On Education and Democratic Preferences

We make the point that preferences for democracy are positively correlated with level of education. This correlation is robust even after controlling for a range of personal characteristics, including country of residence, income, age, or using different definitions of preferences for democracy or using instrumental variables. Interestingly, the results hold across countries with different level of democracy. We use data from World Values Surveys and show that our results are consistent with a simple theoretical model in which education makes political accountability easier.     

From education to democracy: evidence from long-run time-varying estimates

This study reinvestigates the hypothesis that education is expected to have a positive and statistically significant effect on democracy for a panel of 169 countries over the period 1990–2014. Unlike previous studies, we employ the time-varying cointegration approach of Bierens and Martins (Econom Theory 26:1453–1490, 2010) to show the time-varying coefficient associated with education has a positive impact on democracy. Further examination of the countries by income classification reveals that education has a positive and increasing impact on democracy with the greatest impact in low-income countries.     

Middle Class in Africa: Determinants and Consequences

This study complements the inclusive growth literature by examining the determinants and consequences of the middle class in a continent where economic growth has been relatively high. The empirical evidence is based on a sample of 33 African countries for a 2010 cross-sectional study. Ordinary least squares, two-stage-least squares, three-stage-least squares and seemingly unrelated regressions estimation techniques are employed to regress a plethora of middle class indicators, notably, the: floating, middle-class with floating, middle-class without floating, lower-middle-income and upper-middle-income categories. Results can be classified into two main strands. First, results on determinants broadly show that GDP per capita and education positively affect all middle class dependent variables. However, we establish a negative nexus for the effect of ethnic fragmentation, political stability in general and partially for economic vulnerability. Simple positive correlations have been observed for: the size of the informal sector, openness and democracy. Second, on the consequences, the middle class enables the accumulation of human and infrastructural capital, while its effect is null on political stability and democracy in the short run but positive for governance and modernisation. Policy implications are discussed.     

The democratic transition

Over the last two centuries, many countries experienced regime transitions toward democracy. We document this democratic transition over a long time horizon. We use historical time series of income, education and democracy levels from 1870 to 2000 to explore the economic factors associated with rising levels of democracy. We find that primary schooling, and to a weaker extent per capita income levels, are strong determinants of the quality of political institutions. We find little evidence of causality running the other way, from democracy to income or education.     

Temporal causality and the dynamics of democracy,emigration and real income in Fiji

This study is the first to explore temporal causality between democracy, emigration and real income in Fiji within a multivariate cointegration model. We find three long run relationships between democracy, emigration and real income. In the long run there is evidence that migration and democracy Granger cause real GDP in Fiji; real GDP and democracy Granger cause migration from Fiji and that real GDP and migration Granger cause democracy in Fiji. In the short run we find unidirectional Granger causality running from migration to real GDP and from democracy to real GDP, but neutrality between democracy and migration in the short run. We also extend the analysis to examine the degree of exogeneity of the variables beyond the sample period through considering the decomposition of variance and impulse response functions.     

Inequality,Democracy, and Persistence: Is There a Political Kuznets Curve?

The aim of this paper is to provide comprehensive empirical evidence on recent theories that link democracy and income inequality for the period 1960–1997. In simple cross-country regressions I find a non-monotonic link between democracy and inequality when using ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, and Eusufzai tests. I also employ dynamic panel data techniques, which control for potential simultaneity and heterogeneity problems. I also find support for the existence of apolitical Kuznets curve. Moreover, it appears that income inequality is unconditionally persistent. Results are robust to different democracy proxies when sensitivity analysis is applied.     

Democracy and Education in twentieth‐century Latin America

Do democratic electoral systems strengthen a country's outcomes in education? Does the degree of inclusiveness of a democratic system matter? This article offers evidence that political competition and the inclusion of marginalized populations in electoral systems transformed education over an 80‐year period in Latin America. It finds that democracy has a positive effect on education enrollment and illustrates how current work on democracy and development has overlooked important democratic subcomponents, specifically, who votes and how. Our results deepen current work on democracy, operationalizing the impact of electoral expansion in comparative analysis and showing how democracies respond to specific education demands.     

