Multilateral Organisations and the Limits to International Energy Cooperation

Surging world energy prices, increasing oil market volatility and a nascent ‘energy transition’ are posing major challenges for global energy governance. In response, there has been a proliferation in the number of multilateral bodies addressing energy issues in recent years, and a wide range of organisations now claim a role in facilitating intergovernmental energy cooperation. However, the practical achievements of these organisations have been very poor, with all suffering difficulties that have limited their ability to promote shared energy interests between states. This article examines the dynamics of multilateral energy organisations, arguing that the political economy features of energy – securitisation and attendant patterns of economic nationalism – explain why they have failed to develop more robust cooperative mechanisms. Ten global-level organisations are evaluated and found to suffer from membership, design or commitment issues that limit their effectiveness in global energy governance. These challenges are linked to the securitisation of energy, which has led governments to favour low-cost soft-law approaches over potentially more effective hard-law institutional designs. Moreover, the securitisation of energy poses limits for how far multilateral energy cooperation can proceed and means that contemporary efforts to strengthen these organisations are unlikely to succeed in coming years.     

Trade patterns and institutional change in East Asia

We investigate how trade patterns – institutionally intensive exports (IIX) – affect institutional quality in East Asia compared to the rest of the world, and whether the effect changed due to the Asian financial crisis. To examine this, we use panel data of 117 countries for the period 1988–2007. Our fixed effect model estimation reveals that the effect of IIX on institutional quality is negative and significant for East Asia, while the effect is insignificant for the rest of the world. The negative effect in East Asia is more pronounced for the five East Asian countries that were strongly affected by the crisis – South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand – than for other East Asian countries. Furthermore, our results reveal that the negative effect for East Asia does not change significantly after the crisis, both in the short and long term, and that improvement in institutional quality after the crisis is not different from that of the rest of the world. This suggests that the crisis had no significant impact on East Asia's institutional quality or on the effects of IIX on institutional quality.     

Price and nominal wage Phillips curves and the dynamics of distribution in Japan†

This study estimates two types of Phillips curves – the price Phillips curve and nominal wage Phillips curve – for the Japanese economy and analyses the institutional structure of the dynamics of effective demand and income distribution in each period from 1977 to 2007. The estimated results allow us to make the following three findings. First, the Japanese economy was a profit-led regime and a counter-cyclical wage share regime. The combination of regimes can make the dynamics of effective demand and income distribution unstable. Second, the dynamics of price and nominal wage do not reflect each other in Japan by labour–management cooperation. Finally, after 1997, the distributive regime in Japan switched from a counter-cyclical wage share to a pro-cyclical wage share regime because Japanese firms quickened their speeds of employment adjustment. As a result, the dynamics of effective demand and income distribution were stabilised.     

基于社会网络视角的科研合作网络结构及特性分析——以战略性新兴产业领域为例

战略性新兴产业是近几年新出现的研究热点,对其科研合作网络的研究,有助于探究该领域的科研合作现状与发展趋势。基于社会网络分析方法,以中国知网(CNKI)作为数据来源,构建了战略性新兴产业领域作者合作网络、关键词共现网络、作者-关键词耦合网络及机构合作网络,对合作网络的结构及特性等进行了分析。结果表明:战略性新兴产业领域论文合著率基本呈上升趋势,但该领域整体合作仍较为松散,存在较多的小团体;合作网络具有小世界和无标度特性,具有较大影响力的节点作为合作网络的中心,影响着网络内的学术交流和科研工作的开展。     

Seniority and Incumbency in Legislatures

In this article, we elaborate on a strategic view of institutional features. Our focus is on seniority, though we note that this general approach may also be deployed to understand other aspects of institutional arrangements. We have taken the initial game‐theoretic model of seniority of McKelvey and Riezman ( 1992 ), simplified it in order to characterize its fundamental implications, generalized these results in several ways, and extended the model by deriving additional implications. The broad messages of our article, articulated by McKelvey and Riezman as well, are two. First, the endogenous choice of institutional features like seniority by self‐governing groups is strategic. While the fine‐grained ways of doing things in an institutional context surely serve internal functional objectives, these are not the only objectives. Agents making choices on how to govern themselves have private motivations – in the case of elected politicians they often revolve around re‐election. This leads to our second broad message. The institutions through which self‐governing groups conduct their business do not exist in a vacuum. They are embedded in a broader context. Those offering functional explanations for various institutional features overlook this. Particular institutional arrangements have effects outside the governance institution itself. These effects, in principle, could be accidental by‐products. Our strategic approach, however, argues that they may well be the primary reasons for a practice being instituted.     

