Strategic Investment Subsidies under Asymmetric Oligopoly

This paper examines strategic investment subsidies in an international oligopoly. A general oligopoly model is constructed in which firms compete in two stages and governments commit to investment subsidies prior to firms' actions. The paper considers asymmetry among firms that arises from the nature of goods they produce rather than their cost structures. When firms produce asymmetrically differentiated goods, it is found that a change in the number of foreign competitors may alter the sign of the optimal unilateral investment subsidy. An example of policy reversal is provided in the case of strategic research and development subsidies for a quality‐differentiated industry.     

Multiproduct Firms and Environmental Policy Coordination

The literature that analyzes the coordination of environmental taxes by governments considers that firms produce a single good at a single plant. However, in practice firms tend to produce several goods at various production plants (multiproduct firms). These firms may organize themselves in a centralized or decentralized fashion for purposes of decision-making: This affects their output and pollution levels. This paper sets out to analyze the coordination of environmental taxes considering multiproduct firms. We find that the organizational structure chosen by the owners of the firms depends on whether or not governments coordinate with one another in setting taxes, and on whether the goods produced are substitutes or complements. Social welfare is greater if a supranational authority sets taxes in all countries. In this case, joint welfare is never lower if the authority is constrained to set the same tax in all countries.     

ON THE CONSISTENT CONJECTURES EQUILIBRIUM OF EXPORT SUBSIDY GAME

This paper explores an export subsidy game in an international duopoly in which governments of countries as well as firms hold conjectures about the response of other governments. In the framework with linear demand/quadratic cost functions, a homogeneous good and no home consumption, I shall obtain the relations among the conjectural variation of firms, that of governments, and the optimal subsidies for countries. And I shall show that if and only if firms hold the consistent conjectures, Nash type behavior (zero conjectural variation) of governments is consistent.     

Interfirm Bundling and Vertical Product Differentiation

In this paper, we study the competitive effects of bundled discounts offered by pairs of independent firms. In a setting with vertically differentiated goods, where firms decide whether to participate in a discounting scheme before prices are set, it is shown that, in equilibrium, all pairs of firms producing goods of the same quality level offer bundled discounts. Relative to the no‐bundling benchmark, we find that (i) all headline prices rise, (ii) all bundle prices, net of the respective discount, decrease, and (iii) only high‐quality sellers will obtain higher profits. Furthermore, this equilibrium corresponds to the worst scenario in terms of consumer welfare, and it and decreases social welfare.     

专利技术垄断、仿冒进入与政府管制政策

文章通过构建政府、正版厂商与仿冒厂商三者之间的Stackelberg博弈模型,并考虑仿冒品厂商的市场结构特征和性质,探讨了仿冒厂商进入条件下正版厂商的竞争行为、策略以及社会福利水平的变化.经研究发现:(1)市场中有仿冒厂商进入且政府稽查力度较弱的情况下,正版厂商总会选择大于独占均衡时的产出数量作为竞争的最优策略,并且,正版品的市场均衡价格要低于正版品独占时的市场均衡价格;(2)仿冒品和正版品之间具有相互替代性,但替代程度不同,仿冒品对正版品仅能部分替代,正版品对仿冒品产生完全替代作用;(3)仿冒品的存在有可能对正版厂商的利益产生正面的影响和作用;(4)在没有考虑政府管制成本的情况下,政府采取对仿冒品不予追究,或者采取严格的查处力度都会提高社会的福利水平.     

Retailer Market Concentration,Buyer‐Size Discounts and Inflation Dynamics

This study considers the macroeconomic effects of retailer market concentration and buyer‐size discounts on inflation dynamics. During Japan's “lost decades”, large retailers enhanced their market power, thus increasing the exploitation of buyer‐size discounts in the procurement of goods. We incorporate this effect into an otherwise standard New Keynesian model. Calibrating to the Japanese economy during the lost decades, we find that these developments led to a deflation of approximately 0.1% annually.     

