地区环境治理动机、政治关联与企业环境违规处罚——来自环保督政制度的新证据

基于新《环保法》的准自然实验,运用双重差分法和倾向得分匹配法,考量新法实施前后地方环境治理动机变化对企业环境违规处罚力度的影响。结果显示,新法实施前,政治关联对企业环境违规处罚力度具有“庇护”效应;新法实施后,“庇护”效应被削弱。其中,官员型政治关联和市场化水平较低地区的“庇护”效应削弱程度更大。结果表明,治理动机不足是以往环境治理失灵的重要成因。应着力完善正负激励互补的激励结构,强化地方政府环境治理动机。     

生态损害赔偿制度促进了企业环保投资吗?

以沪深A股重污染行业上市公司为研究样本,实证检验《生态环境损害赔偿制度改革试点方案》的实施对企业环保投资的影响及政治关联的调节效应。结果显示：该制度的出台显著提高了试点地区企业的环保投资水平,且企业政治关联对二者之间的关系具有正向调节作用。在解决了自选择偏差问题以及通过安慰剂检验后,该结论依然成立。进一步分析发现,该制度主要通过提高地方环境规制力度来促进企业环保投资。此外,其促进效应在非国有企业、地方财政环保支出较低及市场化程度较高的地区中更为显著。     

我国现行环境税费的环保效果:基于地方政府视角的分析

财政联邦主义理论告诉我们,地方财政行为可能会影响环境政策的执行,在财政分权的情况下,可能出现地方政府为了促进经济增长和增加税收收入而采取放松环境质量管理的策略行为,导致"竞争到底"现象的出现。基于这一理论假设,从地方政府的角度,建立计量经济模型对我国现行环境税费的环保效果进行实证检验,得出如下结论:我国应积极推行绿色GDP等考核指标;明晰中央政府和地方政府各自的环保责任;中央政府应规范地方政府之间的竞争,等等。     

Political Sustainability and the Design of Environmental Taxes

This paper studies the issue of political support for environmental taxes. The environmental tax is determined by majority voting, given a refund rule that specifies the allocation of tax proceeds. The refund rule is chosen by a welfare-maximizing constitutional planner. We show that: (i) The equilibrium tax rate is increasing in the proportion of tax reductions based on wage incomes. (ii) If labor and capital income taxes are reduced in the same proportion, to keep the government's budget balanced, majority voting yields a rate of environmental taxation that is lower than the optimal (Pigouvian) level. (iii) To mitigate this negative bias, the government reduces wage taxes by a higher proportion than capital income taxes. (iv) The final outcome will either be the Pigouvian tax or else all reductions will be given in wage taxes. This depends on individuals' preferences for the polluting good as well as wage and capital income distributions.     

The Political Economy of Volatility Dynamics in the Hong Kong Stock Market

Despite its obvious importance, little empirical research has examined the impact of political risk on stock market volatility. This paper uses data on the Hong Kong stock market over a long sample period to investigate whether political risk has induced regime shifts in stock market volatility. Regime shifts are modelled via a Markov switching EGARCH model that allows for regime-dependent volatility asymmetry. We find strong evidence of regime shifts in conditional volatility as well as significant volatility asymmetry in high volatility periods. Major political uncertainties were reflected in a switch to the high-volatility regime. However, contrary to popular perceptions, we find no evidence that the Hong Kong stock market has become persistently more volatile since the start of Sino-British political negotiations in 1982.     

环境规制影响工业绿色转型的中介及门槛效应研究

运用CRS-DEA模型评估2006—2021年全国工业绿色转型的状况,构建中介效应模型及门槛效应模型实证分析环境规制对工业绿色转型的内在影响机制及传导路径,发现正式环境规制对工业绿色转型的直接影响为负,非正式环境规制对工业绿色转型的直接影响为正,技术创新在正式环境规制影响工业绿色转型中起到正向的部分中介效应,而非正式环境规制通过技术创新和产业结构双重中介要素促进工业绿色转型。正式环境规制和非正式环境规制的门槛效应显示均存在单一门槛。因此,亟需持续推进环境规制的深度和广度,从工业经济增长和绿色低碳发展的“共生”“双赢”视角加快工业绿色转型。     

异质性环境规制与企业盈余信息质量——基于传染效应视角

利用2011—2017年重污染企业数据,检验传染效应视角下异质性环境规制对企业盈余信息质量的影响。研究发现：传染效应强化了显性环境规制对企业盈余信息质量的负向影响,削弱了隐性环境规制对企业盈余信息质量的正向影响。进一步研究发现：对于规模较大、环境不确定性较低和向下盈余管理的企业,传染效应的调节作用更为明显;内部控制质量和社会信任能削弱传染效应的正向调节作用;立法强度、环境补贴和公众参与是影响企业盈余信息质量的主要环境规制。     

生态利益分配的法治考量

环境治理上的困境也是环境法进化和发展的机遇.生态利益分配的失衡导致区域环境不正义问题、城乡环境不正义和群体环境不正义现象.生态利益分配的失衡与失范是生态环境问题的实质.生态利益的分配不是利益的剥夺和限制,其是以利益的维持和增进为目的,法律上权利是利益分配法律实现的惯常路径,利益是权利的核心要素,权利行使以保障利益实现为目的.因此,生态利益应以权利为路径来建构相应分配机制,要借助权属制度,确立权利的享有、权利的行使以及损害赔偿请求权制度来实现生态利益的法律实现.     

The Effect of the Alternation in the Ruling Party on Three-Factor Risks and Returns in ETF: The Case of Presidential Elections in Taiwan

This study discusses the effect of alternation in the ruling party in presidential elections on three-factor risks and returns of the three main exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in Taiwan, which has an unclearly defined international status and whose citizens have the right to vote directly for the president. We find that after the ruling party has been determined, in the period between Election Day and inauguration day, both the stock market and ETFs show a slight rise in prices. This suggests that most investors are initially optimistic after the election results have been announced. Meanwhile, the reverse book-to-market risk value deteriorates significantly. These results indicate that political uncertainty increases the risk premium of market factors and reverse book-to-market factors for some ETFs.     

空间关联与溢出效应：工业生态创新对资源环境承载力的影响研究

采用DEA-SBM模型测算各省市工业生态创新效率,信息熵技术度量各地资源环境承载力水平,空间Durbin模型和偏微分方法分析二者空间关联及溢出效应。研究发现：四种不同空间权重矩阵下的工业生态创新效率直接、间接与总效应系数都为正,并通过1%显著性检验,由此证明工业生态创新是资源环境承载力提升的主要因素之一。此外,区域内的人口密度、环境规制及开发强度对资源环境承载力具有显著正向影响;城镇化水平、对外开放水平与科技水平具有显著负向影响。     

Why Do Politicians Intervene in Accounting Regulation? The Role of Ideology and Special Interests

Politicians frequently intervene in the regulation of financial accounting. Evidence from the accounting literature shows that regulatory capture by special interests helps explain these interventions. However, many accounting rules have broad economic or social consequences, such as their effects on income distribution or private sector subsidies. The perception of these consequences varies with a politician's ideology. Therefore, if accounting rules produce those consequences, ideology plausibly spills over and explains a politician's stance on the technical accounting issue, beyond special interest pressure. We use two prominent U.S. political debates about fair value accounting and the expensing of employee stock options to disentangle the role of ideology from special interest pressure. In both debates, ideology explains politicians’ involvement at exactly those points when the debate focuses on the economic consequences of accounting regulation (i.e., bank bailouts and top management compensation). Once the debates focus on more technical issues, connections to special interests remain the dominant force.