内部货币与我国最优关税政策研究

本文将内部货币引入一个包含两国两商品的纯交换经济,在考虑贸易关税的情形下,将此拓展成一个Nash关税博弈模型。我们用2005年中国与世界其他国家(ROW)的产出和双边贸易数据对该贸易模型进行数值分析,考察一般经济均衡条件下内部货币的引入对我国与ROW最优关税政策的影响。研究表明:(1)内部货币对贸易双方关税博弈的Nash均衡有显著影响,即相对于无内部货币的情形,内部货币的存在将削弱我国在关税博弈中的关税报复力量。(2)中国在2005年的实际关税接近于不考虑ROW关税报复时的最优关税水平及Nash均衡关税,而ROW当时的实际关税却远低于其最优关税和Nash均衡关税水平,这说明我国在2005年所采取的关税政策合乎本国利益。     

碳关税下政府补贴政策及企业减排研发决策的研究

以碳关税政策下发展中国家选择减排研发补贴政策为背景,构建了一个三阶段动态博弈模型。第一阶段为发达国家和发展中国家各自设定碳关税率及研发补贴率;第二阶段为发展中国家企业根据补贴率及税率确定减排率;第三阶段为发达国家及发展中国家企业在发达国家市场上进行产量竞争。利用逆向递归方法求解该动态博弈的最优决策,并对其进行深入分析,分析结果显示:碳关税在一定条件下可以促进企业碳减排并改善环境,但关税会对两国之间的贸易造成一定负面影响。关税政策和补贴政策能够有效提高各自企业的竞争力,但过多的政府干预会影响市场正常秩序。对于发展中国家来说,补贴政策能够促进企业的减排行为,并且企业的成本优势越明显,减排效果越好。     

Strategic Second Sourcing by Multinationals*

Multinationals often serve foreign markets by exporting as well as by investing directly in foreign production facilities. We argue that if the multinational competes in an oligopolistic market characterized by strategic complements then there are strategic reasons to use two production facilities—committing to a second source allows the firm to keep average cost low while increasing its marginal cost. The increase in marginal cost softens product market competition resulting in higher profits. We argue that this theory also has implications for the “make or buy” literature in production management and the literature on second sourcing in industrial organization.     

Imports in Keynesian Models*

This paper examines two main problems relating to the introduction of imports in the simple Keynesian model. First, imports need to be made a function of the aggregate demand components rather than income. Second, unless one assumes that intermediate imports are zero the solution of the simple Keynesian model will provide miltipliers which Overstate the exogenous demand change for domestic product.     

Optimal Trade Policy under Homogeneous Bertrand Competition*

In a seminal paper, Eaton and Grossman (1986) conclude that an export tax is optimal if firms produce heterogeneous products and engage in Bertrand price competition. In particular, they made a comment that could be interpreted to mean that even in the case of a homogeneous product, the optimal policy is still an export tax. This paper has re‐examined the case and found that the optimal export policy can be an export subsidy, free trade, or an export tax, depending on the marginal cost differential between the domestic and the foreign firms. Moreover, if government intervention entails a cost, free trade becomes the only optimal policy.     

Tariff Compensation Without Omniscience*

The piecemeal application of second-best arguments to practical policy-making is highly dangerous. This paper attempts to demonstrate this by taking the recent Australian debate over ‘tariff compensation’ as an example. The attempt to ‘compensate’ for tariff-induced distortions in output prices by means of input subsidies is shown to lead to informational problems so serious that the pursuit of such a policy in practice seems unwise. This point is argued by means of extensive numerical examples. These suggest that the potential welfare gains from tariff compensation, optimally applied, are small relative to the potential costs of well-intentioned but erroneous interventions.     

Lobbying For Tariff Policies*

This paper fully specifies the political and economic markets in which trade policies are formulated and lobbying efforts are determined. In the political market, the winner of a two-candidate race chooses policies, and both candidates have incomplete information about the nonpolicy biases of voters. Voting is probabilistic and lobbying consists of informing candidates of the lobby members' nonpolicy voting biases. Economic markets are described by a Heckscher-Ohlin model. the determinants of lobbying expenditures are developed from these microfoundations instead of being introduced in an ad hoc manner.     

