Recent trends in trading activity and market quality

We explore the sharp uptrend in recent trading activity and accompanying changes in market efficiency. Higher turnover has been associated with more frequent smaller trades, which have progressively formed a larger fraction of trading volume over time. Evidence indicates that secular decreases in trading costs have influenced the turnover trend. Turnover has increased the most for stocks with the greatest level of institutional holdings, suggesting professional investing as a key contributor to the turnover trend. Variance ratio tests suggest that more institutional trading has increased information-based trading. Intraday volatility has decreased and prices conform more closely to random walk in recent years. The sensitivity of turnover to past returns has increased and cross-sectional predictability of returns has decreased significantly, revealing a more widespread use of quantitative trading strategies that allow for more efficient securities prices.     

Are survey forecasts of individual and institutional investor sentiments rational?

We examine the effects of rational risk factors on investor sentiments. We find that institutional investor sentiments are more rational than individual investor sentiments. There are significant positive effects of, market return and dividend yield and negative effect of inflation on both types of sentiments. These risk factors have stronger effects on institutional than individual investor sentiments. Also, there are significant effects of term spread and HML on the institutional investor sentiments. The evidence suggests that linkages between sentiments and stock return stems from a combination of rational outlook and noise i.e. expectations that are not fully justified by information.     

Explaining the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle using Stochastic Discount Factors

I use Stochastic Discount Factors to examine the sources of the idiosyncratic volatility premium. I find that non-zero risk aversion and firms’ non-systematic coskewness determine the premium on idiosyncratic volatility risk. The firm’s non-systematic coskewness measures the comovement of the asset’s volatility with the market return. When I control for the non-systematic coskewness factor, I find no significant relation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock expected returns. My results are robust across different sample periods and firm characteristics.     

THE EFFECTS OF INSIDER TRADING RESTRICTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM HISTORICAL DIVIDEND INITIATIONS AND OMISSIONS

We investigate whether insider trading restrictions had their intended effects during the 1960s and 1970s. We examine insider trading and stock market behavior before dividend initiations and omissions announced between 1935 and 1974. Contrary to existing research and commentary, we show that restrictions had meaningful effects. During the 1960s and 1970s, insiders sold less frequently before dividend omissions, and the average profitability of insider trades declined. In addition, the positive (negative) stock price runup before dividend initiations (omissions) decreased after 1961. The results provide some vindication for the Securities and Exchange Commission's adjudicative approach toward insider trading regulation.     

Exchange trading rules and stock market liquidity

We examine stock exchange trading rules for market manipulation, insider trading, and broker–agency conflict, across countries and over time, in 42 stock exchanges around the world. Some stock exchanges have extremely detailed rules that explicitly prohibit specific manipulative practices, but others use less precise and broadly framed rules. We create new indices for market manipulation, insider trading, and broker–agency conflict based on the specific provisions in the trading rules of each stock exchange. We show that differences in exchange trading rules, over time and across markets, significantly affect liquidity.     

The leverage effect puzzle: Disentangling sources of bias at high frequency

The leverage effect refers to the generally negative correlation between an asset return and its changes of volatility. A natural estimate consists in using the empirical correlation between the daily returns and the changes of daily volatility estimated from high frequency data. The puzzle lies in the fact that such an intuitively natural estimate yields nearly zero correlation for most assets tested, despite the many economic reasons for expecting the estimated correlation to be negative. To better understand the sources of the puzzle, we analyze the different asymptotic biases that are involved in high frequency estimation of the leverage effect, including biases due to discretization errors, to smoothing errors in estimating spot volatilities, to estimation error, and to market microstructure noise. This decomposition enables us to propose novel bias correction methods for estimating the leverage effect.     

Volume- and size-related lead-lag effects in stock returns and volatility: An empirical investigation of the Warsaw Stock Exchange

We analyze the autocorrelation structure of returns and volatility of stocks listed in the single auction system on the Warsaw Stock Exchange during the period January 1996 - October 2000. First, we find that size- and volume-related cross-autocorrelation in portfolio returns exists even after accounting for the portfolio's own-autocorrelation. Second, we find that size and volume leadership are independent from each other. Third, our results indicate slower adjustment of the small (low volume) portfolios to market-wide information that differs for up and down markets. We also find evidence for volatility spillovers between portfolio returns.     

The jump component of S&P 500 volatility and the VIX index

Much research has investigated the differences between option implied volatilities and econometric model-based forecasts. Implied volatility is a market determined forecast, in contrast to model-based forecasts that employ some degree of smoothing of past volatility to generate forecasts. Implied volatility has the potential to reflect information that a model-based forecast could not. This paper considers two issues relating to the informational content of the S&P 500 VIX implied volatility index. First, whether it subsumes information on how historical jump activity contributed to the price volatility, followed by whether the VIX reflects any incremental information pertaining to future jump activity relative to model-based forecasts. It is found that the VIX index both subsumes information relating to past jump contributions to total volatility and reflects incremental information pertaining to future jump activity. This issue has not been examined previously and expands our understanding of how option markets form their volatility forecasts.     

