Possible economic impacts of a shutdown of the thermohaline circulation: an application of <Emphasis Type="Italic">FUND</Emphasis>

Climate change can lead to a substantial reduction of the strength of the thermohaline circulation in the world oceans. This is often thought to have severe consequences particularly on the North Atlantic region and Northern and Western Europe. The integrated assessment model FUND is used to estimate the extent of these impacts. The results indicate that, owing to a slower warming (rather than cooling) of the regions most affected by a thermohaline circulation collapse, climate change induced damages in these regions would be smaller in case of a shutdown of the thermohaline circulation. However, even with a thermohaline circulation collapse, the total and marginal impacts of climate change are negative.JEL Classification: Q510, Q540We are grateful to Till Kuhlbrodt for providing the CLIMBER data and to Andre Krebber for processing them. The German Federal Ministry for Education and Research through the INTEGRATION project, the US National Science Foundation through the Center for Integrated Study of the Human Dimensions of Global Change (SBR-9521914) and the Michael Otto Foundation provided welcome financial support.     

On <Emphasis Type="Italic">Private Governance</Emphasis>

Edward Peter Stringham’s book Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life (2015) is a compelling defense of the proposition that private governance is more widely used and more effective than most people think. Stringham looks to history to see how people solved problems of fraud and cheating without government intervention and provides example after compelling example to contradict the strong claim that a government or any third-party enforcer is necessary for voluntary exchange. While Stringham doesn’t take on the tough problem that private governance is not sufficient for its task, his book is intended to be the beginning, not the end, of thinking about private governance.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Resourceship</Emphasis>: An Austrian theory of mineral resources

Economists inside and outside of the Austrian-school tradition have formulated a subjectivist theory of mineral resources. While von Mises (1940) presented a rudimentary theory, institutionalist Zimmermann (1933 and after) provided an in-depth mind-centered approach distinct from the objective, neoclassical theory for minerals developed by Jevons (1865, 1866), Gray (1913), and Hotelling (1931). A full-fledged Austrian theory identifies the fixity/depletionism view of minerals as incompatible with entrepreneurship. Mineral resourceship, praxeologically akin to manufacturing, or the making of capital goods, demotes the distinction between depletable and nondepletable resources for the sciences of human action. Instead of nonreproducibility, the interplay of geography and institutions becomes the locus of mineral-resource theory, given the nonuniform distribution of deposits. An Austrian-institutional theory is more robust for explaining changes in mineral-resource scarcity than neoclassical depletionism, and offers a wide research agenda for current debates over resource production, usage, and future availability.

The knowledge problem,determinism, and <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Sensory Order</Emphasis>

The arguments presented in Hayek's The Sensory Order suggest that the mind/brain is a decentralized spontaneous order. The decentralized nature of decision-making and the central role of classification in perception, cognition, and action, are solutions to the knowledge problem that confronts the system. The nature of this decentralized complex system suggests that the ordering is deterministic and that free will in the sense of a decision-maker being able to stand outside the circle of cause and effect is an illusion. If determinism is correct, how can we hold individuals responsible for their actions? It is argued that the evolution of responsibility, blame and credit are the products of a second Hayekian spontaneous order. Responsibility and the allocation of credit and blame are part of an implicit social contract that facilitates cultural evolution, political freedom, and economic growth. It is responsibility, not the existence of free will, that makes freedom possible.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Private Governance</Emphasis> and the three biases of political philosophy

Private Governance shows that philosophers, political and legal theorists, and social scientists mistakenly believe in legal centralism, the view that order in the world depends upon and is made possible by state law. In fact, most governance not only happens to be private, but must be private. This paper extends Edward Stringham’s argument by claiming that philosophers tend to suffer from three biases. Diffidence bias means they are overly pessimistic about people’s willingness and ability to cooperate without state enforcement. Statism bias means the overestimate the degree to which cooperation is secured by the state. Guarantee bias means they overestimate the value and need for legal guarantees.     

