The political economy of land reform choices in Central and Eastern Europe

In all Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) land reform has been a key part of the overall agrarian reforms and land reform procedures differ significantly among CEECs. This paper, by focusing on distributional effects and political economy implications, explains why thirteen CEEC governments chose particular reform procedures. Key factors in their choices are the history of the land ownership, including the post-collectivization ownership status, length of Communist rule, the ethnicity of pre-collectivization owners, and the equality of pre-collectivization asset distribution. These factors influence the distributional consequences of the land reform, including the (potential) conflicts between efficiency, social equity, and historical justice, and thus the political economy equilibrium.     

The political economy of the Ecuadorian financial crisis

This paper takes the unusual step of exploring economic hypothesesthrough interviews with key economic agents. It focuses on thecauses of Ecuador's 1999 banking collapse, within an eclecticframework with Minskian elements. Broad support is found for‘endogenous’ explanations of financial crises andlittle backing for explanations such as accidents or policymistakes. Interviewees argued that after the stabilisation programmeof 1992, agents became euphoric and accumulated debt to financeimprudent levels of expansion; that incentives for moral hazardled to financial corruption and excessive risk taking; and thatweak regulation after financial liberalisation encouraged financialfragility.     

Trade liberalization and political support in transition economies

Most transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe have rather surprisingly resisted protectionist pressures-at least during early stages of reform-and pursued fairly liberal trade policies. In this paper, trade policy during transition is explained from a political economy perspective. It is shown that pursuing liberal trade policies can be a rational strategy of reform politicians, maximizing the probability of electoral success.     

Outsiders in economic integrationThe case of a transition economy

We use a spatial model of endogenous growth to investigate the likely impact of discriminatory integration between two advanced insider countries on their own welfare as well as on the welfare of an outsider transition economy. A first point is that, since convergence in per capita income levels depends on relative market access and local market size, piece-wise integration causes insider-outsider divergence. Nonetheless, outsiders can gain in absolute terms if integration fosters the global growth rate. We also show that exclusion from a regional agreement and on-going transition have unpredictable joint effects on the structural adjustment, which might even exhibit a swinging behaviour. Such swings may imply large adjustment costs, which can be reduced by careful integration design. With this respect, the asymmetric phasing-out of trade barriers built into the Europe Agreements seems to work in the right direction. Finally, we point out that the predictions of the model in terms of direct investment and terms-of-trade dynamics are broadly consistent with some actual developments in transition economies.     

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. We show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, dictators who are less likely to lose power, are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support.     

The co‐development of economies and institutions

In this study, we model the Schumpeterian growth theory in a simple discrete‐time framework in which both economies and institutions need to be developed. Individuals need to borrow from an imperfect financial market to develop an economy. A government can adopt two potential strategies for improving the borrowing capacity of individuals and, as a result, enhancing economic performance: ‘the rule of law’ and ‘industrial policies’. We interpret market‐oriented reform in transition economies as a shift from ‘industrial policies’, exemplified at the extreme by the traditional planned economy, to ‘the rule of law’. The presented model shows that both strategies could be the best choice at different stages of development.     

Tipping the (Im)balance: Capital inflows,financial market structure,and banking crises

An emerging consensus among scholars and policy‐makers identifies foreign capital inflows as one of the primary determinants of banking crises in developed countries. We challenge this view by arguing that external imbalances are destabilizing only when banks face substantial competition from securities markets in the process of financial intermediation. We assemble a dataset of banking crises covering the advanced industrialized countries from 1976 to 2011 and find evidence of a conditional relationship between capital inflows, a well‐developed securities market, and the incidence of banking crises. We further explore the impact of capital inflows on banks’ actual risk taking as indicated by their capital adequacy levels and measures of insolvency risk. Our results demonstrate that prudential capital cushions tend to decline with the combination of capital inflows and prominent securities markets. We highlight the political decisions—often made during the early days of a country's financial development—that determine the relative prominence of banks vs. non‐bank financial institutions and conclude with policy recommendations.     

Religion and political economy in Saint-Simon

Abstract

The project of Henri Saint-Simon (1760–1825) was to complete the French Revolution by a social change in order to eliminate the so-called “feudal-military” system and to bring about a new society which he named “the industrial system”. Everything had to be changed, including religion and its relation to political economy. In this paper, I examine: (i) the recurring problem of religion, raised by Saint-Simon as early as his first text; (ii) the emergence of the economic problem of identifying production with politics; (iii) and finally, the metamorphosis of the Christian religion into a moral and industrial religion.     

