Influence of Rent Differentials on the Choice between Office Rent Contracts with and without Relocation Provisions

In this paper we concern ourselves empirically with the influence of rent differentials on the choice between rent contracts with and without relocation provisions investigating the effects of relocation provisions on office rents. The study departs from the extant literature by using a switching simultaneous-equations model to estimate hedonic rent functions for alternative office lease contracts with choices of relocation provisions. The empirical results suggest that price considerations and certain lease terms are important determinants of the choice of office relocation rights. The results also suggest that certain tenant characteristics, like tenant size and creditworthiness, have only a marginal effect on the choice of relocation rights.     

The Borrower's Choice between Fixed and Adjustable Rate Loan Contracts

Previous research indicates that key variables in the choice between fixed and price index-linked debt are the covariances between inflation and real income and between inflation and the real value of the asset financed by the debt. This model extends those results to adjustable rate loan contracts and examines the impact of covariance between the real interest rate and, in turn, real income and real asset values. Positive (negative) covariance between those terms shifts preference toward the adjustable (fixed) loan contract.     

Recourse as shadow equity: Evidence from commercial real estate loans

We study the role that recourse plays in the commercial real estate loan contracts of the largest U.S. banks. We find that recourse is valued by lenders as a substitute for conventional equity. At origination, recourse loans have rate spreads that are about 20 basis points lower and loan-to-value ratios that are almost 3 percentage points higher than nonrecourse loans. Dynamically, recourse affects loan modification negotiations by providing additional bargaining power to the lender. Recourse loans were half as likely to receive accommodation during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the modifications that did occur entailed a relatively smaller reduction in payments.     

Reverse Mortgages: Contracting and Crossover Risk

A pricing model is developed for a reverse mortgage contract where the borrower receives payments either as a lump sum or in an annuity while the loan balance accumulates as a claim against the house. No underwriting criteria on income are applied. One risk of default is that the borrower will remain in the house after the negatively amortizing loan balance exceeds the value of the house. An explicit pricing model of the reverse mortgage permits the evaluation of this default "crossover" option. Alternative methods involving life insurance contracts and securitization are compared as secondary market channels.     

Credit rationing and implicit contract theory : An empirical study

This paper investigate whether or not implicit contract relations predominate in the Japanese bank loan market and produce equilibrium credit rationing. The empirical evidence suggests that risks are shared between banks and firms through interest rate arrangements. This implies that commercial banks in Japan operate in a market dominated by implicit contract relations. However, the evidence does not support the view that Japanese commercial banks execute credit rationing in the sense of Fried and Howitt (1980). Furthermore, the results show that large banks differ from small banks in the risk consideration of loan contracts. These empirical results are completely consistent with the intermarket business group hypothesis such that the group formation aims to share risks and profits among members.     

Collective Wage Contracts,Opt‐Out Clauses,and Firm Wage Differentials: Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data

Using a large linked employer–employee data set, this article studies whether the existence and use of flexibility provisions within centralized collective wage agreements alter the structure of pay across employers. Using level regressions and first‐difference methods, we find that—compared with contracts without any flexibility—wages under opt‐out clauses are more responsive to local profitability conditions in below‐average‐performing establishments. In contrast, the sensitivity of wages to local profitability is smaller in high‐performance establishments. Our results provide further evidence for a threat potential of the existence of opt‐out clauses whose impact on flexibility is larger than the real application.     

Self-Selection in the Fixed-Rate Mortgage Market

This paper analyzes the effect of information asymmetry between the lender and the borrower (i.e., the borrower knows how long he will reside in his home, whereas the lender does not) on the borrower's choice among the interest rate-discount points combinations available in the fixed-rate mortgage market. The analysis shows that if the rate-points trade-off of the mortgage menu is either too steep or too flat, then all types of borrowers will choose the same loan contract from the menu. In addition, if the rate-points trade-off is not convex to the origin, then only the contracts with extreme rate-points combinations will be chosen by borrowers; all contracts with intermediate rate-points combinations are redundant and will not be chosen by any borrowers. Intermediate rate-points combination mortgage contracts would be chosen by some borrowers only if the mortgage menu were to provide a self-selection function. Several necessary conditions of a self-selection mortgage menu are depicted.     

Agency Costs in Apartment Property Management Contracts

Because fees for property management services are based on gross rental collections rather than on net operating incomes, property managers may not always act in the best interest of property owners. This study is an examination of the agency costs that result from the conflict of interests between owners and managers. A nationwide proprietary sample of 242 apartment properties is analyzed to compare agency costs of four distinct types of ownership structures. Agency costs, measured as operating expenses per square foot, are found to be significantly higher for institutional owners than for noninstitutional owners, but not significantly higher in cases where no competition for property management services exists. We conclude that agency costs of property management contracts are significant and the fee provisions of standard property management contracts should be changed to better align the interests of managers and owners.     

