Inventory Dynamics and Business Cycles: What Has Changed?

To what extent can information-technology led improvements in inventory management account for the apparent moderation of economic fluctuations in the United States since the mid-1980s? We argue that changes in inventory dynamics played a reinforcing—rather than a leading—role in the reduction of output volatility. Since the mid-1980s, inventory dynamics have changed in a manner consistent with a faster resolution of inventory imbalances. However, these changes appear to be a consequence of changes in the response of industry-level sales and aggregate economic activity to monetary policy shocks. Our results suggest that it is the interaction between the changes in inventory behavior at the industry level and the macroeconomic environment—where the latter likely includes changes in the conduct of monetary policy and the responses of the economy to policy disturbances—rather than any single factor, that has contributed importantly to the observed decline in economic volatility.     

Investment dynamics with fixed capital adjustment cost and capital market imperfections

This paper examines the implications of financing frictions on capital stocks and on capital accumulation in the presence of non-convex costs of adjusting the capital stock. In this setup finance has an influence on both, the level of capital and the timing of investment. Finance and productivity are complements and finance influences investment the strongest when firms wish to significantly adjust capital for fundamental reasons. These theoretical considerations are confronted with UK data. While finance is mostly irrelevant for long-term capital decision, the short-run investment function shows a significant impact of finance, which is also strongest for strong fundamental investment incentives.     

Executive stock options and IPO underpricing

In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.     

Investment and liquidation in renegotiation-proof contracts with moral hazard

In a long-term contract with moral hazard, the liquidation of the firm can arise as the outcome of the optimal contract. However, if the future production capability or market opportunities remain unchanged, liquidation may not be free from renegotiation. Will the firm ever be liquidated if we allow for renegotiation? This paper shows that the firm can still be liquidated even though liquidation is not free from renegotiation in the long-term contract. In addition to liquidation, the renegotiation-proof contract generates important features of the investment behavior and dynamics of firms observed in the data.     

The two sides of CEO option grants at the IPO

This paper examines the impact of CEO IPO option grants on IPO underpricing. Contrary to Lowry and Murphy (2007) who do not find a relationship between the two, this paper finds such a relationship when board independence, the power of the CEO and venture capitalists (VCs) are taken into account. The results are threefold. First, powerful CEOs are able to reap substantial gains from IPO options, to the detriment of the shareholders. Second, young, powerful VCs use IPO option grants to bribe the CEO to agree to an early IPO which will leave more of the existing shareholders' money on the table. Finally, IPO options only work as a value-enhancing incentive in the presence of strong boards.     

Why are IPO investors net buyers through lead underwriters?

In Nasdaq initial public offerings (IPOs) issued between 1997 and 2002, purchases of lead underwriter clients exceed sales by an amount equal to 8.79% of the total issue. We find that lead underwriter clients do not buy to build larger long-term positions, capitalize on superior execution quality, or because of clientele effects. However, characteristics of net buying that are at odds with these explanations and other behaviors (like institutional purchases of cold IPOs) are all consistent with lead underwriters engaging in quid pro quo arrangements with clients. Price contribution analysis shows that such client buying activity contributes significantly to first-day price increases.     

Technology Shocks and the Labor-Input Response: Evidence from Firm-Level Data

We study the relationship between technology shocks and labor input on Swedish firm-level data using a production function approach to identify technology shocks. Taking standard steps yields a contractionary contemporaneous labor-input response in line with previous studies. This finding may, however, be driven by measurement errors in the labor-input variable. Relying on a unique feature of our data set, which contains two independently measured firm-specific labor input measures, we can evaluate the potential bias. We do not find that this bias conceals any true positive contemporaneous effect. The results thus point away from standard flexible-price models and toward models emphasizing firm-level rigidities.     

Information shares in the US Treasury market

This paper highlights the previously neglected role of the futures markets in US Treasury price discovery. The estimates of 5- and 10-year GovPX spot market information shares typically fail to reach 50% from 1999 on. The GovPX information shares for the 2-year contract are higher than those of the 5- and 10-year maturities but also decline after 1998. Relative bid-ask spreads, number of trades, and realized volatility are statistically significant and explain up to 21% of daily information shares. In roughly 1/4 of cases when public information is released, the futures market gains information share, but macroeconomic announcements rarely explain information shares independently of liquidity.     

