Can entrepreneurship bring happiness? Evidence from China

This paper investigates the relationship between entrepreneurial activities and the happiness of entrepreneurs. We estimate the effects of entrepreneurial decision-making, business experience and other factors on happiness by using China Household Finance Survey data. Our results derived from maximum likelihood estimation methods indicate that entrepreneurial decision-making and entrepreneurial experience affect household happiness significantly. The family well-being is significantly increased if the family is entrepreneurial, and it will be higher if actively entrepreneurial. Both entrepreneurial experience and entrepreneurial investment of time have significantly positive effect on the probability of family well-being. In addition, we find that the mechanism by which entrepreneurship brings happiness to households is through raising household income and wealth, that is, income effects and wealth effects.     

Can television bring down a dictator? Evidence from Chile’s “No” campaign

Can televised political advertising change voting behavior in elections held in authoritarian regimes? We study the case of Chile, where the opposition used television campaigns weeks before the election that ended the seventeen-year dictatorship known as the Pinochet regime. Using national surveys conducted before the election and administrative electoral data, we provide evidence of a positive effect of television exposure on opposition votes. When compared to similar estimates in democracies, the effect of campaigns in Chile appear large. These results suggest that televised political campaigns can help to defeat dictators at the polls.     

Can trust effects on development be generalized? A response by quantile

While the beneficial effects of social trust on economic performance have been largely recognized, we analyze whether these effects can be generalized for economies at different stages of economic development. Contrary to previous studies on this issue based on average effects (mostly considering ordinary least squares estimations), we follow a quantile regression approach that enables us to capture heterogeneous effects of trust for different development levels. By considering data for 80 countries, and using trust indicators from five different waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), our results by quantile indicate that trust is not relevant for the poorest economies, showing the existence of a social poverty trap. In addition, results suggest that the impact of trust on income decreases as an economy becomes richer. This would suggest not only that trust benefits cannot be generalized for all countries, as some previous studies have proposed, but also that the extent of its implications are heavily dependent on the level of development.     

Does the use of professional legal assistance bring measurable benefits?

In this paper, the first attempt to quantify measurable effects of using legal advisory services is made with the use of a random sample and advanced econometric methods (robust MM-estimator). The estimates of parameters of an extended Mincer equation indicate that the appearance of legal problems results in lower earnings per person in a household and the choice of an active reaction to this legal problem results in a substantial reduction of losses.     

Does financial development reduce corruption?

We estimate the impact of bank credit to the private sector on corruption, using indicators of a country’s legal origin as instrumental variables to assess causality. We find that bank credit to the private sector reduces corruption, with the result robust to instrumenting for bank credit and for many different controls.     

Do remittances promote financial development?

Workers' remittances to developing countries have become the second largest type of flows after foreign direct investment. This paper uses data on remittance flows to 109 developing countries during 1975-2007 to study the link between remittances and financial sector development. In particular, we examine the association between remittances and the aggregate level of deposits and credit intermediated by the local banking sector. This is an important question considering the extensive literature that has documented the growth-enhancing and poverty-reducing effects of financial development. We provide evidence of a positive, significant, and robust link between remittances and financial development in developing countries.     

Can remittances buy peace?

This paper offers new empirical evidence on the effects of remittance flows on conflict incidence, onset, and duration in recipient countries. It improves on previous studies by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity among remittance recipient countries, serial correlation of conflict, and the possibility of conflict being endogenous to remittances. To motivate the empirical findings, a micro‐founded model of conflict is developed. The model shows that wealth transfers (such as remittances) can raise the opportunity cost of participation in conflicts which can lead to a reduction in both the number of rebels and the force used by the government forces.     

Does development aid increase military expenditure?

Using a new instrumental variable strategy, we examine whether bilateral development aid increases military expenditure in recipient countries. The instrument is the interaction of donor government fractionalization and the probability of receiving aid. The dataset includes new data on military expenditure for 124 recipient countries over the 1975–2012 period. When accounting for outliers, our results do not suggest that development aid affects military expenditure in the full sample. However, the effect of aid on military expenditure varies across characteristics of recipient and donor countries, even after excluding outliers. First, aid increases military expenditure in countries that depend on aid and are prone to conflicts. Second, aid provided by coordinated market economies increases military expenditure.     

Can EconJobMarket help Canadian universities?

We analyze the academic matching market by considering a simple model in which applicants who face an application cost strategically choose portfolios of applications. Universities then play a decentralized offer game in which unaccepted offers result in failure to trade on both sides of the market. We characterize a basic equilibrium to illustrate the sorting role that application costs play. In a numeric example, we illustrate how reduced application costs can result in increased matching frictions.     

Can You Trust Anybody Anymore?

ThescopeoftheEnrondebacleunderminesthecredibilityofmodernbusi－nessculture．Let’sgetbacktobasics．Therearebusinessscandalsthataresovastandsopenetratingthattheyprofoundlyshockourmostdeeplyheldbeliefsaboutthehonestyandintegrityofourcorporateculture.EnronCorp.isoneofthem.Thisfi-nancialdisastergoesfarbeyondthefailureofonebigcompany.Thisiscorruptiononamassivescale.Tremendousharmhasbefalleninno-centemployeeswhohaveseentheirretirementsavingsdisappearasafewatthetopcashedout.Terriblethingshavehappen…     

Can people learn rational expectations?

In this note the stability of the rational expectations equilibrium for the Foster and Frierman (1990) version of the Blume and Easley (1982) model is investigated under the assumption that the learning mechanism used by economic agents is based on a selection mechanism on a class of competing models having a physical meaning for the agent and not on the interpolation of models having no clear physical meaning, as it is often the case in the literature on learning rational expectations. It is found that, under the standard assumption that the rational expectations model is in the information set of the uninformed trader no matter his degree of rationality, convergence to it is less likely the higher the uninformed agent's degree of rationality, in a sense to be specified in the paper. Some comments on the result are also provided.     

Can Weak Substitution be Rehabilitated?

This paper develops a graphical analysis and an analytical model that demonstrate how weak substitution can be used for non-market valuation. Weak complementarity and weak substitution represent preference restrictions that allow us to develop equivalent price changes to describe quantity or quality changes in non-market goods. The price changes are Hicksian equivalents in that they yield the same utility changes as would the quantity or quality changes. After discussion of several potential applications of weak substitution, the paper develops the parallel between the restriction and recent strategies from modeling differentiated goods.     

Can money buy EU love?

We explore the role played by Cohesion Policy in the Brexit referendum and the subsequent 2017 general election. Although the UK has been a net contributor to the EU, some regions receive significant amounts of regional aid funds. We find that while Cohesion Policy is positively correlated with the remain vote, this relationship is weak. Most of the variation in the remain vote is explained by economic factors. In contrast, there is a robust negative correlation between Cohesion Policy and voter turnout. We estimate that had there not been this negative relationship, some 2 million more voters would have participated in the referendum, which is more than the winning margin between the remain and leave votes. Our analysis of the 2017 election suggests that Conservatives lost and Labour gained votes in the regions that benefited from Cohesion Policy, while remain-supporting regions showed gains for the Liberal Democrats.