A nonparametric approach to measuring the sensitivity of an asset’s return to the market

In the market model the return on an asset is modeled as a linear function of the return on a market index with slope parameter beta. The coefficient beta is often used as a measure of the sensitivity of the asset’s return to the market and to measure the component of the variance of the return that is explained by the market. However, both of these interpretations require the additional assumption that the error term in the market model has mean 0 conditional on the return on the market index, an assumption that is often difficult to verify in practice. In this paper, a nonparametric version of the market model is proposed that does not require such an assumption. This nonparametric model replaces the beta coefficient of the market model with a “beta curve” describing the relationship between the asset’s return and that of the market locally near a given value of the market return. The proposed model is applied to stock returns, as well as to returns on mutual funds. Corresponding tests of the market model are given and it is shown that the nonparametric model often provides an improvement over the standard parametric market model.     

Do managers listen to the market?

There are competing theories as to whether managers learn from stock prices. Dye and Sridhar (2002), for example, argue that capital markets can be better informed than the firm itself, while Roll [Roll, R., 1986, “The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers,” Journal of Business 59, 97–216.] argues managers may ignore market signals due to hubris. In this paper, we examine whether managers listen to the market in making major corporate investments, and whether agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms help explain managers' propensity to listen. We find that, on average, managers listen to the market: they are more likely to cancel investments when the market reacts unfavorably to the related announcement. Further, we find mixed evidence consistent with the notion that managers' propensity to listen is related to agency costs. We find that firms tend to listen to the market more when more of their shares are held by large blockholders, and when their CEOs have higher pay-performance sensitivities.     

Is sustainability rating material to the market?

This study examines whether information about a firm's engagement in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices is material to market participants. Evidence from a sample of 1856 initial public offerings (IPOs) by U.S. companies for the 2007–2018 period robustly documents that firms for which there is available ESG performance information prior to going public exhibit higher underpricing due to a positive market response. Such a reaction is validated by agency cost-reducing practices that ESG-rated firms follow prior to the IPO, the superior post-IPO market performance they exhibit in terms of equity financing, and the higher share of financially sophisticated investors they attract compared to their ESG-unrated peers. Overall, our results highlight that it pays off to do good and to have the right investors; however, firms’ good ESG practices need to be visible to the market, through rating practices, to reap the benefits.     

How to choose the return model for market risk? Getting towards a right magnitude of stressed VaR

Value at Risk (VaR) and stressed value at Risk (SVaR) or expected shortfall are important risk measures widely used in the financial services industry for risk management and market risk capital computation. Fundamental to any (S)VaR model is the choice of the return type model for each risk factor. Because the resulting SVaR numbers are highly sensitive to the chosen return type model it is important to make a prudent choice on the return type modelling. We propose to estimate the return type model from historic data without making an a priori model assumption on the return model. We explain the fundamentals of return type modelling and how it impacts the magnitude of SVaR. We further show how to obtain a global return type model from a set of similar return type models by using geometric calculus. Numerical simulations and illustrations are provided. In this paper, we consider interest rate data, but the proposed methodology is general and can be applied to any other asset class such as inflation, credit spread, equity or fx.     

The market reaction to cross-listings: Does the destination market matter?

This paper examines (i) whether market reactions to cross-listings differ across destination markets and (ii) to what extent the following explanations for value creation around cross-listings can account for differences in market reactions across cross-listings on various destination markets: overcoming market segmentation, increased market liquidity, improved information disclosure, and better investor protection (“bonding”). We analyze 526 cross-listings from 44 different countries on eight major stock exchanges and document significant announcement returns of 1.3% on average for cross-listings on US exchanges, 1.1% on London Stock Exchange, 0.6% on exchanges in continental Europe, and 0.5% (not significant) on Tokyo Stock Exchange. We find evidence consistent with improved disclosure and bonding creating value for cross-listings on US exchanges, while overcoming segmentation and bonding are associated with higher announcement returns on the London Stock Exchange. The evidence is mixed for continental European exchanges and for Tokyo. Our results highlight the role of the destination market in value creation around cross-listings.     

Can hedge funds time market liquidity?

We explore a new dimension of fund managers' timing ability by examining whether they can time market liquidity through adjusting their portfolios' market exposure as aggregate liquidity conditions change. Using a large sample of hedge funds, we find strong evidence of liquidity timing. A bootstrap analysis suggests that top-ranked liquidity timers cannot be attributed to pure luck. In out-of-sample tests, top liquidity timers outperform bottom timers by 4.0–5.5% annually on a risk-adjusted basis. We also find that it is important to distinguish liquidity timing from liquidity reaction, which primarily relies on public information. Our results are robust to alternative explanations, hedge fund data biases, and the use of alternative timing models, risk factors, and liquidity measures. The findings highlight the importance of understanding and incorporating market liquidity conditions in investment decision making.     

