我国乡镇集体企业制度变迁进程分析

乡镇企业制度变迁主要是指乡镇集体企业产权制度的变迁 ,经历了承包制、股份合作制、股份制等制度形式。乡镇集体企业制度变迁的特征表现为 :社区政府逐渐退出所有者身份 ;股权逐渐量化到个人 ;自发的需求诱致为主强制变迁为辅的渐进过程。乡镇企业制度变迁中必须解决好经营者的激励监督问题。     

“沃尔玛现象”剖析

沃尔玛在流通扩张的产业空间下，在品牌、统一经营模式和现代信息技术等方面打造核心竞争力，对分店进行“复制／粘贴”和“选择性干预”，成功地寒现了规模扩大。沃尔玛的进入冲击了当地商业，但推动了零售生产率的提高和整个经济中产业结构的优化调整，改善了消费者福利，本文认为其总体效应是正面的。     

从“利益集团”力量变化看乡镇集体企业改革取向

从农村社队企业转化的乡镇集体企业曾经有过自己的辉煌,但随着市场经济的深化和企业规模的扩张,乡镇集体企业不断面临新的挑战。(一)1.从经济制度看。在市场经济条件下,对于集体土地的无偿使用已经明显不再具有合理性。在我国的土地关系中,一方面,法律规定农村土地由村集体经济组织所有,并且明令禁止土地买卖,农地不得擅自挪做他用;另一方面,土地的流转趋势早已形成并在事实上不断扩大。因此,相对于逐渐兴起的私营企业对于     

解析“新排队现象”

排队购买，这是计划经济时代习以为常的必然现象，匈牙利著名经济学家科尔奈在《短缺经济学》一书中对此进行了透彻的分析。中国改革开放以来，随着经济的超长期高增长和供给的旺盛，通货紧缩、推销、过度库存、甩卖等现象成为经济的常态，“旧排队’’现象早已淡出了中国而成为历史的模糊记忆。     

干部提拔中“打招呼”现象剖析

＂打招呼＂,是指某些领导干部和个人不通过规定的办事程序,私下表达个人意志的一种做法。当前,一些地方每逢提拔干部时,条子满天飞,各种请托纷至沓来,通过关系＂打招呼＂盛行,甚至成为了一种风气。＂打招呼＂歪风,严重干扰用人秩序,败坏用人风气,助长跑官要官,已到了非刹不可的程度。现象扫描在一些地方,     

我国家族企业产权制度变迁因素分析

家族制产权制度某种程度上适应了企业初期发展的需要,但这种制度安排方式却无法实现现代产权制度安排中存在的诸多外部利润。所谓外部利润指的是在新制度安排中存在的,而在现有制度安排中无法实现的“好处”,如规模经济、管理分工等。随着企业规模的扩大,企业对规模经济、管理分工的要求将愈来愈强烈,家族企业所无法实现的外部利润将愈来愈大,进行产权制度变迁的需求也愈强烈。具体说来,我国家族企业产权制度存在的如下安排方式,无法实现相应的外部利润。     

On optimality in collective institutional choice

Conditions are investigated under which democratic choice of the division of land between collective and “private” use and of the distribution of collective income between “needs” and “work” payments will produce a Pareto-optimal land allocation and optimal collective labor incentives. Sen's optimal rule for the degree of “needs” distribution is found to result from self-interested voting on this parameter when the distribution of labor inputs is unskewed or when votes are weighted by labor contributions. This in turn increases the optimality of land allocation, which can be further improved by a simple rental scheme. J. Comp. Econ., Dec. 1981, 5(4), pp. 392–403. Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.     

制度变迁中的个人、企业和政府

个人、企业和政府是市场经济运行中三个不同的行为主体,有着各自的目标函数。本文通过论述三个行为主体目标函数的一致性与冲突性,试图从制度变迁的路径中揭示出行为主体相互作用或相互博弈的经济学问题。一、市场经济条件下行为主体目标函数的一致性在市场经济条件下,个人的目标函数是收入最大化,企业的目标函数是利润最大化,政府的目标函数是发展最大化(经济发展是对政府的充分就业、物价稳定和经济增长三个目标的概括)。这三个行为主体的目标函数具有一致性,表现在两个方面:一是相互的制度界定是其发展的必要条件;二是共享的价值理念是其发展的充分条件。     

