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1.
This paper considers methods for forecasting macroeconomic time series in a framework where the number of predictors, N, is too large to apply traditional regression models but not sufficiently large to resort to statistical inference based on double asymptotics. Our interest is motivated by a body of empirical research suggesting that popular data-rich prediction methods perform best when N ranges from 20 to 40. In order to accomplish our goal, we resort to partial least squares and principal component regression to consistently estimate a stable dynamic regression model with many predictors as only the number of observations, T, diverges. We show both by simulations and empirical applications that the considered methods, especially partial least squares, compare well to models that are widely used in macroeconomic forecasting. 相似文献
2.
Block factor methods offer an attractive approach to forecasting with many predictors. These extract the information in these predictors into factors reflecting different blocks of variables (e.g. a price block, a housing block, a financial block, etc.). However, a forecasting model which simply includes all blocks as predictors risks being over-parameterized. Thus, it is desirable to use a methodology which allows for different parsimonious forecasting models to hold at different points in time. In this paper, we use dynamic model averaging and dynamic model selection to achieve this goal. These methods automatically alter the weights attached to different forecasting models as evidence comes in about which has forecast well in the recent past. In an empirical study involving forecasting output growth and inflation using 139 UK monthly time series variables, we find that the set of predictors changes substantially over time. Furthermore, our results show that dynamic model averaging and model selection can greatly improve forecast performance relative to traditional forecasting methods. 相似文献
3.
《Games and Economic Behavior》2010,68(2):665-681
This paper studies the use of discretionary rewards in a finitely repeated principal–agent relationship with moral hazard. The key aspect is that rewards have informational content. When the principal obtains a private subjective signal about the agent's performance, she may pay discretionary bonuses to provide credible feedback to the agent. In accordance with the often observed compression of ratings, we show that in equilibrium the principal communicates the agent's interim performance imperfectly, i.e., she does not fully differentiate good and bad performance. Furthermore, we show that small rewards can have a large impact on the agent's effort, provided that the principal's stake in the project is small. 相似文献
4.
Marcet and Marimon (1994, revised 1998, revised 2011) developed a recursive saddle point method which can be used to solve dynamic contracting problems that include participation, enforcement and incentive constraints. Their method uses a recursive multiplier to capture implicit prior promises to the agent(s) that were made in order to satisfy earlier instances of these constraints. As a result, their method relies on the invertibility of the derivative of the Pareto frontier and cannot be applied to problems for which this frontier is not strictly concave. In this paper we show how one can extend their method to a weakly concave Pareto frontier by expanding the state space to include the realizations of an end of period lottery over the extreme points of a flat region of the Pareto frontier. With this expansion the basic insight of Marcet and Marimon goes through – one can make the problem recursive in the Lagrangian multiplier which yields significant computational advantages over the conventional approach of using utility as the state variable. The case of a weakly concave Pareto frontier arises naturally in applications where the principal?s choice set is not convex but where randomization is possible. 相似文献
5.
Hitoshi Matsushima 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,133(1):1-30
We investigate the collective decision with incomplete information and side payments. We show that a direct mechanism associated with the social choice function that satisfies budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual rationality exists for generic prior distributions. We consider the possibility that a risk-averse principal extracts full surplus in agency problems with adverse selection. With regard to generic prior distributions, we show that there exists a modified direct mechanism associated with the virtual social choice function, which satisfies budget balancing and interim individual rationality, such that truth telling is the unique three times iteratively undominated message rule profile. 相似文献
6.
We consider a model of team production in which the principal observes only the team output, but agents can monitor one another (at a cost) and provide reports to the principal. We consider the problem faced by a principal who is prevented from penalizing an agent without evidence showing that the agent failed to complete his assigned actions. We show the first-best (high effort but no monitoring) can be achieved, but only if the principal assigns second-best actions. The principal requires monitoring, but agents do not monitor, and as long as output is high, the principal does not penalize agents who fail to monitor. If the principal has the responsibility for monitoring, the first-best outcome cannot be achieved, thus we identify an incentive for delegated monitoring even when agents have no informational advantage. 相似文献
7.
