Abandonment Options and Information System Design

We study a principal-agent model of moral hazard in which the principal has an abandonment option. The option to abandon a project midstream limits a firm's downside risk. From a consumption (production) perspective, the option is clearly beneficial. However, from an incentive perspective, the option can be costly. Removing the lower tail of the project's underlying cash flow distribution also eliminates the information it contains about an agent's (unobservable) productive input. In addition, there is also the issue that the option holder cannot always (ex ante) commit to the precise circumstances under which the option will be exercised. These concerns introduce an interaction in the valuation of the abandonment option and information system. In particular, the manner in which information is coarsened and the direction of the flow of information are critical design parameters that affect option value.     

Presale Contract and its Embedded Default and Abandonment Options

The presale contract is a popular property selling method that allows a buyer to default on the remaining payment and/or a developer to abandon a project. Using a simple two-period game theoretical model, we derive a closed-form pricing equation for a presale contract that explicitly accounts for a developer??s abandonment option and a buyer??s default option. Although a developer has an abandonment option under either a spot sale or a presale method, the option is more valuable under a presale contract because of an additional cash inflow from the presale downpayment. A presale also provides a buyer a default option, which is valuable in a real estate market with uncertain demand and price risk. We analyze the implications of the abandonment option on a developer??s construction decision and choice of selling method, as well as the implications of the default option on a buyer??s purchase decision. Furthermore, our model framework has implications to the pricing of futures contracts that involve both stochastic revenues and costs.     

Agent Employment Horizons and Contracting Demand for Forward-Looking Performance Measures

In this paper, the principal rewards an agent's farsighted effort both in the short and long term, with the short-term reward based on a noisy, forward-looking performance measure and the long-term reward based on a potentially less noisy, trailing performance measure. The main result is that optimal contracting weights depend on the agent's employment time horizon: the shorter the agent's employment horizon the greater the emphasis on the forward-looking performance measure and vice versa. This implies that contracting on forward-looking performance measures can be valuable in mitigating any adverse long-term effects of employees myopically focusing on short-term trailing performance measures.     

Brealey,Myers, and Allen on Real Options

Real options are valuable sources of flexibility that are either inherent in, or can be built into, corporate assets. The value of such options are generally not captured by the standard discounted cash flow (DCF) approach, but can be estimated using a variant of financial option pricing techniques. This article provides an overview of the basics of real option valuation by examining four important kinds of real options:

• 1 The option to make follow‐on investments. Companies often cite “strategic” value when taking on negative‐NPV projects. A close look at the payoffs from such projects reveals call options on follow‐on projects in addition to the immediate cash flows from the projects. Today's investments can generate tomorrow's opportunities.
• 2 The option to wait (and learn) before investing. This is equivalent to owning a call option on the investment project. The call is exercised when the firm commits to the project. But often it's better to defer a positive‐NPV project in order to keep the call alive. Deferral is most attractive when uncertainty is great and immediate project cash flows—which are lost or postponed by waiting—are small.
• 3 The option to abandon. The option to abandon a project provides partial insurance against failure. This is a put option; the put's exercise price is the value of the project's assets if sold or shifted to a more valuable use.
• 4 The option to vary the firm's output or its production methods. Companies often build flexibility into their production facilities so that they can use the cheapest raw materials or produce the most valuable set of outputs. In this case they effectively acquire the option to exchange one asset for another.

The authors also make the point that, in most applications, real‐option valuation methods are a complement to, not a substitute for, the DCF method. Indeed DCF, which is best suited to and usually sufficient for safe investments and “cash cow” assets, is typically the starting point for real‐option analyses. In such cases, DCF is used to generate the values of the “underlying assets”—that is, the projects when viewed without their options or sources of flexibility.     

Technological advances and the decision to invest

Technological advances impact a firm’s investment decision, as they affect the investment cost. They can also affect the profitability due to demand shocks. We study a firm’s optimal investment decision when technological advances occur as surprises and induce uncertain reductions in the investment cost and in earnings. Despite this complex setting we derive closed-form solutions for the investment option value and the investment threshold. When technological advances only impact the investment cost, we demonstrate significant contributions compared to existing research, which restricts the analysis by keeping the expected investment cost path constant. For example, we show that, albeit the investment threshold is constant, the option value is very sensitive in the expected impact of technological advances. Leaving the restrictive setting, we obtain more intuitive results, e.g. that more frequent technological advances increase the option value. When technological advances impact future earnings we find important long-term effects: the investment threshold increases, whereas the option value decreases. Finally, earnings volatility postpones investment, while uncertainty due to technological advances expedites investment.     

