Industry contagion in loan spreads

Spreads on new and renegotiated corporate loans are significantly higher when the loan originates (or is renegotiated) in the two years surrounding bankruptcy filings by industry rivals. This industry-specific contagion is particularly severe in the middle of industry bankruptcy waves. Furthermore, this contagion in loan spreads is mitigated in concentrated industries, consistent with the hypothesis and evidence in Lang and Stulz (1992) that bankruptcy filings in concentrated industries can have positive consequences for rivals (increased market share and/or power). There is also some evidence that contagion affects non-spread terms in loan contracts.     

Does the Medium Matter? The Relations among Bankruptcy Petition Filings,Broadtape Disclosure,and the Timing of Price Reactions

Drawing on a comprehensive sample of 330 bankruptcy petition filings from 1980 to 1993, we find that most of the market reaction does not occur on the bankruptcy petition filing date when the information becomes publicly available. Rather, most of the reaction occurs when news of the bankruptcy filing is more widely disseminated via the Broadtape. This "Broadtape announcement effect" persists after controlling for firm size, exchange listing, and predisclosure information. These are primarily timing differences since abnormal returns cumulated over an 11-day window centered on the filing date do not differ significantly across Broadtape disclosure date classifications.     

Bankruptcy spillover effects on strategic alliance partners

This paper examines whether a party to a strategic alliance or joint venture suffers from spillover effects when the other partner files for bankruptcy. We find that the non-bankrupt strategic alliance partners, on average, experience a negative stock price reaction around their partner firm's bankruptcy filing announcement. This negative effect is strongest for longer partnerships and those with higher returns at the announcement of the initial alliance formation. Furthermore, horizontal alliance firms in declining industries have lower returns, indicating that industry conditions can exacerbate expected problems for the non-bankrupt firm. Non-bankrupt partners also experience drops in profit margins and investment levels in the subsequent two years with the worst performance concentrated among the longer-term agreements. There is very little impact on the returns or performance for joint venture partners, which suggests that these agreements are more insulating for the partner firm.     

Automatic bankruptcy auctions and fire-sales

We test for fire-sale tendencies in automatic bankruptcy auctions. We find evidence consistent with fire-sale discounts when the auction leads to piecemeal liquidation, but not when the bankrupt firm is acquired as a going concern. Neither industry-wide distress nor the industry affiliation of the buyer affect prices in going-concern sales. Bids are often structured as leveraged buyouts, which relaxes liquidity constraints and reduces bidder underinvestment incentives in the presence of debt overhang. Prices in “prepack” auctions (sales agreements negotiated prior to bankruptcy filing) are on average lower than for in-auction going-concern sales, suggesting that prepacks may help preempt excessive liquidation when the auction is expected to be illiquid. Prepack targets have a greater industry-adjusted probability of refiling for bankruptcy, indicating that liquidation preemption is a risky strategy.     

Can Language Predict Bankruptcy? The Explanatory Power of Tone in 10‐K Filings

We examine whether the language used in 10‐K filings reflects a firm's risk of bankruptcy. Our sample contains 424 bankrupt U.S. companies in the period 1994–2015 and we use propensity score matching to find healthy matches. Based on a logit model of failing and vital firms, our findings indicate that firms at risk of bankruptcy use significantly more negative words in their 10‐K filings than comparable vital companies. This relationship holds up until three years prior to the actual bankruptcy filing. With our investigation, we confirm the results from previous accounting and finance research. 10‐K filings contain valuable information beyond the reported financials. Additionally, we show that 10‐Ks filed in the year of a firm's collapse contain an increased number of litigious words relative to healthy businesses. This indicates that the management of failing firms is already dealing with legal issues when reporting financials prior to bankruptcy. Our results suggest that analysts ought to include the presentation of financials in their assessment of bankruptcy risk as it contains explanatory and predictive power beyond the financial ratios.     

Beyond bankruptcy: Does the US bankruptcy code provide a fresh start to entrepreneurs?

