On the design of incentive mechanisms in environmental policy

The objective of this paper is to present environmental policy as a simple game in two stages within a principal-agent framework. At the outset the authority adopts a transfer payment rule. Then the firms react by carrying out abatement activities, based on their chosen levels of emission and output. Next the authority measures the emissions (and residual profit of the industry) and revises the level of its instrument. Then the game starts again. Our purpose is to narrow the scope of ad hoc incentive schemes by characterizing families of optimal linear schemes.We thank two anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions. We have also benefited from comments from I.-M. Andréasson, J. B. Opschoor, H. Verbruggen and the other members of the Task Force II: Environmental Policy instruments of the European Science Foundation Programme: Environment, Science and Society. Wang acknowledges support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG).     

Choosing the right instrument

This paper analyses the optimal choice of second-best optimal environmental policies. Using a partial equilibrium model, the paper first reconfirms the well-known result that the existence of a double dividend (in its weak definition) favours environmental policy instruments which maximise tax revenues for a given improvement in environmental quality. Additional revenues can be used to reduce the distortion of existing taxes such as taxes on labour and capital income. Without uncertainty, environmental taxes and auctioned permits are equally appropriate. In the presence of uncertainty, however, the optimal choice of taxes or tradable permits depends on the relative magnitudes of the marginal environmental damage and the marginal benefit from consuming a polluting good. In the second part, the paper, therefore, analyses how the revenue capacity affects the optimal choice of environmental policy instruments in the presence of uncertainty. The paper shows that the first-best choice rule between price and quantity regulation (Weitzman, 1974) remains valid in a second-best world with distortionary taxation.     

On the strategic potential of technological aid in international environmental relations

Prior to noncooperative choices of abatement of a transboundary pollutant, a technologically advanced country considers making an unconditional transfer of abatement technology to its less-advanced rival. Even though technological aid is given unconditionally and abatement strategies are chosen noncooperatively, in a number of plausible circumstances, a transfer of a superior control technology will induce Pareto-superior pollution abatement.     

On the efficiency of fair trade

The first part of this paper reviews five major theoretical approaches that describe the fundamental causes of poverty, with particular attention to what these theories imply about government policy towards markets and the need for immediate poverty alleviation. Different causal theories have very different policy implications; it is difficult to recommend specific anti-poverty policies with making assumptions about the nature of economic markets and of individual behavior. The paper ends with comments about how to make these choices, arguing that the greater moral onus one associates with poverty, the more willing one should be to adopt less efficient strategies that do more to raise incomes among the poor. The interconnections between markets and social and political systems—which often disadvantage poor populations—suggests that some market regulations and targeted programs may be necessary to reduce poverty, especially if these can be implemented with minimal corruption and monitored for effectiveness.     

On the efficiency of indirect taxes in differentiated oligopolies with asymmetric costs

This paper shows that unit taxation can be welfare superior to ad valorem taxation in asymmetric and differentiated oligopolies if the goods are sufficiently differentiated, the cost variance is sufficiently large and the ad valorem tax rate is sufficiently high. Moreover, this result holds under either Cournot competition or Bertrand competition.      

Economic and environmental efficiency using a social accounting matrix

This paper aims to show the utility of the so-called Social Accounting Matrix and Environmental Accounts (SAMEA) for economic and environmental efficiency analysis. The article uses the SAMEA for Spain in 2000, applied to water resources and greenhouse gas emissions. This matrix is used as a central core of a multisectorial model of economic and environmental performance, and it calculates the denominated “domestics SAMEA multipliers” and their decomposition into characteristic, direct, indirect and induced effects. These multipliers show some evaluation of economic and environmental efficiency. Also, we present an application of these multipliers that demonstrates that there is no causal interrelation between those sectors with higher economic backward linkages and those with higher environmental deterioration backward linkages.     

环境规制对碳效率的多重路径及门槛模型研究

从结构升级及效率提升两大维度刻画环境规制对碳排放效率的关系及作用机制,研究环境规制是如何提升城市碳排放效率的。基于2006—2019年中国279个城市层面数据,采用非参数百分位自抽法,逐步回归法、Sobel检验和交互调节模型验证影响路径,并利用门槛模型探讨不同路径下环境规制的调节作用。结果表明：(1)环境规制促进城市碳排放效率提升,但存在区域异质性;(2)环境规制通过促进产业结构高度化、绿色技术创新和能源效率升级提高碳排放效率,产业结构合理化及产业集聚“遮掩”了环境规制的激励作用;(3)环境规制对提升碳排放效率存在多种门槛效应和调节机制。发挥环境规制对碳排放效率结构和效率的双重激励时,需注意不同路径的维度问题,以提高准度,把握力度。     

Integrated water and economic modelling of the impacts of water market instruments on the South African economy

A static computable general equilibrium model of South Africa is adapted to compare new taxes on water demand by two industries, namely forestry, and irrigated field crops. Comparisons are made with respect to both the short and the long run, in terms of three target variables, namely (i) the environment; (ii) the economy; and (iii) equity. Since the taxes on the two industries do not raise the same amount of revenue, the target variables are calculated per unit of real government revenue raised by the new taxes (also referred to as the marginal excess burdens of the taxes). The model results are robust for moderate values of the water elasticity of demand in the two industries, in both the long and the short run. The tax on irrigated field crops performs better in terms of all three the target variables in the short run. In the long run the tax on irrigated filed crops is better in terms of water saving, but reduces real GDP and the consumption by poor households.     

