过度自信、风险厌恶与我国上市公司经理薪酬激励

经理风险厌恶会增加股东使用业绩薪酬激励的成本,然而通过对我国上市公司高管的经验研究发现,如果经理过度自信,则会减弱风险厌恶带来的负面影响,表现为其薪酬中的报酬业绩敏感度更高,且其与风险之间的负相关关系减弱。同时研究还发现,非系统风险所占总风险比重较大的公司,相比系统风险所占比重较大的公司,会给予过度自信的高管更高的报酬业绩敏感度,这意味着高管的过度自信主要源于其对公司非系统风险认知的偏差。     

Acquisitions,Overconfident Managers and Self‐attribution Bias

We examine whether acquisitions by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns and whether managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution. Self‐attribution bias suggests that overconfidence plays a greater role in higher order acquisition deals predicting lower wealth effects for higher order acquisition deals. Using two alternative measures of overconfidence (1) high order acquisition deals and (2) insider dealings we find evidence supporting the view that average stock returns are related to managerial overconfidence. Overconfident bidders realise lower announcement returns than rational bidders and exhibit poor long‐term performance. Second, we find that managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution bias. Specifically, we find that high‐order acquisitions (five or more deals within a three‐year period) are associated with lower wealth effects than low‐order acquisitions (first deals). That is, managers tend to credit the initial success to their own ability and therefore become overconfident and engage in more deals. In our analysis we control for endogeneity of the decision to engage in high‐order acquisitions and find evidence that does not support the self‐selection of excessive acquisitive firms. Our analysis is robust to the influence of merger waves, industry shocks, and macroeconomic conditions.     

Sociology,risk and the environment: a material-semiotic approach

Abstract

Sociology has made significant contributions to the conceptualisation of risk and critique of technical risk analysis. It has, however, unintentionally reinforced the division of labour between the natural/technical and social sciences in risk analysis. This paper argues that the problem with conceptualisations of risk is not a misplaced emphasis on calculation. Rather, it is that we have not adequately dealt with ontological distinctions implicit in both sociological and technical work on risk between material or objective risks and our socially mediated understandings and interpretations of those risks. While acknowledging that risks are simultaneously social and technical, sociologists have not, in practice, provided the conceptual and methodological tools to apprehend risk in a less dualistic manner. This limits our ability both to analyse actors and processes outside the social domain and to explore the recursive relationships between risk calculus, social action and the material outcomes of risk. In response, this paper develops a material-semiotic conceptualisation of risk and provides an assessment of its relevance to more sociologically informed risk governance. It introduces the ideas of co-constitution, emergent entities and enactment as instruments for reconciling the material and social worlds in a sociological study of risk. It further illustrates the application of a material-semiotic approach using these concepts in the nuclear industry. In deconstructing social–material dualisms in the sociology of risk, this paper argues that a material-semiotic conceptualisation of risk enables both technical and social perspectives on risk not only to coexist but to collaborate, widening the scope for interdisciplinary research.     

Chief financial officer overconfidence and stock price crash risk

Numerous studies have shown the prevalence of overconfidence among Chief Financial Officers (CFOs). Surprisingly, the real effect of CFO overconfidence is under-researched. Using data from a large sample of US-listed firms over the period 1993–2019 and adopting an eclectic theoretical approach, we find that overconfident CFOs are more likely to increase stock price crash risk than non-overconfident CFOs through risk-taking and bad news hoarding. These findings pass a series of robustness tests. Furthermore, departing from most overconfident studies that merely examine one type of top managers (i.e., Chief Executive Officer (CEO)), we consider the influence of CEO and CFO overconfidence jointly. Interestingly, we find that CFO overconfidence outweighs CEO overconfidence in influencing stock price crash risk. Moreover, the overconfidence effect is intensified when overconfident CFOs collaborate with overconfident CEOs, thus raising stock price crash risk. However, stronger governance and a transparent information environment constrain overconfident CFOs' effect on stock price crash risk. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of CFO overconfidence in determining stock return tail risks.     