Classical political economy: the subsistence wage,and job guarantee concerns

Abstract:

In the theoretical framework of classical political economy, including the revisions of Marx and the more recent work of Piero Sraffa and others, the concept of the subsistence wage figures prominently. Here, following a recounting of this concept and demonstrating its significance not only for classical theory but also for larger social concerns, I argue that the “base wage” (as it is sometimes termed) as articulated within a “Job Guarantee” program, is (or should be) comparable to the subsistence wage but requires modification to make it (roughly) equivalent. It will be demonstrated that adherents of the classical approach did not rest their wage theory on a quasi-neoclassical supply–demand approach (with some primitive marginal productivity notion lying behind a supposed demand for labor schedule), but understood wages as socially determined where institutional and historic forces established a normative standard around which market wages gravitated. Such an approach was shared by, among others, Thorstein Veblen and John Maynard Keynes.     

The determinants of economic growth of transition economies: Economic reform versus initial conditions

Abstract

This study analyzes factors for economic recovery of transition economies in Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States for the period of the 1990s. Covariance structure analysis is employed to estimate the structural equation system, and exploratory factor analysis is conducted to measure initial conditions and economic policy as latent variables. The result of analysis shows that the effect of initial conditions is negative and the impact of economic reform on growth is positive. However, the negative effect of initial conditions had overridden the positive impact of economic policy as of 2000. The reason that transition economies could not recover their pre-transition GDP level (even after ten years of transition history) seems to stem from the negative influence of initial conditions on growth rather than the slow speed of economic reform.     

The political economy of housing in England

Problems of housing affordability have been afflicting parts of the UK, especially the South East of England, for a number of years. The problem is closely related to shortages in housing supply, which are, in turn, largely associated with constraints imposed by the English land planning system. A leading theory for explaining these constraints posits that they reflect political economy forces that convey the interests of current homeowners to planning decisions in disproportionate and excessively influential ways. We test this theory by examining survey data on public attitudes to house building in local communities; and by investigating whether these attitudes are related to local planning decisions. We find that there is a tendency for owner-occupiers to express greater opposition to local house building and that, in the decade to 2011, the housing stock grew significantly less in local authorities with higher proportions of owner-occupiers among local households. The results suggest the risk that planning decisions might have been distorted in favour of current homeowners is real and economically significant. We discuss a range of historical, socio-economic and policy trends that help explain why successive governments of various stripes have been reluctant to address head-on problems in housing supply and put a curb on house prices.     

Tax reform in Georgia and the size of the shadow economy

This study applies three different methods widely used in the literature to track changes in shadow economic activity in Georgia following a drastic tax reform in 2005. The first method is a currency demand approach based on macrolevel data. The second and third methods rely on micro level data from household surveys. Overall, we find evidence that the amount of income underreporting decreased in the years following the reform. The biggest change is observed for households headed by a farmer, followed by ‘other’ types of households where the head does not report any working status. Employed and self‐employed households appear very similar before the tax reform and show minimal adjustment in income reporting in the post‐reform period. Results, however, suggest that much of any difference may have come from increased enforcement efforts rather than rate changes.     

Law and credit constraints in transition economies1

Using a survey of over 4,000 firms in 21 transition economies, this paper investigates how legal extensiveness (law on the books) and legal effectiveness (law in practice) affect availability of bank finance. Our findings suggest that both law on the books and law in practice are important, but that they impact firms of different sizes differently. Small firms appear to be the most credit constrained in countries with weak creditor rights and with weak contract enforcement, while large firms are the most credit constrained in countries with weak courts and unclear and inconsistent laws pertaining to firms’ business operations.     

Restructuring financial systems in transition and developing economies: an approach based on the French financial system

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the redesigning of financial systems in Central and Eastern European and developing countries by focusing attention on specific financial institutions appropriate to easing the transition and fostering the creation of markets. The paper argues that the immediate emulation of the better-known institutions of the most developed, market-based financial systems, i.e. the US and the UK, should not be taken for granted. It underlines, instead, the importance of drawing inspiration from the experiences of a variety of institutions and financial systems. Particularly relevant are those systems that have experienced forms of transition and a mix, over time, of market and state intervention.
The approach of this paper is one of institutional financial economics (Neave, 1991 and Williamson, 1986), in which structural details of financial institutions and contracts, in our case French financial institutions, are analysed. We argue that the principles on which some French financial institutions are based and aspects of their functioning are of value to reformers. We discuss the lessons that can be learnt from the Crédit National, the Commissariat Général du Plan, the CODEVI and the SOFARIS.     