Non-monotonic group-size effect in repeated provision of public goods

This paper analyzes the effect of a change in group size on incentives to contribute in repeated provision of pure public goods. We develop a model in which group members interact repeatedly, and might be temporarily unable to contribute to public goods production during some periods. We show that an increase in the group size generates two opposite effects – the standard free-riding effect that suppresses cooperation, and the novel large-scale effect that enhances cooperation. Our results indicate that the former effect dominates in relatively large groups while the latter dominates in relatively small groups. We, therefore, provide a rationale for a non-monotonic group-size effect that may explain previous empirical and experimental findings.     

The Legal-Economic Nexus from the Perspective of New Institutional Economists and Original Institutional Economists

There are two institutional economics approaches to law and economics. New institutional economists prescribe that arbitrators foster efficiency in setting economic disputes and original institutional economists focus on creating reasonable values – that is, balancing efficiency and justice. Disequilibrium between desired efficiency and perceived fairness triggers agency and is a source of coevolution of law and economics.     

区域环保合作制度创新的路径选择:武汉城市圈环保合作研究

首先,对区域环保合作理论和区域环境共同治理理论进行了文献综述,并在此基础上构建了环保合作的制度创新分析框架;其次,结合武汉城市圈环保共同合作的案例,分析了武汉城市圈环保体制机制方面的现实问题;然后,在相关理论和分析框架下从不同层面、不同合作形式和不同合作主体等多方位,对武汉城市圈环保合作的组织构建和制度创新作了深入思考,为城市圈环保合作提供了理论依据和基本架构。     

Religion and Economic Development in History: Institutions and the Role of Religious Networks

I argue that the role of religion on economic performance is mainly through the networks of small religious groups. These groups form social networks that enable individuals to conduct non-formal contract enforcement mechanisms. I analyze the effects of religions on societies, focusing mainly on the institutional aspects that affect the capabilities of creating social capital via networks which enhance cooperation and decrease transaction costs. Since the interaction between institutions and organizations is expected to shape the institutional evolution and economic performance of an economy, religions that have a communal form of organization rather than a vertical (hierarchical) structure, thus allowing many different denominational sub-communities within a society, can be more beneficiary for development and growth. Such institutions may not only provide allocative and production efficiency, but also adaptive efficiency that is a key to long-run growth. However, these effects may turn negative depending on these institutions’ role in causing group hostility and exclusion.     

New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation

ABSTRACT

Existing theories make divergent predictions about the impact of new powers on the global political economy. Some argue that a more even distribution of power will erode international cooperation, while others argue that cooperation can continue with the help of international institutions to overcome collective action problems. We argue that this debate overlooks a critical determinant of the shape of power transitions: the distribution of preferences amongst the major powers. It is primarily in the context of divergent preferences that power transitions are likely to give rise to conflict. Moreover, even where preferences diverge, the gains of cooperation provide a strong incentive to continue to pursue goals through multilateralism. This situation leads to forms of institutional change unanticipated by established theories. These include deadlock in expansive multilateral fora, institutional drift as old rules cannot keep up with the changing political and economic context, and fragmentation as countries seek minilateral solutions that reduce preference diversity. We develop this preference-based, institutional argument by examining the distribution of preferences and institutional change at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Doha Round, where the power transition is relatively advanced.     

区域经济合作中的利益分享与补偿机制

随着竞争的加剧,区域经济合作越来越成为我国地方政府获取竞争优势、促进地区经济发展的重要力量。然而,区域经济合作利益分享与补偿机制的缺失,直接影响到我国区域经济合作与一体化进程。利益分享与补偿机制作为不同地方政府在区域经济合作过程中平衡、协调各方利益的制度安排,是突破现有制度瓶颈、促进区域经济合作的有效途径。     

区域合作的制度基础:跨界治理理论与欧盟经验

区域合作是促进区域协调发展的重要形式。如何克服现有行政区划障碍与解决各合作方经济发展不平衡这“两个难题”是保证合作可持续发展的关键。解决这两个难题不是一个单纯的基于比较优势理论的资源配置或产业分工的问题,而是要建立合作的制度基础。文章尝试从“跨界治理”的视角,借鉴欧盟的跨界治理经验,研究我国区域经济合作的制度基础,提出建立一个符合市场经济原则的跨界治理体系,为推动中国区域经济合作提供一种新的路径参考。     

Understanding the evolution and performance of water markets and allocation policy: A transaction costs analysis framework