Go long or short in pyramids? News from the Egyptian stock market

Similar to other emerging economies, the Egyptian stock market has recently experienced a remarkable run-up but also a major downturn. This paper analyzes the stock market from two angles. First, it compares the performance of the major stock price index with its underlying fundamentals. Second, it explores the relationship between the Egyptian and other stock markets. The paper finds that (i) there is some evidence against a stable relationship between the Egyptian index and its fundamental value; and (ii) short-term correlations and long-term cointegrating relations provide conflicting signals on the value of Egyptian stocks as a means of diversification.     

Earnings management,market discounts and the performance of private equity placements

Private equity placement data allow us to determine whether sophisticated investors can uncover the true value of firms. This can be done by defining sophisticated investors as those who meet the stringent participation requirements of the private equity market. Our results show private equity issuing firms overstate their earnings in the quarter preceding private equity placement announcements and that sophisticated investors do not ask for a fair discount when purchasing the shares of the private issuing firms. We also find evidence showing that the reversal of the effects of pre-issue earnings management is a significant determinant of the long-term performance of private issues. Results further show that post-issue stock performance and operating performance of firms using “aggressive” earnings management significantly underperform those using more “conservative” earnings management.     

Is the long-run underperformance of seasoned equity issues irrational? Evidence from Spain

We investigate if the long-run underperformance in the year after the issue of a sample of Spanish SEO firms is related to behavioural biases that lead investors to slowly adjust their pre-issue overoptimism. We also examine the existence of arbitrage costs that preclude mispricing from being corrected rapidly by sophisticated investors who act as arbitrageurs. Our findings support the contention that small SEO firms are overpriced at the time of the issue and suggest that their post-underperformance is related to arbitrage costs, where transaction costs play an important role although holding costs do not.     

Fractional integration in daily stock market indexes

I use parametric and semiparametric methods to test for the order of integration in stock market indexes. The results, which are based on the EOE (Amsterdam), DAX (Frankfurt), Hang Seng (Hong Kong), FTSE100 (London), S&P500 (New York), CAC40 (Paris), Singapore All Shares, and the Japanese Nikkei, show that in almost all of the series the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected. The Hang Seng and the Singapore All Shares seem to be the most nonstationary series with orders of integration higher than one, and the S&P500 is the less nonstationary series, with values smaller than one and showing mean reversion.     

Information demand and stock market volatility

We study information demand and supply at the firm and market level using data for 30 of the largest stocks traded on NYSE and NASDAQ. Demand is approximated in a novel manner from weekly internet search volume time series drawn from the recently released Google Trends database. Our paper makes contributions in four main directions. First, although information demand and supply tend to be positively correlated, their dynamic interactions do not allow conclusive inferences about the information discovery process. Second, demand for information at the market level is significantly positively related to historical and implied measures of volatility and to trading volume, even after controlling for market return and information supply. Third, information demand increases significantly during periods of higher returns. Fourth, analysis of the expected variance risk premium confirms for the first time empirically the hypothesis that investors demand more information as their level of risk aversion increases.     

Do more reputable financial institutions reduce earnings management by IPO issuers?

This study investigates whether financial intermediaries (FIs) participating in the IPO process play a significant role in restraining earnings management (EM). Specifically, we examine whether EM around IPOs is negatively related to investment banks (IBs) and venture capital (VC) investor reputations. In general, we do not find evidence that VCs as a group significantly restrain EM by IPO issuers. However, we uncover strong evidence that more reputable VCs and IBs are associated with significantly less EM, which is consistent with them implicitly certifying the quality of issuer financial reports. Moreover, a stronger reduction in EM is found when more reputable IBs are matched with more reputable VCs, which indicates that VC and IB reputation are complements rather than substitutes. These conclusions are invariant to adjustments for potential endogeneity of underwriter reputation and VC-backing or reputation.     

