The brain drain and the world distribution of income

Skilled emigration (or brain drain) from developing to developed countries is becoming the dominant pattern of international migration today. Such migration is likely to affect the world distribution of income both directly, through the mobility of people, and indirectly, as the prospect of migration affects the rate of return to education in both the sending and receiving economies. This migration pattern will therefore affect human capital accumulation and fertility decisions in both the sending and receiving economies. This paper analyzes these effects in a dynamic two country model of the world economy where agents in both countries make optimal fertility and human capital decisions. The implications of the analysis for the world distribution of income are derived in the light of recent empirical findings of the brain drain literature. The analysis shows that the current trend towards predominantly skilled emigration from poor to rich countries may in the long run increase inequality in the world distribution of income as relatively poor countries grow large in terms of population. In the short run however, it is possible for world inequality to fall due to rises in GDP per capita in large developing economies with sufficiently low skilled emigration rates.     

Credit constraints,inequality and the growth gains from trade

This paper tests the hypothesis that, in the presence of credit constraints, higher wealth inequality affects negatively the growth gains from trade liberalisation. Variations in the growth rate of value added–decomposed in the growth rate of the number of establishments and the growth rate in average size–of manufacturing industries in 34 developing countries before and after trade liberalisation are used to study the effects of inequality on the difference in growth under liberalised and nonliberalised regimes. The results show that the number of firms in industries with high dependence on external finance in countries with higher inequality grow significantly slower, in both statistical and economic terms, than in industries with low dependence on external finance in countries with lower inequality following a trade liberalisation relative to the closed-economy period.     

Walrasian General Equilibrium Allocations and Dynamics in Two-Sector Growth Models

This paper analyzes and solves miniature Walrasian general equilibrium systems of momentary and moving equilibria. The Walrasian framework encompasses the fundamental neoclassical and classical two‐sector growth models; the families of solutions of steady‐state and persistent growth per capita in various competitive two‐sector economies are parametrically characterized. Moreover, the endogenous behavior of relative prices and the sectoral allocation of primary factors are analyzed in detail. The technology parameters of the capital good industry are decisive for obtaining long‐run per capita growth in closed (global) economies. A review of the literature complements the theorems on the general equilibrium allocations, dynamic systems, and the time paths of Walrasian two‐sector economies.     

Spillovers and the competitive pressure for long-run innovation

This paper discusses the impact of oligopolistic product markets for innovation and growth, highlighting a novel, fundamental role of spillovers. We develop a model of endogenous growth with non-tournament R&D, where spillovers raise the relative R&D efficiency of laggards. A key feature is that the rate of innovation and the market configuration (i.e. the distribution of market shares) are jointly determined. Our results emphasize the role of spillovers in sustaining the competitive pressure that is fundamental for long-run innovation and economic growth.     

Stages of diversification in a neoclassical world

Recent research has documented a U-shaped industrial concentration curve over an economy’s development path. How far can neoclassical trade theory take us in explaining this pattern? We estimate the production side of the Heckscher–Ohlin model using industry data on 44 developed and developing countries for the period 1976–2000. Decomposing the implied changes in industrial concentration over time shows that at least one third of these changes seems to be explained by a Rybczynski effect. This result suggests that capital accumulation led poor countries to diversify their industrial production, while rich countries made their production more concentrated in highly capital-intensive industries.     

Experiencing change and the evolution of adaptive skills: Implications for economic growth

We distinguish learning in a static environment from that in a dynamic environment to show the existence of an important interaction between the development of new technologies and human capital accumulation. Because technological progress creates a more dynamic environment, it complements education in the production of human capital by enhancing adaptive skills. Higher levels of adaptability and human capital in turn determine the profitability of new inventions and the incentive to invest in new R&D. Differences in the history of technological progress produce different levels of adaptability and our results suggest why countries that have comparable levels of education and per capita incomes may differ significantly in their growth performance.     

Growth miracles and failures in a Markov switching classification model of growth

In this paper economic growth is interpreted as a sequence of transitions between distinct growth regimes that countries visit with different frequencies. Countries featuring similar growth dynamics are endogenously grouped into three different clusters. The first cluster comprises successful countries that are characterized by lengthy periods of high or very high growth. Moderately successful countries in the second cluster experience both periods of reasonable growth and periods of stagnation, whereas failing countries in the third cluster suffer from highly volatile growth rates with frequent episodes of crisis. Successful countries are characterized by better initial conditions, policies and institutions compared to the other countries. Neither initial conditions nor institutions distinguish moderately successful from failing countries; what makes them different is policy in the form of investments into infrastructure and human capital, trade liberalization and limited policy volatility.     

