The diversity of expertise on corporate boards in Australia

Expertise diversity is expected to enhance the monitoring and advising functions of boards of directors. Yet, little is known about the expertise that actually exists on corporate boards. In this study, we examine the diversity of professional expertise on corporate boards in Australia and implications for shareholder value. We categorise directors by 11 types of professional expertise and find the most common types of expertise are business executives, accountants, bankers, scientists, lawyers and engineers. We find that expertise diversity is primarily related to board size, industry and location. Our analysis also suggests that shareholders benefit when boards diversify their expertise within a subset of specialist business expertise (lawyers, accountants, consultants, bankers and outside CEOs). Further diversity beyond this subset of expertise is associated with lower firm value and performance.     

On executives of financial institutions as outside directors

We find that the presence of commercial bankers on the board is positively related to aggregate firm debt. Separating by type of debt, the presence of commercial bankers on the board is positively related to short-term, long-term, and total bank debt. We also find that while the presence of unaffiliated commercial bankers on the board is positively related to bank borrowing, the presence of affiliated commercial bankers on the board is not. The results are consistent with the theory that commercial bankers supply bank debt market expertise, but not with the theory that they sit on boards to monitor lending relationships.     

On the marketing of IPOs

Derrien [2005. Journal of Finance 60, 487–521] and Ljungqvist et al. [2006. Journal of Business] build upon the work of Miller [1977. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168] and claim that issuers and the regular customers of investment bankers benefit from the presence of sentiment investors (noise traders) in the market for an initial public offering (IPO). Thus we argue that investment bankers have an incentive to promote an IPO to induce sentiment investors into the market for it. Consistent with this motivation and these models, we expect that the promotional efforts of investment bankers should influence the compensation of investment bankers, the valuation of an IPO, its initial returns and trading, the wealth gains of insider shareholders, and the likelihood that an issuer switches investment bankers for a subsequent seasoned equity offering. Examining data for a sample of IPOs from 1993 through 2000, we find evidence consistent with these predictions and so with the proposition that an investment banker's ability to market an IPO to sentiment investors is important.     

Conflicts of interest on corporate boards: The effect of creditor-directors on acquisitions

This paper investigates the effects on acquisitions of creditor-director presence on corporate boards. Using a hand-collected dataset for boards of large U.S. corporations, we find that companies with creditor-directors are more likely to engage in acquisitions with attributes that are unfavorable to shareholders and favorable to creditors (more diversifying and fewer cash-financed acquisitions). Consistent with these patterns, acquisition announcements are associated with lower shareholder value, higher creditor value, and lower overall firm value when a creditor is present. These results support the hypothesis that conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors can result in value-destroying acquisitions. In addition, commercial bankers with no lending relationship are not affected by conflicts of interest. Where appropriate, our estimation strategy takes into account that there may be self selection of bankers onto corporate boards.     

The American keiretsu and universal banks: Investing,voting and sitting on nonfinancials’ corporate boards

This paper investigates the equity investments and voting rights that American banks control through their trust business. The paper also studies whether the voting rights American banks control through their trust business help explain their presence on firms’ corporate boards. We find that on average the largest 100 American banks control 10% of the voting rights of S&P 500 firms. We also find that there are several firms in the S&P 500 index in which the top banks control more than 20% of their voting rights, and several firms in the country in which these banks control more than 60% of their voting rights. Our investigation into the presence of American bankers on corporate boards shows that bankers are more likely to join the boards of firms in which they control a large voting stake. We also find that banks’ lending relationships help explain bankers’ board memberships. Our results further show that bankers who have both a voting stake in a firm and a lending relationship with it have a higher likelihood of joining the firm's board of directors.     

Audit committee financial expertise,corporate governance,and the voluntary switch from auditor-provided to non-auditor-provided tax services

A prime objective of the SOX is to safeguard auditor independence. We investigate the relation between audit committee quality, corporate governance, and audit committees' decision to switch from permissible auditor-provided tax services. We find that firms with more independent boards, audit committees with greater accounting financial expertise, higher stock ownership by directors and institutions, that separate the CEO and Chairman of the board positions, and with higher tax to audit fee ratios are more likely to switch to a non-auditor provider. Further, we document that firms are more likely to switch prior to issuing equity. We find no evidence that broad financial expertise on audit committees is related to the switch decision, suggesting that the SEC's initial narrow definition of expertise is more consistent with the objective of the SOX. Overall, our results suggest that accounting financial expertise and strong corporate governance contribute to enhanced audit committee monitoring of auditor independence.     