Risk assessments at the Royal Netherlands Air Force: an explorative study

In this paper, differences in the assessment of mission risks and mission benefits between operators and members of the management level in the transport helicopter branch of the Royal Netherlands Air Force (RNLAF) are studied. Results were obtained from a risk analysis that was conducted in accordance with RNLAF procedures. The analysis suggests that the two organizational levels have a coherent perception on risks despite their hierarchical position. Perceived measures of control – controllability – seem to induce the inclusion or the exclusion of what is appeared to be a risk. The analysis also suggests that risk management tools may obscure these perceptual differences. Risk management tools may therefore not be sufficient to attain safe operations. In discussions and future studies on risk management and on hierarchical differences in risk perception, this is something to take well notice of. Also, managers and others involved in risk management need to recognize the implications of using risk management instruments that are based on simplified models of risk. This research adds to the risk management theory because it connects multi-dimensional risk theory with actual organizational risk management practice.     

Relative Importance of Risk Sources in Insurance Systems

Abstract

Actuaries, and other managers of uncertainty, identify factors in modeling insurance risks because they believe (1) that these factors affect the outcome of a risk or (2) that the factors can be managed, thus allowing analysts a degree of control over the insurance system. This paper shows how to use a statistical measure, the coefficient of determination, for quantifying the relative importance of a source of uncertainty. With a quantitative measure of relative importance, risk managers can sharpen their intuition about the relative importance of risk factors and become better custodians of financial security systems.

This paper shows that the coefficient of determination is intuitively appealing in assessing the effectiveness of basic risk management techniques including risk exchange, pooling, and financial risk management. A single source common to all risks reduces the effectiveness of a pool; the risk measure quantifies the relative importance of this common source. The coefficient of determination is shown to have roots in the economics as well as the statistics literature. This connection provides further motivation for using the coefficient of determination and also suggests alternative measures for quantifying relative importance. The risk measure is useful in multivariate situations in which several factors affect a risk simultaneously. The paper illustrates this usefulness by considering a pool of policies that is subject to mortality, a common disaster, and a common investment environment.     

Momentum,Reversals, and Fund Manager Overconfidence

This paper examines the role of investor overconfidence and self‐attribution bias in explaining the momentum effect. We develop a novel measure of overconfidence based on characteristics and trading patterns of US equity mutual fund managers. Stocks held by more overconfident managers experience greater momentum profits and stronger return reversals than stocks held by less overconfident managers. The difference in momentum profits is not compensation for risk nor is it attributable to stock characteristics that influence momentum. Our results are consistent with Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) who argue that momentum results from delayed overreaction caused by overconfidence and biased self‐attribution.     

Time-varying managerial overconfidence and pecking order preference

This paper examines whether managerial overconfidence enhances or weakens pecking order preference. We construct time-varying managerial words-based (i.e. tone of Chairman’s Statement) and action-based (i.e. firm investment and directors’ trading) overconfidence measures. Both optimistic tone and industry-adjusted investment have significant and negative impacts on the pecking order coefficient in the Shyam-Sunder and Myers (J Financ Econ 51:219–244, 1999) regression framework. Overconfident managers tend to use more equity than debt to finance deficits. This new evidence is consistent with the proposition that overconfident managers who underestimate the riskiness of future earnings believe that their debt (equity) is undervalued (overvalued) and therefore prefer equity to debt financing. Thus, managerial overconfidence can lead to a reverse pecking order preference. We also find that managerial overconfidence significantly weakens pecking order preference especially in firms with high earnings volatility and small firms.     

Is managerial ability a moderator? The effect of credit risk and liquidity risk on the likelihood of bank default

This study investigates the effect of credit and liquidity risks as well as the moderating role of managerial ability on the likelihood of European commercial bank default during the period 2006 to 2017. We employ data envelopment analysis and a tobit model to measure banks' efficiency, the z-score to measure the likelihood of their default, and perform endogeneity and model specification robustness tests. Our results reveal that both risks significantly affect the likelihood of bank default and that the high skill of managers does not attenuate this effect. Rather, in the case of credit risk, managerial ability extenuates this effect. Managerial overconfidence and narcissism may explain the latter result. Another plausible explanation is that highly skilled managers who are likely to be rewarded with performance-based compensation schemes may be incentivized to hide bad news for an extended period of time. Such a scenario would increase the likelihood of bank default.     