Regulatory pressure and fire sales in the corporate bond market

This paper investigates fire sales of downgraded corporate bonds induced by regulatory constraints imposed on insurance companies. As insurance companies hold over one-third of investment-grade corporate bonds, the collective need to divest downgraded issues may be limited by a scarcity of counterparties. Using insurance company transaction data, we find that insurance companies that are relatively more constrained by regulation are more likely to sell downgraded bonds. Bonds subject to a high probability of regulatory-induced selling exhibit price declines and subsequent reversals. These price effects appear larger during periods when the insurance industry is relatively distressed and other potential buyers' carpital is scarce.     

THE DYNAMICS OF BOND YIELD SPREADS AROUND RATING REVISION DATES

We examine the effect of rating revisions on sterling Eurobond yields using a panel model with conditional heteroskedasticity that controls for event‐induced changes in the variance of spreads. Positive rating revisions are fully anticipated by the time the upgrade occurs. Negative revisions are only partially anticipated, and spreads on downgraded bonds rise for some time after the downgrade has been announced. This asymmetry is not apparent in a conventional event study model. All ratings announcements are accompanied by a temporary fall in yield volatility. We attribute this to the resolution of uncertainty about the true rating of the bond.     

Did bank distress stifle innovation during the Great Depression?

We find a negative relationship between bank distress and the level, quality and trajectory of firm-level innovation during the Great Depression, particularly for R&D firms operating in capital intensive industries. However, we also show that because a sufficient number of R&D intensive firms were located in counties with lower levels of bank distress, or were operating in less capital intensive industries, the negative effects were mitigated in aggregate. Although Depression era bank distress was associated with the stifling of innovation, our results also help to explain why technological development was still robust following one of the largest shocks in the history of the U.S. banking system.     

The determinants of recovery rates in the US corporate bond market

We examine recovery rates of defaulted bonds in the US corporate bond market, based on a complete set of traded prices and volumes. A study of the trading microstructure around various types of default events is provided. We document temporary price pressure with high trading volumes on the default day and the following 30 days, and low trading activity thereafter. Based on this analysis, we determine market-based recovery rates and quantify various liquidity measures. We study the relation between the recovery rates and these measures, considering additionally a comprehensive set of bond characteristics, firm fundamentals, and macroeconomic variables.     

Arbitrage-free credit pricing using default probabilities and risk sensitivities

The relation between physical probabilities (rating) and risk-neutral probabilities (pricing) is derived in a large market with a quasi-factor structure. Factor sensitivities and default probabilities are obtainable for all kinds of credits on historical rating data. Since factor prices can be backed out from market data, the model allows the pricing of non-marketable credits and structured products thereof. The model explains various empirical observations: credit spreads of equally rated borrowers differ, spreads are wider than implied by expected losses, and expected returns on CDOs must be greater than their rating matched, single-obligor securities due to the inherent systematic risk.     

Building legal indexes to explain recovery rates: An analysis of the French and English bankruptcy codes

The paper analyzes the characteristics of bankruptcy procedures that may impact on creditors’ recoveries. We propose 132 legal indexes accounting for the main functions of bankruptcy codes: namely, the accessibility of the procedures, their ability to disclose information, the protection of debtor’s assets, the coordination of the claimants and their decision power, and the sanction of management. The French procedures are more protective of the debtor’s assets and prioritize the coordination of claims. In England, liquidation procedures protect more secured claims, while unsecured creditors have more decision power under reorganization procedures. Our indexes are then used to explain recovery rates on a set of 833 bankrupt SMEs. Several bankruptcy rules are associated with higher recoveries: namely, accessibility of the procedure, protection of the debtor’s assets, protection of claims, and sanction of faulty management. On the contrary, information disclosure has negative impact on recoveries, probably due to the breach in confidentiality.     

Good and bad credit contagion: Evidence from credit default swaps

This study examines the intra-industry information transfer effect of credit events, as captured in the credit default swaps (CDS) and stock markets. Positive correlations across CDS spreads imply that contagion effects dominate, whereas negative correlations indicate competition effects. We find strong evidence of contagion effects for Chapter 11 bankruptcies and competition effects for Chapter 7 bankruptcies. We also introduce a purely unanticipated event, in the form of a large jump in a company's CDS spread, and find that this leads to the strongest evidence of credit contagion across the industry. These results have important implications for the construction of portfolios with credit-sensitive instruments.