Simulation experiments are used to compare OLS and several principal components (PCR) estimators of the classical linear regression model. According to mean square error and mean absolute error criteria OLS dominates PCR in these experiments. 相似文献
8.
This paper studies the use of discretionary rewards in a finitely repeated principal–agent relationship with moral hazard. The key aspect is that rewards have informational content. When the principal obtains a private subjective signal about the agent's performance, she may pay discretionary bonuses to provide credible feedback to the agent. In accordance with the often observed compression of ratings, we show that in equilibrium the principal communicates the agent's interim performance imperfectly, i.e., she does not fully differentiate good and bad performance. Furthermore, we show that small rewards can have a large impact on the agent's effort, provided that the principal's stake in the project is small. 相似文献
9.
Ecological evidence indicates that transient recreational boating is the principal overland vector of dispersal for several freshwater invasive species. Understanding boating behavior, and how behavior responds to policy changes, is central to understanding the effectiveness of efforts to halt or slow the spread of aquatic invasives. We develop a framework that combines a recreation demand model of boating behavior with a discrete duration model describing the spatial and temporal spread of an aquatic invasive. The integrated approach allows us to link invasion risk probabilities directly to boating behavior, policy levers, and behavior changes arising from policy shocks. With an application to zebra mussels in Wisconsin we show that explicitly accounting for behavioral responses can dramatically change predictions for the effectiveness of particular policies, in some instances leading to increases in invasions risks at some sites. 相似文献
10.
Summary. We examine the strategic role of information transmission in a repeated principal-agent relationship where the agent produces
information that is useful to the principal. The agent values continuous employment for the principal because he makes a relationship-specific
investment that can yield rents to him when the relationship is renewed. Assuming that the parties are sufficiently impatient,
we show that full disclosure of the information produced occurs early in the relationship when the principal can commit to
a long-term relationship, when the agent observes his valuation of continuous employment after making a report on information
produced, or when the agent obtains a low valuation of continuous employment before making a report. By contrast, a strategic
delay in the transmission of information occurs when the principal can only commit to a short-term relationship and the agent
obtains a high valuation of continuous employment before making a report.
Received: October 15, 1997; revised version: July 27, 1998 相似文献
11.
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1994,4(6):545-553
With the greening of political debate around the world, large nations — precluded from using trade instruments explicitly — have become aware of the fact that they can manipulate their domestic tax structure to attain environmental and trade objectives simultaneously. In this note we show how such nations can attain these two targets with one instrument. Specifically, we show how to construct dual purpose taxes. We then focus on the empirical determinants of these taxes. 相似文献
12.
AKIFUMI ISHIHARA 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2017,19(2):527-547
Motivated by commitment problems of contracts in lobbying, this paper studies a model of a repeated common agency where monetary transfers must be voluntary. First, we show that the optimal punishment strategy for a principal takes a two‐phase scheme, which is similar to the punishment characterized by Goldlücke and Kranz. Second, we investigate whether an outcome of standard menu auctions with binding contracts can be supported by implicit contracts. We define the environment to be more preference‐diverse if an efficient decision is less attractive to each principal. We show that the discount factor must be high to support the outcome of the standard menu auction if the environment is preference‐diversified. 相似文献
13.
In this article, we show that a standard economic model, the endogenous learning‐by‐doing model, captures several major themes from the anxiety literature in psychology. In our model, anxiety is a fully endogenous construct that can be separated naturally into its cognitive and physiological components. As such, our results are directly comparable with hypotheses and evidence from psychology. We show that anxiety can serve a motivating function, which suggests potential applications in the principal–agent literature.
相似文献
14.
Alberto Galasso 《Journal of Economic Theory》2008,143(1):558-570
Building on Genicot and Ray [G. Genicot, D. Ray, Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart, J. Econ. Theory 131 (2006) 71-100] we develop a model of non-cooperative bargaining that combines the two main approaches in the literature of contracting with externalities: the offer game (in which the principal makes simultaneous offers to the agents) and the bidding game (in which the agents make simultaneous offers to the principal). Allowing for agent coordination, we show that the outcome of our bargaining procedure may differ remarkably from those of the offer and the bidding games. In particular, we find that bargaining can break agents' coordination and that the principal's payoff can be decreasing in his own bargaining power. 相似文献
15.
