Incentive regulation,service quality,and standards in U.S. electricity distribution

The widespread use of incentive regulation in telecom, electricity, and other industries in the U.S. and elsewhere has raised questions about its possible adverse effect on the quality of service. This paper examines U.S. electricity distribution utilities in the years 1993–1999, several of which were subject to incentive regulation. Controlling for other possible influences, including possible endogeneity of the regulatory regime, the data and model indicate that incentive regulation is indeed associated with significantly longer duration of service outages, although not necessarily more frequent outages. Importantly, this quality reduction is offset in cases where regulation incorporates service quality standards. We also examine the causal chain connecting incentive regulation, cost expenditures, and service quality. We conclude that careful design of quality standards can allow incentive regulation to achieve cost savings without quality degradation.     

中国奖励旅游研究综述

奖励旅游在国外发展较早,体制完备,而我国在这方面刚刚起步,学术界研究甚少。回顾近年来我国奖励旅游的研究情况,探讨目前我国在奖励旅游研究方面的几个热点,同时,展望奖励旅游在我国的发展前景,最后试探性的提出今后奖励旅游的研究方向。希望通过这些探讨,使得奖励旅游在我国得到健康、快速的发展。     

电信服务提供商的多因素激励机制研究

在电信运营商和SP合作中,电信运营商提供业务传输通道,SP主要提供业务服务,然后二者按一定比例对该业务收益进行分成。如何处理电信运营商与SP的关系,是电信产业未来几年所要研究的重点,由于电信运营商和电信服务提供商（SP）之间存在利益冲突和信息不对称,很容易导致SP的违规行为。电信运营商和SP之间的关系属于多因素的委托-代理关系。在设计委托-代理激励合同时,从多因素角度考虑了电信运营商对SP的激励,在设计委托-代理激励合同时,从两个任务的角度即：可观测到的SP发展的用户数、业务量和用户数及业务量增量和可观测到的SP的信用积分和等级。并通过风险成本和代理成本研究可知对SP进行多因素激励是非常必要的。在具体分析时采用了双因素激励模型。     

Separation of Regulatory Powers When Contracts Are Incomplete

The investment of a regulated firm affects the service/good provided on many dimensions. Should an integrated regulator take care of them all? Or is it better to have separate regulators responsible for them? We analyze the effect of the separation of regulatory powers on the regulated firm's ex ante incentive to invest in a “cooperative” innovation. The effects of the innovation are not verifiable and the cost of investing is sunk, hence, there is a problem of hold‐up. We find that when the innovation produces opposite effects the ex ante firm's incentive to invest is larger in the case of separation than in the case of integrated regulation. We also stress the risk of over‐investment that the separation of regulatory powers may induce. We maintain that along with classical incentive regulation—which mainly provides incentives for the firm to be efficient—the separation of regulatory powers may play a role in providing an incentive for cooperative innovations.     

Regulation, market structure and service trade liberalization

In this paper, we develop a theoretical method to quantify the importance of regulation and market structure on the success of service trade liberalization. For this purpose, we incorporate a single imperfectly competitive service sector that can take on various market structures into a standard computational general equilibrium model. We apply our framework to analyze the impact of partial telecom liberalization in Tunisia. We show that if the regulatory environment guarantees competition, Tunisia's welfare can improve up to 0.65%. If a cartel is formed between the domestic incumbent and foreign entrant, however, Tunisia's welfare can drop up to 0.25%. Our results thus call for Tunisia among other developing countries to step up its pro-competitive regulatory reforms while liberalizing its telecom sector.     

A Repeated Game Model of Monetary Union

Given a policy rule of the common central bank of a monetary union, member countries with different preferences about inflation and facing asymmetric shocks have different incentives to secure political intervention in the bank's operation and achieve the temporary benefit of surprise inflation. This is modelled as a repeated game, and the most cooperative outcome subject to the countries' incentive compatibility constraints is found. The optimal rule responds flexibly to asymmetric shocks, adjusting policy away from the full commitment level toward the discretionary level, so as to maintain the worse-hit country's incentive to abide by the rule.     

科研资助的激励机制研究-分析框架与文献综述

科研资助的激励机制这一重要课题一直未能得到经济学家应有的重视.作为一篇综述论文,该文首先深入地分析了科研活动的基本特征及其相应的激励问题.在此基础上,我们介绍了常见的科研资助的激励机制并分析了它们的激励效果.该文重点分析了经典的研发竞赛机制及其改进以及最优的研发竞赛机制设计问题,并指出了研发竞赛机制的不足之处和相应的改进思路.而作为最终的落实,我们在最后提出了相应的政策建议.     

