The flight home effect: Evidence from the syndicated loan market during financial crises

This paper shows that the collapse of the global market for syndicated loans during financial crises can in part be explained by a flight home effect whereby lenders rebalance their loan portfolios in favor of domestic borrowers. The home bias of lenders' loan origination increases by approximately 20% if the bank's home country experiences a banking crisis. This flight home effect is distinct from flight to quality because borrowers of different quality are equally affected. The results indicate that the home bias in capital allocation tends to increase when adverse economic shocks reduce the wealth of international investors.     

农业银行个人助业贷款探讨

个人助业贷款是农业银行个人类贷款的重要金融产品,但由于多种原因,其推出以来发展不尽人意。本文试从助业贷款的发展现状、主要成因、对策建议等方面进行研究,尝试寻找个人信贷业务发展的突破口。     

On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants

With risky debt outstanding, stockholder actions aimed at maximizing the value of their equity claim can result in a reduction in the value of both the firm and its outstanding bonds. We examine ways in which debt contracts are written to control the conflict between bondholders and stockholders. We find that extensive direct restrictions on production/investment policy would be expensive to employ and are not observed. However, dividend and financing policy restrictions are written to give stockholders incentives to follow a firm-value-maximizing production/investment policy. Taking into account how contracts control the bondholder- stockholder conflict leads to a number of testable propositions about the specific form of the debt contract that a firm will choose.     

开拓新兴农村金融市场个金业务策略研究

近年来,随着中国城乡一体化建设的推进,数以亿计的农民进入城镇,在城乡建设中逐步形成了新兴农村金融市场。本文通过对在苏州市城乡一体化建设大背景下新兴农村金融市场个人金融业务需求及其特征的分析认为,中国工商银行苏州分行（以下简称“苏州工行”）应抓住机遇,研究落实新兴农村金融市场个人业务的发展策略,确定苏州工行在新农村金融市场上的运作方式,使之适应新农村市场的环境和竞争,以新的策略开拓新农村金融市场。     

Offshore operations and bank loan contracting: Evidence from firms that set up subsidiaries in offshore financial centers

We examine the effects of a multinational firm's subsidiary operations in offshore financial centers (OFCs) on bank loan contracting terms. Using a propensity score matched cross-country sample of firms with and without OFC subsidiaries, we find that firms with OFC subsidiaries receive less favorable loan terms than firms without OFC subsidiaries. The results from a difference-in-differences analysis and an analysis of a firm's mutation from a non-OFC firm to an OFC firm support the causal effect of offshore operations on the unfavorable loan terms. Furthermore, focusing on firms with OFC subsidiaries, we find that the intensity of offshore operations affects loan terms unfavorably. We also find that the unfavorable effect is more pronounced for more opaque firms and for firms that are headquartered in countries or jurisdictions with weaker legal enforcement. Our findings indicate that banks view offshore operations of borrowers as a credit risk-increasing factor.     

The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on bank loan contracting

Although firm-initiated clawbacks reduce accounting manipulation, they also induce managers to engage in suboptimal activities (e.g., reduce research and development (R&D) expenses) to achieve earnings targets. To assess the effectiveness of clawback provisions, we examine their impact from debtholders' point of view. We find that banks use more financial covenants and performance pricing provisions in the loan contracts and decrease interest rates after firms initiate clawbacks. Moreover, we also find that loan maturity increases and loan collateral decreases subsequent to clawback adoption. Taken together, our findings indicate that firm-initiated clawback provisions enhance financial reporting quality, thereby reducing the information uncertainty that financing providers face.     