This paper assesses the extent to which the US bankruptcy system is effective in providing small businesses a “fresh start” after a bankruptcy filing. I use data from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 National Survey of Small Business Finances to explore how firms fare after a bankruptcy filing. On the positive side, previously bankrupt firms are not any more burdened than the average small firm by problems relating to profitability, cash flow, health insurance costs, or taxes. Further, the fact that these firms are surviving several years after the filing is itself a testament to the efficient functioning of the US bankruptcy system. It suggests that the bankruptcy system goes a long way toward helping businesses recover after a bankruptcy filing.     

Does industry-wide distress affect defaulted firms? Evidence from creditor recoveries

Using data on defaulted firms in the United States over the period 1982–1999, we show that creditors of defaulted firms recover significantly lower amounts in present-value terms when the industry of defaulted firms is in distress. We investigate whether this is purely an economic-downturn effect or also a fire-sales effect along the lines of Shleifer and Vishny [1992. Liquidation values and debt capacity: a market equilibrium approach. Journal of Finance 47, 1343–1366]. We find the fire-sales effect to be also at work: Creditors recover less if the industry is in distress and non-defaulted firms in the industry are illiquid, particularly if the industry is characterized by assets that are specific, that is, not easily redeployable by other industries, and if the debt is collateralized by such specific assets. The interaction effect of industry-level distress and asset-specificity is strongest for senior unsecured creditors, is economically significant, and robust to contract-specific, firm-specific, macroeconomic, and bond-market supply effects. We also document that defaulted firms in distressed industries are more likely to emerge as restructured firms than to be acquired or liquidated, and spend longer time in bankruptcy.     

Fresh Start or Head Start? The Effects of Filing for Personal Bankruptcy on Work Effort

The key feature of the modern US personal bankruptcy law is to provide debtors a financial fresh start through debt discharge. It has long been believed that the primary goal of the discharge policy is to preserve human capital by maintaining incentives to work. We provide the first test of this fresh start argument by estimating the effect of personal bankruptcy filing on work effort using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. Our econometric approach controls for the endogenous self-selection of bankruptcy filing. We find that filing for bankruptcy does not have a positive impact on annual work hours for bankrupt households, a result mainly due to the wealth effects of debt discharge.      

Shareholder Wealth Responses to Bankruptcy Filing Announcements under the Chandler and Reform Acts

This paper examines shareholder wealth responses to bankruptcy filing announcements between 1974 and 1989 to draw inferences about the impact of the adoption of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The authors find that post-Reform Act announcements are associated with more negative pre-filing and announcement period returns to shareholders. Unlike prior research, this study finds that large firms and NYSE-listed firms experience more negative returns. It also finds that the market can discriminate between firms that are ultimately worthless and those that may retain some value for shareholders.     

Forum-Shopping and Personal Bankruptcy

The dramatic increase in U.S. personal bankruptcy filings of the last fifteen years has focused attention on the wide disparities between different states' personal bankruptcy exemptions. These differences have been criticized both on the grounds of equity and also because they provide an incentive to move to a state with a higher exemption before declaring bankruptcy, that is to forum-shop. This paper focuses on the latter of these objections. Using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), we estimate a Nested Logit model of the household migration decision. Our econometric approach specifically avoids the problem of endogenously induced bankruptcy filings by examining the effect of filing propensity, rather than the actual event of filing, on the tendency to migrate to a higher exemption state. We conclude that while there is indeed evidence that considerations of bankruptcy laws do influence interstate migration, the actual effect is relatively modest. We estimate that, in any given year, roughly one percent of moves to higher-exemption states are motivated by considerations of differences in bankruptcy laws; by way of comparison, this is roughly comparable to the magnitude of recent estimates of welfare-induced migration. This suggests that the emphasis on differences in exemptions which has been a feature of recent attempts to reform the bankruptcy code is somewhat exaggerated.     

