The social loss from private monopoly and optimal antitrust enforcement

In this paper we argue that the welfare loss from monopoly equals deadweight loss plus expenditures by monopolists to defend and antitrust enforcers to attack their monopolies. A model of a profit-maximizing monopolist and a social loss-minimizing antitrust enforcer is developed. We find ambiguous effects of deadweight loss and the price of resources used by either party (in maintaining or attacking the monopoly) on the total welfare loss from monopoly. Monopoly profit has a positive but diminishing impact on monopoly welfare loss. Thus the entire monopoly profit will not be transformed into socially useless resource expenditure.     

The degree of monopoly,international trade,and transnational corporations

Using a simple model of production, the paper focuses upon the impact of intra-firm imports on the theoretical specification of the degree of monopoly, and thereby on the functional distribution of income. In particular, it is shown that a rise in an industry's import penetration need not imply a fall in the degree of monopoly. Data for the United Kingdom new motor-car industry is used to assess the bias that results from ignoring intra-firm imports when estimating the degree of monopoly. It is also pointed out that an identical framework can be employed to analyse intra-firm exports.     

Privatization of natural monopoly public enterprises: The regulation issue

The paper presents a simple model that calculates — as a percentage of industry revenues — the welfare gains or losses that might ensue when a public enterprise natural monopoly is replaced by a profit maximizing private monopoly. The model incorporates both the pre-privatization demand elasticity and production efficiency changes subsequent to privatization. The magnitude of the welfare changes suggests that allocative efficiency improvements do not provide a compelling rationale for post-privatization regulation. Greater consideration must be given to other regulatory objectives including distributional concerns and the need to create an institutional environment that encourages investment.     

Commitment and monopoly pricing in durable goods models

This article investigates the issue of commitment by a durable goods monopolist. Two models of the interaction between durability, recycling, and market power are compared. The two differ according to the ability of the seller to credibly commit to a given sales strategy. This article takes the standard durable goods monopoly model, extends it to allow for depreciation, and compares the monopoly markup with Swan's predicted markup for a recycled good. The difference between the two models is shown to reduce to a single parameter in the markup equation.     

Does monopoly mean stagnation?

Through a case study of the telecommunications environment in France, the President of the European Conference of PTT Administrations sets out his views on monopoly and deregulation. He challenges the view that a telecommunications monopoly is an obstacle to progress, arguing that each country must evolve the system that is best suited to its economic, cultural and sociopoltical contexts.     

Toward measuring monopoly power

Some implications of Hyde and Perloff's paper on whether monopoly power can be measured are considered. It is concluded that measuring monopoly power requires a long-run view, with a focus on the implications of product differentiation, and a reliance on accounting data.     

The optimal regulation of a risky monopoly

We study the potential conflict between cost minimization and investment in prevention for a risky venture. A natural monopoly is regulated i) for economic purposes; ii) because it can cause losses of substantial size to third parties (the environment or people). The regulator observes the production cost without being able to distinguish the initial type (an adverse selection parameter) from the effort (a moral hazard variable). In addition, the investment in prevention is non observable (another moral hazard variable) and the monopoly is protected by limited liability. We fully characterize the optimal regulation in this context of asymmetric information plus limited liability. We show that incentives to reduce cost and to invest in safety are always compatible. But, in some cases, higher rents have to be given up by the regulator.     

Reflections on Learner's index of monopoly power

Lerner's index of monopoly power is considered in light of four axioms or principles the index should exhibit. The index is then defined for various types of market, involving externality, dynamics, increasing returns to scale, multiproduction, price discrimination and non-zero cross-elasticities of demand. The role of monopoly profit as opposed to non-competitive distortions becomes more important with greater generality. A supplementary index is defined to measure rents to technology.     

Japan's policy on monopoly and competition in telecommunications

Telecommunications policy in Japan is about to undergo a significant change in the field of domestic telecommunications services. A monopolistic policy has long been maintained - monopoly by the government for the first 80 years and monopoly by the NTT, a domestic common carrier, for the past 30 years. Now, however, a policy of competition is required to meet the needs of citizens and companies when confronted with the age of the information society. This article analyses the trend of past, present and future telecommunications policy in Japan in relation to monopoly and competition.     

The social costs of monopoly?

The essay recounts the contributions of earlier economists to the discussion of the social costs of monopoly. They largely duplicate more contemporary contributions.     

A general equilibrium approach to the measurement of monopoly welfare loss

The paper presents a framework for the evaluation of monopoly welfare losses in a general equilibrium context which includes factors of production. It shows that aggregation of partial equilibrium estimates is likely to be seriously misleading as in indicator of aggregate welfare costs. However, simple approximations to aggregate losses can be derived even in general equilibrium in the case where there are no constraints on the exercise of monopoly power. These approximations suggest that welfare losses are potentially large. If empirically observed losses are small, the implication is not that allocative efficiency is unimportant but that real economies are competitive.     