Population heterogeneity and growth

I investigate the robustness of the link between growth and heterogeneity in a population along ethnic, linguistic, religious, and socio-economic class lines using cross-country data covering the period 1960–92 and 72 countries. In addition to 21 distinct explanatory variables extensively used in the empirical growth literature, I consider several fragmentation and polarization indices capturing the heterogeneity in a population to deal with measurement uncertainty, and utilize Bayesian Model Averaging techniques to address uncertainty issues regarding model specification. My results indicate that while substantial data evidence favors the inclusion of population heterogeneity as a theory when proxied by fragmentation indices, it does not support the inclusion of this theory when proxied by polarization indices. Furthermore, the religious fragmentation index has the strongest evidence in favor of its inclusion as opposed to ethnic and linguistic fragmentation indices and income inequality.     

Corruption,competition and democracy

This paper presents a model of the interaction between corrupt government officials and industrial firms to show that corruption is antithetical to competition. It is hypothesized that a government agent that controls access to a formal market has a self-interest in demanding a bribe payment that serves to limit the number of firms. This corrupt official will also be subject to a detection technology that is a function of the amount of the bribe payment and the number of firms that pay it. Under quite normal assumptions about the shape of the graph of the detection function, multiple equilibria can arise where one equilibrium is characterized by high corruption and low competition, and another is characterized by low corruption and high competition. Some suggestive empirical evidence is presented that supports the main hypothesis that competition and corruption are negatively related.     

International R&D spillovers and institutions

The empirical analysis in “International R&D Spillovers” [Coe, D., Helpman, E., 1995. International R&D Spillovers. European Economic Review, 39, 859-887] is first revisited on an expanded data set that we have constructed for the purpose of this study. The new estimates confirm the key results reported in Coe and Helpman about the impact of domestic and foreign R&D capital stocks on TFP. In addition, we show that domestic and foreign R&D capital stocks have measurable impacts on TFP even after controlling for the impact of human capital. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to include institutional variables. Our results suggest that institutional differences are important determinants of TFP and that they impact the degree of R&D spillovers. Countries where the ease of doing business and the quality of tertiary education systems are relatively high tend to benefit more from their own R&D efforts, from international R&D spillovers, and from human capital formation. Strong patent protection is associated with higher levels of total factor productivity, higher returns to domestic R&D, and larger international R&D spillovers. Finally, countries whose legal systems are based on French and, to a lesser extent, Scandinavian law benefit less from their own and foreign R&D capital than countries whose legal origins are based on English or German law.     

Technology adoption, convergence, and divergence

A new mechanism to explain simultaneous convergence among industrialized countries and divergence between these countries and the rest of the world is presented. Specifically, the adoption of technologies, as embodied in machines, is examined in the context of a world in which capital goods are produced in a few centers and then exported. Since the local cost of introducing machines varies from region to region, technology is not adopted everywhere, and when it is adopted, its intensity varies from place to place. Technological progress diminishes the differences within the group of countries that adopt technologies but increases the gap between those countries and the rest of the world. The model is applied to cases of investment costs generated by deficient institutions and to transport costs. Its predictions are supported by recent research.     

INTER-MARKET COMPETITION THROUGH BUNDLING IN THE PRESENCE OF COST ADVANTAGE

This paper presents a model of inter-market competition through bundling wherein each firm has a cost advantage in a different market and competes against fringe firms. Without cost saving through bundling, there is no equilibrium in which the bundled good is provided. However, with cost saving through bundling, there exist equilibria in which one firm provides bundling and the other does not. In this case, bundling can be used as a device for entry deterrence. Finally, we illustrate that bundling can reduce social welfare by discouraging the efficient entrant from entering the market.     

Democratic institutions and regulatory reforms

We use a sample of 144 countries over the period 2003–2013 to investigate the link between democratic institutions and regulatory reforms. Democracy may be conducive to reform, as politicians embrace growth-enhancing reforms to win elections. On the other hand, authoritarian regimes may not worry as much about public opinion and could undertake reforms that are painful in the short run but bring long-term benefits. We test these alternative hypotheses, using data on regulatory reforms from the World Bank’s Doing Business database. The results provide mixed support for the hypothesis that democracy is good for regulatory reforms. We also show that regulatory reforms are more likely just after parliamentary elections in poor and middle-income countries.     

