Financial constraints of private firms and bank lending behavior

We investigate whether and how financial constraints of private firms depend on bank lending behavior. Bank lending behavior, especially its scale, scope and timing, is largely driven by bank business models which differ between privately owned and state-owned banks. Using a unique dataset on private small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) we find that an increase in relative borrowings from local state-owned banks significantly reduces firms’ financial constraints, while there is no such effect for privately owned banks. Improved credit availability and private information production are the main channels that explain our result. We also show that the lending behavior of local state-owned banks can be sustainable because it is less cyclical and neither leads to more risk taking nor underperformance.     

Subsidiary divestiture and acquisition in a financial crisis: Operational focus, financial constraints, and ownership

We exploit parent- and subsidiary-level data for publicly listed firms in Thailand before, during, and after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis to investigate the extent to which firms with different types of ownership restructure their business portfolios, in terms of divestitures and acquisitions. We compare restructuring choices made by firms mostly owned by (a) domestic individuals with block shares (family firms), (b) domestic firms and/or institutions (DI firms), and (c) foreign investors (foreign firms). We show that following the crisis (1) foreign firms' restructuring behavior is the least affected; (2) domestic firms owned by families and domestic institutions (DI) behave similarly to one another; (3) domestic firms do not increase divestiture in their peripheral segments to improve operational focus or to obtain cash in a credit crunch; they actually reduce divestiture in core segments; and (4) domestic firms also significantly reduce the acquisition of new subsidiaries. Our results challenge traditional explanations for divestiture such as corporate governance, operational refocus, and financial constraints. They indicate that in the great uncertainty of a crisis, domestic firms are able to hold onto their core assets to avoid fire-sale. In essence, they act more conservatively in churning their business portfolios.     

Financial development,bank discrimination and trade credit

Non-state owned firms in China grow tremendously with limited support from banks. This provides a unique setting to test how firms in a country with poorly developed financial institutions fund their prosperous growth opportunities. This paper compares the use of an important non-formal financial channel, trade credit, between state and non-state owned firms in China. We find that, compared to state owned firms, non-state owned firms use more trade credit. We further show that this higher usage is primarily for financing rather than transactional purposes. The results suggest that, in a country with a poorly developed formal financial sector, firms can support their growth through non-formal financial channels that largely rely on implicit contractual relation.     

非公有制企业党组织与企业捐赠

与公有制企业党组织受到较多关注不同,非公有制企业党组织是否真正发挥影响力是同样重要但却被学术界忽略的待研究问题。本文基于手工收集的民营上市公司党组织的相关数据,从社会捐赠这一视角研究党组织影响力对其履行社会责任的影响。结果发现:民营上市公司党组织的影响力越大,企业的社会捐赠力度越大,且显著高于同行业和同地区的平均捐赠水平;这种影响力的促进作用在民营上市公司党组织基础更加稳固的企业、管理层对党组织重视程度更高的企业和党代会时期更加明显。上述结果在控制了可能的内生性问题后依然稳健。本文的发现意味着非公有制企业党组织有助于促进其履行社会责任,这有助于评估和促进非公有制企业党组织的建设及其作用的发挥。     

Credit Crunch and Target Capital Structure: Empirical Studies Based on Natural Experimentin China

Abstract:

Data from China’s credit crunch, which started in 2007, is utilized to establish a natural experiment to investigate the impact of the credit crunch on target capital structures. The sample consists of 1,128 listed companies in China during the period 2000–2011. The interest-bearing debt to total assets ratio is used as a representative indicator for capital structures. The results indicate that the credit crunch was associated with a decrease in the target debt ratios for all listed companies. Small firms, privately owned enterprises, and firms with weak mortgage capabilities responded more sensitively to the credit crunch by showing a substantial decrease in target debt ratios.     

商业信用合同的履行概率,其外部性及现金需求——中国案例

本文测算了商业信用合同违约风险对商业贸易和现金需求的影响。结果显示,外国直接投资企业为其贸易伙伴提供了大量商业信用,而中国的企业,无论是私营,还是国有企业,他们交易实行货到即时付款的比例很高。外国直接投资企业之所以是经济交易中信贷的提供者,是因为他们具有较高的商业信用合同执行技术(contract enforcement technology)。我们还发现商业信用合同的执行技术主要包括贸易物品的竞争力、竞争幅度、与地方政府的关系以及公司治理的性质。一个企业具有较高的合同执行概率,就可能提供大量的商业信用,并获得更大的交易量。合同执行技术对贸易交易量的弹性估计约为2.2。模拟显示如果合同执行概率提高,分布在75%,贸易交易量可增加24%,商业信用规模可增加30%。由于商业信用合约的不完备而导致的经济损失则是巨大的。此外,我们证实,高的商业信用合同执行技术通过商业信用量和交易量的增加而在经济中产生正外部效应。     