We study the design of supervisory functions in an organization with one principal and two agents. Each agent can perform supervision activities regarding the other agent. We characterize the way the principal must structure incentive payments to avoid any collusive activity between agents. In particular, it is shown that better mutual information between agents may hurt the principal. The other main result is the possibility that it may be better to give up one supervisory function or to have a third party be the supervisor if possible. Finally, we show that such a dual supervisory structure raises the possibility that letting collusion happen may be the best policy. 相似文献
16.
《Journal of economic behavior & organization》2008,68(3-4):735-754
We model a mechanism design problem in which the principal owns a project that requires work effort by an agent, but agents may have time-inconsistent, present-biased preferences and lack complete self-awareness of these preferences. The self-control problem and naïveté of an agent may lead him to agree to a contract but later shirk or slack-off, even though doing so is observable. When the principal cannot severely punish shirking and agents are completely naïve, the second-best solution entails allowing a present-biased agent to slack-off in order to avoid a greater loss due to shirking. With greater self-awareness among present-biased agents, the principal may do better by screening some from accepting the contract. Furthermore, when shirking can be severely punished, this does not lead to contracts that eliminate effects of the self control problem. Instead the principal may exploit present-biased agents by offering a contract that allows them to slack-off (which agents fail to foresee they will choose to do) but at the expense of foregoing much compensation. 相似文献
17.
集团控制与国有企业治理 总被引:9,自引:0,他引:9
本文研究集团控制对国有企业可能产生的正面影响机制——减轻管理层代理问题和可能产生的负面影响机制——加重股东间代理问题,全面评估国有企业集团控制作为国企治理模式改革的有效性。以2004年至2008年中国国有上市公司为样本的统计结果显示:(1)集团控制会有效减轻国有企业的管理层代理问题;(2)当外部监管程度高时,集团控制不会加剧国有企业的股东间代理问题;而当外部监管程度低时,集团控制会加剧国有企业的股东间代理问题。因此,集团控制是一种有效改善国有企业管理层代理问题的治理模式,而由此加剧的股东间代理问题应通过强化外部监管加以解决。 相似文献
18.
Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information 总被引:16,自引:0,他引:16
Antoine Faure-Grimaud Jean-Jacques Laffont David Martimort 《The Review of economic studies》2003,70(2):253-279
This paper shows that supervision with soft information is valuable whenever supervisors and supervisees collude under asymmetric information and proceeds then to derive an Equivalence Principle between organizational forms of supervisory and productive activities. We consider an organization with an agent privately informed on his productivity and a risk averse supervisor getting signals on the agent's type. In a centralized organization, the principal can communicate and contract with both the supervisor and the agent. However, these two agents can collude against the principal. In a decentralized organization, the principal only communicates and contracts with the supervisor who in turn sub-contracts with the agent. We show that the two organizations achieve the same outcome. We discuss this equivalence and provide various comparative statics results to assess the efficiency of supervisory structures. 相似文献
19.
《China Economic Journal》2013,6(3):317-322
This paper forecasts inflation in China over a 12-month horizon. The analysis runs 15 alternative models and finds that only those considering many predictors via a principal component display a better relative forecasting performance than the univariate benchmark. 相似文献
20.
This paper proposes a simple but efficient way to improve the predictability of stock returns. Instead of torturously constructing new powerful predictors, we readily select existing predictors that have low correlations and thus provide complementary information. Our forecasting strategy is to use the selected predictors based on a multivariate regression model. In our forecasting strategy, less powerful predictors are also useful for forecasting stock returns if they could provide complementary information. The empirical results show that our forecasting strategy outperforms not only the univariate regression models that use each predictor's information separately but also combination approaches that use all predictors jointly. We also document that our strategy extracts significantly more useful information from the complementary predictors than the competing models. In addition, from an asset allocation perspective, a mean-variance investor realizes substantial economic gains. Furthermore, the evidence based on Monte Carlo simulations supports the feasibility of our forecasting strategy. 相似文献