Pricing Efficiency in the Mortgage Market

Traditionally, the presence of serial correlation has been presumed to indicate an inefficient market for financial assets. As Latham [15] discusses, while the absence of serial correlation implies market efficiency, its mere presence does not imply inefficiency. Rather, market efficiency is a characteristic of security pricing. This study investigates pricing efficiency in the mortgage market. Using mortgage loan quotations for 343 institutions over a 71-week period, the empirical findings show that a wide variety of mortgage contracts are efficiently priced.     

Estimation of Mortgage Defaults Using Disaggregate Loan History Data

This paper addresses, theoretically and empirically, the structure of influences affecting the default option in mortgage contracts. A formal theoretical model recognizes that a number of loan and non-loan related effects beyond equity in the unit could influence the default decision. These include 1) payment levels relative to income, which could displace other investment opportunities or cause a need for borrowing or sale to meet mortgage obligations; 2) current and expected neighborhood and housing market conditions, in particular the expected relative rate of appreciation of the unit and the relative cost of homeownership; 3) economic conditions; 4) wealth; 5) borrower characteristics proxying for variability in income or "crisis" events; as well as 6) transactions costs incurred upon default. Estimates of the model making use of a micro-level sample of individual loan histories over a twelve year period, supplemented by longitudinal census and economic information, find a number of these "other" effects important. Simulations find several of them to dominate the equity effect on default and to help explain why some households with zero or negative equity may not default, while others with positive equity may. The implications of these results for appropriate specification of the pricing model describing the default option and for appropriate underwriting of AMIs are noted.     

Do Liquidated Damages Clauses Affect Strategic Mortgage Default Morality? A Test of the Disjunctive Thesis

We test the disjunctive thesis as it relates to mortgage contracts and find that a liquidated damages clause shifts ones view of a mortgage from a promise to perform to either a promise to perform or pay compensatory damages. However, when a strategic mortgage default is responsible for the breach, the perceived immorality of this action overwhelms the liquidated damages clause effect in support of the disjunctive thesis. We also find that people's conscious “experimentally stated preference” moral stance on installment loan (mortgages, auto loans, credit card debt and even cell phone contracts) default significantly differs from their subconscious “experimentally revealed preference” moral stance indicating a difference between what people say they believe and what they actually believe.     

Prepayment Penalty as a Screening Mechanism for Default and Prepayment Risks

The objective of this article is to offer a theoretical model of asymmetric information to analyze the screening role of prepayment penalty. We consider both default risk and prepayment risk. What makes the role of prepayment penalty interesting and more complicated is that a borrower's contract choice could send conflicting signals to the lender about that borrower's default and prepayment risk type. This is different from earlier theoretical models of mortgage choice under asymmetric information where a certain aspect of the contract (e.g., discount points or loan‐to‐value ratio) is explored as a screening mechanism for a single risk dimension (default risk or prepayment risk) of the borrower type. We show the existence of separating equilibria where different default and prepayment risk types choose contracts with different combinations of prepayment penalty and interest rate. For certain parameter combinations, the model also generates a pooling equilibrium where all borrower types obtain the same contract. Our analysis could offer a partial explanation for the observation that contracts with prepayment penalties are a lot less prevalent than contracts with points.     

Flexible labour market and trade unions: Surprising career paths of Dutch sub-Saharan Africans

Starting from the empirical evidence that minorities are more likely to work on flexible contracts, we investigated the existence of an ethnic gap in flexible contracts between the native Dutch population and sub-Saharan African immigrants between 2006 and 2012. The migrant group is taken as a test case of ‘outsiders’. This study found, quite surprisingly and contrary to what several theories predict, that the expected ethnic gap in job status between the two groups disappeared in the 6 years between 2006 and 2012. Many sub-Saharan Africans successfully transformed their flexible contracts into permanent ones, catching up with the native Dutch by 2012. The analysis of the statutory provisions showed that the workforce numerical composition in the cleaning industry was important for the inclusiveness of sub-Saharan immigrants. This numerical compositional effect was facilitated by the collective agreements negotiated by trade unions, agreements that were extended to temp workers. Sub-Saharan Africans, overrepresented in the cleaning industry, have benefited disproportionally from the settled agreements. We thus conclude that trade unions can improve the inclusion of migrants not only by explicitly focusing on migrant representation but also by targeting sectors with an overrepresentation of migrants.     

UK Fixed Rate Repayment Mortgage and Mortgage Indemnity Valuation

We use a mean-reverting interest rate model and a lognormal house price diffusion model to evaluate British fixed rate repayment mortgage contracts with (embedded) default and prepayment options. The model also provides values for capped mortgage indemnity guarantees and the corresponding (residual) lender's coinsurance. Since the partial differential equation incorporating the general features of these mortgage contracts does not have a closed-form solution, an explicit finite difference method is used for the valuation (and sensitivity) results, with solution improvements to deal with error bounds. Then we provide graphical representations of each mortgage component as a function of house prices and interest rate levels, along with interpretations of the analysis. We calculate precisely the lender's (residual) exposure to house price risk, given the borrower's options, house and interest rate uncertainty, and customary mortgage indemnity insurance for high loan/collateral ratio mortgages.     