股权分置、资金侵占与上市公司现金股利政策

上市公司控股股东是否直接或以现金股利方式间接侵占公司资金一直是困绕学术界和实务界的共同性问题。与以往的研究不同,本文发现现金股利和资金侵占同是大股东实现其股权价值最大化的手段,二者具有可替代性,协整检验的结果也表明二者不是弱外生变量。本文通过联立方程模型将上市公司现金股利政策与资金侵占结合起来考虑,发现国有控股的公司发放的现金股利水平在前一阶段最高;国有法人控股的公司,现金股利发放的水平在后两阶段最高,但资金被侵占的程度最低;社会法人控股股东对现金股利的偏好与国有法人控股股东无异,但其控股的公司资金被侵占的程度最为严重;国有股控股的公司,其资金被侵占的程度介于二者之间。本文通过对公司股利政策的连续考察发现随着证监会推进上市公司改革的逐步深入,非流通股控股股东减少了对上市公司资金的直接侵占,但现金股利形式却变得越来越普遍。     

Ownership structure and risk in publicly held and privately owned banks

Using detailed ownership data for a sample of European commercial banks, we analyze the link between ownership structure and risk in both privately owned and publicly held banks. We consider five categories of shareholders that are specific to our dataset. We find that ownership structure is significant in explaining risk differences but mainly for privately owned banks. A higher equity stake of either individuals/families or banking institutions is associated with a decrease in asset risk and default risk. In addition, institutional investors and non-financial companies impose the riskiest strategies when they hold higher stakes. For publicly held banks, changes in ownership structure do not affect risk taking. Market forces seem to align the risk-taking behavior of publicly held banks, such that ownership structure is no longer a determinant in explaining risk differences. However, higher stakes of banking institutions in publicly held banks are associated with lower credit and default risk.     

Acquisitions: Private versus Public

Takeovers of privately held companies represent more than 80% of all takeovers. Despite their significance, studies of such takeovers and their impact on the wealth of shareholders are rare. Using a very large, near exhaustive, sample of listed and privately held UK targets we examine the impact of such takeovers on the risk adjusted return of listed UK acquirers over the period 1981 to 2001. Acquirers earn significant positive returns during the period surrounding the bid announcement although the gains are dependent on target status, mode of payment, and the relative size of those involved. The much quoted conclusion, derived from the experiences of listed firm bidders that the shareholders of acquiring firms fail to gain from takeovers, cannot be generalised. Acquiring a privately held company is an attractive option for maximising shareholder wealth.     

Trade credit,cash holdings,and financial deepening: Evidence from a transitional economy

This paper investigates the effect of financial deepening on the relationship between trade credit and cash holdings among Chinese listed firms. We first document an asymmetric effect of trade payables and receivables on cash holdings, in that firms hold an additional $0.71 of cash for every $1 of credit payable but use $1 of receivables as a substitute for only $0.15 of cash. We then find that firms in regions with higher levels of financial deepening hold less cash for payables while substituting more receivables for cash. A more highly developed financial sector helps firms to better use trade credit as a short-term financing instrument. Finally, we find that the ratio at which receivables are substituted for cash increased following the implementation of the new receivables pledge policy in 2007, which allowed firms to use receivables as security for loans. This policy event represents an exogenous shock that mitigates the endogeneity concern.     

On syndicate composition, corporate structure and the certification effect of credit ratings

We assess the relative importance of ratings versus stock exchange listings in reducing information asymmetry using a dataset of syndicated loans to public and private firms in the UK. We find that the certification effect of ratings is largest for private firms and that syndicates are smallest if firms are privately held or unrated. Moreover, we find that the marginal effect of being stock exchange listed is insignificant once these firms are rated. Exploiting the heterogeneity among lenders, we find that especially foreign bank and non-bank investors do not provide capital if firms are unrated. Our paper highlights the information produced by rating agencies as an important mechanism by which ratings improve access to capital. Our results also emphasize the importance of syndicate moral hazard on the supply of uninformed capital: bank-borrower relationships significantly increase the loan share syndicated to investors particularly if firms are not listed and unrated.     

Political connections,tax benefits and firm performance: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the different effects of political connections on the firm performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately owned enterprises. Using data on Chinese listed firms from 1999 to 2007, we find that private firms with politically connected managers outperform those without such managers, whereas local SOEs with connected managers underperform those without such managers. Moreover, we find that private firms with politically connected managers enjoy tax benefits, whereas local SOEs with politically connected managers are prone to more severe over-investment problems. Our study reconciles the mixed findings of previous studies on the effect of political connections on firm performance.     

Should Firms Going Public Enjoy Tax Benefits? An Analysis of the Italian Experience in the 1990s

In Italy tax benefits are granted to firms going public. However, does such tax relief really reduce the corporate tax burden? In this study we tackle the issue by considering 21 industrial firms that were listed on the Italian Exchange from 1995 to 1997 and enjoyed a temporary tax rate cut‐off. We find that the increase in the taxable income reported by these firms largely counterbalances the effect of the tax relief. We conclude that a tax rate cut‐off may not necessarily provoke a reduction in the tax burden for newly listed firms, since in the short term they report larger earnings compared with privately‐owned companies. We claim that this ‘induced’ effect is mainly due to: the significant improvement of operating performance in the year of the listing; the reduction of the debt tax shield; an increase in investment and more accounting transparency. Our findings suggest that tax relief for IPO firms does not necessarily mean a loss of revenue for the government.     