The optimal allocation of decision and exit rights in organizations

We show that in a bilateral relation with conflicting preferences and transferable utility it is unambiguously optimal to assign the authority over project decisions to the privately informed rather than the uninformed party. This holds irrespective of the degree of conflict and the distribution of private information. Under the optimal contract, the uninformed party is protected by an exit option, which it will exert when the decision maker has not chosen the promised decision. Exit terminates the relation and diminishes the project surplus. We show that the first‐best efficient solution can be obtained by such a contract.     

清洁能源发电项目投资决策的实物期权模型及其应用

由于理论方法的假设与实际情况往往存在差异,传统DCF分析方法具有本质缺陷。同时,清洁能源发电项目投资具有很高的不可逆性、不确定性、竞争性和可持续发展特性,因此传统DCF分析方法不太适合清洁能源发电项目投资决策。基于此,本文提出了在清洁能源发电项目投资决策中引入实物期权的思路,并初步讨论了清洁能源发电项目投资的实物期权模型及其与企业策略相结合的方法。     

A real-world way to manage real options

Each corporate growth project is an option, in the sense that managers face choices--push ahead or pull back--along the way. Yet many companies hesitate to apply options theory to initiatives such as R&D and geographic expansion, partly because these "real" options are highly complex. In this article, the authors make the case that the complexity of real options can be eased through the use of a binomial valuation model. Many of the problems with real-options analysis stem from the use of the Black-Scholes-Merton model, which isn't suited to real options. Binomial models, by contrast, are simpler mathematically, and you can tinker with a binomial model until it closely reflects the project you wish to value. Suppose your company is considering investing in a new plant. To use the binomial model, you must create an "event tree" to figure out the full range of possible values for the plant during the project's lifetime--next year, at the end of the design phase, upon completion. Then you work backward from the value at completion, factoring in the various investments, to determine the value of the project today. These calculations provide you with numbers for all the possible future values of the option at the various points where a decision needs to be made on whether to continue with the project. The authors also address another criticism of real options: that gaps often arise between theoretical and realized values of options of all types. Such gaps may be largely the result of managers exercising options at the wrong time. To improve the way it manages its real options, a company can look out for the decision trigger points that correspond to the nodes on a binomial decision tree. The trigger points should not only tell managers when they need to decide on exercise but also specify rules governing the exercise decisions.     

实物期权在项目信贷评估中的运用

近20年来,众多国内外学者对实物期权进行了大量研究并得出结论:决策灵活性确实增加了项目整体评估价值。但这些研究基本上是从项目管理者角度进行分析的。本文着重从银行角度探讨了实物期权在信贷评估过程中的作用,结果表明:在传统的以折现现金流法(DiscountedCashFlow,DCF)为主导的项目评估过程中融入实物期权思想,将使对高科技类项目的评价更加客观、全面。对项目投资决策选择权的分析可以加强信贷工作人员对项目贷款风险趋势的事前判断,对项目在未来运行中的不确定性进行评估,并通过在合同中增加约束性条款,实现项目权利向银行权利的转化,以降低银行信贷风险。     

Delegation to Encourage Communication of Problems

We study a principal's choice to centralize or delegate decisions to an agent when delegation can be used to encourage the agent to communicate potential problems. We find that the principal may choose centralization either to exercise better control over the agent's actions or to provide stronger incentives. Delegation emerges in equilibrium only if the costs of effort to acquire information for both the principal and the agent are sufficiently high. We find that increases in the principal's penalties for an incorrect decision may increase the principal's expected payoff, owing to optimal organizational responses. In addition, catastrophic risk, the risk of incorrectly accepting a defective audit (or product), may be greater under centralization than under delegation. Furthermore, catastrophic risk can be increased by well-intentioned legislative efforts to decrease such risk by, for example, increasing the agent's penalties for failing to take a corrective action, because the organizational structure may change.     

