价格形成机制。在完全竞争市场条件下,排污权的市场价格等于各企业的边际治理成本。经济增长、污染治理技术进步、政府环境目标以及预期因素等将对排污权价格变动产生影响。在不完全竞争条件下,市场势力和交易费用的存在降低了排污权价格机制的效率。文章最后提出了优化排污权价格形成和运行机制的政策建议。     

我国航空运输服务业的市场结构及价格竞争策略分析

我国航空运输服务业从宏观上分析具有寡头垄断的市场结构特点,从航线运营的角度分析却具有垄断竞争的特点,因此我国航空运输服务市场还处在重要的发展变革阶段。在我国空运市场特定的经济环境下,旅客的购买决策受到多种因素的影响,航空公司的价格竞争主要表现为不同价格的子舱位数量的决策,并且具有复杂的价格体系。在同一航线上经营的不同企业一方面要针对价格需求弹性大和时间需求弹性大的旅客采取强硬的价格竞争策略;另一方面也要注重差异化价格竞争策略, 避免恶性竞争的发生。     

Product market competition and productivity shocks

I investigate the interaction effects of competition and productivity shocks on stocks’ earnings and returns. I find that the sensitivities of earnings and returns to productivity shocks are negatively associated with competition intensity. I also find that the excess returns of productivity shocks-sorted portfolios are lower when competition intensity is high, even after controlling for known return predictors. Overall, the empirical evidence shows firms are less exposed to productivity shocks when competition is high. As such, this study provides a possible mechanism through which the structure of product markets affects stock returns.     

Foreign market entry,upstream market power,and endogenous mode of downstream competition

In a differentiated duopoly model of trade and FDI featuring both horizontal and vertical product differentiation, we examine whether globalization and trade policy measures can generate welfare gains by leading firms to change their mode of competition. We show that when a high-quality foreign variety is manufactured under large frictions due to upstream monopoly power, a foreign firm can become a Bertrand competitor against a Cournot local rival in equilibrium, especially when the relative product quality of the foreign variety is sufficiently high and trade costs are sufficiently low (implying higher input price distortions due to double marginalization). Our results suggest that such strategic asymmetry is welfare improving and that the availability of FDI as an alternative to trade can make welfare-enhancing strategic asymmetry even more likely, especially when both input trade costs and fixed investment costs are sufficiently low and trade costs in final goods are sufficiently large.     

Analysis of price competition and strategic implications for heterogeneous market structure

This paper examines strategic competition behavior in heterogeneous market structure where both conventional offline and online firms coexist in equilibrium and draws strategic implications with some remarks on welfare. Research on the price competition between conventional offline and online firms has been done through empirical approaches; however, the results are conflicting. This paper reconciles the existing conflicting empirical findings on price levels between conventional offline and online firms through a theoretical approach. We find that as the online market matures, prices in both conventional and online firms drop, and the price in the online firm can be higher than that in a conventional offline firm. Furthermore, if convenience associated with the online increases, the online price tends to exceed the conventional offline price.     

Price discovery and the effects of fragmentation on market quality: evidence from Cypriot cross-listed stocks

Using a novel high-frequency data set, we examine the contribution of Greek trading to the price discovery process of a pair of Cypriot blue-chip, cross-listed stocks during overlapping trading hours. Additionally, we investigate the effects of market fragmentation on the home market’s quality, as measured by microstructure-based liquidity measures. Contrary to earlier studies from other markets, our findings show that foreign stock exchanges can act as the leading contributors to price discovery and can concentrate the majority of trading activity and produce the lowest transaction costs. Our results also show that market fragmentation can lead to negative effects on market liquidity.     

Intranational Price Convergence and Price Stickiness: Evidence from Denmark

We show that estimates of the half‐life of deviations from the law of one price are biased when their precision is not taken into account when aggregating data for different types of goods. Using a comprehensive dataset with monthly price data for 124 homogeneous products across regions in Denmark over the period 1997–2010, we find a large positive aggregation bias. On average, we find that the half‐life is 8.4 months when taking the bias into account, compared with 28.7 months when applying the standard method. The heterogeneity in the estimated half‐life can be explained by price stickiness, distance between regions, and whether the good is traded or non‐traded.     