Corporate social responsibility,credit rating,and private debt contracting: new evidence from syndicated loan market

We examine the impact of corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities on loan spreads of syndicated bank loans, with a particular interest in how CSR and credit ratings are interrelated as a joint determinant of loan spreads. Focusing on private debt contracts, we show that both CSR strengths and concerns are related to their loan spreads. CSR strengths work to lower firm risk, hence reducing the loan spread, whereas CSR concerns increase firm risk, thus increasing the loan spread. Once we include detailed credit rating information in the models, however, CSR concerns lose significance, but CSR strengths remain significantly related to the loan spread. We also find that both CSR strengths and CSR concerns are related to loan spread for non-rated firms, but the CSR concern effect is stronger than the CSR strength effect for these firms. A further test shows that firm risk measured by stock return volatility plays as a direct channel through which a firm’s CSR activities affect loan spreads, whose result lends further support to our main results. Overall, our results provide strong evidence that CSR matters to the pricing of loan contracts beyond credit rating information and the results remain robust to the possible firm size effect and the endogeneity issues.     

The voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards and loan contracting around the world

Using a sample of non-U.S. borrowers from 40 countries during 1997 through 2005, this paper investigates the effect of the voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on price and nonprice terms of loan contracts and loan ownership structure in the international loan market. Our results reveal the following. First, banks charge lower loan rates to IFRS adopters than to non-adopters. The difference in loan rates in excess of a benchmark rate between the two groups is about 20 basis points for all loans and nearly 31 basis points for London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)-based loans. Second, banks impose more favorable nonprice terms on IFRS adopters, particularly less restrictive covenants. We also provide evidence suggesting that banks are more willing to extend credit to IFRS adopters through larger loans and longer maturities. Finally, IFRS adopters attract significantly more foreign lenders participating in loan syndicates than non-adopters.     

Optimal financial contracting: dept versus outside equity

This article presents a theory of outside equity based on thecontrol rights and the maturity design of equity. I show thatoutside equity is a tacit agreement between investors and managementsupported by the equity-holders' right to dismiss managementregardless of performance and by the lack of a prespecifiedexpiration date on equity. As a tacit agreement outside equityis sustainable despite management's potential for manipulatingthe cash flows and regardless of how costly it is for equityholders to establish a case against managerial wrongdoing. Iestablish that the only outside equity that investors are willingto hold in equilibrium is that with unlimited life, the veryoutside equity that corporations issue. Consistent with empiricalevidence, this model predicts that debt-equity ratios are higher(lower) in industries with low (high) cash flow variability     

On the theory of market information efficiency

This paper discusses the concept of market information efficiency and demonstrates the following: As the number of traders who participate in the market becomes large, the variations in the price of a security caused by the variations in traders' beliefs make the market price vary as if traders all knew the ‘true’ distribution of returns on the security. The empirical implications of the analysis are also explored.     

On financial contagion and implied market volatility

This paper investigates volatility contagion across U.S. and European stock markets during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Eurozone Sovereign Debt Crisis (ESDC). Using a sample of international implied volatility indices on daily changes, I explore asymmetric conditional correlation dynamics across stable and crisis periods and across the different phases of both crises. Empirical evidence indicates the existence of contagion in cross-market volatilities. A different pattern of infection is observed across the phases, since the early phase of the GFC and the late period of escalation of the Euro crisis are the most contagious periods. This implies that the initial signal of the two crises has been differently recognized by implied volatility markets. The results provide important implications for the effectiveness of international portfolio diversification and volatility hedging during periods of negative shocks.     

Disequilibrium in the UK corporate loan market

In the last decade, a debate has resurfaced about whether financial constraints stemming from asymmetric information and incentive problems play an important role in propagating monetary policy shocks. This paper investigates the monetary transmission mechanism in the UK and its impact on the availability of bank credit to small and medium size firms.The empirical specification is based on a disequilibrium model that allows for the possibility of transitory credit rationing. Sample firms are classified endogenously into ‘borrowing constrained’ and ‘borrowing unconstrained’. The analysis of credit rationing takes into account not only firm specific variables, but also important macroeconomic factors such as the prevailing monetary conditions and the stage of the business cycle.We find that (i) firms’ assets play an important role as collateral in mitigating borrowing constraints; (ii) during periods of tight monetary conditions corporate demand for bank credit increases, whereas the supply of bank loans is reduced; (iii) to avoid bank credit rationing smaller companies increase their reliance on interfirm credit; (iv) the proportion of borrowing constrained firms is significantly higher during the recession years of the early 1990s than at other times.     