新制度经济学的新发展:历史比较制度分析

新制度经济学在完全理性与有限理性之间左右摇摆,限制了制度理论的发展。以格雷夫为代表的历史比较制度分析,在有限理性前提下,通过大量案例研究,提出了自己关于制度及其变迁的真知灼见:(1)克服两个“两分法”,发展了统一的制度概念;(2)将制度理解为博弈均衡,重点解释古典博弈论成为制度分析有用工具的条件;(2)研究制度在变化的环境中如何存续、内生的制度变迁以及过去制度影响后续制度的原因和作用机制;(3)提出了独具特色的互动的特定历史情景分析,将重复博弈理论与特定历史情景结合起来去识别制度,解释其出现、存续和变迁。     

Young firms and innovation: A microeconometric analysis

This paper discusses the sources of product innovation in young innovative companies (YICs), here defined as firms engaged in product innovation and with less than 8 years of activity. In particular, we look at in-house and external R&D and at the acquisition of external technology in its embodied and disembodied components. These input–output relationships are tested on a sample of 2713 innovative Italian firms. A sample-selection approach is applied to study both the determinants of product innovation and the factors affecting the intensity of innovation.Results show that in-house R&D is linked to the propensity to introduce product innovation both in mature firms and YICs; however, innovation intensity in the YICs is mainly dependent on embodied technical change from external sources, while in-house R&D does not play a significant role.     

制度变迁的成本——收益分析

像任何人工物一样,作为人的创造物,制度也像物质产品和思想产品一样,同样具有收益和成本两个方面。采用精致的有限理性(有限知识,有限信息,有限思维资源)的广义经济人假设,自然要引入收益和成本的概念。追求目标值最大化,实际上就是追求收益超过成本的差额最大化。     

The restructuring of insider-dominated firms: A comparative analysis

We study the effects of different modalities of privatization to insiders on the restructuring process in two former Soviet republics - Georgia and Moldova -using enterprise survey data for 1995-97. Enterprise restructuring was similar in companies where incumbent managers received significant ownership stakes for free and in state-owned companies. In contrast, the restructuring process was faster in companies bought by their managers. We interpret these results to suggest that managers' incentives to restructure decrease when they perceive their newly acquired ownership as a windfall gain.     

The sale of small firms: a multidimensional analysis

Summary. This paper endogeneizes the security voting structure in an auction mechanism used to sell a small firm. The design of security voting structure allows the seller to choose between two objectives which are not mutually consistent. If the seller wants to maximize his revenue, he should retain some shares to benefit from the future dividends generated by the acquirer. At the opposite, if he wants to sell his firm to the most efficient candidate, he should sell all the shares. Received: July 4, 2001; revised version: October 31, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The paper has benefited from a number of comments from the anonymous referees. Correspondence to: C. At     

Determinants of the acquisition of listed versus unlisted firms in different legal and institutional environments

The aim of this article is to analyse the determinants of the decision to acquire unlisted rather than listed firms in different legal and institutional environments. We estimate a probit model considering the mergers and acquisitions (M&As) announced by European listed firms (19 countries) that acquires worldwide listed or unlisted firms (36 countries) in the period 2002–2007. Our results show that managerial opportunism is a determinant in the acquisition of listed firms, occurring with greater probability in acquiring countries with low shareholder and minority shareholder protection. Information asymmetry is another relevant determinant that promotes the acquisitions of unlisted firms. Furthermore, the less developed the capital market in the country of the acquired firm, the greater the probability of acquisitions of unlisted firms. This article contributes to the M&A literature by showing that in addition to managerial opportunism and information asymmetry, the legal and institutional environments in both the acquiring and the target countries are also relevant aspects explaining the decision of whether to acquire listed or unlisted firms.     

Organizational forms in the knowledge economy: a comparative institutional analysis

This paper provides a framework with which to analyze organizational forms in the knowledge economy. We focus on an important trade-off facing modern firms: firms can acquire the property of all the innovations developed by their employees and can greatly increase their profits, yet this type of private intellectual property rights regime can discourage the innovative effort of the very same workers. Allowing workers to carry their knowledge outside the firm eliminates this disincentive. Hence, strategic complementarities may exist between innovative partners and a disclosure driven intellectual property rights regime, and passive employees and a private intellectual property rights regime. An evolutionary game theoretic model demonstrates these strategic complementarities and shows when economies tend towards disclosure driven or private intellectual property rights regimes.