The (small) blessing of foreign aid: further evidence on aid’s impact on democracy

In an empirical contribution to the literature of foreign aid, we estimate the impact of foreign aid on democracy in a panel of 93 developing economies during 1971–2010. We find that foreign aid promotes democracy, with the result robust to different estimation methodologies and control variables and to instrumenting for foreign aid.     

Why does democracy need education?

Across countries, education and democracy are highly correlated. We motivate empirically and then model a causal mechanism explaining this correlation. In our model, schooling teaches people to interact with others and raises the benefits of civic participation, including voting and organizing. In the battle between democracy and dictatorship, democracy has a wide potential base of support but offers weak incentives to its defenders. Dictatorship provides stronger incentives to a narrower base. As education raises the benefits of civic engagement, it raises participation in support of a broad-based regime (democracy) relative to that in support of a narrow-based regime (dictatorship). This increases the likelihood of successful democratic revolutions against dictatorships, and reduces that of successful anti-democratic coups.     

Does economic openness affect liberal and electoral democracy in a different way? Empirical evidence from developing countries

The focus of this paper was to empirically analyze the impacts of economic liberalization on the liberal and electoral democracy in a sample of 106 less developed and developing countries over the period 1970–2016. The economic relationship between these countries and the global trade and the financial system generates a crucial question of to what extent political conditions are affected by this changing relation. To test these relationships, this paper uses V‐Dem's liberal democracy and electoral democracy indices and nine economic liberalization variables. Utilizing two‐step system dynamic panel GMM estimation indicates that trade openness and economic globalization, de facto strongly affects electoral democracy.     

Democracy and growth

Growth and democracy (subjective indexes of political freedom) are analyzed for a panel of about 100 countries from 1960 to 1990. The favorable effects on growth include maintenance of the rule of law, free markets, small government consumption, and high human capital. Once these kinds of variables and the initial level of real per capita GDP are held constant, the overall effect of democracy on growth is weakly negative. There is a suggestion of a nonlinear relationship in which more democracy enhances growth at low levels of political freedom but depresses growth when a moderate level of freedom has already been attained. Improvements in the standard of living—measured by GDP, health status, and education—substantially raise the probability that political freedoms will grow. These results allow for predictions about which countries will become more or less democratic over time.     

Are Democracies Cleaner?

We inquire whether democracies enjoy lower pollution levels than autocracies by investigating the ‘clean democracy hypothesis’, which posits that democracies have a more demand-determined policy formation leading to more stringent environmental policies. We test this hypothesis with a large data set covering 137 countries and the period 1970–2012 using eleven different air pollutants as endogenous variables and a wide range of control variables measuring democracy, development stage, globalization, and factor endowments. We find no consistent evidence that democracies are cleaner, not even the richer ones, which casts doubt on the validity of single pollutants studies. Numerous checks show the robustness of our results.     

Democracy and economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa: a panel data approach

This paper studies the link between democracy and economic development for 28 countries of Sub-Saharan Africa for the period 1980–2005 in a panel data framework. A democracy index constructed from the Freedom House indices. A variety of panel data unit root and cointegration tests are applied. The variables are found to be integrated of order one and cointegrated. The Blundell–Bond system generalized methods-of-moments is employed to conduct a panel error-correction mechanism based causality test within a vector autoregressive structure. Economic growth is found to cause democracy in the short-run, while bidirectionality is uncovered in the long-run. In addition, the long-run coefficients are estimated through the panel fully modified ordinary least squares and dynamic ordinary least squares methods. Democracy has a positive impact on GDP and vice versa. These results lend support to the virtuous cycle hypothesis.     

Democracy and economic outcomes: Evidence from the superstars of modern art

This paper analyses the impact of the political environment on the value of artistic outcomes as measured by the price of paintings produced over the period from 1820 to 2007. The analysis is based on a unique dataset encompassing a global sample of 273 superstars of modern art born between 1800 and 1945, auction results of their paintings, and data on the political environment in the respective production countries. Controlling for a variety of economic and hedonic variables, there is a statistically significant, positive link between the level of democracy and the value of artistic output. Moreover, we find that democracy has a significant positive impact both on the density of superstar painters and the collective artistic human capital in a country.     

