Location-then-price competition with uncertain consumer tastes

Summary. We investigate Hotellings duopoly game of location-then-price choices with quadratic transportation costs and uniformly distributed consumers under the assumption that firms are uncertain about consumer tastes. When the uncertainty has a uniform distribution on the closed interval , with , we characterize the unique equilibrium and the socially optimal locations. Contrary to the individual-level random utility models, we find that uncertainty is a differentiation force. For small (large) sizes of the uncertainty, there is excessive (insufficient) differentiation. More uncertainty about consumer tastes can have positive or negative welfare effects, depending on the size of the uncertainty.Received: 1 February 2003, Revised: 1 April 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D43, D81, L10, L13, R30, R39. Correspondence to: Kieron J. MeagherWe thank Simon Anderson, Jörg Borrmann, Vince Crawford, Bernd Engelmann, Catherine de Fontenay, Simon Grant, Stephen King, Preston McAfee, John Miller, Scott Page, Rohan Pitchford, Bill Schworm, Joel Sobel, an anonymous referee and seminar participants at CALTECH and at the 1999 Econometric Society Winter Meetings for their comments and criticisms. Zauner was affiliated with the Department of Economics, University of Sydney, during the earlier stages of this project.     

Profits and competition under alternative technologies in a unionized duopoly with product differentiation

This paper aims at investigating if the conventional wisdom (i.e. an increase of competition linked to a decrease in the degree of product differentiation always reduces firms׳ profits) can be reversed in a unionized duopoly model. We show that a decrease in the degree of product differentiation may affect wages, hence profits, differently, depending on both the firms׳ production technology and the mode of competition in the product market. Specifically, under constant returns to labour, the “reversal result” can apply under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, but it is more likely when firms compete in quantities. By contrast, under decreasing returns, profits can increase with competition but only if firms compete in prices.     

Cooperation versus competition in product innovation

This paper analyzes the optimal antitrust policy in the context of a patent race. In a simplified model, we identify the conditions under which allowing cooperation yields greater welfare than imposing competition. In view of our results, we discuss, critically, the current European policy towards R&D cooperation.     

Influence of market-level and inter-firm differences in costs on product positioning and pricing

The objective of this article is to study the impact of differentiation and firm positioning on firm’s pricing decisions in a horizontally differentiated competitive market. We build a parsimonious game-theoretic model and analyse simultaneous entry of firms. The effect of differentiation is modelled as an additional cost incurred by both firms based on the degree of differentiation between the firms. The cost of positioning is modelled as a market level cost affecting both firms whereby firms incur a cost if they want to position themselves away from the centre of distribution of consumers. Our analysis provides some surprising results, explains some conflicting empirical observations documented in previous research and may also be useful for further empirical research in this area by providing sharper predictions about the impact of various types of costs on market outcomes. For example, we find that if the cost of positioning is sufficiently high, then a firm with lower cost of differentiation charges a higher price in equilibrium, even when no differences in exogenous costs exist. We also find that under some circumstances the cost disadvantaged firm can enjoy higher price-cost margins compared to the cost leader thereby suggesting that higher costs could be a blessing in disguise.     

A difficulty with the address models of product differentiation

Summary. In models of product differentiation and location models it is implicitly assumed that consumers can afford to buy the differentiated goods in the market. I show that with income heterogeneity there are severe existence problems of a price equilibrium in models of horizontal product differentiation with unit demand because some consumers are income-constrained. The result generalizes to other models of product differentiation, search, and switching costs. I present an alternative specification of variable individual demand in which this kind of existence problem cannot arise. Received: October 17, 1997; revised version: February 20, 1998     

Integrating dynamic pricing and inventory control for fresh‐agri product under consumer choice

In this article, we investigate a joint pricing and inventory problem for a retailer selling fresh‐agri products (FAPs) with two‐period shelf lifetime in a dynamic stochastic setting, where new and old FAPs are on sale simultaneously. At the beginning of each period, the retailer makes ordering decision for new FAP and sets regular and discount prices for new and old inventories, respectively. After demand realisation, the expired leftover is disposed and unexpired inventory is carried to the next period, for continuing selling. Unmet demand of all FAPs is backordered. The objective is to maximise the total expected discount profit over the whole planning horizon. We present a price dependent, stochastic dynamic programming model taking into account zero lead‐time, linear ordering costs, inventory holding and backlogging costs, as well as disposal cost. As the influence of the perishability, each customer selects his preferred choice based on the utility of product price and quality. By the way of constructing demand rate vector, the original formulation can be transferred to be jointly concave and tractable. Finally, we characterise the optimal policy and develop effective methods to solve the problem. We also conduct numerical studies to further characterise the optimal policy, and to evaluate the loss of efficiency under static policies when compared to the optimal dynamic policy.     

Deterministic heterogeneity in tastes and product differentiation in the K-logit model

In this paper we use the K-deformed multinomial logit model to study product differentiation. The focus is on the economic interpretation of the deformation parameter which is the key parameter of this model. Then we establish the relationship between this parameter and probability choice, price elasticity and markup.     

