Managerial Self-Interest, Pension Financial Slack and Corporate Pension Funding

This paper examines the impact of managerial self-interest on corporate pension funding decisions. It is postulated that managers with no ownership stake in the firm will have incentives to maintain financial slack in the form of excess pension funding. Pension funding slack may be viewed as a managerial perquisite that decreases the probability of necessary future debt financing. Such a strategy may increase the value of undiversified human capital to the detriment of maximizing shareholder wealth. As managerial ownership increases, the incentives to consume such a perquisite will decrease since the interests of managers and shareholders become more aligned. The results presented in this study strongly support this proposition.     

Institutional Investor Ownership and Corporate Pension Transparency

We examine the association between institutional ownership and defined benefit (DB) pension decisions. We find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with pension underfunding, opportunistic increases in the expected rate of return assumption in the presence of underfunding, and significant ownership of the firm's own stock in the DB plan portfolio. Furthermore, these relations are stronger when institutional ownership is concentrated, when institutions are nontransient investors, or when institutions are relatively large. These results suggest that institutional investors are monitoring firm pension decisions, particularly those institutions with stronger monitoring incentives or resources.     

Debt Management under Corporate and Personal Taxation

The presence of long-term debt in a corporation's capital structure is shown to give rise to a valuable tax-timing option that can be exercised by the firm on behalf of its shareholders. This option, which is not available if the firm is fully equity financed, implies that leverage will have a positive tax effect on total firm value even if there is no such effect associated with the tax deductibility of the coupon interest payments on debt. The more volatile interest rates and bond prices are, the more valuable the tax-timing option and the larger the favorable impact of debt on shareholder wealth.     

Financial Capital and Taxation Policy*

This paper suggests a relatively simple analytical framework for taxing all financial arrangements. The debt/equity distinction is determined by the contingency principle. The accruals/realisation distinction is determined separately by the volatility principle. The capital/revenue character distinction is effectively removed directly or by a character hedging regime. Hybrids, synthetics, hedging arrangements and other portfolios are tax‐assessed on an aggregate, rather than a bifurcated, basis. The framework could be applied to both classical and dividend‐imputation‐based business tax systems.     

Making Federal Pension Policy Work

Abstract

Millions of Americans retire while they are still productive. Of these, many will have the resources to enjoy all of their golden years. Unfortunately, many others will face economic hardships after they have exhausted their own resources but have become too frail to return to work. Part of the problem is that the current pension system is fraught with financial incentives that push ablebodied elderly workers into retirement just when they should instead be encouraged to remain in the workforce to accumulate additional retirement assets. This paper recommends a number of ways to change federal pension laws in order to encourage elderly workers to remain in the workforce. For example, this paper recommends toughening the penalty on premature distributions, repealing the minimum distribution rules, and repealing the exceptions to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act that permit retirement plans to provide early retirement incentives and subsidies.

This paper also considers whether the government should require that all retirement plans be neutral as to the timing of retirement. In an age-neutral world, workers would always accrue more benefits if they kept working. Consequently, more workers would remain in the workforce, accumulating additional assets for their eventual retirement.

Finally, this paper also considers how federal pension policy could help counteract the tendency of Americans to retire too early because they underestimate their life expectancies, overestimate their financial resources, and fail to understand the deleterious effects of inflation. In particular, this paper recommends that the government require that virtually all retirement plans pay at least a portion of their benefits in the form of an inflation-adjusted annuity.     

Capital Controls as Taxation Policy

This paper studies the public finance implications ofcontrols on international financial capital flows, proposinga model of controls as distortionary taxation. The model formalizesa capital controls rule that conforms real-world stylized factsand is sustainable in the long-run. Capital controls are shownto distort agents' optimal intratemporal portfolio decisionsand intertemporal consumption decisions, affecting the dynamicsof financial and real variables. We use the model to analyzethe feasible set of tax instruments—in terms of level andmix—available to the government and the complex relationshipsbetween expenditures and taxes mediated by the foreign sector.     

The Association between Board Composition and Corporate Pension Policies

This study examines the role of board composition in the determination of pension policies. The results suggest that the proportion of outside directors serving on the board is positively related with pension plan funding levels. In addition, the proportion of outside directors mitigates the relation between financial distress risk and plan underfunding. Last, as firms approach distress, boards with a greater proportion of outside directors tend to allocate a lower fraction of plan assets to riskier securities. Together, our findings suggest that outside directors are mindful of their obligations toward pension plan beneficiaries.     

