Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley–Shubik index

In this paper we explore the noncooperative foundations of the bargaining power that a voting rule gives to each member of a committee that bargains in search of consensus over a set of feasible agreements under a voting rule. Assuming complete information, we model a variety of bargaining protocols and investigate their stationary subgame perfect equilibria. We show how the Shapley–Shubik index and other power indices can be interpreted as measures of ‘bargaining power’ that appear in this light as limit cases.     

Dissertation abstract: Essays on veto bargaining games

This dissertation experimentally analyzes the outcomes of multilateral legislative bargaining games in the presence of a veto player. The first essay examines veto power—the right of an agent to unilaterally block decisions but without the ability to unilaterally secure his/her preferred outcome. Using Winter’s (1996) theoretical framework, I consider two cases: urgent committees where the total amount of money to be distributed shrinks by 50% if proposals do not pass and non-urgent committees where the total amount of money shrinks by 5% if proposals do not pass. Committees with a veto player take longer to reach decisions (are less efficient) than without a veto player and veto players proposals generate less consensus then non-veto players proposals, outcomes on which the theory is silent. In addition, veto power in conjunction with proposer power generates excessive power for the veto player. This suggests that limiting veto players’ proposer rights (e.g., limiting their ability to chair committees) would go a long way to curbing their power, a major concern in committees in which one or more players has veto power. Finally, non-veto players show substantially more willingness to compromise than veto players, with players in the control game somewhere in between. I relate the results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power as well as concerns about the impact of veto power in real-life committees. The second essay discusses in detail the voting patterns in the veto and control games reported in the first essay. The empirical cumulative density functions of shares veto players accepted first degree stochastically dominates that of shares for the controls and the empirical cdfs of shares the controls accepted first degree stochastically dominate that of shares for non-veto players. Random effect probits support this conclusion as well. In addition, regressions imply favorable treatment of voting and proposing between non-veto players which, however, does not result in larger shares in the end. Coalition partners consistently demand more than the stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium share except for veto players in non-urgent committees. JEL Classification C7, D7, C78, D72 Dissertation Committee: John H. Kagel, Advisor Massimo Morelli Alan Wiseman Stephen Cosslett     

Host-country policy – commitment or no-commitment: a theoretical analysis

This paper develops a model of foreign entry strategy and examines welfare of the host-country under two situations - (i) where host-country government commits to the tax policy, (ii) where host-country government does not commit to the tax policy. It turns out that under the non-committed government policy the foreign firm does not prefer to hold equity share in the domestic project. The host-country welfare, however, is more under the committed government policy than the non-committed government policy when the foreign firm has sufficiently higher bargaining power. The possibility of technology choice by the foreign firm reduces the range of bargaining power of the foreign firm over which the host-country welfare is more under the committed policy compared to the non-committed policy.     

The Role of Culture and Meaning in Rational Choice

The Wason card selection and the Tversky &; Kahneman frame anomaly are examined in the context of a probabilistic, constructivist biological model of decision-making. Rational choice requires that decision-makers understand the meaning of the choices they confront. In fact, the determination of meaning and the process of rational choice represent two sides the same coin. Further, perception, cognition and action are ill-posed problems. To solve these problems ‘missing data’ must be supplied by the brain. This data is acquired by both ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes. These evolutionary processes facilitate the determination of meaning and as a product of that process also facilitate the construction of rationality. Two interrelated brain systems involved in this construction process are examined: an emotional system that rapidly and non-consciously assigns reward expectancy values to objects in the environment and a sensory-motor system that participates in the discovery of more general information that facilitates environment/body interactions. Jointly, these systems help a naïve agent to find ‘meaning in an unlabeled world’ and to predict the outcomes of future interactions with that world by supplying ‘background’ information, i.e., by supplying the missing data necessary for rational choice. This ‘background’ represents the imprint of the statistical structure of the world on the brain and, as such, embodies the individual’s Bayesian priors. Lack of sufficient background capacities can result in systematic judgment errors and seemingly irrational decisions. Complex culture is a key aspect of the environment that facilitates the construction of rationality, in part, by becoming internalized as background. Culture facilitates the creation of complex social constructs that contribute to cultural evolution, reduce uncertainty, and increase rationality; however, cultural evolution can get ahead of itself—potentially leading to background failure and errors in judgment and choice. Finally, it is not simply complexity or lack of hands-on experience that lead to error: an additional component that might be called semantic opacity is necessary.     