Preemptive rent seeking and the social cost of monopoly power

Monopoly power evokes rent seeking aimed at supplanting an incumbent monopolist as well as preemptive rent seeking by incumbents concerned with deterring entry of potential competitors. Using an illustrative example where preemptive rent seeking takes the form of excess capacity, this note makes the point that the relation between the value of resources expended in the two types of rent-seeking activity determines whether exposure of an incumbent monopolist to the discipline of potential competition reduces the social cost of monopoly power.     

Telecommunications services in France: The regulated monopoly and the challenge of competition

Classical microeconomic modelling cannot alone explain the present trend of telecommunications deregulation. Based upon an examination of the French situation, the author argues that the current phenomenon should be viewed more as a game between three main players whose behaviour can be analysed using principles of industrial organization. The traditional telecommunications monopoly is bound to react defensively in response to increasingly powerful demand, stimulated by technical innovations, while at the same time the public policy maker searches for modern regulatory principles. Demand, as represented by large corporate customers, will probably trigger the next step in the game between the three players.     

The monopoly v competition debate

Arguments for and against monopoly and competition in the provision of telecommunication services are considered from the perspective of a dominant telecommunications operator in a small European country, Sweden. The importance of provision of public services is stressed as well as the need for efficient international standardization. Finally, it is argued that there is a parallel between the position of dominant telecommunication operators in small and medium-sized countries and the INTELSAT system.     

Dynamic monopoly pricing with network externalities

In this paper, we study the optimal dynamic monopoly pricing for a good which exhibits positive network externalities. When network externalities are of sufficient magnitude, we show that, contrary to the Coase theorem, (1) there is no time inconsistency problem; (2) subgame perfect equilibrium prices increase as time passes. From this point of view, positive network externalities allow the monopoly to commit itself credibly to increasing future prices.Ce papier étudie la tarification optimale intertemporelle d'un monopole qui vend un bien exhibant des externalités positives de réseau. Lorsque ces externalités sont suffisamment importantes, nous montrons que, contrairement au théorème de Coase, (1) il n'y a pas de problème d'incohérence temporelle, (2) les prix d'équilibre parfait croissent avec le temps. De ce point de vue, les externalités positives de réseau permettent au monopole de s'engager crédiblement sur une politique de prix futurs à la hausse.     

The UK telecommunications monopoly: An independent view

The author assesses how much of the UK Post Office monopoly is ‘natural’, and how much is purely statutory and could be replaced by conditions of free and open competition. He also considers the historical reasons behind the PO's purely statutory monopolies, and the extent to which they remain desirable from the point of view of the public interest at a time of rapid technological change. Finally, he examines the implications for the health of the European computer, telecommunications and electronic industries of the growing divergence between European leased communications line costs and costs in North America.     

Highway robbery: complementary monopoly and the hold-up problem

We analyze the hold-up problem in the context of the Cournot–Ellet theory of complementary monopoly. The strategic interaction among travelers and two distinct owners of successive segments of a segment road is used as a metaphor for complementary goods that are traded sequentially. It is shown that when trade occurs double marginalization is eliminated. Furthermore, allowing for strategic placement of the tollbooths (simultaneous trade) avoids the hold-up problem but not double marginalization. Thus, this analysis suggests the endogenous creation of institutions among complementary monopolistic suppliers that assure their customers of not being held up whenever it is strategically possible.     

Sunk costs,contestability and airline monopoly power

This paper examines the effects of sunk costs and potential competition on pricing behavior in monopoly airline markets. We find little evidence to support the proposition from contestable markets theory that the level of sunk costs influences pricing by monopolists. Rather, the results support the view, consistent with numerous game theoretic oligopoly models, that the costs and the price-cutting reputation of potential entrants influence incumbent behavior. These results suggest that contestability theory may not be robust. Even in the markets characterized by increasing returns to scale, the perfectly contestable market may not be a useful welfare standard.I am grateful to Richard Levin, Merton J. Peck, Sharon Oster, Paul MacAvoy, Dan Kaplan, Michael Levine, David Sappington, Andrea Shepard, and Diana Strassman for their advice. Participants at numerous workshops also made useful comments. Steven Davis, Tadas Osmolshis, and Maeve O'Higgins provided help with the data and technical assistance. I acknowledge financial support from Yale University and the Eno Foundation for Transportation. The usual disclaimer, of course, applies.     

制度环境、激励结构与垄断行业收入规范

文章将转轨经济条件下制度及经济环境随机变动的因素引入分析中,并将收入合同作为管制者与经营者之间策略互动的一个内生结果。特定制度环境导致的垄断厂商经营者面临不确定性的扩大以及国有产权下管制者与经营者贴现因子的差异使我国垄断行业厂商经营者有更大的动力攫取制度设计中的信息租金。认为在垄断性行业改革中更多的强调绩效考核及引入专家式监管对我国垄断性行业收入规范改革有着重要的作用。