The collective bargaining of flexicurity: A case for sector‐level analysis? The Italian chemical and metalworking sectors compared

Although employment relations in Europe have long been seen as a factor of rigidity, limiting managerial discretion and adaptability, in the last 30 years, they have witnessed a trend towards decentralisation of collective bargaining and negotiations increasingly centred on flexibility–security trade‐offs between employers and employees. Research on the contribution of collective bargaining to the so‐called flexicurity has mostly focused on national‐level institutional arrangements. In this article, we contend that meso‐level differences need to feature more prominently in the debate. Our comparison of two sectors in the same country (chemicals and metalworking in Italy) shows that decentralisation has divergent effects on flexicurity issues depending in particular on differences in market structures and on depth of bargaining. The interplay between these two factors affects what we refer to as procedural security, which we view as important in ensuring sustainable trade‐offs between flexibility and security.     

Union effects on pay levels in Britain

The contraction of union representation in Britain raises the question of whether or not unions still achieve a wage premium. Analysis of matched employer–employee data from the 1998 Workplace Employee Relations Survey shows that there is now no demonstrable premium for private sector workers in general. However, unions do achieve a wage premium of around 9% for about half of employees covered by collective bargaining arrangements. The effect of union bargaining spills over to other employees in the same workplaces. The paper identifies circumstances where union effects are strongest—employer endorsement of union membership, high collective bargaining coverage and multi-unionism.     

New Technology in Unionized Firms: Advantages of Mandatory Bargaining

U.S. Labor Law currently allows employers whose work forces are unionized to introduce new technologies without bargaining over the decision to do so. This forces unions to adopt inefficient strategies when negotiating collective bargaining agreements in an effort to minimize the impact of technological change on their members. Allowing unions to bargain over the decision to introduce new technologies would obviate their having to resort to these inefficient strategies. In addition, it might increase the likelihood of employees suggesting alterations in production processes that would increase the rate of technological change. For these reasons, this article advocates amending U.S. labor law to require employers to bargain over the introduction of new technologies.     

Employee participation and contemporary labor law in the US

Employee participation has commonly been seen, in US conditions, as in potential conflict with the maintenance and development of collective bargaining. Since labor law seeks to protect the collective bargaining rights of employees, an important current debate is concerned with to what extent, if at all, the law needs to be changed to encourage employee participation schemes without weakening this protection.     

Private Politics

This paper introduces the subject of private politics, presents a research agenda, and provides an example involving activists and a firm. Private politics addresses situations of conflict and their resolution without reliance on the law or government. It encompasses the political competition over entitlements in the status quo, the direct competition for support from the public, bargaining over the resolution of the conflict, and the maintenance of the agreed-to private ordering. The term private means that the parties do not rely on public order, i.e., lawmaking or the courts. The term politics refers to individual and collective action in situations in which people attempt to further their interests by imposing their will on others. Four models of private politics are discussed: (1) informational competition between an activist and a firm for support from the public, (2) decisions by citizen consumers regarding a boycott, (3) bargaining to resolve the boycott, and (4) the choice of an equilibrium private ordering to govern the ongoing conflicting interests of the activist and the firm.     

Post-<Emphasis Type="Italic">Burlington</Emphasis>: What Employers and Employees Need to Know About Retaliation

Since the landmark decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, numerous federal district courts and circuit courts of appeals in the United States have considered employees’ retaliation claims. This paper reviews several post-Burlington cases and provides employers with a roadmap as to what has been held to be retaliation under the law and what has not. Our contribution is an up-to-date analysis of retaliation cases, on a specific employment action basis, to provide guidance to employers of the types of activity that could support a claim of retaliation and to employees to alert them as to the types of activity that they should not have to endure in the workplace.     

Sign This Agreement Not to Compete or You're Fired! Noncompete Agreements and the Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will

A California jury recently awarded an employee who was fired for refusing to sign a noncompete agreement $1.2 million in damages for wrongful discharge. Whether employees have a right to refuse to sign unenforceable noncompete agreements is an emerging employment law issue. This article considers whether a wrongful discharge remedy is available in such cases under the public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. State court decisions addressing the question are conflicting. Some courts have allowed employers to discharge employees who refuse to sign a noncompete agreement even if the agreement is unreasonable. Other courts have recognized a claim for damages under the public policy exception. This article explores the issue from policy and managerial perspectives, critically analyzing the policy justifications advanced by the courts in those decisions, and comments on the liability risks to employers and the proper resolution of the issue.     

Drug testing and the law

This article examines judicial and administrative rulings and legislation involving or related to the issue of drug testing in the workplace. It discusses the rights of employees in the public and private sector: constitutional rights; federal, state, and local statutory rights; rights of unionized employees; and common law rights. It analyzes both the current state of the law and future directions the law may take, as courts and administrative agencies decide more cases and governmental bodies continue to pass drug testing legislation.     