Strategic sophistication of individuals and teams. Experimental evidence

Many important decisions require strategic sophistication. We examine experimentally whether teams act more strategically than individuals. We let individuals and teams make choices in simple games, and also elicit first- and second-order beliefs. We find that teams play the Nash equilibrium strategy significantly more often, and their choices are more often a best response to stated first order beliefs. Distributional preferences make equilibrium play less likely. Using a mixture model, the estimated probability to play strategically is 62% for teams, but only 40% for individuals. A model of noisy introspection reveals that teams differ from individuals in higher order beliefs.     

资本项目开放对劳动议价能力与收入份额的影响 —基于跨国制造业数据的分析

本文基于跨国制造业数据实证研究了资本项目开放对于劳动收入份额的影响效应。基于不同方法、指标和模型的分析结果显示：总体上看,资本项目开放未对制造业劳动收入份额产生显著影响;分样本结果表明,资本项目开放会对发展中而非发达经济体的劳动收入份额产生显著负面影响,而且外部融资依赖度越高的行业受到的负面影响程度越大。资本和劳动要素议价能力的相对变化是形成上述结果的关键。进一步的分析证实资本项目开放显著降低了发展中经济体的劳动议价能力,但对发达经济体劳动议价能力未形成明显影响,从而为前述结论提供了机制支撑。在决定资本项目是否开放以及开放时机的选择时,应对包括收入分配在内各种因素的可能复杂影响加以充分考虑     

Easter Island’s collapse: a tale of a population race

The Easter Island tragedy has become an allegory for ecological catastrophe and a warning for the future. In the economic literature the collapse is usually attributed to irrational or myopic behavior in the context of a fragile ecosystem. In this paper we propose an alternative story involving non-cooperative bargaining between clans to share the crop. Each clan’s bargaining power depends on its threat level when fighting a war. The biggest group has the highest probability of winning. A clan’s fertility is determined ex ante by each group. In the quest for greater bargaining power, each clan’s optimal size depends on that of the other clan, and a population race follows. This race may exhaust the natural resources and lead to the ultimate collapse of the society. In addition to well-known natural factors, the likelihood of a collapse turns out to be greater when the cost of war is low, the probability of succeeding in war is highly responsive to the number of fighters, and the marginal return to labor is high. We analyze whether these factors can account for the difference between Easter and Tikopia Islands. The paper also makes a methodological contribution in that it is the first fertility model to include strategic complementarities between groups’ fertility decisions.      

新农村建设:一个政治经济学视角的解析

新农村建设是对城乡经济社会发展不平衡的一个积极回应,它包含经济增长和社会发展两个层面.从政治经济学视角出发,在经济增长方面,户籍、土地、保障等制度性因素制约到农村劳动力的有效流转,从而对劳动生产率提升和农业发展产生负面影响;在社会福利方面,农民的数量优势没有转化为谈判优势,对市场价格和政策制定的影响力较小,其社会福利获取以及发展程度处于不利地位.据此,新农村建设必须对相关制度性、组织性因素进行完善和改革,部分农民的真正流转和留守农民的自发组织将尤其重要.     

Two Experiments to Test a Model of Herd Behaviour

We carry out two experiments to test a model of herd behaviour based on the work of Banerjee (Quarterly Journal of Economics, CVII, 797–817, 1992). He shows that herding occurs as a result of people observing the actions of others and using this information in their own decision rule. In our experiments herding does not occur as frequently as Banerjee predicts. Contrary to his results, the subjects' behaviour appears to depend on the probabilities of receiving a signal and of this signal being correct. Furthermore, Banerjee finds that the pattern of decision making over a number of rounds of the game is volatile whereas we find that decision making is volatilewithin rounds.     