Corporate Management of Highly Dynamic Risks: Evidence from the Demand for Terrorism Insurance in Germany

This paper investigates a corporation's risk management response to highly dynamic risks. Using a unique data set on the German terrorist insurance market, the paper tests whether corporate risk managers have a clear understanding of the probability distribution of highly dynamic risks or if risk managers learn from severe losses and base their decisions upon day-to-day experience. The paper further investigates whether risk managers become more confident in their risk management decisions over time. For this purpose, we apply Viscusi's prospective reference theory to a corporate context. We find that firms learn from single events when making their risk management decisions, and that risk managers become more confident with their risk management decisions over time.     

Social Security with Heterogeneous Populations Subject to Demographic Shocks

In a previous paper, we showed how a pay-as-you-go social security scheme, based on voluntary contributions, can be an appropriate institution to reach an optimal sharing of risks among generations in the presence of demographic uncertainties. We study here the functioning of such schemes when there are different population strata, with different demographic shocks and wages. We show that while a collective voluntary pay-as-you-go scheme can provide efficient intergenerational risk sharing, it is likely to be destabilized by pensions funds specialized by agents' types. This is true both when there is a complete set of contingent markets, where the risk pooling capabilities of a collective fund are potentially of less interest, and when markets are incomplete. In this last circumstance, a collective fund may help the living agents to share their intragenerational risks. However, we show that the resulting allocation does not Pareto dominate the outcome of individual funds by agent types, and that there are incentives for agents to separate from any collective organization.     

Overconfidence,Compensation Contracts,and Capital Budgeting

A risk‐averse manager's overconfidence makes him less conservative. As a result, it is cheaper for firms to motivate him to pursue valuable risky projects. When compensation endogenously adjusts to reflect outside opportunities, moderate levels of overconfidence lead firms to offer the manager flatter compensation contracts that make him better off. Overconfident managers are also more attractive to firms than their rational counterparts because overconfidence commits them to exert effort to learn about projects. Still, too much overconfidence is detrimental to the manager since it leads him to accept highly convex compensation contracts that expose him to excessive risk.     

Effects of managerial overconfidence and ability on going-concern decisions and auditor turnover

I examine how the appearance of managerial overconfidence and managerial ability affect 1) auditors' decisions to issue a going concern opinion and 2) auditor dismissal rates after issuing a going concern opinion. Managerial attributes are likely to have an influence on auditors' decisions because auditors obtain and evaluate information about client management's remedy plans when there is substantial doubt about the entity's ability to continue as a going concern. While prior literature on managerial overconfidence classifies all managers who demonstrate overconfident behaviors in one group, I argue that the literature needs to take managerial ability into consideration when measuring overconfidence. I find that auditors are more likely to issue a going concern opinion to clients with seemingly overconfident managers only when the management who appears overconfident is also incompetent. I also find that auditors are more likely to be dismissed after issuance of a going concern opinion when the client company has seemingly overconfident management. Finally, I find that the association between managerial overconfidence and auditor dismissal subsequent to issuance of a going concern opinion is stronger when management is relatively more powerful than the company's audit committee.     

Risk Management of Correlation Products

Trading units within the banking and dealer community that trade exotic instruments are well aware of the hazards of using traditional tools in analysing the risks resulting from positions taken in their specialised markets. The global risk management systems within these organisations have been slower to recognise the new risk profiles created by more recently traded exotic instruments. For traditional risks that are separable , the evaluation of risk at the individual trading units and the subsequent aggregation of risk across trading units captures the risks inherent in the portfolio. However, with non-traditional, non-separable risks, this division (by trading unit) and subsequent aggregation (by risk managers) of risks may obscure an increasing amount of risk found in the firm's trading operation.     

Worst case portfolio vectors and diversification effects

We consider the problem of identifying the worst case dependence structure of a portfolio X ₁,…,X _n of d-dimensional risks, which yields the largest risk of the joint portfolio. Based on a recent characterization result of law invariant convex risk measures, the worst case portfolio structure is identified as a μ-comonotone risk vector for some worst case scenario measure μ. It turns out that typically there will be a diversification effect even in worst case situations. The only exceptions arise when risks are measured by translated max correlation risk measures. We determine the worst case portfolio structure and the worst case diversification effect in several classes of examples as, e.g. in elliptical, Euclidean spherical, and Archimedean type distribution classes.     