我国存款保险制度的机构模式选择*

基于规制经济学激励理论，本文从制度比较视角探讨了存款保险制度以附属机构模式和独立机构模式运行的不同制度绩效。在独立机构模式下的存款保险制度，激励机制更为清晰，有助于降低监管机构救助与处置成本的冲突。随着制度环境和制度条件的成熟、问题银行处理经验的积累、技术型专业化监管人力资源的增强，应当适时将我国存款保险制度转换为独立机构模式的存款保险制度。本文从存款保险制度机构模式选择的视角，对我国存款保险制度的完善和改进提出政策建议。     

A model of incentive regulation

A method of incentive regulation is presented. The regulatory agency sets a‘fair rate of return’ which is used to determine a ‘target’ profit for the regulated firm. If the firm's actual profit differs from the target profit, it retains a fraction of the excess (or absorbs a fraction of the deficit). This feature of the system provides a strong incentive for efficient operation. Properties of the incentive system are explored and problems of implementation are briefly examined.     

规制经济学理论研究综述

本文详细介绍了规制经济理论发展、演化的脉络。对传统的规制公共利益理论、规制俘虏理论、规制经济理论及其主要代表人物的观点予以评述 ;重点介绍了信息不对称和目标不一致情况下的激励规制理论及其经典模型。     

A Dynamic Model of Export Competition, Policy Coordination, and Simultaneous Currency Collapse

This paper shows that the "price wars during booms" logic of Rotemberg and Saloner ( American Economic Review , vol. 76, 1986, 390–407) provides an explanation of contagious currency crises. The idea is as follows. When a group of countries relies on exports to a common foreign market, pressures for competitive devaluations arise. In response, competing exporters peg their exchange rates to the currency of their export market. However, it must be in each country's self-interest to adhere to its peg, and a common adverse external shock can make an existing (implicitly) cooperative arrangement unenforceable. Maintaining the arrangement requires a collective devaluation that reduces the unilateral incentive to devalue.     

The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties

Intellectual property treaties create two types of obligations:for national treatment of foreign inventors and for certainharmonized protections. I investigate both the incentive tojoin such treaties and the incentive to harmonize. As comparedto an equilibrium in which the countries' policy makers makeindependent choices, harmonization will generally strengthenprotections. This analysis recognizes that public sponsorshipis sometimes an efficient alternative to intellectual property.However, there are no institutions to harmonize public spending,and there are no international mechanisms to repatriate thespillovers it generates. As a consequence, there may be toolittle public sponsorship and too much intellectual property.A country's inclination to strengthen harmonized protectionswill depend both on its innovativeness (positively) and on thesize of its domestic market (negatively).     

监管压力、经济周期与宏观审慎政策效果*

本文基于我国52家主要银行2007—2015年的面板数据,考察了监管压力和经济周期对宏观审慎政策效果的影响。相关实证结果表明：（1）监管压力的上升能够显著促使银行增加资本缓冲,逆周期的宏观审慎政策在总体是有效的。（2）监管压力的上升会促使银行加快其资本缓冲的调整速度,这在城市商业银行和农村商业银行等中小银行表现得尤为明显。（3）经济周期会对宏观审慎政策的有效性产生一定影响,但这一影响在不同性质的银行中有所不同。对于国有商业银行和股份制商业银行,经济上行期的政策效果相对较弱,而在经济下行期,政策效果相对较强。对于城市商业银行和农村商业银行,经济周期的影响恰好相反。（4）在顺周期性机制下,银行行为存在过度承担风险以获取高收益的倾向,通过提升监管压力可以有效抑制这一倾向,从而促使银行降低风险,提高稳定性。     

Technical efficiency,allocative efficiency,and the impact of incentive regulation in telecommunications in the United States

Incentive regulation is now an important regulatory tool in the telecommunications industry in the United States. The objective of incentive regulation is to improve productive efficiency, enhance service quality and consumer welfare, and reduce the costs of regulation. The issue that is considered here is whether incentive regulation in the form of a price cap applicable to interstate access service to local loops has resulted in an increase in the technical efficiency and allocative efficiency of local exchange carriers (LECs). After discussing the reasons for adopting incentive regulation, the nature of price caps is explored followed by an overview of the methodology for measuring the effects of incentive regulation on productive efficiency. The results indicate that for changes in technical efficiency, there is a definite randomness between 1985 and 1993 with technical efficiency increasing in some years and decreasing in others. Subsequent to 1993, however, there is a consistent improvement in technical efficiency. Given that incentive regulation in the forin of price caps was implemented for LECs in 1991, it is likely that some portion of the improvement in technical efficiency subsequent to 1993 is attributable to incentive regulation. A pronounced upward trend in allocative efficiency is observed beginning in 1985. It is problematic, however, to attribute the improvement in allocative efficiency to the adoption of incentive regulation. It is more likely an artifact of the divestiture of AT&T although some indeterminant portion is probably associated with the implementation of price caps.JEL classification: L51, L96     