关于建国以来四次强调农户自主的思考

建国５０ 年来,每当国际国内形势严峻,需要发展农村经济以应对困难局面时,就会在政策上强调农户自主经营。此文着重分析了建国以来四次强调农户自主经营的过程和特点,研究了再次循环变化的内在原因,从而提出了以巩固农户自主经营为中心,深化农村改革, 发展农村经济的政策建议。     

Multiple Criteria Decision Making: A Case Study of the Columbia River Salmon Recovery Plan

A common problem faced by decision makers is choosing the best alternative from among many. Traditionally, such decisions in the public arena were made using benefit-cost analysis, which involves the conversion of all costs and benefits associated with a project into monetary terms. But public projects often have a variety of economic, ecological, social and political objectives, many of which cannot or perhaps should not be converted to monetary terms. In such projects decisions must be made based on multiple, even conflicting objectives. Multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) methods are widely used for such decisions. However, a common disadvantage among many such methods available in the literature is that they require input from a real decision maker. This paper presents the development and application of an expert system based on fuzzy set theory and IF-THEN rules. The system mimics a real decision maker. Along with two conventional MCDM methods the developed expert system was applied on a data set from the Columbia River Basin salmon recovery plan to assess its potential usefulness as a decision-making tool for natural resource projects. The results suggest that the fuzzy expert system is easy to develop and makes better decisions than the other two conventional MCDM methods used.     

On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents

This paper provides a thorough equilibrium analysis of a wage contract negotiation model where the union must choose between strike and holdout between offers and counter-offers. When the union and the firm have different discount factors, delay in reaching an agreement may Pareto dominate many immediate agreements. We derive the exact bounds of equilibrium payoffs and characterize the equilibrium strategy profiles that support these extreme equilibrium payoffs for all discount factors. In particular, our analysis clarifies open issues on the maximal wage in this model when the union has a higher discount factor than the firm. We would like to thank Wilko Bolt, Gerard van der Laan, Michiel Keyzer, and an associate editor and the referee for their comments and suggestions. Quan Wen is grateful to the Tinbergen Institute and the Vrije Universiteit for their hospitality and generosity. This project is supported by Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), grant B45-271.     

Learning Direction Theory and the Winner’s Curse

We report an experiment on a decision task by Samuelson and Bazerman (1985). Subjects submit a bid for an item with an unknown value. A winners curse phenomenon arises when subjects bid too high and make losses. Learning direction theory can account for this. However, other influences on behaviour can also be identified. We introduce impulse balance theory to make quantitative predictions on the basis of learning direction theory. We also look at monotonic ladder processes. It is shown that for this kind of Markov chains the impulse balance point is connected to the mode of the stationary distribution.     

A Guide to Extracting Information from Environmental Pressure Groups

This paper examines the relationship between environmental pressure groupsand environmental policy makers. Environmental pressure groups are assumedto possess valuable private information on environmental issues.Environmental pressure groups are also assumed to pursue their ownpreferences, which are only partially correlated with policy makers'preferences. A new aspect is that binding contracts with side payments arenot allowed, which accurately describes the interaction betweenenvironmental pressure groups and governments. It is shown that by choosingprobabilities of acting on environmental pressure groups' signals, adecision maker can force environmental pressure groups to reveal superiorinformation even in the absence of binding contracts.     

绿色施工的激励机制研究——基于施工企业决策的微观视角

从施工企业决策的微观视角出发,分别基于经济学和管理学的角度集中分析了施工企业是否进行绿色施工的决策,从而揭示了为何绿色施工推广存在困难,并提出了相应的激励对策,即：消除传统施工的外部不经济性,降低实施绿色施工的收益不确定性,建立绿色施工的价值标准和评价机制.