Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies

What explains private investment in autocracies, where institutions that discourage expropriation in democracies are absent? We argue that institutionalized ruling parties allow autocrats to make credible commitments to investors. Such parties promote investment by solving collective-action problems among a designated group, who invest with the expectation that the autocrat will not attempt their expropriation. We derive conditions under which autocrats want to create such parties, and we predict that private investment and governance will be stronger in their presence. We illustrate the model by examining the institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Party.     

Unbundling democracy: Political rights and civil liberties

Much recent political economy and political science literature views democracy in terms of political rights. This view, often referred to as electoral democracy, is particularly pronounced in the empirical literature. We reincorporate the role of civil liberties, which are at the core of modern democracy, in two ways. We identify four fundamental sources of potential differences in the evolution of political rights and civil liberties. We present systematic, robust and varied empirical evidence on the direct impact of two of these potential sources of differences using cross-national panel data and accounting for the modernization hypothesis. We obtain two noteworthy empirical results: civil liberties exhibit greater persistence than political rights in affecting subsequent outcomes; and, our main result, civil liberties are complementary to political rights when affecting subsequent outcomes, while the reverse is not the case. Consequently, one must incorporate civil liberties as a determinant of electoral democracy. More generally, both dimensions must be considered to understand the setbacks recently experienced by many democracies, despite their holding of free and fair elections.     

Competition and inter-firm credit: Theory and evidence from firm-level data in Indonesia

Using firm-level data we investigate the relationship between trade credit and suppliers' market structure and find a ∩-shaped relationship between competition and trade credit, with a discontinuous increase in credit provision between monopoly and duopoly. This “big jump” arises because monopolists are more likely to not offer any trade credit than firms in competitive environments. Our model exploits the fundamentally different nature between cash and trade credit sales, arguing that firms are unable to commit ex ante to a trade credit price. We show that monopolists will often sell only on cash, while credit is always provided in competitive environments.     

Institutions and growth in limited access societies

We build a dynamic political economy model with a two-class society, workers and the elite, in which the elite formation, the innovation rate and fiscal policy are endogenous. The model generates a mapping between institutions and patterns of growth consistent with empirical evidence. Ex ante, when facing constraints in choosing institutions, the elite may delegate policy control to some of its members, even though such delegation exacerbates the conflict within the elite and causes policy failures. Committing to such institutional arrangements prevents more harmful outcomes, such as rapid entry and subsequent deterioration of the elite?s economic and political power.     

Measuring the return on household enterprise: What matters most for whom?

Return on assets (ROA) from household enterprise is crucial for understanding the well-being and productivity of households in developing economies. Yet the definition and measurement of household enterprise ROA remain inconsistent or unclear. We illustrate potential measurement problems with examples from various actual surveys. We then take advantage of a detailed integrated household survey to perform a robustness analysis, acting as if we had gathered less data than was actually the case, to see what matters and for whom. The three issues that matter most for accurate measurement of household enterprise ROA are the choice of accrual versus cash basis of income, the treatment of household's own labor in enterprise income, and the treatment of non-factor income. Also, this sensitivity matters most for a relatively poor region dominated by crop cultivation relative to a richer region with non-farm enterprises. Though the choice between accrued income and cash income matters less when the frequency of the data declines, there remains high sensitivity in longer-term and annualized data. We conclude the paper by providing recommendations on how to improve the survey questionnaires for more accurate measurement in field research.     

Political democratization, economic liberalization, and growth volatility

This study empirically investigates the effects of political and economic liberalization on growth volatility using a difference-in-difference method for a sample of 158 countries over the 1970-2005 period. The results show that, when examined separately, economic liberalization leads to a significant reduction in volatility while democratization is not followed by a decrease in growth volatility. For countries that undertake only one liberalization, opening up the economy to international trade reduces volatility in growth; becoming a democracy, on the other hand, seems to increase macroeconomic instability. For countries that implement both political and economic liberalizations, no statistically significant effect on volatility is detected. These results serve to provide additional support for the policy recommendation that developing countries should liberalize their economy first and then consider political liberalization.     

Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages

In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats’ investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations.     

