A simple continuous measure of credit risk

This paper introduces a simple parameterization for the risk-neutral default probability distributions for risky firms that are easily computed from quoted bond prices. The corresponding expected times to default have a particularly simple form and are proposed as a measure for credit risk. Being continuous in nature, times to default provide a much finer measure of risk than those provided by ratings agencies. Comparison with the ratings provided by Moody's and the distance to default measures calculated using the Merton [Merton, R. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: the risk structure of interest rates. Journal of Finance, 2(2), 449-470] model shows that the highest rank correlation is found between the proposed time to default measure and Moody's ratings.     

Accounting-based versus market-based cross-sectional models of CDS spreads

Models of financial distress rely primarily on accounting-based information (e.g. [Altman, E., 1968. Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate bankruptcy. Journal of Finance 23, 589–609; Ohlson, J., 1980. Financial ratios and the probabilistic prediction of bankruptcy. Journal of Accounting Research 19, 109–131]) or market-based information (e.g. [Merton, R.C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. Journal of Finance 29, 449–470]). In this paper, we provide evidence on the relative performance of these two classes of models. Using a sample of 2860 quarterly CDS spreads we find that a model of distress using accounting metrics performs comparably to market-based structural models of default. Moreover, a model using both sources of information performs better than either of the two models. Overall, our results suggest that both sources of information (accounting- and market-based) are complementary in pricing distress.     

Credit market shocks and economic fluctuations: Evidence from corporate bond and stock markets

To identify disruptions in credit markets, research on the role of asset prices in economic fluctuations has focused on the information content of various corporate credit spreads. We re-examine this evidence using a broad array of credit spreads constructed directly from the secondary bond prices on outstanding senior unsecured debt issued by a large panel of nonfinancial firms. An advantage of our “ground-up” approach is that we are able to construct matched portfolios of equity returns, which allows us to examine the information content of bond spreads that is orthogonal to the information contained in stock prices of the same set of firms, as well as in macroeconomic variables measuring economic activity, inflation, interest rates, and other financial indicators. Our portfolio-based bond spreads contain substantial predictive power for economic activity and outperform—especially at longer horizons—standard default-risk indicators. Much of the predictive power of bond spreads for economic activity is embedded in securities issued by intermediate-risk rather than high-risk firms. According to impulse responses from a structural factor-augmented vector autoregression, unexpected increases in bond spreads cause large and persistent contractions in economic activity. Indeed, shocks emanating from the corporate bond market account for more than 30 percent of the forecast error variance in economic activity at the two- to four-year horizon. Overall, our results imply that credit market shocks have contributed significantly to US economic fluctuations during the 1990-2008 period.     

The Impact of the Federal Reserve's Large‐Scale Asset Purchase Programs on Corporate Credit Risk

Estimating the effect of Federal Reserve's announcements of Large‐Scale Asset Purchase (LSAP) programs on corporate credit risk is complicated by the simultaneity of policy decisions and movements in prices of risky financial assets, as well as by the fact that both interest rates of assets targeted by the programs and indicators of credit risk reacted to other common shocks during the recent financial crisis. This paper employs a heteroskedasticity‐based approach to estimate the structural coefficient measuring the sensitivity of market‐based indicators of corporate credit risk to declines in the benchmark market interest rates prompted by the LSAP announcements. The results indicate that the LSAP announcements led to a significant reduction in the cost of insuring against default risk—as measured by the CDX indexes—for both investment‐ and speculative‐grade corporate credits. While the unconventional policy measures employed by the Federal Reserve to stimulate the economy have substantially lowered the overall level of credit risk in the economy, the LSAP announcements appear to have had no measurable effect on credit risk in the financial intermediary sector.     

A Simple Approach to Valuing Risky Fixed and Floating Rate Debt

We develop a simple approach to valuing risky corporate debt that incorporates both default and interest rate risk. We use this approach to derive simple closed-form valuation expressions for fixed and floating rate debt. The model provides a number of interesting new insights about pricing and hedging corporate debt securities. For example, we find that the correlation between default risk and the interest rate has a significant effect on the properties of the credit spread. Using Moody's corporate bond yield data, we find that credit spreads are negatively related to interest rates and that durations of risky bonds depend on the correlation with interest rates. This empirical evidence is consistent with the implications of the valuation model.     