节能减排政策传导机制及效果研究——以重庆市节能减排政策体系为例

"十二五"期间,节能减排作为调结构、扩内需的重要方式以及可持续发展的重要举措,被提上了议事日程。作为老工业基地之一的重庆市,资源消耗量与废物排放量持续增加,形势不容乐观。拟对重庆市现行节能减排政策传导机制及效果进行深入研究,以期推动重庆市经济的可持续发展。研究发现,重庆市促进节能减排以实施命令控制型政策和排污收费政策为主,市场化手段仍不成熟,如排污权交易活跃度低、相关税收政策缺失等。基于这些问题,结合西方国家经验与重庆市资源环境市场特点,提出构建绿色税收体系,加快排污权交易市场建设,完善市场机制等建议。     

论生活排污权交易制

当前城市生活污染已呈超过工业污染之势,城市环境保护工作面临着加快环保基础设施建设的紧迫任务。而与此同时,一大批致力于生活污染源头控制的环保技术和设备却得不到转化和应用。针对这一目前城市环境管理工作中的新矛盾,本文在借鉴工业排污权交易制的基础上,首次提出了生活排污权交易制的设想,并就生活排污权交易制的理论基础、运作模式以及急待解决的一些问题等方面展开了论述。     

Estimation of the efficiency of structural funds: a parametric and nonparametric approach

This article seeks to perform an analysis of the efficiency of the application of the structural funds in the regions classified as Objective 1 over the period 2000 to 2006, applying the techniques known as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and stochastic frontier. In the first place, we are going to identify which are the most efficient regions. Finally, we will analyse the extent to which certain factors have repercussions on the efficiency such as country, geographical location and contribution of agriculture of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the result indicates that some of these variables have significantly influences of technical efficiency.     

促进FDI与中国涉外税收政策的动态和谐

外商直接投资是促进中国经济发展的一支重要力量,中国经济发展需要FDI,FDI需要中国,从中国经济利益和FDI追求利润的相互和谐过程入手,不仅要考虑中国经济需求与FDI的利益分配政策的和谐,也要考虑经济结构和谐、经济增长和谐。以制定符合中国国情的涉外税收政策。     

The participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty: a spatial probit analysis

This paper represents treaty participation as a two-stage game, for which nations first decide whether or not to participate and then they choose their level of participation. The resulting subgame perfect equilibrium is used to derive a reduced-form equation for estimating and separating the influences of the variables at the two decision stages. This spatial probit equation forms the basis for a full-information maximum likelihood estimator that accounts for the simultaneity bias associated with public good spillins at both stages. When the procedure is applied to the Helsinki Protocol, we find that the strategic influence of a variable may drastically differ depending upon which stage is scrutinized.     

On the efficiency of the negligence rule

The three versions of the negligence rule discussed in the literature differ regarding whether a negligent injurer is liable for the entire loss or only for the incremental loss; or regarding whether negligence is defined as failure to take at least due care or failure to take a cost‐justified precaution. It is shown in the paper that the incremental version with untaken precaution notion of negligence is not efficient; not even for the unilateral case. The paper also establishes, for the bilateral case, the efficiency of the incremental version with the shortfall‐from‐due‐care way of defining negligence.     

通过农业与环境政策一体化的途径防治农业化学品污染问题探讨

我国农业政策对生态环境的关注经历了一个从无到有的过程,而已经出台的农业生态环境保护政策在实施过程中由于对农户和地方政府的利益造成了一定影响,也没有被很好地执行。所以,我国农业政策应兼顾经济发展与环境保护,针对当前农业化学品污染严重的问题,按照农业与环境政策一体化的思路,采取有效的政策措施,最终获得经济发展和防治农业化学品污染的双重收益。     

On the Efficiency of Competitive Markets for Emission Permits

It is typical for economists andpolicy makers alike to presume that competitivemarkets allocate emission permits efficiently.This paper demonstrates that competition in theemission permits market cannot assureefficiency when the product market isoligopolistic. We provide the conditions underwhich a bureaucratic mechanism is welfaresuperior to a tradeable emission permitssystem. Price-taking behaviour in the permitsmarket ensures transfer of licenses to the lessefficient in abatement firms, which then becomemore aggressive in the product market,acquiring additional permits. As a result, theless efficient firms end up with a higher thanthe welfare maximizing share of emissionpermits. If the less efficient in abatementfirms are also less efficient in production,competitive trading of permits may result inlower output and welfare.     

慈善捐赠税收激励原理及效应探析

慈善捐赠被视为调节贫富差距的平衡器,税收政策是国家直接掌握的刚性调节手段,世界各国都制定相应的税收政策激励慈善捐赠。运用税收政策促进慈善捐赠主要基于弥补公共品政府缺位、有限政府理论和帕累托改进理论。税收政策通过改变慈善捐赠的相对价格产生的收入效应和替代效应,促进捐赠数额的增加。     

从税收公平角度看我国个人所得税制的全面性改革

公平原则是各国税制建立的基本出发点和基本原则。公平的个人所得税制将可以充分发挥其调节收入公平分配的独特功能。然而,由于在税制模式、税率结构、费用扣除和税收征管等方面的缺陷,导致我国现行个人所得税制的公平缺失非常严重。因此,必须对个人所得税制进行全面性改革,即通过转变税制模式、科学设计税率结构、合理规定费用扣除标准和完善税收征管等方面的改革,提高其公平性,以有效发挥其调节功能,实现社会公平目标。