Effects of longevity and dependency rates on saving and growth: Evidence from a panel of cross countries

While earlier empirical studies found a negative saving effect of old-age dependency rates without considering longevity, recent studies have found that longevity has a positive effect on growth without considering old-age dependency rates. In this paper, we first justify the related yet independent roles of longevity and old-age dependency rates in determining saving and growth by using a growth model that encompasses both neoclassical and endogenous growth models as special cases. Using panel data from a recent World Bank data set, we then find that the longevity effect is positive and the dependency effect is negative in savings and investment regressions. The estimates indicate that the differences in the demographic variables across countries or over time can well explain the differences in aggregate savings rates. We also find that both population age structure and life expectancy are important contributing factors to growth.     

Resource abundance, growth and welfare: A Schumpeterian perspective

This paper takes a new look at the long-run implications of resource abundance. It develops a Schumpeterian model of endogenous growth that incorporates an upstream resource-intensive sector and yields an analytical solution for the transition path. It then derives conditions under which, as the economy's endowment of a natural resource rises, (i) growth accelerates and welfare rises, (ii) growth decelerates but welfare rises nevertheless, and (iii) growth decelerates and welfare falls. Which of these scenarios prevails depends on the response of the natural resource price to an increase in the resource endowment. The price response determines the change in income earned by the owners of the resource (the households) and thereby the change in their expenditure on manufacturing goods. Since manufacturing is the economy's innovative sector, this income-to-expenditure effect links resource abundance to the size of the market for manufacturing goods and drives how re-source abundance affects incentives to undertake innovative activity.     

Comparing the spread of capitalism and democracy

We apply Leeson and Dean’s (2009) method for studying democratic dominoes to capitalist spillovers to compare the rates at which capitalism and democracy spread between countries. We find that capitalism and democracy spread at approximately the same modest rate.     

GROWTH, R&D AND WELFARE: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY

This paper analyzes the normative side of an R&D growth model in which market structure and growth are jointly determined in the equilibrium of a one‐sector economy under monopolistic competition. We find that a distortion in the allocation of R&D, namely the presence of technological spillovers between firms, generates two market failures: insufficient growth and excessive entry of firms. We show that this result is driven by the interplay between market structure and growth. A simple tax/subsidy scheme to support the efficient solution is proposed.     

Trade, democracy, and the gravity equation

Does democracy affect trade? There are several channels by which democracy may affect trade, with differing implications. First, democratization in the exporting country can improve product quality and reduce trade costs, increasing bilateral trade. Second, democratization in the importing country may increase trade barriers and thus reduce imports. In this paper, I analyze the effect of democracy on trade by augmenting the gravity equation with democracy. Using a rich panel data set and controlling for the endogeneity of democracy, I find empirical evidence consistent with the hypothesis that democracy fosters trade. This finding is robust to various econometric methods and to the use of disaggregated specifications.     

Wealth inequality,democracy and economic freedom

Using a novel panel data set from the Credit Suisse on the top wealth shares for 46 sample countries spanning 2000–2014, this paper empirically investigates to what extent wealth inequality influences economic freedom and whether this relationship is affected by the level of democracy. Economic freedom is measured by the Fraser Institute's economic freedom summary index as well as its five major sub-indices, such as government size, property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade, and regulations. Wealth inequality is measured by the top wealth shares. Trade union density is used as an instrument for wealth inequality. Empirical results suggest that the rising wealth inequality significantly hampers overall economic freedom, property rights protection, freedom to trade, soundness of money and regulatory environment. Furthermore, this negative effect of wealth inequality is reinforced at a lower level of democracy. These findings are robust to alternative measures of wealth inequality, economic freedom, treatment for endogeneity, and model specification.     

Preaching democracy: The second Vatican council and the third wave

We use variation in religious doctrine produced by the unexpected Second Vatican Council (1962–65) to investigate the impact of religion on democratization. The Council, which transformed the Catholic Church from defender of the ancien régime into a leading apostle of religious freedom, human rights and democracy, represents the most significant example of institutionalized religious change since the Protestant Reformation. We adopt a difference-in-difference approach to estimate the Council's impact on democracy. Furthermore, we provide historical narratives on how the post-conciliar Catholic Church influenced the democratization process in different national contexts. Our research substantiates that the Church played a decisive role in third wave democratization.