Does the type of ownership control matter? Evidence from China’s listed companies

By tracing the identity of large shareholders, we group China’s listed companies into those controlled by state asset management bureaus (SAMBs), state owned enterprises (SOEs) affiliated to the central government (SOECGs), SOEs affiliated to the local government (SOELGs), and Private investors. We argue that these distinct types of owners have different objectives and motivations and this will affect how they exercise their control rights over the firms they invest in. In particular, we contend that private ownership of listed firms in China is not necessarily superior to certain types of state ownership. To test our arguments we investigate the relative efficiency of state versus private ownership of listed firms and the efficiency of various forms of state ownership. The empirical results indicate that the operating efficiency of Chinese listed companies varies across the type of controlling shareholder. SOECG controlled firms perform best and SAMB and Private controlled firms perform worst. SOELG controlled firms are in the middle. The results are consistent with our predictions.     

Disproportional ownership structure and pay–performance relationship: Evidence from China's listed firms

This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in China's listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling shareholders have a positive effect on the pay–performance relationship, while a divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative effect on the pay–performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate controlling shareholders' type into state owned enterprises (SOE), state assets management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based pay–performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the market based pay–performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private benefit.     

Do political connections affect stock price crash risk? Firm-level evidence from China

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms in the period from 2003 to 2012, this paper empirically investigates how the presence of politically connected directors affects stock price crash risk. We thereby make a distinction between listed state-controlled firms and privately controlled firms due to their different incentives to appoint politicians as directors on the board. Our empirical results show that politically connected directors exacerbate stock price crash risk in listed state-controlled firms, an effect driven by the appointment of local government officials as directors. In contrast, hiring politicians as directors, particularly central-government-affiliated directors, helps listed privately controlled firms to reduce stock price crash risk. Finally, good quality of institutions does not help to alleviate the positive relationship between political connections and stock price crash risk in listed state-controlled firms. However, it does weaken the role of political connections in reducing crash risk in listed privately controlled firms.     

How are political connections valued in China? Evidence from market reaction to CEO succession

Using a sample of listed Chinese firms between 2000 and 2010, the paper analyzes the stock market reaction to CEO succession. We document significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns when CEO succession is accompanied with increased political connections. We also show that the market reaction to political connections is significantly stronger for external successors and for poorly performing firms, while it is significantly weaker for firms in high-tech industries and firms located in more developed regions. Finally we find that political connections are valued significantly less in state owned enterprises than in privately controlled firms. Our findings suggest that Chinese investors do value political connections, and such valuation is conditioned by successor origin, prior firm performance, industry, region, and ownership structure.     

Why newly listed firms become acquisition targets

We study the operating, financial, and ownership structure characteristics of newly listed firms which become acquisition targets shortly after their initial public offerings. We examine whether such firms get acquired because of their successful performance or as an alternative to delisting. We find that firms, which do relatively well in terms of operating as well as stock performance and attract institutional investor interest, draw the attention of acquirers. Furthermore, we observe that investments made by newly listed target firms do not destroy shareholder value and have comparable profitability to investments made by newly listed firms which grow by acquisitions. Overall, firms acquired shortly after listing are on a growth trajectory similar to that of surviving firms.     

Trade Credit,Future Earnings,and Stock Returns: A Self-Dealing Perspective

Chinese listed firms are characterized by a great magnitude of long-duration accounts receivable from controlling shareholders and their affiliates, and they often do not make bad debt allowances. On many occasions, these receivables are never collected. We find that firms with a great magnitude of accounts receivable demonstrate a low level of future profitability and low stock returns. It does not appear that the low earnings persistence of these firms is responsible for their poor future performance as predicted by the accrual anomaly, because the firms also report low concurrent earnings. In the context of the Chinese stock market, we interpret the results as being consistent with self-dealing through trade credit by controlling shareholders. This study contributes to the self-dealing literature by identifying a more subtle channel of expropriation of minority shareholders in China.     

Creditor control rights and firm investment policy

We present novel empirical evidence that conflicts of interest between creditors and their borrowers have a significant impact on firm investment policy. We examine a large sample of private credit agreements between banks and public firms and find that 32% of the agreements contain an explicit restriction on the firm's capital expenditures. Creditors are more likely to impose a capital expenditure restriction as a borrower's credit quality deteriorates, and the use of a restriction appears at least as sensitive to borrower credit quality as other contractual terms, such as interest rates, collateral requirements, or the use of financial covenants. We find that capital expenditure restrictions cause a reduction in firm investment and that firms obtaining contracts with a new restriction experience subsequent increases in their market value and operating performance.