<Emphasis Type="Bold">The Free-Market Innovation Machine - Analyzing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism</Emphasis>

Book Review

The Free-Market Innovation Machine - Analyzing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism     

A note on spurious significance in regressions involving <Emphasis Type="BoldItalic">I</Emphasis>(0) and <Emphasis Type="BoldItalic">I</Emphasis>(1) variables

We demonstrate that t ratios (the F statistic) for I(1) regressors in a model with an I(0) dependent variable will generally be oversized. This indicates that spurious significance occurs in a situation where it was not previously identified. We also compare the asymptotic rejection rates of t ratios for various combinations of I(1) and I(0) variables in the two-variable linear regression model. These rejection rates systematically increase with the degree of autocorrelation, yielding spurious significance, when both variables are either positively or negatively autocorrelated. In contrast, when one variable is negatively autocorrelated and the other is positively autocorrelated the rejection rates systematically fall and are undersized.     

Rank based cointegration testing for dynamic panels with fixed <Emphasis Type="Italic">T</Emphasis>

In this paper, we show that the cointegration testing procedure of Binder et al. (Econom Theory 21:795–837, 2005) for Panel Vector Autoregressive model of order 1, PVAR(1) is not valid due to the singularity of the hessian matrix. As an alternative we propose a method of moments based procedure using the rank test of Kleibergen and Paap (J Econom 133:97–126, 2006) for a fixed number of time series observations. The test is shown to be applicable in situations with time-series heteroscedasticity and unbalanced data. The novelty of our approach is that in the construction of the test we exploit the “weakness” of the Anderson and Hsiao (J Econom 18:47–82, 1982) moment conditions. The finite-sample performance of the proposed test statistic is investigated using simulated data. The results indicate that for most scenarios the method has good statistical properties. The proposed test provides little statistical evidence of cointegration in the employment data of Alonso-Borrego and Arellano (J Bus Econ Stat 17:36–49, 1999).     

Not just guidelines: Pirate codes and the emergence of property rights in <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Invisible Hook</Emphasis>

Peter Leeson’s The Invisible Hook provides a readable and entertaining narrative of the hidden economics of the Golden Age of Piracy. This essay comments on one particular aspect of Leeson’s work: what we can learn from pirates about the emergence and evolution of property rights? I conclude that pirate codes had their origins in part in legally enforceable agreements and that pirates’ blend of individual and communal property rights bore some resemblance to the property rights of wandering tribal peoples.     

The economic agent as rule maker and rule user: <Emphasis Type="BoldItalic">Homo Sapiens Oeconomicus</Emphasis>

The paper discusses the micro foundations of evolutionary economics, introducing a unified concept of the economic agent as a rule maker and rule user. Based on recent findings of the neuronal, cognitive and behavioral sciences, Homo Sapiens Oeconomicus emerges as an alternative to Homo Oeconomicus. A taxonomy of rules distinguishing between cognitive, behavioral and blueprint rules and a set of theoretical propositions related to the structure and evolution of those rules are suggested.JEL Classification: A 12, B 41, B 52, B 53, D 00, D 64, D 80, D 83, E 11, L20The present paper had its origin in a research project on The Interdisciplinary Foundations of Economic Decision Making supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation during 1978-1980. The core of that work was a brain model whose architecture also serves as a corner stone for this paper. Since then there have been substantial developments in the respective areas; some of the major findings of the more recent research in the neuronal, cognitive and related sciences are discussed and integrated into the present paper. - I gratefully acknowledge insightful comments and criticisms from Georg D. Blind. Some ideas were discussed during my tenure as a Visiting Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Queensland, in fall 2003, and I wish to record my appreciation of the hospitality during that visit. Particular thanks for the inspiring discussions go to Peter Earl, John Foster, and, as always, Jason Potts. Special thanks are due to Juli Lessmann and Charles R. McCann for their thoughtful corrections of my English prose and their editorial help. The usual disclaimer applies.