Structural models of corporate bond pricing with maximum likelihood estimation

This paper empirically examines the proxy, volatility-restriction (VR) and maximum likelihood (ML) approaches to implementing structural corporate bond pricing models, and documents that ML estimation is the best among the three implementation methods. Empirical studies using either the proxy approach or the VR method conclude that barrier-independent models significantly underestimate corporate bond yields. Although barrier-dependent models tend to overestimate the yield on average, they generate a sizable degree of underestimation. The present paper shows that the proxy approach is an upwardly biased estimator of the corporate assets and makes the empirical framework work systematically against structural models of corporate bond pricing. The VR approach may generate inconsistent corporate bond prices or may fail to give a positive corporate bond price for some structural models. When the Merton, LS, BD and LT models are implemented with ML estimation, we find substantial improvement in their performances. Our empirical analysis shows that the LT model is very accurate for predicting short-term bond yields, whereas the LS and BD models are good predictors for medium-term and long-term bonds. The Merton model however significantly overestimates short-term bond yields and underestimates long-term bond yields. Unlike empirical studies in the past, the Merton model implemented with ML estimation does not consistently underestimate corporate bond yields.     

Structural Models of Corporate Bond Pricing: An Empirical Analysis

This article empirically tests five structural models of corporatebond pricing: those of Merton (1974), Geske (1977), Longstaffand Schwartz (1995), Leland and Toft (1996), and Collin-Dufresneand Goldstein (2001). We implement the models using a sampleof 182 bond prices from firms with simple capital structuresduring the period 1986–1997. The conventional wisdom isthat structural models do not generate spreads as high as thoseseen in the bond market, and true to expectations, we find thatthe predicted spreads in our implementation of the Merton modelare too low. However, most of the other structural models predictspreads that are too high on average. Nevertheless, accuracyis a problem, as the newer models tend to severely overstatethe credit risk of firms with high leverage or volatility andyet suffer from a spread underprediction problem with saferbonds. The Leland and Toft model is an exception in that itoverpredicts spreads on most bonds, particularly those withhigh coupons. More accurate structural models must avoid featuresthat increase the credit risk on the riskier bonds while scarcelyaffecting the spreads of the safest bonds.     

Internal liquidity risk in corporate bond yield spreads

The recent global financial crisis reveals the important role of internal liquidity risk in corporate credit risk. However, few existing studies investigate its effects on bond yield spreads. Panel data for the period from year 1993 through 2008 show that corporate internal liquidity risk significantly impacts bond yield spreads (and changes) when controlling for well-known bond yield determinant variables, traditional accounting measures of corporate debt servicing ability, cash flow volatility, credit ratings, and state variables. This finding indicates that internal liquidity risk should therefore be incorporated into bond yield spread modeling.     

Tempered stable structural model in pricing credit spread and credit default swap

In this paper, we explore the features of a structural credit risk model wherein the firm value is driven by normal tempered stable (NTS) process belonging to the larger class of Lévy processes. For the purpose of comparability, the calibration to the term structure of a corporate bond credit spread is conducted under both NTS structural model and Merton structural model. We find that NTS structural model provides better fit for all credit ratings than Merton structural model. However, it is noticed that probabilities of default derived from the calibration of the term structure of a bond credit spread might be overestimated since the bond credit spread could contain non-default components such as illiquidity risk or asymmetric tax treatment. Hence, considering CDS spread as a reflection of the pure credit risk for the reference entity, we calibrate it in order to obtain more reasonable probability of default and obtain valid results in calibration of the market CDS spread with NTS structural model.     

Do Credit Spreads Reflect Stationary Leverage Ratios?

Most structural models of default preclude the firm from altering its capital structure. In practice, firms adjust outstanding debt levels in response to changes in firm value, thus generating mean-reverting leverage ratios. We propose a structural model of default with stochastic interest rates that captures this mean reversion. Our model generates credit spreads that are larger for low-leverage firms, and less sensitive to changes in firm value, both of which are more consistent with empirical findings than predictions of extant models. Further, the term structure of credit spreads can be upward sloping for speculative-grade debt, consistent with recent empirical findings.     

Leverage, options liabilities, and corporate bond pricing

The two major problems with typical structural models are the failure to attain a positive credit spread in the very short term, and overestimation of the overall level of the credit spread. We recognize the presence of option liabilities in a firm’s capital structure and the effect they have on the firm’s credit spread. Including option liabilities and employing a regime switching interest rate process to capture the business cycle resolves the above-mentioned drawbacks in explaining credit spreads. We find that the credit spread overestimation problem in one of the structural models, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (J Finan 56:1929–1957, 2001), can be resolved by combining option liabilities and the regime-switching interest rate process when dealing with an investment grade bond, whereas with junk bonds, only the regime-switching interest rate process is needed. We also examine vulnerable option values, debt values, and zero-coupon bond values with different model settings and leverage ratios.      

Hedging credit: Equity liquidity matters

We theorize and confirm a new channel by means of which liquidity costs are embedded in CDS spreads. We show that credit default swap (CDS) spreads are directly related to equity market liquidity in the Merton [Merton, R.C., 1974. On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates. J. Finance 29, 449–470] model via hedging. We confirm this relationship empirically using a sample of 1452 quarterly CDS spreads over 2001–2005. In the model, this relationship is monotone increasing when credit quality worsens. These results are robust to alternative measures of equity liquidity and other possible determinants of CDS spreads.     