Conjectural-variation models and supergames with price competition in a differentiated product oligopoly

Conjectural-variation models (CV models) are popular in empirical research as they infer the degree of market power from real data. Theorists of industrial organization, however, disapprove of them for lack of theoretical foundation arguing that dynamic reactions are forced into a static model with the strategy space and time horizon only loosely defined. The presented model follows an idea put forward by Cabral (1995) and demonstrates that the CV model can be interpreted as the joint-profit-maximizing steady-state reduced form of a price-setting supergame in a differentiated product market under optimal punishment strategies. For the symmetric two-firm case the CV parameter is shown to cover the full range of possible outcomes — from Bertrand competition to joint unconstrained monopoly — depending on the degree of product differentiation, market growth, bankruptcy risk, and the discount rate. For the asymmetric-cost case numerical calculations are provided.     

Ramsey pricing in a hierarchical structure with an application to network-access pricing

This paper studies a hierarchical structure where an upstream regulated industry sells an intermediate good to a downstream regulated industry. Some sufficient conditions for all Ramsey prices to exceed marginal costs are derived. This hierarchical structure is shown to decrease the profit margin of the intermediate good but preserve its sign. Further, the hierarchical structure also decreases the profit margin of the final good sold by the downstream regulated industry. This is because this final good is a hierarchical complement to the intermediate good sold by the upstream regulated industry. The impacts upon other publicly produced goods, however, could be said to be neutral. Therefore, the hierarchical structure has asymmetric impacts upon publicly produced goods. Accordingly, the equiproportional output-reduction statement of Ramsey rule does not survive. This paper ends with providing an application to the network-access pricing problem.     

Stability and bifurcation in a simple heterogeneous asset pricing model

Stability and bifurcation analysis of deterministic systems has been widely used in modeling financial markets. We develop a simple pricing model with two types of rational traders, fundamentalists and chartists, in order to study well price behavior in financial markets, we use student t distribution to replace traditional normal distribution to describe fundamental price process. We study the stability and bifurcation of the underling deterministic system and use numerical simulation to study the dynamic of the stochastic system, including autocorrelations structures and high kurtosis of the returns. It is found that the fundamental price becomes stable (unstable) when the activities from both types of traders are balanced (unbalanced).     

Unemployment and product market competition in a Cournot model with efficiency wages

This paper analyzes the impact of product market competition on unemployment, wage and welfare in a model where unemployment is caused by the efficiency wage consideration and oligopolistic firms compete in quantity. It is shown that while more intense competition in the product market increases output and reduces price, it does not necessarily lead to a lower unemployment rate or a higher wage for workers. Depending on the technologies, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the level of employment (respectively, wage, welfare) is not always monotonic, and, in some instances, has an inverted U‐shape.     

A modified logit model for time series with an application to the pricing behaviour of manufacturing firms in Australia

The modified logit model (Amemiya and Nold, 1975) is generalised to the case where the error term is autocorrelated. The asymptotic distribution (as n →∞ and T →∞) of a feasible GLS estimator of β is derived. Tests of linear restrictions on β and the significance of ρ are presented. The results of the applied work suggest that the factors which explain the pricing behaviour of manufacturing firms, as reported in the tendency survey conducted by the Australian Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Westpac Banking Corporation, include historical inflation rates of up to 7 quarters and capacity utilisation. First version received: March 2001/Final version received: July 2002 RID="*" ID="*"  The first draft of this paper was written while the author was on study leave at the Department of Econometrics, University of Sydney, Australia.     

Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games

We model strategic competition in a market with asymmetric information as a noncooperative game in which each seller competes for a buyer of unknown type by offering the buyer a catalog of products and prices. We call this game a catalog game. Our main objective is to show that catalog games have Nash equilibria. The Nash existence problem for catalog games is particularly contentious due to payoff discontinuities caused by tie-breaking. We make three contributions. First, we establish under very mild conditions on primitives that no matter what the tie-breaking rule, catalog games are uniformly payoff secure, and therefore have mixed extensions which are payoff secure. Second, we show that if the tie-breaking rule awards the sale to firms which value it most (i.e., breaks ties in favor of firms which stand to make the highest profit), then firm profits are reciprocally upper semicontinuous (i.e., the mixed catalog game is reciprocally upper semincontinuous). This in turn implies that the mixed catalog game satisfies Reny’s condition of better-reply security—a condition sufficient for existence (Reny in Econometrica 67:1029–1056, 1999). Third, we show by example that if the tie-breaking rule does not award the sale to firms which value it most (for example, if ties are broken randomly with equal probability), then the catalog game has no Nash equilibrium. This paper was written while the second author was Visiting Professor, Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne, Universite Paris 1, Pantheon-Sorbonne. The second author thanks CES and Paris 1, and in particular, Bernard Cornet and Cuong Le Van for their support and hospitality. The second author also thanks the C&BA and EFLS at the University of Alabama for financial support. Both authors are grateful to Monique Florenzano and to participants in the April 2006 Paris 1 NSF/NBER Decentralization Conference for many helpful comments on an earlier version of the paper. Finally, both authors are especially grateful to an anonymous referee whose thoughtful comments led to substantial improvements in the paper. Monteiro acknowleges the financial support of Capes-Cofecub 468/04.     

