母以子贵:性别偏好与妇女的家庭地位-来自中国营养健康调查的证据

基于中国普遍存在的对男孩的性别偏好,本文采用所生育小孩的性别作为妇女家庭地位和议价能力的度量指标,研究该指标对家庭内部资源分配及后果的影响。中国健康营养调查数据中有关家庭耐用品消费决策的信息表明,第一胎性别对妇女在家庭中的地位有重要作用。本文发现,当妇女的家庭地位随着生育男孩而提高后,家庭中食物支出份额会增加,该妇女营养摄入增加,而她的身体健康状况会变好。     

Maternal Healthcare in Tajikistan: A Bargaining Framework

Abstract

This study examines women's declining use of maternal healthcare services in post-socialist Tajikistan. Using data from the 2003 and 2007 Tajikistan Living Standards Surveys (TLSS), the findings support previous evidence that a woman's use of prenatal and delivery care depends on her education, household income, and proximity to services. However, previous models have not specified who makes the decision to use maternal healthcare services. This study finds that in Tajikistan a woman shares decision making with her spouse and the eldest woman in the household. There is limited evidence that traditional proxies for bargaining power, such as relative earnings level, affect outcomes. The authors conclude that where women's exit options are limited, surveys evaluating the value of women's assets and their services in the home, as well as questions about decision making, will allow more refined measures of women's bargaining power.     

Endogenous gender power,household labor supply and the demographic transition

We present a microeconomic model of the household in which there exists no difference in spousal preferences but childrearing is more time costly for women. Bargaining between the wife and the husband forms the basis of household decisions. Marital bargaining power is determined according to the incomes of the spouses, which in turn help to determine their reservation utility levels outside the marriage. The endogeneity of bargaining power introduces a non-cooperative element to the couples' decision-making problem because both the husbands and the wives take into account how their pre-marital education decisions affect their marital power and the share they extract from household resources in the future. The model predicts that wives invest more than is Pareto efficient in their education in order to increase their bargaining power in marriage. As a consequence, couples have fewer children and consume more when exogenous structural changes lead women to invest more in education. A corollary of the model is that empowering women directly through social reforms such as a lower gender wage gap leads to lower fertility and higher spousal consumption and leisure.     

Women empowerment and infant mortality in Bangladesh

This study attempts to investigate the effects of women empowerment on infant mortality in Bangladesh. Four indicators have been considered to measure four dimensions of women empowerment: the level of education, participation in household (HH) decisions, autonomy in movements and employment status. The rotated factor analysis technique is used to construct the last three dimensions. The Weibull parametric survival model has been specified and estimated using the Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey (BDHS) data of 2011. The results show that three measures of empowerment (the level of education, participation in HH decisions and autonomy in movements) contribute significantly to the reduction of infant mortality. But women employment is associated with increased mortality for infants. The findings of this study have a number of policy implications on this issue for a developing country like Bangladesh.     

On the determinants of household debt maturity choice

This article jointly analyses a behavioural and a cultural concept to explain household debt portfolio choice. The behavioural approach explores the role of time preferences on household debt maturity in a theoretical model and a numerical analysis. We derive a positive relationship between the long-term discount factor δ and the optimal maturity of household loans. The cultural approach examines whether national culture is a reasonable predictor for household debt maturity. We show that culture is an important factor for households’ borrowing decisions and has even more predictive power than time preferences. Countries with higher scores on the Hofstede dimension of long-term orientation tend to have shorter household debt maturity. Time preferences incur a primarily mediating role, because the effect of national culture on the borrowing decision is reduced, as the long-term discount factor δ increases.     

SELF‐REPORTED ECONOMIC CONDITION AND HOME PRODUCTION: INTRA‐HOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION IN ITALY

This paper applies a collective model of intra‐household welfare distribution using individual self‐reported data. The model accounts for household production, and self‐reported information on economic condition is used to identify the sharing rule governing the bargaining process in the family. The theoretical framework implies a broad concept of full income, which includes household production as time allocated to domestic activities. We find that self‐reported data on economic status are useful in recovering individual shares of household income and that both wages and non‐strictly‐economic individual variables play an important role in the bargaining process determining the sharing rule in Italy.     

How does bargaining power affect remittances?

This paper examines the factors affecting the amount of remittances by migrants to their home countries, in a context of a family bargaining model. Spanish data does not show the same clear relationship between remittances and migrant income that is captured in the theoretical literature and certain empirical papers. Family bargaining models emerge as a useful framework within which to study remittances, and bargaining power is a key element in determining the level of such remittances. As a consequence of the consideration of bargaining power, the effect of income levels on remittances emerges as non-monotonic.     