Water markets and associated allocation policy reforms have struggled to achieve their intended goals in many water-stressed rivers, in part due to the institutional friction imposed by transition and transaction costs. This paper elaborates a transaction costs analysis framework to examine the evolution and performance of water markets and allocation policy reforms. This analysis rests on three pillars: i) a synthesis of three theoretical traditions of institutional analysis (Williamson, North, and Ostrom) often considered independently; ii) a framework to examine the types and interactions of transaction costs in market-based water allocation over time; and iii) an illustrative analysis of three large river basins – the Colorado, Columbia and Murray–Darling – with varying levels of success in market-based water policy reforms. The resulting framework accounts for water's complexity as an economic good. This framework and the case studies lead to the identification of several policy implications including the need for: a multiphase sequencing of reform, strategic investment in institutional transition costs, and institutional choices that preserve future flexibility to adjust water rights and diversion limits to manage social and environmental externalities.     

Bioeconomics of some nonhuman and human societies: new institutional economics approach

New institutional economics (NIE) has been very successful in explaining the role of institutions such as the firm, money, and contract law in facilitating production and exchange in human societies. In this paper, I will show that the NIE approach, which so far has been used by economists to analyze institutions and organizations in human society, including the ethnically homogeneous middleman groups, can also be extended to explain the high degree of cooperation and coordination of activities of honeybees, ants, and schooling fish. In addition, the paper emphasize the importance of identity in nonhuman and human societies in eliciting cooperation and in detecting cheaters or fakers. This paper thus contribute to the integration/consilience of economics and biology by providing a more unified view of aspects of the bioeconomics of nonhuman and human societies.     

中国-欧盟信息通信技术合作的契机与挑战

中国与欧盟在信息与通信领域的科技合作始于20世纪80年代。多年以来,信息通信一直是欧盟直接对华投入最大的科技合作领域。中国与欧盟信息通信技术合作机制不断完善,合作方式日益多样化。中国与欧盟互有需求,法律框架提供了制度保障,合作机制日臻完善,加之中国与欧盟成员国之间有友好合作的基础,种种有利条件使信息通信合作成为中国与欧盟科技合作的重点领域之一并具有很大发展空间。     

Industrial interactions and academic patenting: evidence from German scientists

Using a unique survey of scientists at a large public research organization, this paper examines the effects of industry interactions on academic patenting. Two types of collaborations, industrial cooperation and consulting, are considered. Results show that both cooperation and consultancy increase the likelihood of patenting. However, only the positive influence of industrial cooperation stands up to robustness checks. Effects of personal, professional and institutional factors are in line with the literature, yet with some differences across cooperation and consultancy. Implications for research policy concerning academic patenting and challenges that industry may experience are discussed.     

Cooperation and Institution in Games

Based on recent developments in non‐cooperative coalitional bargaining theory, I review game theoretical analyses of cooperation and institution. First, I present basic results of the random‐proposer model and apply them to the problem of involuntary unemployment in a labour market. I discuss extensions to cooperative games with externalities and incomplete information. Next, I consider the enforceability of an agreement as an institutional foundation of cooperation. I re‐examine the contractarian approach to the problem of cooperation from the viewpoint that individuals may voluntarily create an enforcement institution.     

Competition and Cooperation in the Small Firm Sector

This paper examines the nature of economies of scale in the small firm sector and aims to provide new insight into the economic efficiency of small firm industrial districts. The theoretical analysis identifies the role played by collective external economies of scale that are realised through cooperation over input activities. Using game theory it is shown that cooperation can emerge both as a result of rational profit maximising behaviour and as a result of institutional and cultural environments that encourage cooperation and trust. The implications for industrial policy are discussed in the concluding section.     

中国(云南)与东盟国家科技合作现状及对策研究

在分析中国-东盟科技合作的制度环境,云南与东盟科技合作现状、存在问题的基础上,结合区域间科技合作的特点和规律,就进一步推进云南与东盟科技合作提出了相应的对策建议。     

Government Policy and Trajectories of Radical Innovation in Dirigiste States: A Comparative Analysis of National Innovation Systems in France and Korea

Contrary to the argument that radical innovation is only compatible with institutional arrangements characteristic of liberal market economies, this paper shows how state-led economies successfully organize their innovation systems to promote radical innovation with a comparative analysis of two dirigiste states, France and Korea. The authors further analyse how government policies under similar institutional arrangements drive different trajectories of radical innovation, as illustrated by their relative competitiveness in the ICT sector. The two dirigiste economies have undergone substantial institutional changes adapting to globalization but sustained state initiatives in coordinating their relationship-based innovation systems, reinforcing the cooperation among the state, academia and industry.