Predicting the outcome following bankruptcy filing: a three-state classification using neural networks

This paper uses artificial neural networks (ANNs), multi-state ordered logit and nonparametric multiple discriminant analysis (NPDA) for predicting the three-state outcome of bankruptcy filing. The study compares the classification accuracy of these procedures. It differs from previous studies on predicting financial distress by focusing on the firm after the filing of bankruptcy using accounting data, market data, and court-related information. Following the filing and through court approval the bankruptcy is resolved as firms are either acquired by other firms, emerging as independent operating entities, or liquidated. Distinguishing this three-state outcome is more complex than discriminating between healthy and financially distressed firms. Models suggested in previous studies for predicting the two-group financial distress perform poorly for our three-state scenario. Therefore, we develop models which focus on characteristics relevant for the bankruptcy resolution. We use a sample of 237 publicly traded firms which have complete data. For the entire sample and estimation samples, ANNs provide significantly better three-state classification than logit and NPDA. However, for some holdout samples the differences in classification accuracies are statistically insignificant. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Financial Distress and Bank Lending Relationships

We use a unique data set of bank loans to examine the wealth effects on lead lending banks when their borrowers suffer financial distress. We find a significant negative announcement return for the lead lending bank when a major corporate borrower announces default or bankruptcy. Banks with higher exposure to the distressed firm have larger negative announcement-period returns. The existence of a past lending relationship with the distressed firm results in larger wealth declines for the bank shareholders. Finally, financial distress also has a significant negative effect on borrower's returns.     

Intra‐industry bankruptcy contagion: Evidence from the pricing of industry recovery rates

How does bankruptcy contagion propagate among industry peers? We study the debt recovery channel of industry contagion by examining whether the cost of a company's debt is affected by the observed recovery rates of its bankrupt industry peers. Our results show that lower industry recovery rates are associated with higher loan spreads, but only when the contracts were originated during industry bankruptcy waves. Consistent with the debt recovery channel of industry contagion, we find that the negative effects of industry recovery rates are significantly stronger under situations where the effect is expected to be more salient.     

The Information Content of Short Selling Around Close Supply Chain Relationships

Close supply chain relationships are sometimes detrimental to the partnering firms, and short sellers recognize this before the rest of the market. Suppliers and customers that are in linked, close supply chain relationships have higher short interest on average. Further, higher short interest increases the likelihood of large, linked customers reporting negative earnings surprises, whereas suppliers with high short interest are more likely to report negative earnings surprises, irrespective of the supply chain structure. Short selling is informative to capital markets because these suboptimal relationships eventually lead to dependent suppliers being delisted from a stock exchange for financial distress reasons.     

U.S. consumer bankruptcy choice: The importance of general equilibrium effects

We study the implications of U.S. personal bankruptcy rules for resource allocation and welfare. Our analysis shows that general equilibrium considerations along with bankruptcy chapter choice and production matter crucially for the effects of policy reform. Contrary to previous work, we find that completely eliminating bankruptcy provisions causes significant declines in output and welfare by reducing capital formation and labor input. Furthermore, subjecting Chapter 7 filers to means testing, as suggested by recent legislative proposals, would not improve upon current bankruptcy provisions and, at best, leave aggregate filings, output, and welfare unchanged. However, we do find that an alternative tightening of Chapter 7, in the form of lower asset exemptions, can increase economic efficiency.     

Emerging from Chapter 11 Bankruptcy: Is It Good News or Bad News for Industry Competitors?

A firm under Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection may emerge from bankruptcy in a more advantageous competitive position within its industry to the detriment of their industry rivals. Using a sample of 264 firms that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy during the period 1999-2006, I find that its industry competitors demonstrate negative postemergence long-term equity returns and deteriorating financial performance. Additional tests indicate that this outcome is less likely due to overall industry distress. Competitors tend to be more adversely affected if they are in more concentrated industries, if they have lower credit quality, when a more efficient firm emerges, and when the duration of bankruptcy is longer. This study suggests a need to reconsider Chapter 11's role in promoting competition and allocation of resources given its negative externalities on industry competitors.     