Perfect competition and optimal product differentiation

This paper considers whether a competitive economy will achieve an optimal allocation when firms produce differentiated products.In the model studied, firms market those products which maximize profit given the demand curves facing them. Markets are assumed to be open only for goods actually traded. Competitive conditions are achieved by replicating the consumer sector. It is shown that market equilibrium may be suboptimal if those products not being produced are highly complementary in consumption. Sufficient conditions on preferences and production sets for the market equilibrium to be optimal are given.     

On microfoundations of the city

This paper considers the spatial structure of a city subject to final demand and vertical linkages. Individuals consume differentiated goods (or services) and firms purchase differentiated inputs (or services) in product (or service) markets where firms compete under monopolistic competition. Workers rent their residential lots in an urban land market and contribute to the production of differentiated goods and inputs. We show that firms and workers co-agglomerate and endogenously form a city. We characterize and discuss the spatial distribution of firms and consumers in such cities on one- and two-dimensional spaces. We show that final demand and vertical linkages raise the urban density and reduce the city spread.     

ON THE EMERGENCE OF NON‐PROFIT FIRMS AS ALTERNATIVES TO THE GOVERNMENT*

It is well known that many non‐profit firms coexist with government firms in industries that provide collectively consumed goods and services, such as education, healthcare, social services, and art and culture. This paper explores the specific circumstances under which non‐profit firms can emerge as alternatives to the government. We show that a non‐profit firm emerges only when the residents’ median preference for a collective good is significantly low. This finding implies that, somewhat paradoxically, a non‐profit firm emerges to replace the government and provide a collective good only when the majority of residents consider the good non‐essential.     

城市化、结构变动与农业发展——基于城乡两部门的动态一般均衡分析

本文认为,地方政府和企业之间的合谋是中国经济的高增长率和高事故率并存的原因。我们刻画了最优的防范合谋契约,在该契约下地方政府和企业拥有正的信息租金,防范合谋将给中央政府带来额外的成本。在临界值以下,赔偿金具有部分地替代监督和惩罚的作用。以最优的防范合谋契约为基准,我们解释了造成当前政企合谋大量存在的若干重要原因:中央政府防范合谋的成本太高、地方政府缺乏长远预期、企业被过度抽税、第四方监督失效和惩罚不可置信等。     

Optimal penalty and accounting policy

This study considers risky investment projects under adverse selection and examines optimal penalties for erroneous auditing reports to maximize social welfare. These penalties give firms an incentive to choose accounting policies that maximize social welfare. We characterize the optimal penalties such that efficient firms choose an aggressive accounting policy and inefficient firms choose a conservative accounting policy.     

ALTRUISM,EGOISM, AND THE ROLE OF SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS*

The economic approach to understanding human behavior has encountered serious difficulties when attempting to explain the private provision of public goods, such as voting and charitable contributions to large organizations. To gain insights into these important issues, this study takes an interdisciplinary approach. The individual is modeled formally in terms of dual egoistic/altruistic utilities, and the recursive relation between altruism and the existence and production of social capital is developed. The model is analyzed as a non-cooperative game between the egoistic and altruistic selves. The socialized rational actor that results from the combination of social capital, dual utilities, and non-cooperative behavior resolves a number of public goods paradoxes. Comparative statics and the dynamics of social capital formation are explored.     

跨国公司全球化生产模式的理论分析——基于行业的视角

本文在迪克希特-斯蒂格里茨(D-S)垄断竞争模型的基础上,建立了一个3×2×2模型,分析了不同行业特性对跨国公司生产模式的影响.结果表明,跨国公司的生产模式和其自身行业特性有很大关系,某一生产环节投资的固定成本越低,跨国公司越倾向于将其转移到低成本国家;东道国市场规模越大,越有利于吸引跨国公司投资;成品的交易成本越高,跨国公司越倾向于采取本地组装的生产模式;中间品交易成本越高,跨国公司越倾向一体化的生产模式,将中间品和组装放在一起,分散在多国生产.该模型的分析结果和现实情况基本吻合,对分析跨国公司如何在全球组织其生产活动具有很好的解释力.     