Intra‐household bargaining power and household expenditure allocation: Evidence from Iran

This article examines the role of intra‐household bargaining power on household expenditure patterns in Iran to see whether women’s empowerment can achieve similar results in Iran as we have seen it achieve in other countries of the world. This study is insightful because it tells us whether Iranian women, who have experienced both economic and noneconomic constraints over many years, can utilize increased power toward economic development. The bargaining power is measured by the sex ratio in the marriage market. Using the Household Income and Expenditure Survey in Iran, we find that greater bargaining power of women contributes significantly toward greater provision of education and health expenditure within the household, creating a potential for an increase in welfare for the next generation.     

Does Gender have any Effect on Aggregate Saving? An empirical analysis

This study investigates the effects of gender on aggregate saving. We test the hypothesis that shifts in women's relative income, which can affect their bargaining power within the household, have a discernible impact on household saving and, by extension, gross domestic saving, due to differing saving propensities by gender. The empirical analysis is based on panel data for a set of semi-industrialised economies, covering the period 1975-95. The results indicate that, as some measures of women's relative income and bargaining power increase, gross domestic saving rates rise. The implied gender disparity in saving propensities may be linked to differences in saving motives based on gender roles, and well as divergent experiences of economic vulnerability. These findings suggest the importance of understanding gender differences in planning for savings mobilisation and in the formulation of financial and investment policies.     

Public Transfers and Participation Decisions in Botswana's Subsistence Economy

Botswana has an extensive set of publicly provided cash and in‐kind food transfers geared at providing a safety net to poor and vulnerable groups. While such programs have improved household welfare, from a theoretical perspective they could have also created work disincentives or welfare dependency among recipient families. This article tackles this issue by modeling the impact of publicly provided cash and in‐kind food transfers on farmer participation decisions in the subsistence crop economy in Botswana, using a probit regression and agricultural census data for 2004. Results show that social pensions have had no impact on farmer participation decisions, most likely because they are too small to influence household behavior. However, government food rations (GFRs) have reduced the probability of farmer participation in subsistence crop production, and, hence, have created work disincentive among recipient subsistence families. Specifically, recipient families of GFRs are 8.1 percentage points less likely to participate in crop production than non‐recipient households.     

Measuring the Level and Inequality of Wealth: An Application to China

We construct and compare three distinct measures of household asset wealth that complement traditional income‐ or expenditure‐based measures of socioeconomic status. We apply these measures to longitudinal household survey data from China and demonstrate that household asset wealth has been increasing over time, a theme consistent with many previous studies on the process of development in China. Unlike other studies that have shown rising income inequality over time, however, we show that asset wealth inequality has actually been declining in recent years, indicating widespread participation in the benefits of economic reforms. Furthermore, the evolution in the cumulative distribution of household welfare is such that social welfare has been increasing with the passage of time, despite rising inequality in the early years of the survey.     

Household investment decisions and offspring gender: parental accounting

Numerous behavioural factors have been identified as having an impact on household stockholding decisions. Given there is both theoretical and empirical evidence to support the premise that offspring gender can influence specific types of parental preferences, I test the theory that offspring gender has an effect on parental investment decision-making. I find that offspring gender does influence household stock market participation. Specifically, I find that having only female offspring can significantly increase the probability of stockholding. Given stockholding can have large effects on household wealth levels and that family wealth levels affect intergenerational transfers, this finding could have important implications for understanding distributional welfare issues.     

Elicitation effects in a multi-stage bargaining experiment

We examine elicitation effects in a multi-stage bargaining experiment with escalating stakes conducted under direct-response and strategy-method elicitation. We find a significantly greater incidence of decisions leading to bargaining failure under direct responses. In addition, the predictive power of alternative risk attitude measures differs between the elicitation methods. Potential sources of the effects and resulting implications are discussed.     

WHO’S THE BOSS? HOUSEHOLD DISTRIBUTION OF POWER IN A NON‐COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK

When labour market participation influences bargaining power in a household, the male and the female labour supplies can be either positively or negatively related. If negatively related, possibilities include: ‘balance of power’, the complete dominance of one member, and circumstances where inequity persists with incomplete dominance. If effort levels are positively sloped, it is possible to have equilibrium at either high or low effort levels leading to equity. The effects of economic development and wage discrimination are also discussed.     

