The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement

The economic literature on optimal law enforcement is very recent. Becker's seminal paper on crime and law enforcement dates from 1968 and most papers which are the focus of this survey have been published in the last ten years.The core result presented by Becker is the following: the probability and the severity of punishment deter crime. Therefore, the fine should be maximal since it is a costless transfer whereas the probability of detection and conviction is costly. Much of the recent work has attempted to show why Becker's result may not hold.     

Rational probation decisions for juvenile delinquents

Assuming a risk of innocent conviction and fully rational individuals, the current study addresses the effects of immediate punishment and probation rules. Strict dominance of a probation rule requires that the judicial system is highly unreliable and, at the same time, learning over criminal careers is strong. Else, an optimal punishment scheme can always be based on either regularly offering probation or appropriate immediate punishments. Received: July 2000 / Accepted: November 2001 RID="*" ID="*" The authors gratefully acknowledge valuable comments by three anonymous referees and the US co-editor of the journal.     

浅谈如何在贫困山区开展消防执法工作

文章结合在贫困山区开展消防监督执法工作的经验,针对标准更高、处罚更严的新《消防法》及其配套法律法规的颁布实行与贫困山区经济发展相对落后、消防基础设施薄弱、单位经营普遍困难、公民法律意识不强之间的矛盾,提出日常加强法律法规宣传、执法时做好思想工作、执法后悉心帮扶、注重部门联动发挥执法最大效力4点对策。     

Optimal law enforcement when victims are rational players

The economic analysis of crime usually views a victim as a passive party whose role is limited to suffering harm. In this paper, we extend the economic theory of law enforcement by modeling victims as an active party in criminal deterrence. First, they may take some precautions to avoid victimization. Second, they may or may not report their victimization. The lack of reporting weakens law enforcement and criminal deterrence by reducing detection rates. This suggests that victims could be encouraged to report by being paid a compensation. Nevertheless, compensating victims certainly reduces precaution. We argue that such effect never offsets the gains obtained in terms of criminal detection and apprehension. Received: December 1998 / Accepted: January 2000     

OSHA inspections: Process and outcomes in programmed inspections versus complaint-investigated inspections

Inspections are an important tool for enforcing OSHA regulations. As with any enforcement procedure, OSHA inspections are an effective tool to the extent that they are conducted in a consistent manner. In this study we compared 3,000 inspections randomly initiated by OSHA with 3,000 inspections conducted by OSHA in response to an employee complaint. Significant differences in both process and outcome variables were found between the two types of inspections. We discuss the findings in terms of the “threat effect” as a tool for enforcement of OSHA safety standards.     

A sequential model for cracking down on street markets for illicit drugs

This paper develops a sequential decision-making model for assisting law enforcement officials in allocating resources during a crackdown operation on illicit drug markets. The sequential crackdown model (SCM) considers a probabilistic framework, where the probability of incarceration of a dealer and the probability of dealing are modeled as a function of the size of a drug market, crackdown enforcement level, drug dealer's financial hardship, and other market characteristics.The model was developed and tested in consultation with enforcement officials from Philadelphia, PA and Camden, NJ. We present a detailed, step-by-step implementation scheme for updating parameters on each day of the crackdown. Parameter estimation along with examples of model usage is provided. Through these examples, we illustrate how the SCM could be helpful in understanding the response of illicit drug markets to various enforcement strategies. We further show conditions under which an alternating crackdown policy (referred to as a crackdown-backoff) or a consistent use of maximum possible enforcement would be optimal strategies for managing a drug crackdown operation. Within the context of the model and parameter estimates, we show that a much quicker and less costly collapse could be implemented if the available enforcement resources are increased. Finally, the model provides possible conditions under which a crackdown operation would be unsuccessful in eliminating a drug market.     

Analysing tax evasion dynamics via the Ising model

We develop a model of tax evasion based on the Ising model. We augment the model using an appropriate enforcement mechanism that may allow policy makers to curb tax evasion. With a certain probability tax evaders are subject to an audit. If they get caught they behave honestly for a certain number of periods. Simulating the model for a range of parameter combinations, we show that tax evasion may be controlled effectively by using punishment as an enforcement mechanism.     