Balancing Hate Speech, Professional Ethics, and First Amendment Rights: A Case of and from the Judiciary

As an increasing number of state and local governments pass laws that prohibit discrimination against gay and lesbian employees, individual citizens and groups opposed to such rights continue to fight against them. Although the First Amendment to the United State Constitution guarantees the right to free speech, a potential problem arises when the impartiality of a member of the judiciary is questioned based on free ‘‘hate speech’’ expressed as a private citizen. This paper explores the dilemma the courts face relative to the professional ethics of those who oversee the courts where gay and lesbian and other employees attempt to ensure their rights to fair treatment in the workplace.     

Arbitration of Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims in a Nonunion Environment: A Guide to Procedural Fairness

The previous decade has seen an increasing trend toward the use of arbitration to resolve statutory employment discrimination claims. The enforceability of most private sector arbitration agreements arising in a nonunion setting is reviewable under the Federal Arbitration Act. Such arbitration agreements are most often created by management and become a condition of employment. To represent a feasible alternative to court litigation, employers and employees must have confidence that outcomes achieved through the arbitration process will be enforced by the courts as final and binding upon the parties to the dispute. The extent to which an arbitration agreement adequately protects the procedural and remedial rights of the participants is an important issue affecting the probability that a court will enforce the outcome of an arbitration procedure. This paper reviews guidelines provided by the courts and practitioners to aid in the design of an effective and legally enforceable arbitration procedure to resolve statutory employment discrimination claims arising in a private sector nonunion environment.     

Managing in aNuevo Mundo: Accommodating linguistic and cultural diversity under title VII

This article examines a legal issue that is derivative of the increasingly multicultural character of the American work force. The recent case of Garcia v. Spun Steak(1993, 1994) is illustrative of the challenge managers can face in dealing with cultural and linguistic diversity in the workplace. Over time, there have been conflicting messages in employment discrimination law as to the propriety of employer-imposed restrictions on the use of languages other than English in the workplace. However, the basic question involves the balancing of both the employer’s right to manage the business and the right to self-expression in the language of one’s choice in the workplace. Recommendations are made as to how each party’s rights can be balanced under the law. What will be seen is that in the nuevo mundoof work found at the edge of the twenty-first century, the interests of both employers and employees may be best served by policies favoring language promotion over language restrictions.     

The equal pay act: Responsibilities and rights

The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (EPA) requires that men and women receive equal pay for equal work. Plaintiffs who claim discrimination on the basis of the EPA may settle out of court, or may bring legal action in the courts. Employers possess specific rights under the law, and can defend themselves against charges of discrimination through a number of “employer defenses.” These defenses involve providing that pay differences are based on seniority systems, merit systems, production systems, or “any other factor other than sex.” This article will also discuss the impact of court decisions that have further honed the responsibilities and rights of both employees and employers under the EPA.     

Individualism and collectivism: into the 1990s

New, employer-led initiatives in the management of human resources are said to have pitched the emphasis towards the ‘individualistic’ rather than the ‘collectivistic’ aspects of the employment relationship. The marginaliza-tion of trade unions and collective bargaining which this has entailed are but two (albeit fundamental) facets of a wide-ranging set of issues and repercussions. Individualization of employment policies throws up dilemmas and unresolved challenges for managers, trade unions and employees.

In embarking upon a major new empirical research project it has become necessary to revisit and review the utility of the currently available literature. In particular, how well would the traditional approaches to modelling individualism and collectivism cope with the new directions taken by recent managerial initiatives? The results of this analysis contribute the heart of this article. It is suggested that previous approaches ignore key dimensions of change which managers are currently pursuing. A new set of categories is proposed for understanding the mix of individual and collective elements in current developments. It is argued that these more accurately reflect current issues and tensions in management strategy.     

Virginia's New Ban on Public Employee Bargaining: A Case Study of Unions, Business, and Political Competition

This article explores the reasons why the Virginia General Assembly passed a law prohibiting public employee bargaining some 16 years after the Virginia Supreme Court had clearly ruled that such bargaining was impermissible absent express statutory authority. The impetus for this legislation apparently was a series of actions by Governor L. Douglas Wilder's administration involving payroll deductions for state employees. The Virginia case is compared and contrasted to the findings of recent aggregate quantitative studies of the determinants of public sector labor relations legislation, illustrating the relative influence of organized business interests over those of labor.     

The civil rights act of 1991: Death Knell for traditional faculty staffing and pay practices in business schools?

The language in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 relating to “alternative selection practices equally effective in achieving legitimate employment goals” may require business schools to alter their traditional staffing and compensation practices. Because of market conditions, many business schools pay newer faculty members more than faculty members currently on staff. This practice may have an unlawful, discriminatory impact on older faculty. Several nondiscriminatory alternatives that may be equally effective in achieving business schools’ need to employ and compensate competent faculty are examined.     