Real Options: Meeting the Georgetown Challange

In response to the demand for a single, generally accepted real options methodology, this article proposes a four‐step process leading to a practical solution to most applications of real option analysis. The first step is familiar: calculate the standard net present value of the project assuming no managerial flexibility, which results in a value estimate (and a “branch” of a decision tree) for each year of the project's life. The second step estimates the volatility of the value of the project and produces a value tree designed to capture the main sources of uncertainty. Note that the authors focus on the uncertainty about overall project value, which is driven by uncertainty in revenue growth, operating margins, operating leverage, input costs, and technology. The key point here is that, in contrast to many real options approaches, none of these variables taken alone is assumed to be a reliable surrogate for the uncertainty of the project itself. For example, in assessing the option value of a proven oil reserve, the relevant measure of volatility is the volatility not of oil prices, but of the value of the operating entity—that is, the project value without leverage. The third step attempts to capture managerial flexibility using a decision “tree” that illustrates the decisions to be made, their possible outcomes, and their corresponding probabilities. The article illustrate various kinds of applications, including a phased investment in a chemical plant (which is treated as a compound option) and an investment in a peak‐load power plant (a switching option with changing variance, which precludes the use of constant risk‐neutral probabilities as in standard decision tree analysis). The fourth and final step uses a “no‐arbitrage” approach to form a replicating portfolio with the same payouts as the real option. For most corporate investment projects, it is impossible to locate a “twin security” that trades in the market. In the absence of such a security, the conventional NPV of a project (again, without flexibility) is the best candidate for a perfectly correlated underlying asset because it represents management's best estimate of value based on the expected cash flows of the project.     

Strategy as a portfolio of real options

In financial terms, a business strategy is much more like a series of options than like a single projected cash flow. Executing a strategy almost always involves making a sequence of major decisions. Some actions are taken immediately while others are deliberately deferred so that managers can optimize their choices as circumstances evolve. While executives readily grasp the analogy between strategy and real options, until recently the mechanics of option pricing was so complex that few companies found it practical to use when formulating strategy. But advances in both computing power and our understanding of option pricing over the last 20 years now make it feasible to apply real-options thinking to strategic decision making. To analyze a strategy as a portfolio of related real options, this article exploits a framework presented by the author in "Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started on the Numbers" (HBR July-August 1998). That article explained how to get from discounted-cash-flow value to option value for a typical project; in other words, it was about reaching a number. This article extends that framework, exploring how, once you've worked out the numbers, you can use option pricing to improve decision making about the sequence and timing of a portfolio of strategic investments. Timothy Luehrman shows executives how to plot their strategies in two-dimensional "option space," giving them a way to "draw" a strategy in terms that are neither wholly strategic nor wholly financial, but some of both. Such pictures inject financial discipline and new insight into how a company's future opportunities can be actively cultivated and harvested.     

The agency problem,investment decision,and optimal financial structure

This article constructs a real options model in which a firm has a privileged right to exercise an irreversible investment project with a stochastic payoff. Supposing that the investment costs are fully sunk, a firm that exercises the investment option after debt is in place will then choose a better state to exercise this option as it issues more bonds. This debt-overhang phenomenon, however, benefits the firm since waiting is itself valuable. Accordingly, the firm will both exercise the investment option later and issue more bonds as compared with a firm that issues bonds upon exercising the investment option.     

Inventory Decision under Demand Uncertainty: A Contingent Claims Approach

This study uses the discrete-time option pricing model for the evaluation of the firm's inventory decision under demand uncertainty. The paper establishes the following optimal inventory decision implications: the optimal order quantity is positively related to the product selling price, product salvage value, interest rate, and the size of the outstanding orders; and negatively related to the product cost. The effect of demand uncertainty on the optimal order quantity is shown to be ambiguous. This study also shows that the maximum present value of profit from the contingent claims approach can be substantially different from that of the modified standard newsboy problem.     

Public Sector Outsourcing as an Exchange Option

The outsourcing of government activities is justified primarily by expected cost savings. In the formal process of determining whether there are potential savings from contracting out, public sector agencies in Australia are required by published government guidelines to measure the relevant costs of in-house activities and to compare these with external bids. Similar and in technical respects essentially identical requirements exist in Great Britain. The cost comparison methodology advocated in these various publications is deficient in that it makes no allowance for the financial value of the option to contract out. Like other options, the option to contract out provides a hedge against uncertainty, and is all the more valuable the more uncertain (less predictable) the agency's future costs of in-house and external service arrangements. In the face of inherently uncertain cost streams, there is something to be said for conserving all available options. By interpreting the option to contract out as a financial asset with theoretically measurable value, arguments for government agencies maintaining at least some in-house capabilities are given a basis in 'rational economics'.     