The control dynamics of outsourcing involving an early-stage firm

Firms in the early stage of their organisational lifecycle experience challenges that shape the adoption of management controls. They are also recognised for their use of outsourcing. However, the accounting research has provided limited insight on how these control challenges and inter-organisational control concerns interact to influence the adoption of specific controls within an outsourcing relationship involving an early-stage firm. Exploration of this gap provides a key motivation for this paper. Contrary to existing management control and organisational science literature, we find a strong preference for new or enhanced action controls. Conversely, we find low levels of interest in result controls by managers within the buyer but not the supplier firm. These preferences influence inter-organisational control adoption within the frame of an incomplete outsourcing contract that emphasises flexibility in terms of relationship exit. Within the limits of a case study methodology, we argue that adoption of inter-organisational controls is shaped by tensions between the control challenges of early-stage firms, the control preferences of managers within these firms and inter-organisational control concerns. These findings have theoretical implications, expanding the Davila et al. [2009. Reasons for management control systems adoption: insights from product development systems choice by early-stage entrepreneurial companies. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34 (3–4), 322–347] framework and the Merchant [1985. Control in Business Organizations. Boston, MA: Pitman] control typology into an ESF inter-organisational control context.     

Managerial overconfidence and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from primary and secondary data

The corporate finance literature argues that overconfident managers tend to hold less cash, and this leads to a significant deviation from optimal cash levels. We analyse the impact of executive overconfidence on the corporate cash holdings of listed Vietnamese firms. To quantify managerial overconfidence, a novel core measure used in our analyses is voice pitch, which is obtained from interviews with top-line managers. Other measures of managerial overconfidence are also used to support the results and confirm the validity of the voice pitch measure. Our empirical evidence, with economically significant results, reveals that higher levels of overconfidence amongst managers are associated with lower cash holdings. Surprisingly, the findings show that overconfident managers tend to be associated with a low level of deviation from optimal cash holding levels. In addition, our findings also provide evidence that managerial overconfidence can increase cash levels and deviations from target cash holdings for overinvesting firms.     

Risk aversion,prudence, and compensation

In a standard principal-agent setting, we use a comparative approach to study the incentives provided by different types of compensation contracts, and their valuation by managers with utility function u who are risk averse (u″<0) and prudent (u″′>0). We show that concave contracts tend to provide more incentives to risk averse managers, while convex contracts tend to be more valued by prudent managers. This is because concave contracts concentrate incentives where the marginal utility of risk averse managers is highest, while convex contracts protect against downside risk. Thus, managerial prudence can contribute to explain the prevalence of stock-options in executive compensation. However, convex contracts are not optimal when the principal is sufficiently prudent relative to the manager.     

Risk Management—the Revealing Hand

Many believe that the recent emphasis on enterprise risk management function is misguided, especially after the failure of sophisticated quantitative risk models during the global financial crisis. One concern is that top‐down risk management will inhibit innovation and entrepreneurial activities. The authors disagree and argue that risk management should function as a “revealing hand” that identifies, assesses, and mitigates risks in a cost‐efficient way. In so doing, risk management can add value by allowing companies to take on riskier projects and strategies. But to avoid problems encountered in the past, particularly during the recent crisis, risk managers must overcome deep‐seated individual and organizational biases that prevent managers and employees from thinking clearly and analytically about their risk exposures. In this paper, the authors draw lessons from seven case studies about the ways that a corporate risk management function can foster highly interactive dialogues to identify and prioritize risks, help to allocate resources to mitigate such risks, and bring clarity to the value trade‐offs and moral dilemmas that often must be addressed in decisions to manage risks. Developing an effective risk management system requires, first, an agreement about a company's objectives, values, and priorities; second, a clear formulation and communication of the firm's “risk appetite”; and, third, continuous monitoring of a firm's risk‐taking behavior against its declared risk limits. Quantitative risk models should not be the sole—or even the most important—basis for decision‐making. They cannot replace management judgment and are best used to trigger in‐depth discussions among managers and employees about the most important risks faced by the firm and the best ways to respond to them.