Audit committee characteristics and financial statement comparability

Financial statement comparability enables weighing the similarities and differences in financial performance between firms. Prior studies mainly focus on the role of accounting standards in the production of comparability, but the role of economic agents has been largely overlooked. We find that a firm's audit committee size and financial expertise affect its financial statement comparability. Financial information tends to be more comparable among industry peers when audit committees are larger and more members have financial and accounting expertise. The effect of audit committee expertise on comparability is stronger for firms with less independent and smaller boards, for firms with non-Big 4 auditors and for firms with CEOs serving as the chairperson of the boards.     

The role of investment banker directors in M&A

We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect firms? acquisition behavior. We find that firms with investment bankers on the board have a higher probability of making acquisitions. Furthermore, acquirers with investment banker directors experience higher announcement returns, pay lower takeover premiums and advisory fees, and exhibit superior long-run performance. Overall, our results suggest that directors with investment banking experience help firms make better acquisitions, both by identifying suitable targets and by reducing the cost of the deals.     

DOES BOARD INDEPENDENCE MATTER FOR CORPORATE INSURANCE HEDGING?

We test the effect of board independence on corporate purchases of property insurance. We find that board independence increases the incidence of property insurance use but does not have a significant effect on the extent of property insurance use given that a firm decides to insure its assets. These findings are consistent with the argument that: (1) more independent boards view it necessary to have property insurance to manage asset‐loss risks and (2) excessive insurance or insurance purchases induced by managerial risk aversion and/or self‐interest does not benefit shareholders and so may not be supported by independent boards.     

Marketing Closed‐End Fund IPOs: An Analysis of the International Stock Funds

Various studies argue that underwriting fees are excessive and investment bankers prolong the price stabilization period in aftermarket trading of closed‐end fund (CEF) shares. The poor performance of these funds also raises questions about the financial sophistication of initial public offering (IPO) buyers. In this study, we examine these issues for a sample of international stock CEFs. Our findings indicate that underwriting fees are not excessive relative to industrial issues, and we do not find that investment bankers prolong the stabilization period to camouflage the underwriting cost. Our findings are consistent with earlier studies that discounts contribute significantly to the poor performance during the first six months of aftermarket trading.     

Overlapping board connections with banker directors and corporate loan terms: Evidence from syndicated loans

I look at the relationship between corporate loan terms and board members' connections to bankers through employment on other boards, a connection relatively unaffected by confounding factors. Using syndicated loan data, I find that firms connected to bankers via other boards are more likely to borrow, and they receive cheaper pricing. However, loan maturity does not differ between connected and unconnected firms. During the 2007–2008 financial crisis loan availability declined for all firms, but connected firms continued to borrow and to receive lower spreads. Generally, my results support the importance of social connections in decreasing information asymmetry and reducing transaction costs.     

Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors?

We examine three‐day cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of 702 newly appointed outside directors assigned to audit committees during a period before implementation of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). Motivated by the SOX requirement that public companies disclose whether they have a financial expert on their audit committee, we test whether the market reacts favorably to the appointment of directors with financial expertise to the audit committee. In addition, because it is controversial whether SOX should define financial experts narrowly to include primarily accounting financial experts (as initially proposed) or more broadly to include nonaccounting financial experts (as ultimately passed), we separately examine appointments of each type of expert. We find a positive market reaction to the appointment of accounting financial experts assigned to audit committees but no reaction to nonaccounting financial experts assigned to audit committees, consistent with accounting‐based financial skills, but not broader financial skills, improving the audit committee's ability to ensure high‐quality financial reporting. In addition, we find that this positive reaction is concentrated among firms with relatively strong corporate governance, consistent with accounting financial expertise complementing strong governance, possibly because strong governance helps channel the expertise toward enhancing shareholder value. Together, these findings are consistent with financial expertise on audit committees improving corporate governance but only when both the expert and the appointing firm possess characteristics that facilitate the effective use of the expertise.     

Classified boards,the cost of debt,and firm performance

This paper documents that classified boards substantially reduce the cost of debt. The evidence is not consistent with the argument that bondholders benefit from board classification because they are concerned about hostile takeovers. Instead, the results suggest that the lessened concern for takeovers associated with a classified board structure reduces managerial risk-taking, and increases managerial incentive for financial disclosure, with both effects inuring to bondholders’ benefit. Consistent with prior literature, classified boards on average are associated with a lower firm performance. However, under the circumstances that the agency conflict between shareholders and bondholders is severe, the performance effect of classified boards appears benign.     