Identifying non-cooperative behavior among spouses: Child outcomes in migrant-sending households

I propose a model of household decision-making under asymmetric information and show that resulting allocations may not be fully cooperative. The model yields a simple test for cooperative decision-making, which I apply to data from China. I find that, when the father migrates without his family, children spend more time in household production, while mothers spend less time in both household production and income-generating activities. This is not consistent with standard cooperative models of the household: simply reallocating time to compensate for the father's absence would cause an increase in household labor for both children and mothers and, if migration occurs in response to a negative shock, we should observe an increase in mothers' time in income-generating activities rather than a reduction. The results also do not appear to be driven by an increase in mothers' bargaining power, as children's human capital is not affected by migration, controlling for income.     

CHILD LABOUR IN VIETNAM

Abstract.  The paper tests the explanatory power of a theoretical model of household decisions about child labour and school enrolment and analyses the determinants of child labour in Vietnam, a country that is experiencing a rapid transition toward a market economy. The theoretical framework, used as a benchmark, is in the spirit of the 'new household' economics and links household decisions about schooling and child labour to intergenerational altruism and to human capital investment. On this basis, we analyse the evolution and determinants of child labour using two household surveys (1993 and 1998) for Vietnam.     

Microfinance and gender empowerment

In this paper, we develop a theoretical model of household production, bargaining and credit to analyse how access to microcredit affects intra-household decision-making and welfare, and identify conditions under which female household members are most likely to benefit. We show that, consistent with ethnographic accounts of the impact of microcredit programmes on poor households, access to loans can lead to a variety of outcomes for intra-household decision-making and welfare depending on initial conditions and that, in some instances, women borrowers may experience a decline in welfare. We identify two instances in which a woman is most likely to benefit: when there is scope for investing the loan profitably in a joint activity, and when a large share of the household budget is devoted to household public goods.     

Household bargaining over fertility: Theory and evidence from Malaysia

We develop and test a model of household bargaining over fertility when transfers between spouses are possible. The model makes precise how the fertility preferences of each spouse translate into fertility outcomes. We show this depends on whether or not spouses can commit to their future actions within marriage. If couples bargain with commitment, fertility outcomes take account of both spouses' fertility preferences and do not depend on the threat point in marital bargaining. If couples bargain without commitment, the influence of each spouse's fertility preference on fertility outcomes depends on the relevant threat point in marital bargaining, and the distribution of bargaining power. We test the models using household data from the Malaysia Family Life Survey. This data set contains information on each spouse's desired fertility level, as well as fertility outcomes. We exploit differences in threat points in marital bargaining across ethnic groups to help identify the underlying bargaining model. The evidence suggests couples bargain without commitment.     

THE IMPACT OF INTRA HOUSEHOLD BALANCE OF POWER ON EXPENDITURE PATTERN: THE AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE*

The collective approach to household behaviour models the household utility function as the weighted average of the utilities of the individual members of the household. These weights, which measure the relative bargaining power of males and females within the household, are generally regarded as fixed and exogenous. The paper extends the collective approach and estimates a model where the weights are endogenously determined. The novelty of the analysis lies in the simultaneous equations estimation of the bargaining power and the budget share equation that allow for the endogeneity of the power variable in the examination of its impact on the budget share of the various items. The estimation is conducted using data from the 1998–99 Australian Household Expenditure Survey data set. The relative bargaining power of males and females have statistically significant effects on household expenditure patterns. The analysis reveals some interesting non‐monotonic relationships between relative power and budget shares that vary a great deal between commodities.     

Husbands,Wives, and Housework: Graduates of Stanford and Tokyo Universities

Barbara Bergmann argues that economic gender equity requires equity not only in paid employment, but also in household work. We examine the household task arrangements of a sample of married 1981 graduates of Stanford and Tokyo (Todai) Universities, about a decade after their graduation. No less than 43 percent of Stanford graduates shared household tasks about equally with their spouse, a much higher sharing rate than for the whole U.S. population. However, only 12 percent of Todai women and 8 percent of Todai men had egalitarian household task arrangements, a sharing rate about equal to that of the whole Japanese population. Holding other variables constant, Stanford men who did at least half of household tasks paid an earnings penalty of about 10 percent. Women who did more than half of household tasks did not pay an earnings penalty. Our examination of task arrangements among dual-career couples provides support for bargaining power theories of the division of household tasks, but suggests that societal ideology plays a critical role in defining the scope for bargaining.