Pension Fund Manager Tournaments and Attitudes Towards Corporate Characteristics

Abstract:  This paper explores the relationship between the tournament incentives of pension fund managers and the characteristics of equities they choose to hold. Using a comprehensive data set on pension fund portfolio holdings, we determine the intensity of fund manager tournaments by sorting pension funds into portfolios based on the number of concurrent managers each pension fund employs. We then investigate which corporate characteristics are preferred by each of these portfolios by estimating share selection models that include a range of corporate characteristics that are expected to shape the returns to investment in stocks over the short and long run. We find that the intensity of the tournament faced by fund managers plays a significant role in shaping preferences over corporate characteristics. Managers facing more intense tournaments exhibit significantly weaker preferences for attributes associated with long run payoffs, such as social performance and growth potential, and significantly stronger preferences for short term attributes, such as operational efficiency, when compared to managers that face weak or no tournament incentives.     

Environmental Policy,Efficient Taxation and Unemployment

In this paper, I consider environmental policy as part of a mixed tax problem with a general income tax and linear commodity taxes. I assume that the wage rate is determined by bargaining between unions and firms. The results show that the change in the number of employed persons, following a change in the use of a tax instrument, affects the optimal tax structure via two channels; (i) it makes the tax revenues available for public expenditures more or less costly to collect, and (ii) it affects the aggregate demand for the good that causes the environmental damage. This means that the use of taxation to counteract the labor market imperfection is not easily separated from the environmental aspects of tax policy.JEL Code: D62, H21, J60     

Capital Structure,Corporate Taxation and Firm Age*

This paper analyses the relationship between corporate taxation, firm age and debt. We adapt a standard model of capital structure choice under corporate taxation, focusing on the financing and investment decisions typically faced by a firm. Our model suggests that the debt ratio is associated positively with the corporate tax rate and negatively with firm age. Further, we predict that the tax-induced advantage of debt is more important for older firms than for younger ones. To test these hypotheses empirically, we use a cross-section of around 405,000 firms from 35 European countries and 127 NACE three-digit industries. In line with previous research, we find that a firm's debt ratio increases with the corporate tax rate. Further, we observe that older firms exhibit smaller debt ratios than their younger counterparts. Finally, consistent with our theoretical model, we find a positive interaction between corporate taxation and firm age, indicating that the impact of corporate taxation on debt increases over a firm's lifetime.     

Prospects for Co-ordination of Corporate Taxation and the Taxation of Interest Income in the EU

This paper evaluates the recent proposals for a co-ordinated capital tax policy in the European Union, focusing on an EU-wide minimum withholding tax on interest income and alternative ways to increase the effective tax rate on corporate profits. The analysis draws on current theoretical and empirical research and views the recent capital tax reforms undertaken by individual member countries as rational adjustments to changing conditions in capital markets. Special emphasis is placed on the constraints for EU tax policy imposed by the possibility of shifting capital income to third countries. The paper concludes that some aggregate efficiency gains can be expected from the EU co-ordination proposals, but additional tax collections will be limited largely to the group of small savers while highly mobile large-scale investors are likely to avoid the EU tax.     

国外商业养老保险税收制度比较

本文试图通过比较部分发达国家和一些发展中国家的商业养老保险税收制度,同时分析归纳国外养老保险改革及其税制研究趋势,旨在对我国商业养老保险税制改革及促进发展商业保险有所启示,对上海率先实施个人税延型养老保险试点的相关政策措施有所借鉴。     

Dividend Policy and Corporate Performance

Substantial research has been conducted to determine the signal that results from dividend initiations and omissions. Our study extends from previous research by measuring the long-term valuation effects following dividend initiations and omissions. We find that firms initiating dividends experience favorable long-term share price performance. Conversely, firms omitting dividends experience unfavorable long-term share price performance. The long-term valuation effects resulting from dividend initiations are more favorable for firms that are smaller, that overinvest, and that had relatively poor performance prior to the initiations. The long-term effects resulting from dividend omissions are more unfavorable for large firms and for firms experiencing relatively large dividend omissions.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy with Consumption Taxation

We characterize optimal fiscal policies in a general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and endogenous public spending. The government can tax consumption, as alternative to labor income taxes. Consumption taxation acts as indirect taxation of profits (intratemporal gains of taxing consumption) and enables the policymaker to manage the burden of public debt more efficiently (intertemporal gains of taxing consumption). We show analytically that these two gains imply that the optimal share of government spending is higher under consumption taxation than with labor income taxation. Then, we quantify numerically each of these gains by calibrating the model on the U.S. economy.