To Segregate or to Integrate: Education Politics and Democracy

How is the quality of public education affected by the presence of private schools for the rich? Theory and evidence suggest that the link depends crucially on the political system. We develop a theory that integrates private education and fertility decisions with voting on public schooling expenditures. We find that the presence of a large private education sector benefits public schools in a broad-based democracy where politicians are responsive to low-income families but crowds out public education spending in a society that is politically dominated by the rich. The main predictions of the theory are consistent with state-level data and micro data from the U.S. as well as cross-country evidence from the Programme for International Student Assessment study.     

Does direct democracy make for better citizens? A cautionary warning based on cross-country evidence

It has been shown that both formal existence and actual use of direct democratic institutions have effects on a number of variables such as fiscal policies, quality of governance but also economic growth. Further, it has been argued that direct democratic institutions would not only have an impact on policy outcomes but influence citizen participation and attitudes toward politics. For the first time, these conjectures are tested in a large cross-country sample here. Overall, we do not find strong effects and some of the significant correlations are rather small substantially. In contrast to previous studies, voter turnout is not higher when direct democracy is available or used. Further, and also in contrast to previous studies, citizens do not express a greater interest in politics in countries with direct democracy institutions. Finally, they display lower trust in government and parties but not in parliament. These results shed some doubt on the hope that direct democracy would make for better citizens.     

Democracy and Growth: Alternative Approaches

This article focuses on two previously unexamined aspects of the relationship between economic growth and democracy. First, the growth experiences of countries that experience significant changes in democracy are examined directly. Countries that democratize are found to grow faster than a priori similar countries, while countries that become less democratic grow more slowly than comparable countries. These differences do not seem to be due to differences in education or investment levels. Second, regression tree analysis suggests that democracy, along with initial income and literacy, contributes to the identification of regimes of countries facing similar aggregate production functions.     

Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830-1938

This paper examines the relation between public spending and the spread of democracy in Western Europe during the period 1830-1938. Our data set includes measures of the size of the electorate, the election rule, and electoral participation, as well as measures of the size and composition of central government expenditures for 12 countries. We estimate panel regressions, and find that (1) the gradual lifting of socio-economic restrictions on the voting franchise contributed to growth in government spending mainly by increasing spending on infrastructure and internal security; (2) the female suffrage had a weak positive effect, through spending on health, education and welfare; (3) the change from majority to proportional rule, which took place in 10 of the countries, did not contribute to growth in government spending, and held back spending on health, education and welfare; (4) there exists (weak) complementarity between economic development and the spread of democracy.     

Government size,democracy, and corruption: An empirical investigation

Previous studies on the effect of government size on corruption have produced mixed results. In an attempt to explain these ambiguous results, this study investigates the effect of government size on corruption by taking into account the role of the democracy in each country. Using annual data of 82 countries between 1995 and 2008, the estimation results indicate that an increase in government size can lead to a decrease in corruption if the democracy level is sufficiently high and, in contrast, can lead to an increase in corruption if it is too low. As robustness checks, the estimations using a different index of corruption and a different proxy for government size are also conducted. The results reveal that our main findings are robust. Furthermore, to address endogeneity problems, we conduct the instrumental variables estimation and the system generalized method of moments estimation, the results of which also support our primary findings. These results provide some important implications for policymakers seeking to perform government interventions without aggravating corruption.     

Democracy and prosperity in two decades of transition1

This article revisits the relationship between democracy, liberalization and prosperity in transition countries, using a panel of 25 countries over 20 years. Earlier investigations found political and economic liberalization to be positively correlated although the relationship between political liberalization and prosperity remained unclear. In this article, the results are ambiguous regarding the relationship between democracy indicators by Freedom House and the Polity Project on one hand and growth on the other. This contribution therefore investigates the component variables of these indicators to determine their degree of influence. The findings suggest that basic constitutional rights and constraints on the government rather than political competition as such may be conducive to both economic liberalization and prosperity in the transition countries.