Attitudes to pay systems:an exploratory study within and across cultures

The present study investigates employees’preferences for criteria that are used in pay systems, namely, performance, cost of living, tenure, educational qualification, collective bargaining, skill, market rate, responsibility and special demands. The study also explored variation and similarities of employees’preferences for the criteria across four countries, namely Australia (N = 162), Indonesia (N = 100), Malaysia (N = 129) and Hong Kong (N = 39). The results indicate that the respondents prefer multiple criteria to determine their pay. Preferences for length of service and educational attainment were found to be significantly different across countries, particularly between Australian and Asian samples (Indonesian and Malaysia). This variation is, in part, attributed to cultural differences. Other variables, such as age, educational qualification, position, and industry sector, have been found to be significant correlates of preference for pay systems. Implications for reward management have been discussed.     

Arbitral standards in medical screening grievances

Recent media attention to employer's growing use of tests to detect the AIDS virus among employees has revived a longstanding public debate over the approriateness of workplace medical screening. Under current statutory and common law, employers are given considerable latitude to implement medical screening policies. Although Rothstein (1984) has speculated that collective bargaining may provide the strongest protection currently available against the misuse of medical screening by employers, there has been no comprehensive analysis of such protections. This article begins to address that gap in the literature by investigating the standards commonly applied by arbitrators in deciding grievances protesting adverse personnel allocation decisions that allegedly have been based, at least in part, on medical screening.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1989 Annual Conference of the Council on Employee Responsibilities and Rights, and was published in the Conference Proceedings.     

Worker directors and collective bargaining

Elizabeth Chell and Derek Cox report on some of their findings of a study into worker directors and collective bargaining which was carried out between 1976 and 1979 and funded by the Department of Employment. The research involved seven private sector companies which have some form of worker director system.     

Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action

The best known achievement of the literature on resource-allocating mechanisms and their message spaces is the first rigorous proof of the competitive mechanism's informational efficiency. In an exchange economy withN persons andK+1 commodities (including a numeraire), that mechanism announcesK prices as well as aK-compenent trade vector for each ofN−1 persons, making a total ofNK message variables. Trial messages are successively announced and after each announcement each personprivately determines, usingprivate information, whether she finds the proposed trades acceptable at the announced prices. When a message is reached with which all are content, then the trades specified in that message take place, and they satisfy Pareto optimality and individual rationality. The literature shows that no (suitably regular) mechanism can achieve the same thing with fewer thanNK message variables. In the classic proof, all the candidate mechanisms have the privacy property, and the proof uses that property in a crucial way. ‘Non-private’ mechanisms are, however, well-defined. We present a proof that forN>K,NK remains a lower bound even when we permit ‘non-private’ mechanisms. Our new proof does not use privacy at all. But in a non-private mechanism, minimality of the number of message variables can hardly be defended as the hallmark of informational efficiency, since a non-private mechanism requires some persons to know something about the private information of othersin addition to the information contained in the messages. The new proof of the lower boundNK invites a new interpretation of the competitive mechanism's informational efficiency. We provide a new concept of efficiency which the competitive mechanism exhibits and which does rest on privacy even whenN>K. To do so, we first define a class ofprojection mechanisms, wherein some of the message variables are proposed values of the action to be taken, and the rest are auxiliary variables. The competitive mechanism has the projection property, with a trade vector as its action and prices as the auxiliary variables. A projection mechanism proposes an action; for each proposal, the agents then use the auxiliary variables, together with their private information, to verify that the proposed action meets the mechanism's goal (Pareto optimality and individual rationality for the competitive mechanism) if, indeed, it does meet that goal. For a given goal, we seek projection mechanisms for which theverification effort (suitably measured) is not greater than that of any other projection mechanism that achieves the goal. We show the competitive mechanism to be verification-minimal within the class of private projection mechanisms that achieve Pareto optimality and individual rationality; that proofdoes use the privacy of the candidate mechanisms. We also show, under certain conditions, that a verification-minimal projection mechanism achieving a given goal has smallest ‘total communication effort’ (which is locally equivalent to the classic ‘message-space size’) among all private mechanisms that achieve the goal, whether or not they have the projection property.     

Location Choice and Contract Bargaining

We study how managerial bargaining power affects outcomes and payoffs in a Hotelling‐type duopoly framework with restricted and unrestricted locations. We show that bargaining power only affects the distribution of the surplus between owners and managers but does not affect the locations, prices, managerial incentives, and consumer welfare. This is in stark contrast to van Witteloostuijn et al. (2007) and related contributions where bargaining power has real effects. We argue that the difference between our irrelevance result and their findings originates from the fact that their approach seems to be based on a behavioral assumption and not on microeconomic principles of owner–manager bargaining. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.