上市公司会计信息披露失真现象的经济博弈分析

本文针对目前我国上市公司普遍存在的向中小股东披露的会计信息失真的问题,运用经济博弈的分析方法对会计信息披露各环节的博弈模型进行了分析,得出了目前上市公司会计信息传递存在混同均衡的结论,较好地解释了信息披露失真的现象。     

A model of strategic delegation in contests between groups

We analyze a contest between two groups where group members have differing valuations for the contested rent. Generically the pivotal group member with the median valuation of the rent will not act himself but will want to send a group member that has preferences different to her own into the contest. The delegation can be either to more or less “radical” group members. The direction of delegation depends on the order of moves and the relative “aggressiveness” of the group medians. We show that almost certainly very asymmetric equilibria arise, even if the median group members value the rent (almost) equally. Delegation can lead to a social improvement in terms of resources spent in the contest. We are indebted to Tobias Boehm, Nicolas Klein, Kai Konrad, Dan Kovenock, Matthias Messner, Johannes Muenster, Ray Rees, Hans Zenger and seminar participants at the 2005 Meeting of the Public Choice Society, the European Public Choice Society, the Royal Economic Society, the WZB Berlin, and the Universities of Guelph and Munich for their comments and suggestions. The editor, Massimo Morelli, and an anonymous referee helped to substantially improve the paper.     

Welfare analysis of rent control with side payments: a natural experiment in Cairo, Egypt

Anecdotal evidence suggests that bribery is a common means of obtaining rent controlled apartments. Increased tenant maintenance is a less often noted, but potentially important, phenomenon in controlled markets. Previous empirical studies of the effects of rent control have neglected these side payments, presumably for lack of data. This paper presents evidence on their size and incidence for the controlled market of Cairo, Egypt, as well as estimates of effects such side payments have on welfare gains and losses from controls.     

The cost of strikes in the Spanish mining sector: modelling an undesirable input with a distance function

In some contexts, firms have to deal with certain elements or factors that affect the production outcome but which are non-market in nature and therefore do not have a price. In this paper we propose a new use of a production economics tool, the input distance function, to empirically measure the effects of these factors. Although we suggest a general use of this methodology, it has been developed in the context of measuring the effects of labor disputes in a particular declining industry, that of Spanish coal mining. We have estimated an equation system comprising an input distance function and cost share equations to calculate the cost generated by strikes.

Monthly rent with variable deposit: A new form of rental contract in Korea

In this paper, we describe the structure of the monthly-rent-with-variable-deposit (MRVD) contract, a distinct type of rental contract in Korea. We demonstrate that the Chonsei contract is one variant of the MRVD contract. To explain the MRVD contract, we propose a leverage-effect-seeking hypothesis. Based on this hypothesis, we are able to elucidate a variety of rental market conditions in Korea. Our hypothesis is consistent with the simultaneous existence of several types of rental contracts and various combinations of monthly rent, as well as the up-front deposit in the MRVD contracts. We also focused on the deposit-to-monthly-rent conversion rate, a critical factor in the Korean rental housing market. Our hypothesis indicates that conversion rates vary across local markets depending on local market conditions, such as the expected house price appreciation rate. The results of our data analysis demonstrate that our hypothesis more adequately explains the observed trend in the conversion rate, as well as that in the MRVD contracts.