Domestic financial market frictions,unrestricted international capital flows,and crises in small open economies

Summary. We present an example of a small open economy where small increases in the world interest rate may induce a sharp decline in output and a precipitous depreciation of the exchange rate. Due to a costly state verification problem in domestic credit markets, combined with unrestricted international capital flows, our economy generates two long-run equilibria, one with low GDP and a relatively depreciated real exchange rate (RER), and one with high GDP and a relatively appreciated RER. The first is always a saddle, while the second may be a sink or a source, depending on the level of the world interest rate. A crisis is identified with the economy switching from an equilibrium path approaching the high-output steady state to the saddlepath approaching the low-output steady state. In Mexicos recent history, periods of growth associated with appreciation of the RER have alternated with periods of sharp contraction and depreciation of the RER. Our economy displays such behavior in response to changes in the world interest rate.Received: 9 April 2002, Revised: 20 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E5, F4.G. Antinolfi, E. Huybens: We thank Steve Fazzari, Tim Kehoe, Todd Keister, Manuel Santos, Karl Shell and especially Bruce Smith for very helpful discussions. Jaime Calleja Alderete, Eduardo Camero Godínez, and Juan Vargas Hernández provided excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are ours. Huybens was an assistant professor in the Centro de Investigación Económica, ITAM, at the time this article was written, and part of this work was completed while Antinolfi was a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The views expressed herein are those of the authors, and do not reflect those of the World Bank or the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Correspondence to: G. Antinolfi     

The impact of institutional volatility on financial volatility in transition economies

What have been the determinants of financial volatility in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union? This paper posits that institutional changes, and in particular the volatility of crucial institutions such as property rights, have been the major causes of financial volatility in transition. Building a unique monthly database of 20 transition economies from 1991 to 2017, this paper applies the GARCH family of models to examine financial volatility as a function of institutional volatility. The results show that more advanced institutions help to dampen financial sector volatility, while institutional volatility feeds through directly to financial sector volatility in transition. Democratic changes in particular engender much higher levels of volatility, while property rights are sensitive to the metric used for their measurement.     

The trade wind,the statesman and the system of commerce: Sir James Steuart's vision of political economy

In the conception of history of the abbé de Condillac, one thing is really original. He establishes a causal relation between the functioning of the human mind and the history of societies. First, the understanding of humankind is not disordered: society develops, stages follow one another. But the commercial stage leads societies to divide into classes, the landowners are interested only in frivolous, luxurious objects: they have become denatured. Their behaviour entails society in a long phase of decline. However, this course is not inevitable. Condillac wishes to reform the individual in order to modify society and he proposes economic safeguards capable of reducing disparities. Life is simple, but history is not halted.     

State enterprise performance and soft budget constraints: The case of Bulgaria

This paper analyses the performance of state enterprises in Bulgaria during 1992-94. Consistent with the literature on other transitional economies, this paper finds that one key factor underlying (the lack of) enterprise adjustment in Bulgaria during this period was the availability of financing. Empirically, the (lack of) past adjustment and the softness of finance are the best predictors of current adjustment. Many state enterprises, mostly smaller ones, appear to have adjusted to the new economic structure, partly in response to tighter budget constraints. However, a number of large, hard-core lossmaking state enterprises did not adjust, due primarily to the soft budget constraints that they faced. These enterprises crowded out profitable enterprises, both public and private, through their large financing requirements, adversely affecting economic growth. Moreover, continued bank financing of these large loss-makers decapitalized the banking system, and budgetary financing of their losses, largely through tax arrears, has undermined fiscal policy. This lack of enterprise adjustment and the resulting financial indiscipline lies at the core of the macroeconomic difficulties that Bulgaria has recently faced.     

Integration and transition: Scenarios for the location of production and trade in Europe

Applying a newly developed CGE-model, we present scenarios for the future economic geography of Europe. The model divides the world into ten regions, five of which are European, and 14 industries, of which 12 are imperfectly competitive. With a complete input-output structure, the model captures comparative advantage mechanisms as well as intra-industry trade and 'new economic geography' agglomeration forces. The simulations focus on the consequences of successful transformation in Eastern Europe. The results indicate that transformation and European integration are of great importance for Eastern Europe, while the overall effects for other European regions are small. Individual sectors in the EU, such as Textiles and Transport Equipment, are, however, in some cases strongly affected.
JEL classification: C68, F12, F17, R11.