Analysis of the Lotka-Volterra competition equations as a technological substitution model

This paper provides insight into the dynamics of the Lotka-Volterra competition (LVC) equations, a much used competition model, and compares the dynamics of LVC competitive substitution to that of several well-known substitution models. The behavior of the LVC equations is analyzed for the special case of a dominant competitor at equilibrium being replaced after the introduction of a small population of an invading competitor with a competitive advantage. Expressions are derived that describe the growth of the invading competitor and that growth is shown to be of four classes: left asymmetric, logistic, right asymmetric with 1−ε₂ asymptote and right asymmetric with γ asymptote. It is shown that the LVC model reverts to logistic substitution in a market of fixed size, a result with important implications. The LVC equations are fitted to the Gompertz, Bass, Non-Symmetrical Responding Logistic (NSRL) and Sharif-Kabir substitution models and compared using a novel graphical technique. The LVC equations can reasonably mimic the full range of curve shapes exhibited by each of these models.     

实物期权定价理论及其在中国的适用性分析

实物期权作为西方新兴的价值评估方法在中国拥有广阔的应用前景，但在应用时也应充分注意到这一方法本身的局限性，以及它在中国特殊情况下可能产生的一些问题。本文介绍了两种金融期权定价方法在实物期权中的应用，以及实物期权定价理论在中国的适用性分析。     

Further results on monopolistic competition,markup pricing and the business cycle in Switzerland

This paper investigates how firms’ market power affects the price level. Based on a small macro-model it is shown empirically that firms have structural markup pricing power and take advantage of favourable business cycle fluctuations. To this aim, a multivariate time series model with double integrated variables is estimated. Thereby a model-based business cycle indicator can be derived. Its information content is confronted with survey data giving rise to what is going to be called semantic cross validation approach.

Energy efficiency and heating technology investments: Manipulating financial information in a discrete choice experiment

We elicit homeowners’ willingness to pay (WTP) for energy efficiency and low-carbon technologies in the context of heating appliance replacement. We employ a within-between subject design that involves manipulating information in a two-stage discrete choice experiment (DCE) and use WTP space estimation to identify the role of financial information in reducing fossil fuel use. We find that homeowners’ average valuation of energy efficiency exceeds associated heating cost savings, suggesting that they also consider non-monetary benefits when evaluating this type of investment, whereas information about private and pro-social benefits of investments only has a limited impact on WTP. Evidence also suggests that homeowners have a strong preference for the existing technology. Consequently, fossil fuel users’ WTP for switching to low-carbon technologies does not cover respective investment cost differentials, and we derive evidence on how combined subsidies and information can induce these users to opt out of fossil technologies.     

Some evidence in the trading and pricing of equity LEAPS

This paper documents some evidence in the trading and pricing of equity Long-term Equity AnticiPation Securities (LEAPS). The main findings on trading are that LEAPS open interest, trading volume, and put/call ratio are seasonal on a yearly basis possibly due to the impact of the “melding” process that is unique to equity LEAPS. This paper also finds that the Black–Scholes Option Pricing Model, in general, overprices or underprices out-of-the-money (OTM) or in-the-money (ITM) equity LEAPS calls, respectively, and the model tends to overprice when the options are very deep in-the-money (VDITM). Furthermore, the evidence indicates that the deviations of the Black–Scholes prices from the observed option market prices are more pronounced in equity LEAPS than in standard options, suggesting that the Black–Scholes Option Pricing Model is less well suited to the pricing of equity LEAPS than to the pricing of standard options.     

On the “merger paradox” in price competition with asymmetric product differentiation

By assuming asymmetric product differentiation, we consider the “merger paradox” in price competition (or the incentive to collude in prices). We investigate whether the emergence of the merger paradox depends on the degree of product differentiation between firms. In particular, unlike Deneckere and Davidson (1985), we demonstrate that if the degree of product differentiation between the insider and outsider is sufficiently small, then they are strategic substitutes, and thus, the merger paradox arises in price competition.     

Complementarity between product and process innovation in a monopoly setting

In this article we study complementarity between market-enhancing product innovation and cost-reducing process innovation in a monopoly setting. First, we consider the possibility for a firm to alternatively invest only along one of the two directions and compare the incentives of process vs. product innovation. Then, we allow the firm to invest simultaneously in both activities, showing that both investment levels and profit are higher than in the case of individual investment. Thus, product and process innovations are complementary, and the firm always prefers the simultaneous adoption of both activities.