The risk–return relations in the Singapore stock market

This paper examines the risk–return relations in the Singapore stock market for the period April 1986 to December 1998. Though beta is significantly related to realized returns, the explanatory power is low. Adding other stock characteristics such as skewness and kurtosis provides limited incremental benefits. However, when a conditional framework based on up and down markets is introduced, the explanatory power increases more than 100 times and there is a significant positive (negative) relation between beta and returns when the market excess returns are positive (negative). The same relation applies when unsystematic risk, total risk and kurtosis are added separately to the beta–return relation during up and down markets with increased explanatory power. Our results indicate that other stock characteristics in addition to beta are also important in pricing risky assets and investors do not hold diversified portfolios. Our results are also checked and compared with another conditional model with time-varying betas conditional on a set of economic variables.     

Stock market return predictability: Does network topology matter?

This paper provides new evidence for the predictability of excess market portfolio returns using a network approach. In particular, this article introduces a measure of interconnectedness to capture the interrelationship of returns of 100 largest stocks in S&P500 during 1990–2014. In the financial network literature, the interconnection of a stock network is often regarded as a channel through which an idiosyncratic shock propagates. The idiosyncratic risk propagation is crucial to the debate over the relationship between idiosyncratic risk and market returns because the idiosyncratic risk is not always diversified away. Rather, the network can sometimes amplify the effect of the idiosyncratic risk to cause aggregate fluctuation. In accordance with this theoretical argument, I empirically show that the network topology, measured by diameter, works together with the idiosyncratic risk, measured by average stock variance, to affect the market portfolio returns. This relationship persists after controlling for well-known variables known to forecast the stock market returns.     

Do mutual fund managers time market liquidity?

This paper examines mutual fund managers' ability to time market-wide liquidity. Using the CRSP mutual fund database, we find strong evidence that over the 1974–2009 period, mutual fund managers demonstrate the ability to time market liquidity at both the portfolio level and the individual fund level. Liquidity timing predicts future fund performance and the difference in the risk-adjusted returns between top and bottom liquidity-timing funds is approximately 2% per year. Funds exhibiting liquidity-timing ability tend to have longer histories, higher expense ratios, and higher turnover rates.     

Is the market underreacting or overreacting to open market share repurchases? A UK perspective

Using UK open market repurchases, we reject the market underreaction hypothesis and the market overreaction hypothesis proposed by Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), respectively. The evidence suggests that the UK market reacts slowly to actual repurchases made by value firms. UK repurchases on average do not suffer from share undervaluation prior to the announcement. Value firms perform just as well as glamour firms during the authorisation period but outperform glamour firms significantly 2 years following the announcement. It turns out that value firms repurchase over 6% more shares than glamour firms during the authorisation period.     

The role of the carbon market in relation to the cryptocurrency market: Only diversification or more?

The role of the carbon market in relation to the cryptocurrency market is still unclear. Given the carbon-intensive nature of the cryptocurrency industry, whether the carbon market is able to capture the carbon footprint of the cryptocurrency market (i.e., diversification) or act as a safe haven or a hedge against it remain unexplored issues. To address this issue, this paper employs the generalized autoregressive score-dynamic conditional score-Copula (GAS–DCS–Copula) model, incorporating the asymmetric tail distribution. We identify the asymmetric tail properties of both the carbon and cryptocurrency markets with significant otherness. Further, to account the importance of China in mining the cryptocurrencies, we incorporate Chinese carbon market in our analysis to investigate the difference with the European carbon market. Finally, we provide evidence that the European carbon market provides a safe haven and a hedge against the cryptocurrency market while Chinese carbon market is not. Our findings have implications for both investors and policymakers.     

How does the stock market react to the announcement of green policies?

We investigate the impact of 19 announcements of environmental regulation on the equities listed on the Australian Stock Exchange over the period 2005–2011. Using a well-established event study methodology, we assess whether these announcements are value constructive or destructive for equity investors. Additionally, we estimate the change in systematic risk following the announcements. Our results show that the Australian market was particularly sensitive to the carbon pollution reduction scheme (CPRS) announcement. A cumulative abnormal return of −31% was recorded in the alternative energy sector after Australia submitted its target range to the Copenhagen Accord. We observe that a move towards a greener nation has a mixed effect on abnormal returns with apparent sector-by-sector differences. Green policies appear to affect the long-term systematic risk of industries, leading to the diamond risk phenomenon.     

Going public to acquire? The acquisition motive in IPOs

Newly public firms make acquisitions at a torrid pace. Their large acquisition appetites reflect the concentration of initial public offerings (IPOs) in mergers and acquisitions-(M&A-) intensive industries, but acquisitions by IPO firms also outpace those by mature firms in the same industry. IPO firms’ acquisition activity is fueled by the initial capital infusion at the IPO and through the creation of an acquisition currency used to raise capital for both cash- and stock-financed acquisitions along with debt issuance subsequent to the IPO. IPO firms play a bigger role in the M&A process by participating as acquirers than they do as takeover targets, and acquisitions are as important to their growth as research and development (R&D) and capital expenditures (CAPEX). The pattern of acquisitions following an IPO shapes the evolution of ownership structure of newly public firms.     

Do Privatization IPOs Outperform in the Long Run?