Corporate governance structure and product market competition

This article assesses the effects of the competitive structure of a product market on a firm’s corporate governance structure. Our model demonstrates that shareholders strategically determine the corporate governance structure, including the manager’s stock ownership and his controlling power over the firm, in order to maximize their utility in the product market competition. We find that the manager’s stock ownership is lower and his controlling power over the firm is higher when the firm’s product is more profitable or when competition within the product market is more severe. The inefficiency of the wealth transfer from shareholders to the manager also affects the corporate governance structure.     

Trade liberalisation,market competition and wage inequality in China's manufacturing sector

Economic reforms of the late 1980s have contributed to rapid economic growth in China. While the overall standard of living has improved, economic growth has also resulted in an increase in income inequality. Rising income inequality can increase social tensions that can impede further economic growth. By making use of firm level panel data, this paper focuses on the impact of increased market competition and trade liberalisation on skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China's manufacturing sector. A theoretical model is used to argue that trade liberalisation and market competition can affect skilled–unskilled wage inequality. Based on this result, an econometric model is specified. The empirical analysis presented in this paper shows that increased trade liberalisation has contributed to an increase in skilled–unskilled wage inequality in China's manufacturing sector. However, increase in market competition has the opposite effect.     

Price Convergence and Information Efficiency in German Natural Gas Markets

In 2007, Germany changed network access regulation in the natural gas sector and introduced a so‐called entry–exit system. The spot market effects of the reregulation remain to be examined. We use cointegration analysis and a state space model with time‐varying coefficients to study the development of natural gas spot prices in the two major trading hubs in Germany and the interlinked spot market in the Netherlands. To analyse information efficiency in more detail, the state space model is extended to an error correction model. Overall, our results suggest a reasonable degree of price convergence between the corresponding hubs. Market efficiency in terms of information processing has increased considerably among Germany and the Netherlands.     

Examining technological competition between BMW and Hyundai in the Korean car market

The Korean car market has increased in size. BMW and Hyundai are the top-ranked imported and domestic vehicle brands in Korea, respectively. Thus, it is important to understand these companies and the Korean car market, because technology is most significant in the vehicle industry. In this paper, we compare BMW with Hyundai from the technological perspective. Our research is focused on an analysis of the technological competition between BMW and Hyundai based on their developed technologies. We use all BMW and Hyundai patents from worldwide patent databases to analyse the two companies’ technologies. In addition, we apply statistical methods and machine learning algorithms to the patent analysis. In our conclusion, we show the technological differences and competition between BMW and Hyundai, and find their relative strengths and weaknesses.     

公共物品的价格形成与优化分析

运用广义价格理论 ,论文首先分析公共物品价格形成机理及其交易均衡的特殊性 ,接着分析公共物品价格的成分构成 ,然后在此基础上分析公共物品价格形成优化的主要措施和途径。     

Inter-linkages between competition and stabilisation policies in the banking sector and stock market development in Europe

The banking sector and the stock market in Europe have been adversely impacted by a series of global financial crises over the last two decades. Major financial reforms were implemented to enhance the stability and competition within the banking sector. Measures were also implemented to create a vibrant stock market in Europe to stimulate economic growth in Europe. This study examines the interactions between stock market development, banking competition, and banking stability in European countries from 1996 to 2016. The purpose of the study is to understand the inter-linkages between these variables to ascertain the spillover impact of policy reforms in the banking sector on the stock market and vice-versa. Using a vector error-correction model, the study finds long-run and short-run inter-linkages between banking competition, banking stability, and stock market development in European countries. The study’s most robust result is that banking competition and banking stability stimulate stock market development in the long run. There is also some evidence that healthy competition in the banking sector and stock market development instils greater stability in the banking sector. The results suggest that policy measures put in place to create a vibrant stock market must include elevating banking competition and banking stability, with policymakers being cognizant that causality may be bidirectional.