Overreaction in the thrift IPO aftermarket

We study the initial returns and long-run performance of a unique sample of thrifts that have recently converted from mutual to stock form. In addition to a full claim on all IPO proceeds, new investors in a converted thrift also receive a claim on all pre-conversion market value at no cost. Thus, the average firm in our sample has a degree of underpricing automatically built into its offer price. We find that after removing the large initial returns, cumulative excess returns for the firms in our sample are positive for 12 months after the IPO. Beginning in the second year after the IPO, the average firm in our sample undergoes a significant price correction that lasts approximately 18 months and which produces negative cumulative abnormal returns for up to 5 years post-issue. Differences in risk-adjusted returns also indicate negative long-run returns, with poor performance concentrated in the second and third years following the IPO. The return differences are most pronounced among the small thrifts in our sample, and are broadly consistent with investor overreaction at the time of the IPO that continues for 6–12 months before prices begin reverting back to fundamental value.     

IPO auctions and private information

IPO auctions, which provide an impartial way of determining IPO pricing and share allocations, offer a natural setting for examining whether institutional investors possess private information, and for measuring how valuable their information is. Analyzing detailed bidding data from Taiwan’s discriminatory (pay-as-bid) auctions, we find that, relative to retail investors, institutional investors tend to bid higher in auctions when IPO shares are more valuable, and that underpricing is larger in auctions with relatively higher institutional bids. These results imply that institutional investors are better informed about IPO value, and that they obtain higher information rents when they bid higher relative to retail investors. We estimate the value of institutional investors’ private information to be worth about 8.68% of return, which is the extra rate of return they command on their informational advantages over retail investors.     

Operating and stock market performance of state-owned enterprise privatizations: The Spanish experience

We investigate the operating and stock market performance of Spanish state-owned enterprises (SOEs) privatized through public share issue offerings (SIPs) from 1990 to 2001, when the last SIP was conducted. We compare the performance of SOEs and privately-owned firms. We find significant operating improvements in Spanish SOEs after the privatization. Specifically, they show significant increases in income efficiency, real sales and employment. Spanish governments tried to minimize the foregone proceeds when selling SOE shares and underpriced them lower than private firms. We relate these results with the pressure of the Maastricht Treaty fiscal criteria, as well as lower information asymmetries between firms and investors. Finally, we do not find long-term abnormal stock market performance after SIPs.     

Corporate capital structure and the characteristics of suppliers and customers

We investigate the link between a firm's leverage and the characteristics of its suppliers and customers. Specifically, we examine whether firms use decreased leverage as a commitment mechanism to induce suppliers/customers to undertake relationship-specific investments. We find that the firm's leverage is negatively related to the R&D intensities of its suppliers and customers. We also find lower debt levels for firms operating in industries in which strategic alliances and joint ventures with firms in supplier and customer industries are more prevalent. Consistent with a bargaining role for debt, we find a positive relation between firm debt level and the degree of concentration in supplier/customer industries.     

Transparency in IPO mechanism: Retail investors’ participation,IPO pricing and returns

Using data from the transparent Indian IPO setting, the paper examines retail investors’ participation, their influence on IPO pricing and the returns they make on IPO investment. The transparency in the mechanism, which allows investors to observe prior investors’ participation, leads to demand which is concentrated at either one or two points of the offer price range. Analysis of investors’ demand during the offer period shows that the participation of retail investors is significantly influenced by the participation of institutional investors. We examine IPO pricing and find that favourable demand by retail investors is positively associated with a high IPO price even after controlling for demand by institutional investors. Further, we find that due to aggressive bidding by overconfident investors, retail investors are, on average, unlikely to make positive allocation weighted initial returns even in a setting where they do not have to compete with institutional investors. Retail investors, however, can earn significant positive allocation weighted initial returns if they limit their participation in IPOs with above average institutional investors’ demand.     

Information content of IPO grading

In the year 2007, Indian capital market regulator-SEBI, introduced a unique certification mechanism for IPOs whereby all IPOs have to undergo mandatory quality grading by independent rating agencies. In this paper we argue that such objective, independent and exogenous certifying mechanism provides a better opportunity to test the well established certification hypothesis, especially in the context of emerging markets with institutional voids. Using a sample of 163 Indian IPOs we test the efficacy of IPO grading mechanism. We find, grading decreases IPO underpricing and positively influences demand of retail investors. Grading reduces secondary market risk and improves liquidity. However, grading does not affect long run performance of the IPOs. IPO grading successfully capture firm size, business group affiliation and firm’s quality of corporate governance. Our findings imply that, in emerging markets, regulator’s role to signal the quality of an IPO contributes towards the market welfare.