Using Corporate Inflation Protected Securities to Hedge Interest Rate Risk

In the first half of 2008, rising inflation became a concern, but by the fall the focus was on deflation. Such shifts in the outlook for inflation represent a significant risk for some companies, particularly those whose revenues and profits are negatively affected by increases in inflation and rates. For such companies, the use of long‐term fixed‐rate debt will provide at least a partial hedge against increased rates. Less widely appreciated is that even companies whose profits move up and down with inflation face considerable risk from fluctuations in interest rates. Conventional wisdom holds that floating‐rate debt hedges this risk. But this article argues that floating‐rate debt still leaves a company exposed to increases in real interest rates. Inflation‐sensitive companies such as utilities can use corporate inflation‐protected securities (CIPS) to hedge their real interest rate risk as well as inflation risk. In addition to its hedging benefits, CIPS also have the potential to reduce borrowing costs by satisfying growing investor demand for high‐quality securities that provide inflation protection (including demand sources like the recent restoration of French savings accounts to inflation).     

On the Relative Pricing of Long‐Maturity Index Options and Collateralized Debt Obligations

We investigate a structural model of market and firm‐level dynamics in order to jointly price long‐dated S&P 500 index options and CDO tranches of corporate debt. We identify market dynamics from index option prices and idiosyncratic dynamics from the term structure of credit spreads. We find that all tranches can be well priced out‐of‐sample before the crisis. During the crisis, however, our model can capture senior tranche prices only if we allow for the possibility of a catastrophic jump. Thus, senior tranches are nonredundant assets that provide a unique window into the pricing of catastrophic risk.     

Hedging emerging market bonds and the rise of the credit default swap

On October 5, 2001, when credit spreads were widening, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange CME de-listed the full menu of emerging market Brady bond futures contracts. This is intriguing because at a time when interest in hedging and speculating in emerging market sovereign credit risk should be at its peak, the CME de-listed precisely the sort of contract designed to hedge and speculate in sovereign credit risk. This paper finds statistical evidence suggesting that the developing over the counter CDS contract acted as a substitute product for the Brady bond futures contract thereby undermining the Brady bond futures contract and contributing to its demise.     

How and why do small firms manage interest rate risk?

Although small firms are particularly sensitive to interest rates and other shocks, empirical work on corporate risk management has focused instead on large public companies. This paper studies fixed-rate and adjustable-rate loans to see how small firms manage their exposure to interest rate risk. Credit-constrained firms are found to match significantly more often with fixed-rate loans, consistent with prior research that shows the supply of credit shrinks during periods of rising interest rates. Banks originate a higher share of adjustable-rate loans than other lenders, ameliorating maturity mismatch and exposure to the lending channel of monetary policy. Time-series patterns in the fixed-rate share are consistent with recent evidence on debt market timing.     

How do bond investors perceive dividend payouts?

We explore how bond investors view corporate cash distributions through dividends and how that view influences corporate cost of debt. Explaining between 45 and 67 percent of variance in credit spreads at the time of issuance, our model reveals a non-linear association between dividend payouts and investment return expected by bondholders. In particular, while bondholders view cash disbursements in small amounts as a positive signal, large dividend payouts are viewed negatively. Our results thus provide support for both the signaling hypothesis and for the agency-cost-of-debt hypothesis. The results are robust even after controlling for firm size, growth opportunities, profitability, leverage, business risk, asset tangibility, and term structure. Exploiting the 2003 dividend tax cut as an exogenous shock, we demonstrate that our results are not vulnerable to endogeneity problems. Finally, we find no evidence of corporations timing the payouts strategically to influence the cost of debt.     

Hedging bonds subject to credit risk

This paper provides a simple and practical approach to hedging bonds that are subject to credit risk. Three new hedge ratios are derived and tested and the roles of basis risk and diversification is investigated. Empirical tests reveal that basis risk is an important factor in hedging corporate bonds. These tests identify a need for new interest rate derivatives where the underlying asset is subject to credit risk.     

News and the cross-section of expected corporate bond returns

We study the cross-section of expected corporate bond returns using an inter-temporal CAPM (ICAPM) with three-factors: innovations in future excess bond returns, future real interest rates and future expected inflation. Our test assets are a broad range of corporate bond market index portfolios. We find that two factors – innovations about future inflation and innovations about future real interest rates – explain the cross-section of expected corporate bond returns in our sample. Our model provides an alternative to the ad hoc risk factor models used, for example, in evaluating the performance of bond mutual funds.     

Corporate fraud and bank loans: Evidence from china

Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank, as both the firm’s credit risk and information risk increase after punishment. By focusing on Chinese firms’ borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud, we find that firms’ bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower, but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms. In addition, loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before, but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts. In addition, we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the “performance-bank loan” relationship. Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm’s ability to source debt financing, which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud.