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1.
Recent work documents large positive abnormal returns when a hedge fund announces activist intentions regarding a publicly listed firm. We show that these returns are largely explained by the ability of activists to force target firms into a takeover. For a comprehensive sample of 13D filings by portfolio investors between 1993 and 2006, announcement returns and long-term abnormal returns are high for targets that are ultimately acquired, but not detectably different from zero for firms that remain independent. Firms targeted by activists are more likely than control firms to get acquired. Finally, activist investors’ portfolios perform poorly during a period in which market wide takeover interest declined. 相似文献
2.
Before December 1999, the capital gains of shareholders who sold their shares into Australian takeovers have been taxable irrespective of payment method. Subsequently, shareholders can elect to rollover capital gains in equity takeovers. We examine the effect of this change on the association between target shareholder capital gains and bidder and target firm shareholder wealth. The results indicate that prior to the regulatory change, cash consideration results in higher target shareholder returns for non‐taxation reasons. After the introduction of capital gains tax rollover relief, we find that target and acquiring firm shareholders earn lower returns when cash consideration is offered to shareholders with greater capital gains. 相似文献
3.
Lease financing is a well‐recognized mechanism for reducing the agency costs of debt. This study examines whether firms that attempt to control the agency costs of equity through strong governance structures, including Chief Executive Officer compensation alignment and board structure, are more likely to use an agency cost reducing debt structure, such as leasing. For a sample of large firms, we find that firms who use more incentive compensation and have more outside directors also tend to use more lease financing, suggesting these agency cost reducing measures are complements. 相似文献
4.
Private financing of large-scale infrastructure projects through public private partnerships (PPPs) has grown in recent decades. Together with changes in conventional construction procedures, there have been changes in the project financing model. The use of PPPs raises questions as to the role of the private sector in infrastructure provision and the conditions governing the long-term contractual relationships between the private and public sectors. In some early examples of PPPs, the government guaranteed a minimum profitability over the cash flows using a set of contractual terms which transferred some of the risk of the project from the private provider back to the government. Using a large toll road project, the Melbourne CityLink Project, as a case study we show how the imposed conditions can be treated as real options, how these options affect the incentive to invest and how the public sector may be transferring considerable value to the private sector through government guarantees. 相似文献
5.
This paper investigates how takeovers create value. Using plant-level data, I show that acquirers increase targets' productivity through more efficient use of capital and labor. Acquirers reduce capital expenditures, wages, and employment in target plants, though output is unchanged. Acquirers improve targets' investment efficiency through reallocating capital to industries with better investment opportunities. Moreover, changes in productivity help explain the merging firms' announcement returns. The combined announcement returns are driven by improvements in target's productivity. Targets with greater productivity improvements receive higher premiums. These results provide some first empirical evidence on the relation between productivity and stock returns in takeovers. 相似文献
6.
This paper reviews the vast academic literature on the market for corporate control. Our main focus is the cyclical wave pattern that this market exhibits. We address the following questions: Why do we observe recurring surges and downfalls in M&A activity? Why do managers herd in their takeover decisions? Is takeover activity fuelled by capital market developments? Does a transfer of control generate shareholder gains and do such gains differ across takeover waves? What caused the formation of conglomerate firms in the wave of the 1960s and their de-conglomeration in the 1980s and 1990s? And, why do we observe time- and country-clustering of hostile takeover activity? We find that the patterns of takeover activity and their profitability vary significantly across takeover waves. Despite such diversity, all waves still have some common factors: they are preceded by technological or industrial shocks, and occur in a positive economic and political environment, amidst rapid credit expansion and stock market booms. Takeovers towards the end of each wave are usually driven by non-rational, frequently self-interested managerial decision-making. 相似文献
7.
This paper examines the impact of multiple directorships on stockholder wealth around the announcements of mergers and acquisitions. Grounded in agency theory, we argue that multiple directorships affect the quality of managerial oversight and thus influence agency conflicts in acquisition decisions. We show that acquiring firms where directors hold more outside board seats experience more negative abnormal returns. This adverse effect, nonetheless, does not extend across the entire range of multiple directorships. Rather, the detrimental impact is significant only when the number of outside board seats surpasses a certain threshold. We interpret this result as suggesting that directors serving on multiple boards allow value-destroying acquisitions when they become too busy beyond a certain point, and the effect of directors’ busyness on acquisition performance appears to be nonlinear. We employ several alternative definitions of directors’ busyness and obtain consistent results. 相似文献
8.
This paper examines how information asymmetry affects cross-border strategic alliance formation by US firms over the period 2000–2008. We construct a measure, information costs, based on both geographical distance and the proportion of worldwide GDP the partner’s home country represents. Consistent with our expectations, we find an inverse association between information costs and cross-border strategic alliances. When considering the proportion of alliances formed with publicly quoted overseas partners, we find this is unaffected by the level of information costs but rather the level of stock market development, tax rate and general economic conditions. Information costs are, however, significantly negatively related to alliances with overseas private organizations. Our results offer clear support for the on-going importance of information asymmetry in corporate decision making. 相似文献
9.
Prior research has shown that differential access to debt markets significantly affects capital structure. In this paper, we examine the effect of access to debt markets on investment decisions by using debt ratings to indicate bond market access. We find that rated firms are more likely to undertake acquisitions than nonrated firms. This finding remains even after accounting for firm characteristics, for the probability of being rated, and in matched sample analysis as well as in subsamples based on leverage, firm size, age and information opacity. Rated firms also pay higher premiums for their targets and receive less favorable market reaction to their acquisition announcements relative to non-rated firms. However, the average announcement returns to rated acquirers are non-negative. Collectively, these findings suggest that the lack of debt market access has a real effect on the ability to make investments as well as on the quality of these investments by creating underinvestment, instead of simply constraining overinvestment. 相似文献
10.
Ming-Yuan Chen 《International Review of Financial Analysis》2005,14(5):533-558
Two features in Taiwan's companies complicate the ownership-performance relationship. First, the firm's management is usually controlled, either directly or indirectly via equity interlocks, by the controlling family. The shareholding of managers is an access through which the controlling owners can secure control and entrench their private benefits. Second, the management generally consists of individual managers and representatives appointed to top managerial positions by institutions that hold a substantial percentage of shares. The role of corporate managers played by institutions is important in Taiwan's companies. Echoing these two features, empirical results suggest a low inflection point for the nonlinear relation between managerial ownership and performance. Moreover, the impact of managerial ownership on performance varies between different identities of managers and depends on whether the firm is group-affiliated or independent. There is also evidence to show that the relation between individual and institutional managerial ownership is complementary at low levels of ownership and becomes substitutive as ownership gets higher. 相似文献
11.
The corporate charters of a sample of Mexican firms show that private firms often significantly enhance the legal protection offered to investors, but public firms rarely do so. We construct a model that endogenizes the degree of investor protection that firms provide, using as a springboard the assumption that legal regimes differ in their ability to enforce precisely filtering contracts that provide protection only in those cases where expropriation can occur. Our model generates predictions about the types of contracts that would be employed and the levels of investor protection that would prevail across different legal regimes in both private and public firms. 相似文献
12.
In the paper, we find that diversification reduces the heterogeneity of investor beliefs on firm value. We obtain this finding by comparing not only between diversified and focused firms but also between diversifying and non-diversifying mergers. We also find that the reduced heterogeneity of investor beliefs on a diversified firm relative to its focused peers is negatively associated with its contemporaneous excess value and positively associated with its future excess value. Overall, our results contribute to the understanding about how corporate organization structure affects the heterogeneity of investor beliefs and further firm value. 相似文献
13.
We analyze the influence of the level as well as the change in family ownership on value creation in mergers involving newly public firms. Our findings suggest that acquirers with low levels of family ownership earn lower abnormal returns than do those with high levels of ownership. In addition, families with low ownership in their firm are more likely to use cash as the medium of exchange, thus avoiding dilution and maintaining their control. Further, acquisitions of targets with low levels of family ownership are associated with greater value creation. Our results are consistent with the entrenchment of families at low levels of ownership and a better alignment of their interests with those of minority shareholders at high levels of ownership. Finally, we find that dilution of the family’s ownership, due to the use of stock as the medium of exchange, alters the family’s incentives and thus influences firm value. 相似文献
14.
We study the role of pyramidal ownership structures in the creation of new firms. Our results suggest that pyramids arise because they provide a financing advantage in setting up new firms when the pledgeability of cash flows to outside financiers is limited. Parent companies supply inside funds to new firms that, due to large investment requirements and low pledgeable cash flows, cannot raise enough external financing. The financing advantage of pyramidal structures is pervasive in many countries, exists regardless of whether new firms are set up by business groups or by smaller organizations, and is an important underpinning of entrepreneurial activity. 相似文献
15.
Within diversified firms, the negative impact of leverage on investment is significantly greater for high q than for low q segments and significantly greater for non-core than for core segments. This differs substantially from focused firms and is consistent with the view that diversified firms allocate a disproportionate share of their debt service burden to their higher q and non-core segments. We also find that, among low-growth firms, the positive relation between leverage and firm value is significantly weaker in diversified firms than in focused firms. We conclude that the disciplinary benefits of debt are partially offset by the additional managerial discretion in allocating debt service that is provided by the diversified organizational structure. 相似文献
16.
We analyze a large sample of US corporate bond tender offers to understand what affects tender premiums as well as the percentage of bonds tendered. For the average (median) tender offer, the tender price is 5.55% (3.24%) greater than the pre-tender market price while the percentage of bonds tendered is 82.3% (94.6%). Premiums offered by firms are greater when the firm is simultaneously soliciting consents to amend restrictive covenants and when the bond has a greater number of restrictive covenants. Premiums are also greater when long-term risk-free yields are low and the yield curve is flatter – conditions where a firm might want to lock in favorable long-term rates by issuing new debt and retiring old debt. Bondholders respond to higher tender premiums by tendering a greater percentage of their bonds – a 1% increase in tender premium increases the tendering rate by approximately 9%. Bondholders also tender a greater percentage of bonds possessing less desirable characteristics such as a short remaining maturity or bonds that are simultaneously undergoing consent solicitations. Finally, we find that tender offers are easier to complete when bond ownership concentration is greater. 相似文献
17.
We investigate the impact of corporate life cycle on takeover activity from the perspective of acquiring firms. Using the earned/contributed capital mix as the proxy for firm life cycle, we find a highly significant and positive relation between firm life cycle and the likelihood of becoming a bidder. This finding is, however, driven by the mature rather than the old acquirers in the sample. Further we find that, whilst firm life cycle has a positive effect on the probability that a deal will be negotiated, it is negatively related to tender offers. In addition, the likelihood of making both cash and mixed deals are positively related to the corporate life cycle. Finally, we find that life cycle has a negative impact on the abnormal returns generated on the announcement of a deal although it is unable to distinguish between the returns received by firms at different stages in their life cycle. 相似文献
18.
Using a large sample of private debt renegotiations from 1996 to 2011, we report that, even in the absence of any covenant violation, debt covenants are frequently renegotiated. These renegotiations primarily relax existing restrictions and result in economically large changes in existing limits. Renegotiations of specific covenants are a response to both the distance the covenant variable is from its contractual limit and the firm?s specific operating conditions and prospects. Moreover, the borrower?s post-renegotiation investment and financial policies are strongly associated with the covenant changes resulting from the renegotiation. Overall, the findings imply that, even outside of default states, creditors have strong control rights over the borrower?s operating and financial policies, and they exercise these rights in a state contingent manner through covenant renegotiations. 相似文献
19.
We provide a link between diversification discount and corporate use of financial derivatives. We show that diversified firms benefit from financial risk management. Our findings are consistent with the notion that derivative usage lowers information asymmetry and thereby reduces the negative valuation effects of diversification. Our evidence complements the earlier findings of both the risk management literature and diversification discount literature and is robust to controls for endogeneity and information asymmetry levels. 相似文献
20.
The ongoing global financial crisis has led to the largest increase in state intervention since the Great Depression. Direct government ownership in publicly-traded corporations has increased dramatically since 2008. How will this increase in public ownership affect the governance of these erstwhile private companies? We examine the impact of government ownership on corporate governance using a sample of firms from the European Union, a region that is relatively familiar with active government participation. Our main finding is that government ownership is associated with lower governance quality. We further show that while government intervention is negatively related to governance quality in civil law countries, it is positively related to governance quality in common law countries. Finally, we find that the preferential voting rights of golden shares are especially damaging to governance quality. 相似文献