Renegotiation of Troubled Debt: The Choice between Discounted Payoff and Maturity Extension

Renegotiation of securitized debt contracts is generally a more efficient solution to default than foreclosure when there are significant deadweight costs associated with the enforcement of security rights. Recent literature shows that when renegotiation takes the form of discounted loan payoffs, it eliminates deadweight costs associated with the liquidation or transfer of assets. There is evidence, however, that, in practice, renegotiation of other contract terms such as maturity is a more common form of loan workout. This observation is puzzling because, in general, maturity renegotiation does not eliminate deadweight costs. We provide a partial answer to this puzzle by showing that maturity renegotiation better aligns the incentives of borrowers and lenders than does renegotiation of principal. Specifically, we find that borrowers who expect that lenders will renegotiate maturity in the event of default have less incentive to divert cash flow from the collateral during the term of the loan and less incentive to take on additional risk. If the lender's cost of managing these standard agency problems is positively related to the magnitude of the borrower's incentive, then maturity renegotiation will result in lower monitoring and enforcement costs.     

Relationship marketing and contract theory

The theoretical foundation of contracts and their limitations in governing exchange between firms is a current area of research in economics and business. The relationship marketing approach in business-to-business markets focuses on aspects in interfirm exchange that contracts cannot deal with efficiently. However, the ability to use contractual forms of governance where possible is crucial to the enhanced scope of relationship marketing management. We argue that contracts and relationships are complementary and that contracts provide an evolving governance structure for relationships. We examine the evolution of interfirm exchange theories in this framework and illustrate the convergence between contract theory and relationship marketing management, with examples from procurement in the supply chain, capacity reservation contracts, and program management.     

组织信息体制、制度化关联与高技术企业集群治理效率

高技术企业集群是一种网络式中间体组织，其组织结构更多的表现为组织之间垂直方向和水平方向的信息关联关系。不同的信息关联形成不同的信息体制。高技术企业集群治理合约分为VC捆绑武治理合约、转换者式治理合约、主导企业式治理合约等三种典型形式．其治理合约的选择受制于信息体制的交易费用大小。信息体制有其特定的制度生存环境，并且具有不同的交易费用结构特征．必须使制度环境与信息体制相匹配。制度化关联与信息体制的耦合互动可以弥补组织信息体制内生的体制缺陷．降低总交易费用。制度环境的扰动和制度的历时关联影响治理合约的治理效率．治理合约需要做出相应的调遣．     

Switching costs in local credit markets

Switching costs are a key determinant of market performance. This paper tests their existence in the corporate loan market in which they are likely to play a central role because of the complexity of contracts and the relevance of informational problems. Using very detailed data at bank-firm level on four Italian local credit markets we empirically show that firms tend to iterate their choice of the main bank over time. This inertia is not related to unobserved and time invariant firms' preferences across banks and can be attributed to the existence of switching costs. Moreover these costs are higher for single-bank firms. We also offer evidence that banks price discriminate between new and old borrowers by charging lower interest rates to the former in order to cover part of the switching costs. The discount amounts to about 44 basis points and is equal to 7% of the average interest rate. These results prove robust to a number of other potential identification drawbacks.     

中国西部地区金融发展支持经济增长的实证研究

文章从金融资产结构的角度(包括银行贷款、保险资产以及股票等)对西部地区1985~2010年的金融发展与经济增长的关系进行了实证研究,结论表明:保险市场对经济增长的推动作用不显著;股票市场对西部地区经济的贡献率仅为0.0834;银行贷款显著地促进了西部地区的经济增长,其中短期贷款的贡献最大;从贷款投向来看,工业贷款贡献率最大,其次是农业贷款,最后是第三产业贷款。结合本文实证结论,提出了优化和改善西部地区银行体系的信贷结构、继续增加对西部地区农业的有效资金投入、通过加大对第三产业授信规模来提高第三产业在国民经济中的比重、同时提高第三产业就业吸纳力等政策建议。     

商业银行房地产项目放贷初始决策研究

信贷业务是商业银行利润的主要来源,也是银行管理和决策中最复杂、最困难的金融业务之一,具备一个良好贷款资产结构和拥有大量较强盈利能力贷款资产是商业银行核心竞争力的重要体现之一.文章从银行视角出发,对房地产项目的放贷问题进行投资分析,由于该决策具有刚性,故传统投资分析方法足够对其评价;对某房地产新项目实例进行计算分析,采用以资本资产定价模型为基础的适用新模型确定折现率,取得了较好的效果,具有一定的现实应用意义.