Structure in the Italian overnight loan market

We analyze the Italian interbank loan market from 1999 until 2010. The analysis of net trade flows shows a high imbalance caused by a few large net borrowers in the market. The trading volume shows a significant drop starting in 2007, which accelerates with the Lehman default in late 2008. The interbank loan network is very dense. Hence, we try to identify strong links by looking for preferential lending relationships expressed by discounts in the loan rate. Furthermore, we estimate the dynamics of credit spreads for each bank and find that economically significant spreads for the overnight market developed only in 2010. The analysis of preferential loan relationships reveals that in the pre-Lehman era large net borrowers used to borrow at a slight discount. In the post-Lehman era borrowers with large net exposures paid more than the average market rate, which shows that the risk evaluation of market participants has changed considerably.     

市场退出制度引路

到目前为止,金融市场改革在一些方面还落后于整个改革进程。虽然金融监管机制近年来不断改进,但市场化的金融准入和退出制度尚未建立起来,这在客观上阻碍了中国金融改革深化的步伐。     

Earnouts: A study of financial contracting in acquisition agreements

We empirically examine earnout contracts, which provide for contingent payments in acquisition agreements. Our analysis reveals considerable heterogeneity in the potential size of the earnout, the performance measure on which the contingent payment is based, the period over which performance is measured, the form of payment for the earnout, and the overall sensitivity of earnout payment to target performance. Our tests of the determinants of contract terms yield support for the view that earnouts are structured to minimize the costs of valuation uncertainty and moral hazard in acquisition negotiations.     

A theory of loan syndication

We provide a new theory of loan syndication. Bank syndicates control sector risk by downsizing the industry when market demand fails to meet expectations.     

The theory of financial intermediation

Traditional theories of intermediation are based on transaction costs and asymmetric information. They are designed to account for institutions which take deposits or issue insurance policies and channel funds to firms. However, in recent decades there have been significant changes. Although transaction costs and asymmetric information have declined, intermediation has increased. New markets for financial futures and options are mainly markets for intermediaries rather than individuals or firms. These changes are difficult to reconcile with the traditional theories. We discuss the role of intermediation in this new context stressing risk trading and participation costs.     

Earnings performance of major customers and bank loan contracting with suppliers

Using a sample of 3725 loan facility–years for supplier firms that have financial data on their major customers during the period 1995–2011, this study investigates whether the earnings performance of major customers has effect on the price and nonprice terms of loans to the supplier firms. We find that various contracting terms are more favorable for loans to supplier firms whose major customers have higher return on assets (ROA). More importantly, we find that the effect of major customers’ earning performance on loan contracting terms is weaker for the borrowers with prior loan relationships with banks, while it is stronger for the borrowers that are highly dependent on their major customers. Our results suggest that banks take into account major customers’ earnings performance when contracting with their supplier firms, and the informativeness of customer earnings varies with the nature and strength of the customer–supplier relationships.     

论金融理论的创新

把金融看成是与货币流通相关的经济活动有它的合理性；把货币流通和信用活动包含在金融定义之内，强调金融是货币资金融通，有其合理性和局限性，把金融定义为“资本市场的运营、资本资产的供给与定价”是由融资活动的发展变化推进的；从方法论的角度说有从横向考察金融和从纵向考察金融；新近出版的博迪、莫顿合著的《金融学》在什么是金融、为会么要研究金融及怎样研究金融等方面都有创新。     

Internal governance,legal institutions and bank loan contracting around the world

Using a sample of non-U.S. firms from 22 countries during 2003–2007, we examine the effect of firm-level governance on various features of loan contracting in the international loan market. We find that banks charge lower loan rates, offer larger and longer-maturity loans, and impose fewer restrictive covenants to better-governed firms. We also find that the favorable effect of firm-level governance on some loan contracting terms is stronger in countries with strong legal institutions than in countries with weak legal institutions. Our results suggest that banks view a borrower's internal governance as a factor that mitigates agency and information risk, and that country-level legal institutions and firm-level governance mechanisms complement each other in influencing loan contracting terms.