The response of competitors to announcements of bankruptcy: An empirical examination of contagion and competitive effects

We find, like [Lang, L.H.P., Stulz, R.M., 1992. Contagion and competitive intra-industry effects of bankruptcy announcements: An empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics, 32(1), 45–60], that large firm bankruptcies generate a dominant contagion effect. A value-weighted portfolio of competitors' stocks experiences a significant loss of 0.56% in the three days centered around the Chapter 11 announcement. This represents an average loss of $3.32 for all the competitors combined for every dollar lost by the bankrupt firm. In addition, we find that small firm bankruptcies also generate a dominant contagion effect among smaller sized competitors; an equally-weighted portfolio of all competitors has a significant 0.12% drop. In a new approach to separate the contagion and competitive effects, we compare the stock price reactions of competitors who themselves subsequently file for bankruptcy in the next three years (candidates for contagion effect) with those who do not do so (candidates for competitive effect). As expected, candidates for contagion effect experience a significant, negative three-day stock price reaction of −4.68%. However, contrary to expectations, candidates for competitive effect also have a significant, negative return (−0.49%), suggesting that the competitive effect is weak at best since it is dominated by the contagion effect even in this sample. Other procedures to identify candidates for competitive effect generally yield similar findings. Finally, we analyze competitors' stock price reactions based on selected characteristics (e.g., industry concentration, and leverage), with similar results as before. One explanation for the failure to detect a competitive effect is that the impact may already have been incorporated in stock prices prior to the filing for Chapter 11. Consistent with this explanation, we find significant positive stock price reactions by competitor stocks for the hundred days prior to the bankruptcy announcement.     

Prior Wall Street Journal Announcements of Possible Bankruptcy Filings and Price Reactions to Subsequent Bankruptcy Filings

This study examines the relation between prior Wall Street Journal (WSJ) announcements of possible bankruptcy filings and price reactions to subsequent bankruptcy filings for 336 firms that filed for bankruptcy between 1980 and 1993. Extant research indicates that price reactions to announcements of economic events are inversely related to the amount of surprise in the announcements. Prior WSJ anouncements of possible bankruptcy filings increase the markets a priori assessment of firms' probability of bankruptcy, thereby potentially reducing the surprise in subsequent bankruptcy filings. We hypothesize smaller price reactions to bankruptcy filings for firms where the WSJ previously published an article indicating that the firm may file for bankruptcy. Our results are consistent with this hypothesis. Specifically, we find smaller price reactions to bankruptcy filings for firms with prior WSJ announcements of possible bankruptcy filings. Our results hold after controlling for firm size, probability of bankruptcy, exchange listing, leverage, and predisclosure information.     

Distressed Debt Restructuring in the Presence of Credit Default Swaps

The availability of credit insurance via credit default swaps has been closely associated with the emergence of empty creditors. We empirically investigate this issue by looking at the debt restructurings (distressed exchanges and bankruptcy filings) of rated, nonfinancial U.S. companies over the period January 2007–June 2011. Using different proxies for the existence of insured creditors, we do not find evidence that the access to credit insurance favors bankruptcy over a debt workout. However, we document higher recovery prices following a distressed exchange in firms where empty creditors are more likely to emerge.     

The 15-day debate and the value of early release of information: Evidence from 10-K filings

We analyze the impact of enforcing a 60-day 10-K deadline on large accelerator filers (LAFs) relative to enforcing a 75-day deadline on accelerator filers (AFs) from 2006 to 2015. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that LAFs are more likely to issue restatements after the 2006 SEC filing acceleration (“regulation”) has been introduced. The regulation causes LAFs to have lower information asymmetry, which is consistent with our finding that LAFs’ Internet search traffic for filings is lower. Overall, the market does not react stronger toward LAFs’ 10-K filings even though their 10-K filings are more timely. An unintended consequence of the regulation is an increase in filings by other firms during LAFs’ 10-K filing dates, which reduces investors overall attention toward these filings.