Private law enforcement with competing groups

This paper introduces groups that are in conflict against each other in law enforcement policy. These groups can have an effect on the process of law enforcement by making upfront investments, such as bribes. We also investigate consequences when a policy maker acts to maximize a bribe instead of social welfare. Thus, this paper presents an inclusive framework for incorporating private law enforcement, corruption and avoidance activities. This article shows that this competition can lead to moderate and more efficient law enforcement activities. This indicates that inefficient law enforcement by authority with harm reduction motivation can be avoided. Additionally, this paper shows that depending on the policy maker’s objection between rent-seeking motivation or social welfare maximizer, deterrence effects vary. This paper provides a clear mechanism that the rent-seeking motivated policy maker tends to set less severe enforcement policies than the social welfare level.     

气象法律成本缺失的经济学分析——以气象探测的环境保护为视角

从法经济学理论分析,"违法成本低"问题在立法上的体现,是法律责任的设定不合理,大大降低了违法者应当承担的"预期成本"。本文界定了气象违法成本,对气象法律责任立法缺失问题进行了分析,指出目前我国对气象违法责任主体的处罚偏轻。法律规范过于依赖行政处罚或民事赔偿,对刑事手段重视不够。刑事责任和行政责任主要体现了惩罚,而民事责任主要体现了补偿,不同的法律责任体现出不同的法律意图,对气象违法主体行为也会产生不同的威慑效果。只有将这三者有机结合,才能降低政府的监管成本,同时提高公众保护气象环境、遵守气象法的意识。而刑事责任的空缺使气象违法成本大大降低,不利于气候状况的监测和保护,这种局面必须改变。     

电子商务安全管理的路径探析

文章通过简要分析电子商务安全管理存在的隐患,探讨了防范电子商务安全问题的法律手段、技术手段和监管手段。文章认为,一方面,要不断地完善电子商务的立法和执法,加大电子商务犯罪活动惩治力度;另一方面,在加强电子商务中消费者的权益保障意识的同时,还应从技术手段入手提高电子商务安全管理,构建完善的安全管理体系。如果在电子商务中能够多途径并抓,必定能够达到完善电子商务安全管理的目的。     

审计任期强制轮换的经济学分析

本文运用经济学分析方法,在假设监管部门的识别及处罚机制不完备的条件下,通过将审计任期强制轮换的具体经济学目标设为培育更多的信誉好的会计师事务所。分析结果表明,当审计任期强制轮换的制度转换成本较低时,这种强制轮换是有效的,但当制度转换成本较高时,这种强制则是无效的。且政策的有效性随着监管部门的识别及处罚机制的渐趋完备而提升。在轮换成本不可知的条件下,要使强制轮换政策有效,可行的办法是提高监管部门识别信誉好与差会计师事务所的能力,同时健全完善相应的处罚机制。     

On the different styles of large shareholders’ activism

This paper extends Noe’s (Rev Financial Studies 15:289–317, 2002) model of large shareholder activism in two directions. First, it considers a framework in which large shareholders can choose not only when to monitor, but also how intensively they want to monitor the firm. Second, it considers the impact of laws and regulations by introducing a governance quality parameter that makes monitoring more cost effective. The model yields a new and rich characterization of activism. We find that share wealth (ownership concentration) induces monitoring for higher firm value through more frequent monitoring with unchanged intensity. Cash wealth motivates activism for trading gains, not higher firm value, through less frequent monitoring coupled with higher intensity. We also find that better governance leads to higher firm value through more frequent but less intense activism. When asymmetries within the group of large shareholders exist, the model predicts that the larger/wealthier/more efficient shareholders are more active. These results are broadly consistent with the empirical evidence.     

加强法治建设 提高路政执法能力

依法治路是构建和谐交通的重要特征。没有规范化的法治建设就不可能有和谐的交通秩序，要保障良好的高速公路运营环境，促进社会发展和经济发展，就必须加强法制建设，提高路政执法能力，全面提升路政管理水平和服务水平，努力实现“端正执法理念，坚持文明执法，改进执法作风，坚持公正执法，规范执法行为，坚持严格执法”的目标。     

Sounding the alarm: Impact of political instability on growth and fiscal health of the Indian economy