An Empirical Analysis of the Effect of Aid on Growth

The fact that so many countries register low per capita income after receiving enormous amounts of foreign aid questions its effectiveness as a tool for economic growth and consequently as an instrument of poverty alleviation. The impact of foreign aid on economic growth is ultimately an empirical question and one that will be addressed in this paper. The paper uses the most recent data and incorporates most of the salient features of the new growth literature to test the effect of aid on economic growth. Three important conclusions emerged from the empirical analysis of the paper. First, it shows that the effect of aid on growth is nonlinear. The nonlinearity of the relationship indicates a threshold for foreign aid beyond which more aid is detrimental to economic growth. Second, the empirical results of this paper support Burnside and Dollars findings that a good policy environment is important for aid to work effectively. Aid effectiveness can only be sustained in an environment of good economic policy. Finally, using etholinguistic fractionalization as an instrument, the empirical results of the paper indicate that the relationship between AID/GDP and economic growth is sequential. More and more aid leads to lower economic growth.The authors would like to thank W. Mark Crain, G. Chris Rodrigo, Willem Thorbecke, an anonymous referee, and the participants of the 57th International Atlantic Economic Conference held in Lisbon, March 10–14, 2004. This paper is presented to the conference under a different title. Professor Ali would also like to thank the Research Council of Niagara University for their financial help.     

Constitutional protection of economic rights: The Swiss and U.S. experience in comparison

This paper analyzes the contribution of the Swiss and the U.S. Constitution to protect economic liberties, and compares the different strategies that both constitutions rely on to achieve this goal. Pertinent provisions in the Swiss Constitution are rather precise but relatively easy to change, whereas the U.S. Constitution is characterized by vaguely formulated constraints that are difficult to amend formally and that are interpreted by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the substantial constitutional changes that did occur in both countries seem to have followed strikingly similar patterns: Initially, regional integration through reciprocal market opening within both countries facilitated the constitutional protection of economic liberties. Subsequently, the constitutional protection of economic liberties eroded in both countries, especially against federal legislation, due to changes in the interpretation of the constitution through the courts, or by formal amendment. Lastly, both constitutions were not immune against sudden demands by special interest groups that were being raised during times of crisis or war. I wish to thank Beat Blankart, Ludger Schuknecht and Barry Weingast for helpful comments.     

Disease or utopia? Testing Baumol in education

Baumol’s Cost Disease offers a compelling hypothesis of rising unit costs in stagnant sectors, but increased productivity in progressive sectors may generate the same prediction through income effects. We examine quantity (rather than expenditure) data from the U.S. educational sector to distinguish between these explanations. Our results indicate significant negative impacts of manufacturing productivity on teacher–pupil ratios.     

The role of the government in financial sector development

This study examines the impact of two dimensions of the government, namely, size and quality, on two dimensions of the financial sector, size and efficiency, in a cross section of 71 economies. The study finds that increased quality of the government as measured by governance and legal origin positively influences both financial sector size and efficiency. The size of the government proxied by government expenditure and the government ownership of banks has a negative effect on financial sector efficiency, and a positive impact on financial sector size, particularly in the low income economies.     

Double marginalization and cost pass-through: Weyl–Fabinger and Cowan meet Spengler and Bresnahan–Reiss

Consider the classical double marginalization problem of single-product successive monopolies. We show that the ratio of the cost pass-through at the final sale relative to that at the wholesale level is characterized by the curvature of inverse demand in the final market. We also apply Cowan’s (2012) method, which utilizes the idea of pass-through in an analysis of third-degree price discrimination, to compare consumer surplus under vertical integration and separation.     

Monopolistic competition and income dispersion

We develop a model of monopolistic competition that accounts for consumers’ heterogeneity in both incomes and preferences. This model makes it possible to study the implications of income redistribution on the toughness of competition. We show how the market outcome depends on the joint distribution of consumers’ tastes and incomes and obtain a closed-form solution for a symmetric equilibrium. Competition toughness is measured by the weighted average elasticity of substitution. Income redistribution generically affects the market outcome, even when incomes are redistributed across consumers with different tastes in a way such that the overall income distribution remains the same.     

On the Relationship Between Innovation and Product Market Competition

This paper considers a theoretical model where firms reduce their initial unit costs by spending on R&D activities in a collusive market and where firms are able to coordinate on distinct output levels other than that of the unrestricted joint profit maximization outcome. We show that, in our model, the degree of collusion (captured by the discount factor) reduces the incentive to innovate when innovation is made non‐cooperatively. The reason is that non‐cooperative R&D introduces a negative externality where firms overinvest beyond the effort required to minimize the cost in order to extract profits from the rival firm, and a reduction in product competition helps internalize the externality. In a research joint venture the absence of R&D rivalry leads to contrary results. The main implication is that the validity of the Schumpeterian hypotheses depends on the extent of cooperation at the R&D stage.