Effects of Chinese Imports on Relative Wages: Microevidence from Chile*

The increasing prominence of China in world trade raises important questions about the impact of this on importer countries. In this paper, we address the issue of how import competition from China has affected relative wages in the Chilean manufacturing industry. Using plant‐level data for the period 1996–2005, we find that increasing imports from China have depressed relative wages in sectors with higher Chinese‐import penetration. Our results show a significant reduction of relative wages, between 4 and 25 percent, for those sectors that have experienced the largest increases in Chinese imports. We also find that this effect is particularly strong for small firms, while large firms are unaffected.     

Strategic Policy Towards Multinationals for Oligopolistic Industries

The author considers an environment with two firms, one domestically owned and one a foreign-owned multinational corporation (MNC), both producing in the host (domestic) country. It is found that there are three distinct dimensions that affect a country's strategic policy towards domestically-owned firms and foreign-owned firms: the number of policy instruments available to the host government (whether or not it can tax/subsidize both types of firms), the location of the market (in the host country or a third country), and the extent of spillover of the foreign-owned firms' production.     

Optimal Monetary Policy with Vertical Production and Trade*

This paper explores the optimal monetary policy response to domestic and foreign technology shocks in an open economy with vertical structure of production and trade. We find that any stage‐specific productivity shock in one country may have a transborder spillover effect on the other country via the vertical trade. So when choosing optimal monetary rules, each monetary authority should respond to both home and foreign productivity shocks. Also, the flexible exchange rate cannot replicate the flexible price equilibrium, even under producer currency pricing, due to price stickiness in multiple stages. We also find that the existence of a transborder spillover effect depends on the currencies of price setting. Finally, vertical trade may affect the value of exchange rate flexibility under PCP and LCP setting.     

Multinationals,Information Update,and Product Adaptation *

This paper develops a dynamic model of decision making by multinational firms. The firm chooses between exporting and producing abroad when it expands the market. Bayes learning is incorporated into this model in addition to fixed cost and transport cost Production in a foreign country gives the firm new information about the demand function. This information is applied to adjust the firm's expectation as well as output choice in the future. This process not only reduces the risk encountered by a firm in a foreign market, but also increases acceptance of the product which the firm manufactures. This paper concludes even if producing abroad loses money in the first period, the firm may still choose to set up plants in foreign countries rather than exporting, due to the dynamic information advantage associated with going multinational. [F23,F21]     

State Trading and Tariff Rate Quotas: The Case of Korea's Rice Imports

This paper analyzes the effects of trade liberalization of tariff‐rate quotas under import “state trading enterprises” (STEs) in agriculture. An analytical framework is provided to determine the importance of which instrument is binding under competition (the in‐quota or out‐of‐quota tariff or the quota) and under the initial STE equilibrium. It also depends on whether or not the STE controls both the domestic market prices and owns/controls the import quota (and whether it is obligated to fill the quota or not). An empirical example of the rice STE in South Korea has simulations showing that an increase in imports can be achieved through a moderate expansion of the quota or a decrease in the out‐of‐quota tariff to the level where it becomes binding. However, a significant level of quota expansion induces the STE to switch to the autarky solution and social welfare declines.     

The Optimal Tariff Formula in a Two-Period Economy

The optimal tariff formula is derived for a large country trading both consumption goods and an investment good in a two-period economy. The formula greatly simplifies the results of the standard one-period economy where both consumption goods and real capital are traded with or without a non-traded good; in particular, the results do not depend on the relative intensities of the two goods.
JEL Classification Numbers: D11, F11, F34.     

Revenue-Constrained Combination of an Optimal Tariff and Duty Drawback

A duty drawback is an export subsidy determined as a percentage of the tariffs paid on the imported inputs used in its production. This paper examines the revenue-constrained optimal tariff structure in a small open economy including a duty drawback as a trade policy tool. This paper has two main aims. First, we show that the revenue-constrained optimal combination of tariff and duty drawback for a given revenue level is not unique. Second, we show that if the optimal import tariff rates are all positive when the duty drawback rate is zero, then the optimal import tariff rates are always positive when the duty drawback is positive.     

Explaining Australia's Imports: 1974–1989*

A model is estimated to explain Australia's demand for imports over the period from September 1974 to September 1989. Using cointegration techniques, it is found that growth in imports is well explained by movements in domestic activity, relative prices of imports and exports, and overtime. The models explain almost all of the rapid growth in imports over the period from September 1986 to September 1989. Over this period, the relative price of domestic goods to imports grew more strongly than domestic activity, and the contribution of relative prices to growth in imports is found to outweigh that of activity.