A noticeable change evident in the Indian political scenario since the eighties has been a sharp rise in the frequency with which governments have been ousted out of power. This augurs well for Indian democracy as it reflects a ‘political awakening’. Such changes in government, after an election reflect ‘orderly’: transfer of power and are inherent to the democratic form of governance. However, a close scrutiny of the political scenario at the state government level shows that there have been very frequent changes in government between elections. A high frequency of changes in government could be expected to result in frequent reversals or modifications in policy decisions and have a destabilizing effect on the economy. The present study is an empirical exercise undertaken at the level of state governments. It makes a first attempt to examine the impact of political instability on growth and on the fiscal health of the Indian economy. Received: September 25, 2000/Accepted: January 11, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" Sincere thanks to Professors Ajit Karnik and Abhay Pethe for their comments and suggestions. I would also like to thank the two anonymous referees for their insightful comments and suggestions, which have been of great help. The usual disclaimer applies.     

On the advantages of economically designed the Hotelling’s T2 control chart with variable sample sizes and sampling intervals

Faraz and Parsian (Statistical Paper, 47: 569–593, 2006) have shown that the double warning lines (DWL) scheme detects process shifts more quickly than the other variable ratio sampling schemes such as variable sample sizes (VSS), variable sampling intervals (VSI) and variable sample sizes and sampling intervals (VSSVSI). In this paper, the DWLT²control chart for monitoring the process mean vector is economically designed. The cost model proposed by Costa and Rahim (Journal of Applied Statistics, 28: 875–885, 2001) is used here and is minimized through a genetic algorithm (GA) approach. Then the effects of the model parameters on the chart parameters and resulting operating loss is studied and finally a comparison between all possible variable ratio sampling (VRS) schemes are made to choose the best option economically.     

谈我国教育行政执法的建设与发展策略

教育行政执法是国家有效管理教育事业的重要手段,是教育行政机关依法行政的主要形式,是贯彻执行有关教育法律法规的根本途径,是促进教育事业全面、协调和可持续发展的可靠保障。本文认真探讨了加强我国教育行政执法的重要性,并提出了一些发展建议。     

The ARCO decision: Inroads into the per se rule under Section 1 of the Sherman Act

In this study, the author analyzes the 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decision inAtlantic Richfield Company vs. USA Petroleum Company approving Atlantic Richfield’s maximum pricing plan improsed on its distributors (despite the Court’s recognition that theper se rule forbade such schemes). Theper se rule had been one of the last substantial measures of effective antitrust policy administered by enforcement authorities and the courts, perhaps even more fundamental than scrutiny of proposed mergers and predatory practices. That principle has been weakened by the ARCO decision. The author addresses some of the likely consequences of the ascendancy of the Chicago School and the NeoClassical theory generally in antitrust interpretation.     

Counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies in the United States

In spite of the increase in domestic law enforcement policies in the U.S. drug related crime has followed a non-monotonic trend and cocaine and heroin prices, instead of increasing, have been dropping or remained stable over time. All this in a context of an increase in these drugs’ consumption during the 1980s and a small decrease during the 1990s. This paper provides an explanation to these counter-intuitive effects of domestic law enforcement policies. We model how drug lords respond to this type of policy within a conflict framework over the control of distribution activities for illegal drugs, which is novel. The model predicts drug distribution activities, drug prices and drug consumption. These predictions appear to be consistent with the empirical evidence in the United States.     

Cross-ownership as a hostage exchange to support collaboration

The impossibility of writing complete contracts causes loss of profitable transactions among firms, since their managers cannot ex ante bind themselves to future actions. We show how a reallocation of ownership rights into a network of mutual shareholdings among a coalition of firms produces an efficient enforcement mechanism. Co-operation is achieved by exchanging control rights until a mutual threat of capture of control is established. By making control over their firms vulnerable to a takeover by the other members of the coalition, each firm is able to make a credible commitment to future efficient actions. In equilibrium no punishment is administered, so that the arrangement achieves the outcome under complete contracts. More generally, it is proved that a mutual hostage exchange may dominate the threat of loss of reputation as an enforcement mechanism.     

Robust bubbles with mild penalties for default

Limited enforcement of debt contracts and mild penalties for default can lead to low equilibrium interest rates, to ensure debt repayment. Low interest rates, in turn, create conditions for bubbles. I show that bubbles in unsecured private debt exist when the punishment for default is a permanent or a temporary interdiction to trade. Bubbles are an inefficient source of liquidity, as they lower interest rates and reduce welfare by discouraging saving.