This paper investigates the long-run stock returns of privatization initial public offering (IPO) firms using a sample of 241 privatization IPOs from 42 countries during the period 1981-2003. We compare one-, three-, and five-year holding period returns of privatization IPOs to those of the domestic stock market indices and to size and size- and book-to-market equity ratio (BM)-matched firms from the same countries. Consistent with previous studies, we find that privatization IPOs significantly outperform their domestic stock markets in the long run. However, they show less consistent abnormal long-term stock performance relative to their size or size- and BM-matched benchmark firms.     

A note on the time–series relationship between market industry concentration and market volatility

Using cross-sectional regression analysis, previous studies provide conflicting results regarding the relationship between market industry concentration and market volatility. This paper investigates this relationship in the time–series. Using data from twenty one developed markets and the world market, we find that this relationship is significant and positive in about 61% of the markets: the more concentrated the market, the more volatile the market. We also find that, in 70% of the markets, there exists a causal relationship between market industry concentration and market volatility and the direction of causality runs from the former to the latter. Our results suggest that market industrial structure is a significant factor in explaining market volatility.     

Is this the right time to come out? Case study

In this fictional case study, Adam Lawson is a promising young associate at Kirkham McDowell Securities, a St. Louis underwriting and financial advisory firm. Recently, Adam helped to bring in an extremely lucrative deal, and soon he and a few other associates will be honored for their efforts at the firm's silver anniversary dinner. George Campbell, vice president in mergers and acquisitions, is caught unprepared when Adam tells him that, after serious reflection, he has decided to bring his partner, Robert Collins, to the banquet. George is one of Adam's biggest supporters at the firm, and he personally has no problem with Adam being gay. But it is one thing for Adam to come out of the closet at the office. It is quite another to do so at a public company-client event. After all, Kirkham McDowell's client roster includes some very conservative companies--one of the country's largest defense contractors, for example. George is concerned with how Adam's openness about his sexual orientation will play with their clients and, as a result, how senior management will react. Adam has not come to George for permission to bring Robert to the dinner. But clearly Adam wants some sort of response. George has never faced sexual diversity issues in the workplace before, and there is no company policy to guide him. Just how negative an effect could Robert have on Adam's career with the firm and the firm's relationship with its clients? Isn't it possible that even the firm's most conservative clients will simply decide that Adam's choice of guest is a personal matter--not a business one?(ABSTRACT TRUNCATED AT 250 WORDS)     

Are return seasonalities due to risk or mispricing?

Stocks tend to earn high or low returns relative to other stocks every year in the same month (Heston and Sadka, 2008). We show these seasonalities are balanced out by seasonal reversals: a stock that has a high expected return relative to other stocks in one month has a low expected return relative to other stocks in the other months. The seasonalities and seasonal reversals add up to zero over the calendar year, which is consistent with seasonalities being driven by temporary mispricing. Seasonal reversals are economically large and statistically highly significant, and they resemble, but are distinct from, long-term reversals.     

Do regulatory changes affect the underpricing of European IPOs?

We use a sample of 3677 European IPOs during the period 1998–2012 to examine how the adoptions of corporate governance codes by Member States of the European Union (EU) have affected IPO underpricing on Member State-regulated markets, where issuers are subject to corporate governance rules instituted by Member States, relative to a control sample of IPOs on exchange-regulated markets, where issuers are exempt from Member State corporate governance codes. Using this control sample approach facilitated by the existence of second-tier, exchange-regulated markets in the EU, we find that, on average, IPO underpricing declined on Member State-regulated markets after Member States adopted corporate governance codes containing SOX-like provisions. We do not find a similar reduction in IPO underpricing on exchange-regulated markets. Our results are robust to alternative specifications, and our findings support the view that elevating corporate governance standards increases transparency and reduces information asymmetries that affect IPO valuations.     

Do jumps mislead the FX market?

This paper investigates the link between jumps in the exchange rate process and rumours of central bank interventions. Using the case of Japan, we analyse specifically whether jumps trigger false reports of intervention (i.e. an intervention is reported when it did not occur). Intraday jumps are extracted using a non-parametric technique recently proposed by Lee and Mykland in 2008 and by Andersen et al. in 2007, and later modified by Boudt et al. in 2011. Rumours are identified by using a unique database of Reuters and Dow Jones newswires. Our results suggest that a significant number of jumps on the YEN/USD have been falsely interpreted by the market as being the result of a central bank intervention. The paper has policy implications in terms of central bank interventions. We show that in times where the central bank is known to intervene, some investors may attach a lot of weight to central bank interventions as a source of exchange rate movement, leading to a false ‘intervention explanation’ for observed jumps.     

Multi-asset class mutual funds: Can they time the market? Evidence from the US,UK and Canada

The importance of asset allocation decisions in wealth management is well established. However, given its importance it is perhaps surprising that so little attention has been paid to the question of whether professional fund managers are skilful at timing market movement across asset classes over time. The timing literature has tended to concentrate on the timing skill of single asset class funds. Using data on US, UK and Canadian multi-asset class funds, we apply two alternative methodologies to identify the asset class timing abilities of managers. Overall, whether we apply a returns-based method or a holdings-based testing approach, we find evidence of only a tiny minority of funds with asset class timing ability.