全球化背景下产业集群的升级——以浙江慈溪、义乌、桐乡典型产业集群为例

产业集群为企业和区域提供了强大的竞争力,但产业集群本身面临着升级的问题。在全球化背景下,产业集群应在全球价值链中从低往高爬升。文章通过实证方法,以浙江省慈溪小家电、义乌小商品、桐乡毛衫三个典型产业集群为例,分析了我国产业集群在全球价值链中从制造、设计到自创品牌的动态升级过程。     

Technology transfer in a horizontally differentiated product market

This paper considers technology transfer in a Cournot-duopoly market where the firms produce horizontally differentiated products. The patent licensing contract consists of up-front fixed fee and per-unit output royalty for products of neither close substitutes nor isolated. In case the goods are close substitutes then only per-unit output royalty is the optimal solution. However, whether the incentive for imitation increases with product differentiation is ambiguous. Further, in case of credible imitation threat, the relationship between better technology transfer and product differentiation may be ambiguous. We have briefly addressed the implications of multiple licensing.     

Government Spending and Taxation in Democracies and Autocracies

The paper develops a theoretical rationale for a non-linear relationship between the level of democracy and government spending. A model is presented showing why and how political participation influences the spending behavior of opportunistic governments that can choose an optimal combination of rents and public goods to attract political support. If the level of democracy remains low, governments rationally prefer rents as an instrument to assure political support. With increasing democratic participation, however, rents become an increasingly expensive (per unit of political support) instrument while the provision of public goods becomes more and more efficient in ensuring the incumbent government's survival in power. As a consequence, an increase in democracy, which drives a country from a pure autocracy to a semi-participatory system, tends to reduce government spending, while an increase in political participation from a semi-participatory country to a full democracy tends to raise the size of the public sector.     

A Model of Shareholder Discounts

Many companies supplying consumption goods and services provide their shareholders with price discounts. This paper presents a simple model describing shareholder discounts and consequent market equilibrium. It is found that shareholder discounts resemble many features of two-part tariffs. The welfare analysis shows that the equilibrium outcomes with shareholder discounts are Pareto inefficient. Compared with uniform pricing, shareholder discounts unambiguously increase major shareholders' wealth but their effects on consumers and society are generally ambiguous.     

THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT INVESTMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN MALAYSIA ON THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR PORTFOLIO COMPANIES

Research into the impact of government ownership on the financial performance of listed companies typically assumes the government to be a monolithic entity and fails to consider that government ownership rights are administered by different types of government organizations. Exploring the financial performance of government controlled listed companies we find that in Malaysia the impact of government ownership varies depending on the type of organization which manages the government's ownership stakes. Taking into account golden Share provisions as well as the presence of senior civil servants and of politicians on boards of Directors, we find that firms controlled by investment organizations under federal government control tend to outperform firms controlled by regional governments’ investment organizations.     

INFLATION AND THE DISPERSION OF REAL WAGES*

The article studies the effects of inflation on real wage dispersion in a search‐monetary framework. The economy is characterized by frictions in both the goods and the labor markets. In the goods market, buyers and sellers bargain over prices, whereas in the labor market firms post wage offers. In equilibrium, a lower inflation rate increases the dispersion of real wages. This result is consistent with both the observed trends in wage dispersion and the inflation rate witnessed in the 1980s and the 1990s in the United States and the empirical literature linking reduced inflation to greater wage dispersion.     

TO TAX OR NOT TO TAX? THE CASE OF ELECTRONIC COMMERCE

Despite the intensifying debate over the taxation of Internet commerce, the relevant issues have not been given a systematic treatment in the context of the literature on optimal taxation. This article presents such an analysis and investigates separately the taxation of business purchases of intermediate goods, the taxation of consumer purchases of final goods and services, and the various issues of administration and compliance costs as they apply to the development of E-commerce. The authors conclude that generally the optimal tax literature cannot be used in support of a blanket tax exemption for Internet purchases. Certain conditions could lead to the optimality of an exemption, but those conditions are not likely to be met in practice.