UNITARY BOARDS AND MUTUAL FUND GOVERNANCE

A unique governance structure for mutual funds is unitary board—one board overseeing all funds in the entire family. We find strong evidence for unitary board as an effective governance mechanism. Funds with unitary boards are associated with lower fees, are more likely to pass the economies of scale benefits to investors, are less likely to be involved in trading scandals, and rank higher on stewardship. In contrast, funds with larger or more independent boards charge higher fees and rank lower on stewardship. Our findings indicate that unitary boards of small size, rather than independent boards, may be more beneficial to fund shareholders.     

The association between characteristics of audit committee accounting experts,audit committee chairs,and financial reporting timeliness

We investigate the association between audit committee (AC) members' financial expertise and financial reporting timeliness, and extend the discussion by investigating how the source of accounting expertise (e.g., public accounting or CFO) differentially influences financial reporting timeliness. We predict and find that AC accounting financial expertise is associated with timelier accounting information. Further, we find that accounting expertise gained from public accounting experience is associated with timelier financial reporting; however, accounting expertise gained from CFO experience is not. We also find that AC chairs (ACCs) with accounting expertise from public accounting experience are significantly associated with timelier financial reporting while ACCs with CFO-sourced accounting expertise are not. Our results are important for two reasons. First, our results suggest that AC accounting financial expertise contributes to AC effectiveness by improving the timeliness of financial information. Second, our findings highlight how personal characteristics of accounting financial experts influence contributions toward AC effectiveness.     

Do corporate boards matter during the current financial crisis?

This study examines the impact of corporate boards on firm performance during the current financial crisis. Using buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the crisis to measure firm performance, we find that board independence, as traditionally defined, does not significantly affect firm performance. However, when we redefine independent directors as outside directors who are less connected with current CEOs, a measure we call strong independence, there is a positive and significant relationship between this measure and firm performance. Second, outside financial experts are important for firm performance. We find that the positive impact of outside financial experts on firm performance is more significant than that of strong independence. Overall, our results suggest that firm performance during a crisis is a function of firm-level differences in corporate boards.     

Director Networks and Credit Ratings

We explore the effect of director social capital, directors with large and influential networks, on credit ratings. Using a sample of 11,172 firm‐year observations from 1999 to 2011, we find that larger board networks are associated with higher credit ratings than both firm financial data and probabilities of default predict. Near‐investment grade firms improve their forward‐looking ratings when their board is more connected. Last, we find that larger director networks are more beneficial during recessions, and times of increased financial uncertainty. Our results are robust to controls for endogeneity. Tests confirm that causality runs from connected boards to credit ratings.     

It pays to have friends

Currently, a director is classified as independent if he or she has neither financial nor familial ties to the CEO or to the firm. We add another dimension: social ties. Using a unique data set, we find that 87% of boards are conventionally independent but that only 62% are conventionally and socially independent. Furthermore, firms whose boards are conventionally and socially independent award a significantly lower level of compensation, exhibit stronger pay-performance sensitivity, and exhibit stronger turnover-performance sensitivity than firms whose boards are only conventionally independent. Our results suggest that social ties do matter and that, consequently, a considerable percentage of the conventionally independent boards are substantively not.     

Leases on balance,a level playing field?

Due to changes in lease agreements accounting standards, firms will soon have to recognize operating lease obligations that historically have been kept off-balance sheets (OBS). Research indicates that this change will have substantial effects on the presentation of the financial position and results of firms involved. It is also expected that this will affect decision-making by stakeholders such as boards, managers, bankers and financial analysts. Although it is assumed that these professionals consider all relevant information, it is also known that the smaller the chance of relevant information being overlooked, the better the decision-making. In this study we examine whether IFRS 16 has that positive effect. The results from this research suggest that the accounting treatment under IFRS 16 contributes to the quality but not necessarily to the ease of making investment financing decisions.     

Bankers on the board and the debt ratio of firms

We investigate the impact that bankers on the board have upon a firm's debt ratio, debt to total capital, 1 year subsequent to their appointment. We find that the presence of lending bankers on a firm's board negatively affects the debt ratio, while the impact of non-lending bankers varies with the firm's probability of financial distress. The results suggest that non-lending bankers provide expertise and certification for distressed firms while exercising a monitoring role for non-distressed firms. In contrast, the results suggest that lenders on the board exercise a monitoring role independent of the firm's financial distress. When combined with established findings in the literature, we conclude that there may be two ways to avoid conflict between a board-appointed banker's fiduciary responsibility and the interests of her bank. When the potential for conflict is high, lenders may forgo board positions, while non-lending bankers may merely alter their role on the board.