Real options,agency conflicts,and optimal capital structure

We examine the impact of a stockholder–bondholder conflict over the timing of the exercise of an investment option on firm value and corporate financial policy. We find that an equity-maximizing firm exercises the option too early relative to a value-maximizing strategy, and we show how this problem can be characterized as one of overinvestment in risky investment projects. Equityholders’ incentive to overinvest significantly decreases firm value and optimal leverage, and significantly increases the credit spread of risky debt. Numerical solutions illustrate how the agency cost of overinvestment and its effect on corporate financial policy vary with firm and project characteristics.     

OPTION EXERCISE GAMES: THE INTERSECTION OF REAL OPTIONS AND GAME THEORY

While the real options approach has proven useful in providing an analytical framework for analyzing the timing of investment decisions, a notable failure of the approach has been an almost complete lack of strategic considerations. In standard real options models, invest-ment (and exercise) strategies are for-mulated in isolation, without considering the potential impact of other firms' exercise strategies. This paper illustrates how the intersection of real options and game theory provides powerful new insights into the behavior of economic agents under uncertainty.
Introducing strategic considerations into the real options framework can lead to a rethinking of standard real option analysis. For example, one of-ten cited conclusion of the real options literature is the overturning of the standard capital budgeting rule of in-vesting immediately in any project with a positive NPV. Because the fu-ture value of the asset is uncertain, there may be significant benefits to deferring the investment until condi-tions prove even more favorable. But this result clearly depends on the lack of competitive access to the project. If firms fear preemption, then the option to wait becomes less valuable. For example, while the standard real op-tions models suggest that a real estate developer should wait until the devel-opment option is considerably "in the money," competition and the fear of preemption will likely force develop-ers to build much earlier.     

Time to build,option value,and investment decisions

Investment decisions and outlays are often made sequentially. For example, the rate at which construction proceeds is usually flexible and can be adjusted with the arrival of new information. Traditional discounted cash flow methods which treat the pattern of investment as fixed ignore this flexibility and understate the value of the project. This paper uses contingent claims analysis to derive optimal decision rules and to value such investments. We determine the effects of time to build, opportunity cost and uncertainty on the investment decision. For reasonable parameter values, we show how a simple NPV rule can lead to gross errors.     

THE VALUE OF A REGULATORY SEAL OF APPROVAL

I investigate whether obtaining a regulatory seal of approval adds to firm value. For a sample of thirty-four firms that acquired the insured deposits of failed banks, I find a significantly greater price response for firms that could benefit from obtaining a regulatory seal of approval than for firms that had recently obtained a similar form of approval. Further, abnormal returns to winning bidders are significantly larger when a regulatory seal of approval is likely to be more valuable, i.e., when the industry faces severe economic problems. In addition, bidder gains are significant only in markets where regulatory certification of a firm's health is important—markets that have recently experienced several bank failures. Finally, wealth transfers from the FDIC insurance fund may contribute to bidder gains. The evidence suggests that obtaining a regulatory seal of approval can positively affect firm value.     

Real options under a double exponential jump-diffusion model with regime switching and partial information

We consider the irreversible investment in a project which generates a cash flow following a double exponential jump-diffusion process and its expected return is governed by a continuous-time two-state Markov chain. If the expected return is observable, we present explicit expressions for the pricing and timing of the option to invest. With partial information, i.e. if the expected return is unobservable, we provide an explicit project value and an integral-differential equation for the pricing and timing of the option. We provide a method to measure the information value, i.e. the difference between the option values under the two different cases. We present numerical solutions by finite difference methods. By numerical analysis, we find that: (i) the higher the jump intensity, the later the option to invest is exercised, but its effect on the option value is ambiguous; (ii) the option value increases with the belief in a boom economy; (iii) if investors are more uncertain about the economic environment, information is more valuable; (iv) the more likely the transition from boom to recession, the lower the value of the option; (v) the bigger the dispersion of the expected return, the higher the information value; (vi) a higher cash flow volatility induces a lower information value.