The Effect of Endogenous Regulation on Telecommunications Expansion and Efficiency in Latin America

I examine the effect of reform on telecom performance using a second-generation regulatory framework index and panel data techniques to test how regulatory governance affected sector performance in 22 Latin American countries during the period 1980–1997. Sound regulatory governance in telecommunications has a positive impact on network expansion and efficiency, in both the static and dynamic specifications. Openness of markets to competition and divestment of former state-owned telco operators also contributed positively to better sector performance. The dynamic specification shows that past performance has its own strong effect on present (and perhaps future) performance.     

PRICING REGULATIONS AND NETWORK TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENTS: A RETROSPECTIVE EVALUATION

This article evaluates the impact of the introduction of incentive regulation on technology deployment, as evaluated using two technology deployment metrics, among the population of local exchange carriers in the USA between 1988 and 2001. The regulatory schemes are disaggregated into five categories, permitting examination of heterogeneity among regulatory schemes. The results show that the rate of return method and the other intermediate incentive schemes implemented have had a negative impact on technology deployment. Conversely, the introduction of pure price caps schemes had a positive and significant impact on firms’ technology deployment. These results highlight the importance of appropriate incentive compatible mechanism design in motivating firms to adopt the new and important technologies that have been developed.     

A population policy for Zimbabwe Rhodesia

The author offers suggestions for the implementation of a population policy in Zimbabwe, with the aim of substantially reducing that country's birth rate within the next 10 years. He briefly examines the consequences of continued population growth and suggests steps to be taken by the government in preparation for the introduction of a population policy. Courses of action for policy implementation are proposed, including organization of public information programs, provision of family planning services, introduction of incentive programs, and promotion of reproductive research     

我国电网激励性价格监管政策研究

本文主要研究电网的价格监管政策框架。通过监管方法配合的视角，以监管内容与监管时间为标准，将世界主要国家的电网监管制度总结为四大模式，并详细对比分析了英美两国的电网监管实践。以理论与国际实践为参照，本文指出我国实行的以回报率监管为基准的模式是适合当前发展阶段的，后续需要针对回报率监管的弱激励以及事前定价的特点，引入强激励机制和不确定调整机制。特别是制定强激励方案，本文提出了两条可选择路径。     

SHOULD A MANDATORY SUBORDINATED DEBT POLICY BE INTRODUCED IN THE UNITED KINGDOM? EVIDENCE FROM THE ISSUANCE ACTIVITY OF BANKS AND BUILDING SOCIETIES

Current research is beginning to question the role and effectiveness of traditional rules‐based bank regulatory oversight in favor of incentive‐compatible regulatory design and market discipline and, in particular, mandatory subordinated debt market discipline. However, research on the suitability of a mandatory subordinated debt policy (MSNDP) has focused primarily on the United States. The primary aims of this article, therefore, are to examine the market for subordinated debt (SND) issued by UK credit institutions and to assess the suitability of introducing an MSNDP into UK banking regulation. A further contribution of this article is that it explores SND issuance and its characteristics at a bank level and, uniquely, considers them in relation to regulatory, structural, and economic events that either are specific to the UK or otherwise affect international banks. The article compares the UK findings with research on SND markets in the United States and Europe and, in so doing, raises concerns over whether an MSNDP for the largest global credit institutions would be feasible. Although the focus of this study is the UK banking industry, the country‐focused bank‐level approach provides conclusions that might be relevant to other countries considering the implementation of an MSNDP.(JEL G18, G28)     

产权管制放松与中国经济转轨绩效

基于信息成本约束的政府放松对分散决策单位的产权管制会带来资源配置的激励机制和行为角色的重大变化。由于市场分散性决策的信息成本过高成为政府资源权利配置的约束条件,所以政府应逐渐放松对配置资源权利管制的范围,并让位于分散决策单位进行产权运用和调配。产权管制放松对经济转轨绩效的影响显著,是提高中国经济绩效的关键因素。